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A B S T R A C T  
 
Taciturn bills of rights and constitutions – texts that express concepts at high levels 
of abstraction or which do not provide much guidance in other ways – pose 
challenges for courts responsible for determining their meaning and applying them. 
This dissertation aims to identify the approach that might be taken by courts in 
Commonwealth jurisdictions with written constitutions. It argues that the starting 
point is the legislative intention underlying the text, and that the preferred 
conception of such an intention is moderate originalism. This requires ascertainment 
of the meaning the legislators imbued the text with through their choice of words at 
the time the constitution was enacted, but which recognizes that parts of the text may 
be interpreted dynamically where language connoting abstract moral principles has 
been employed. 
The dissertation distinguishes constitutional interpretation from constitu-
tional construction. Interpretation involves identifying the semantic content of a 
constitutional text, and to do so courts should consider the linguistic, purposive and 
applicative meanings of terms and provisions. Where interpreting the text does not 
yield any useful or complete legal rule, the court must engage in construction by 
applying legal principles and techniques such as the presumption in favour of 
generosity, the use of constitutional implications, and a proportionality analysis. 
Thus, any constitutional ‘silence’ is in fact not so silent after all, as it may be given 
voice by the court. 
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I N T R O D U C T I O N  
 
WHEN FORMER COLONIES of the British Empire gained their independence, most of 
them maintained a political system based on the Westminster model. There are 
naturally differences in such systems between Commonwealth nations. Some – often 
the larger ones such as Australia, Canada and Malaysia – have a federal system, 
while the political systems of smaller ones like New Zealand and Singapore are 
unitary. Some nations have a bicameral parliament, others possess a legislature with 
a single chamber. Notwithstanding these variances, as in the United Kingdom there 
is usually an overlap between the membership of the executive and the legislature. 
The prime minister and members of the cabinet are drawn from among the persons 
elected to parliament. Other ubiquitous features are the organization of members of 
parliament (MPs) into political parties, which ensure their members support the 
executive’s policies through the use of party whips and disciplinary sanctions; and 
the appointment as prime minister of a person commanding the confidence of a 
majority of MPs. Laws enacted by the parliament are usually initiated by the 
executive. 
However, one distinct break made with the United Kingdom in a large number 
of Commonwealth nations was the adoption of a written constitution, frequently 
incorporating a bill of rights. The implication is that the legislature is not sovereign 
in the British sense, since the judiciary has a legal duty to exercise United States-style 
judicial review and declare legislation that is inconsistent with the constitution to be 
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void and of no effect. Again, the power that a legislature possesses under such a 
written constitution varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, depending on factors 
such as the manner in which each constitution is drafted, the attitude taken by the 
court towards its role in constitutional adjudication, and – probably – political 
considerations. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1  for instance, 
provides in section 1 that the rights and freedoms set out in the Charter are “subject 
only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a 
free and democratic society”, which implies that rights and freedoms may be limited 
by laws enacted by the Parliament of Canada provided that the conditions specified 
in the section are respected. The Charter impresses on Canadian courts the 
responsibility of determining whether legislation is reasonable and justifiable in a 
free and democratic society. The reach of section 33 of the Charter is further – it 
empowers Parliament or a provincial legislature to expressly declare legislation to be 
operational despite inconsistency with certain Charter provisions.2
The Canadian position may be compared with the situation in Singapore and 
Malaysia, the constitutions of which are worded similarly due to their shared legal 
history. 3  Many of the provisions of the bills of rights of these two nations’ 
constitutions are subject to legislative restrictions that may be imposed on specified 
                                                   
1  Pt I of the Constitution Act, 1982, which is Sch B of the Canada Act 1982 (c 11) (UK). 
2  Namely, ss 2 and 7–15 of the Charter. Such a declaration ceases to have effect five years after 
coming into force, or on such earlier date as may be specified in the declaration, but may be extended: 
ss 33(3)–(5). On the use of the override procedure, see Peter W Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada 
(5th ed) (Scarborough, Ont: Thomson/Carswell, 2007), vol 2, at 165–167, [39.2]. 
3  The fundamental liberties in Pt II of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia extended to 
Singapore when the latter became a state of Malaysia in 1963. In 1965, when Singapore left the 
Federation of Malaysia and became an independent republic, its Parliament enacted the Republic of 
Singapore Independence Act 1965 (No 9 of 1965, 1985 Rev Ed), s 6(1) of which stated that the 
provisions of the Malaysian Constitution, apart from certain exceptions, “shall continue in force in 
Singapore subject to such modifications, adaptations and qualifications and exceptions as may be 
necessary to bring them into conformity with the independent status of Singapore upon separation 
from Malaysia”. These include most of the fundamental liberties in the Malaysian Constitution, which 
are now in Pt IV of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1999 Reprint). 
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grounds. For example, Article 14(1)(b) of the Singapore Constitution (in pari materia 
with Article 10(1)(b) of the Malaysian Constitution) states that “all citizens of 
Singapore have the right to assemble peaceably and without arms”. However, this is 
expressly subject to Article 14(2)(b) (Malaysia’s Article 10(2)(b)), which states that 
“Parliament may by law impose… on the rights conferred by clause (1)(b), such 
restrictions as it considers necessary or expedient in the interest of the security of 
Singapore or any part thereof or public order…”. This provision may be termed 
sparsely worded as it does not expressly mention that the restrictions imposed by 
Parliament on the right of assembly must be reasonable or justifiable in a democratic 
society. The phraseology led the High Court of Singapore to hold in a 2005 case that 
… there can be no questioning of whether the legislation is “reasonable”. The 
court’s sole task, when a constitutional challenge is advanced, is to ascertain 
whether an impugned law is within the purview of any of the permissible 
restrictions. … All that needs to be established is a nexus between the object of 
the impugned law and one of the permissible subjects stipulated in Art 14(2) 
of the Constitution.4
The Court took the view that the use of the phrase necessary or expedient in the 
Constitution “confers on Parliament an extremely wide discretionary power and 
remit that permits a multifarious and multifaceted approach towards achieving any 
of the purposes specified in Art 14(2) of the Constitution”.5 On the other hand, one 
year later a different approach was taken by the Malaysian Court of Appeal to Article 
10(2), the Court stating that it was necessary to read the word reasonable into the 
sub-clauses of that Article6 as the court “must not permit restrictions upon the rights 
conferred by art 10 that render those rights illusory”. 7  Thus, the Malaysian 
Parliament may only abridge the right to freedom of assembly in a proportionate 
                                                   
4  Chee Siok Chin v Minister for Home Affairs [2006] 1 SLR(R) 582 at 602, [49]. 
5  Id. 
6  Dr Mohd Nasir bin Hashim v Menteri Dalam Negeri Malaysia [2006] 6 MLJ 213 at 220, [9]. 
7  Id at 220, [11]. 
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manner and to the extent that the restrictions are reasonably necessary.8 The fact 
that the Singaporean and Malaysian courts have taken divergent approaches to 
essentially the same constitutional text is intriguing. It raises the issue of the 
approach that courts in Commonwealth jurisdictions with sparsely worded 
constitutions and bills of rights should take when called upon to interpret such texts, 
which this dissertation seeks to examine. 
Chapter One 9  of the dissertation justifies the methodology employed, 
explaining why referring to foreign jurisprudence is appropriate when determining 
what meaning should be given to constitutional provisions and how they should be 
applied. Chapter Two goes on to examine the roles played by the three branches of 
government – executive, legislature and judiciary – as regards interpreting bills of 
rights, and seeks to rationalize why it is correct to regard the judiciary as the 
‘ultimate interpreter’. In connection with this, Chapter Three looks at the doctrine of 
deference and the extent to which it should be applied by courts towards the political 
branches of government in judicial review involving bills of rights. 
The next three chapters attempt to identify the approach that Commonwealth 
courts may take towards determining the meaning of constitutional texts and 
applying them to specific scenarios. Chapter Four considers the concept of legislative 
intention, and argues that it requires a moderately originalist stance to be taken 
towards constitutional interpretation. The chapter also explains why moderate 
originalism permits judges to apply a dynamic interpretation to the meaning of the 
text in appropriate circumstances. These themes are expanded upon in Chapter Five, 
                                                   
8  Id at 220–221, [11]. 
9  An earlier version of this chapter was published as Jack Tsen-Ta Lee, “Interpreting Bills of 
Rights: The Value of a Comparative Approach”, (2007) 5 In’t J Const L 122–152. 
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which proposes a way of analysing how the ‘meaning’ of a certain constitutional term 
or provision should be understood and determined, relating it to the concepts of 
legislative intention and taking a purposive approach to interpretation. It also 
elaborates on how judges may interpret texts dynamically by employing the 
distinction between the connotation and denotation of terms, an approach applied by 
Australian courts.10 Finally, Chapter Six introduces constitutional construction, the 
idea that a court must apply legal principles external to the text when the semantic 
meaning of the text fails to provide sufficient guidance as to how a provision should 
be applied to a particular scenario. The chapter also discusses why a proportionality 
analysis is appropriate when determining whether a constitutional right is 
legitimately restricted by legislation. 
Overall, this dissertation submits that the judiciary should not be begrudged 
its responsibility of interpreting constitutional and bill of rights texts with a proper 
degree of flexibility in order to maximize the rights guaranteed to people. 
                                                   
10  Portions of this chapter have been published as Jack Tsen-Ta Lee, “The Text Through Time” 
(2010) 31 Stat L Rev 217–237. 
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IT IS GENERALLY FAIR TO SAY THAT it is a widespread practice for courts in common-law 
jurisdictions to refer in their judgments to legal material from other jurisdictions, 
particularly those with which they share a similar heritage. Yet, on closer 
examination, this assertion turns out to be rather an overstatement. It is no doubt 
true in so far as traditional common-law subjects such as contract and tort law are 
concerned, but less so for constitutional and human rights law. In fact, in certain 
jurisdictions, among them Malaysia, Singapore and the United States of America, 
                                                   
1  Rudolf von Jhering, Geist des römischen Rechts auf den verschiedenen Stufen seiner 
Entwicklung, Part I (9th ed) (Basel: B Schwabe, 1955) at 8f, cited in Konrad Zweigert & Hein Kötz, 
Introduction to Comparative Law (3rd rev ed) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998) (translated from the 
German by Tony Weir) at 17. 
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some quarters are decidedly sceptical about the legitimacy of consulting comparative 
materials in relation to the latter areas of law. In a speech given at the University of 
Chicago Law School in November 2005, the United States Attorney General Alberto 
Gonzales expressed concern over what he saw as the “growing tendency” by judges to 
interpret the Constitution by reference to foreign law, which might “undermine the 
long tradition of reverence that Americans have for the supreme law of the land”.2
This scepticism is rather curious, for it appears to be useful for a court to refer 
to foreign legal material – including cases, legislation and academic writings – for a 
number of reasons. For instance, a court may use comparative material to shed light 
on the effect that should be given to the text of a bill of rights in its own jurisdiction, 
especially where the point has not arisen in the local context or it is contended that 
previous interpretations are flawed. The use may be fairly superficial; for instance, 
the experiences of foreign jurisdictions, as indicative of certain international trends 
or trends among established democratic nations, may be cited to support or disavow 
a particular approach taken by the court. Alternatively, a court may identify a 
doctrine of foreign law and apply it in expressing the meaning of the text of a 
domestic bill of rights, with suitable modifications if necessary. In addition, a court 
may find foreign law of value not for its substantive content but for the general 
approach taken to the interpretive enterprise. This may enable it to better 
understand and explain its approach to interpreting its own bill of rights. 
                                                   
2  Alberto R Gonzales, Attorney General, “Prepared Remarks”, address at the University of 
Chicago Law School (9 November 2005) <http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/Attorney-General-
Foreign-Law-Speech> at 2. The transcript of the speech is also available from the website of the Office 
of the Attorney General, United States Department of Justice at <http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/ 
speeches/2005/ag_ speech_0511092.html> (both websites accessed 22 January 2006). 
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This chapter examines why the use of comparative material for these purposes 
has been criticized as illegitimate. Specifically, four main concerns are dealt with. 
The first is one based on the texts of bills of rights. Under this heading we will 
consider whether a court is justified in declining to consider comparative material on 
the ground that the text of a foreign bill of rights differs from that of the domestic 
charter. This concern has particularly held sway in the Commonwealth republics of 
Malaysia and Singapore. On the other hand, in the United States the principal 
concern appears to be that since a bill of rights reflects the identity and values of the 
nation, it is inappropriate to look to the experience of other countries. We will 
examine that concern, as well as two other concerns based on varying domestic 
conditions in different jurisdictions and the practicality of referring to foreign law. It 
is concluded that there are, in fact, sound justifications for courts taking a 
comparative approach to the interpretation of bills of rights. 
I. CONCERN BASED ON THE TEXT: THE ‘FOUR WALLS’ DOCTRINE 
In 1963, the Chief Justice of the Federation of Malaya stated in Government of the 
State of Kelantan v Government of the Federation of Malaya that the Malayan 
Federal Constitution was “primarily to be interpreted within its own four walls and 
not in light of the analogies drawn from other countries such as Great Britain, the 
United States of America or Australia”. 3  This statement appeared in a short 
judgment delivered on the eve of the coming into force of the Malaysia Act 1963 
(UK)4 which, as the history books tell us, resulted in the merger of the Federation of 
Malaya and the British colonies of North Borneo (Sabah), Sarawak and Singapore to 
                                                   
3  [1963] MLJ 355 at 358, HC (Malaysia). 
4  1963 c 35. 
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form a new Federation of Malaysia and, thus, the independence of the colonies from 
Great Britain. The case was the result of an attempt by the State of Kelantan, then a 
member of the Federation of Malaya, to block the merger and thus the formation of 
Malaysia. 
In these circumstances of urgency, Thomson CJ can perhaps be forgiven for 
neither describing the analogies from foreign jurisdictions that he declined to apply 
to the Malayan Constitution, nor explaining clearly what he meant by an 
interpretation within the four walls of a constitution. However, in support of his 
statement, he referred to Adegbenro v Akintola, 5  a judgment of the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council on appeal from the Supreme Court of Nigeria which 
had been rendered less than three months earlier. There, Viscount Radcliffe, 
delivering their Lordships’ judgment, said:6
[T]he Constitution of Western Nigeria is now contained in a written 
instrument in which it has been sought to formulate with precision the powers 
and duties of the various agencies that it holds in balance. That instrument 
now stands in its own right; and, while it may well be useful on occasions to 
draw on British practice or doctrine in interpreting a doubtful phrase whose 
origin can be traced or to study decisions on the Constitutions of Australia or 
the United States where federal issues are involved, it is in the end the 
wording of the Constitution itself that is to be interpreted and applied, and 
this wording can never be overridden by the extraneous principles of other 
Constitutions which are not explicitly incorporated in the formulae that have 
been chosen as the frame of this Constitution. 
If Thomas CJ’s statement was to be understood in the light of Adegbenro v Akintola, 
then Government of the State of Kelantan stands for the proposition that foreign 
principles of law should not be applied if they cannot be accommodated by the 
constitutional text. The rule ensures that the text is not ignored. 
                                                   
5  [1963] AC 614, PC (on appeal from Nigeria). 
6  Id at 631–632. 
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Although the ‘four walls’ theory or doctrine (as it has been termed by 
academics)7 has been applied repeatedly by the courts of Malaysia8 and Singapore, it 
does not appear to have been understood in the manner suggested above. As regards 
Singapore, the doctrine was reiterated by the Privy Council almost 20 years after 
Government of the State of Kelantan in Ong Ah Chuan v Public Prosecutor,9 a 
decision on appeal from Singapore rendered when the Privy Council was still the 
Republic’s court of final resort. In that case it was submitted on the appellant’s behalf 
that a rebuttable presumption created by the Misuse of Drugs Act 1973 conflicted 
with the ‘presumption of innocence’ which was a fundamental human right protected 
by Articles 9(1) and 12(1) of the Singapore Constitution.10 Article 9(1) prohibits the 
deprivation of life or personal liberty save in accordance with law, while Article 12(1) 
guarantees all persons equality before the law and equal protection of the law. Lord 
Diplock, in delivering the judgment of the court that dismissed the appeal, expressed 
the view that the two Articles differed considerably in their language from the 
corresponding provisions of the Indian Constitution in that the former were much 
less detailed. Articles 9(1) and 12(1) differed even more widely from the Bill of Rights 
in the United States Constitution. Thus: 
[i]n view of these differences their Lordships are of opinion that decisions of 
Indian Courts on Pt III of the Indian Constitution should be approached with 
                                                   
7  Thio Li-ann, “The Secular Trumps the Sacred: Constitutional Issues Arising from Colin Chan 
v Public Prosecutor” (1995) 16 Sing L Rev 26 at 62; Thio Li-ann, “Recent Constitutional Developments: 
Of Shadows and Whips, Race, Rifts and Rights, Terror and Tudungs, Women and Wrongs” [2002] 
Sing J Legal Studies 328 at 347; Victor V Ramraj, “Comparative Constitutional Law in Singapore” 
(2002) 6 Sing J Int’l Comp L 302; Thio Li-ann, “‘Pragmatism and Realism Do Not Mean Abdication’: 
A Critical and Empirical Inquiry into Singapore’s Engagement with International Human Rights Law” 
(2004) 8 Sing YB Int’l L 41 at 59. 
8  Loh Kooi Choon v Government of Malaysia [1977] 2 MLJ 187, FC (Malaysia); Phang Chin 
Hock v Public Prosecutor [1980] 1 MLJ 70, FC (Malaysia); Public Prosecutor v Pung Chen Choon 
[1994] 1 MLJ 566, SC (Malaysia). See also Public Prosecutor v Ooi Kee Saik [1971] 2 MLJ 108, HC 
(Malaysia). 
9  [1981] AC 648, [1979–1980] SLR(R) 710, PC (on appeal from Singapore). 
10  Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1999 Reprint). 
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caution as guides to the interpretation of individual articles in Pt IV of the 
Singapore Constitution; and that decisions of the Supreme Court of the 
United States on that country’s Bill of Rights, whose phraseology is now 
nearly two hundred years old, are of little help in construing provisions of the 
Constitution of Singapore or other modern Commonwealth constitutions 
which follow broadly the Westminster model.11
Following this lead, the four walls doctrine has been applied in various 
Singapore cases. In Attorney-General v Wain (No 1)12 the respondents, who were 
facing an action for contempt by scandalizing the court after the publication of a 
news article in the Asian Wall Street Journal, sought to rely on decisions from 
Canada and other Commonwealth jurisdictions discussing freedom of speech. The 
judge held that the Canadian decisions were not useful authorities “for they are 
decisions based on the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms which has no 
parallel in Singapore”.13 As regards the cases from other parts of the Commonwealth, 
the judge said that:  
though they make interesting reading, I find that so many of them turn on 
their own facts. As is to be expected, the judges in making their decisions in 
those cases were concerned with the social, political, industrial and other 
economic conditions prevailing in their respective societies at the particular 
time. It is therefore difficult to reconcile or to rationalize the many different 
and conflicting views expressed by the judges in their decision-making 
process. At best the cases only serve as illustrations of the application of the 
law of contempt in those countries.14
In Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v Lee Kuan Yew,15 a defamation case, the 
appellant invited the court to consider provisions in bills of rights guaranteeing 
freedom of speech in jurisdictions such as Canada, India and the United States of 
America, as well as Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. He 
submitted that Article 14(1) of the Singapore Constitution, which protects freedom of 
                                                   
11  [1981] AC at 669, [1979–1980] SLR at 721, [22]. 
12  [1991] 1 SLR(R) 85, HC (Singapore). 
13  Id at 96, [35]. 
14  Id at 96, [36]. 
15  [1992] 1 SLR(R) 791, CA (Singapore). 
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speech and expression, required defamation law to be modified such that the defence 
of qualified privilege attached to the publication of statements defamatory of public 
officials or candidates for a public office relating to their official conduct or the 
performance of their public duties made by those who had an honest and legitimate 
interest in the matter to those who had a corresponding and legitimate interest, 
whether as electors or as citizens potentially affected by the conduct of public 
officials. Two leading cases – the decision of the United States Supreme Court in 
New York Times Co v Sullivan16 and that of the European Court of Human Rights in 
Lingens v Austria17 – were heavily relied upon. The Court of Appeal declined to 
consider this submission, holding that the terms of Article 14 differed materially 
from the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and 
from Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights.18
Singapore courts continued to apply the four walls doctrine even after appeals 
to the Privy Council were completely abolished with effect from 8 April 199419 and 
the Court of Appeal became Singapore’ final appellate court. Chan Hiang Leng Colin 
v Public Prosecutor20 concerned orders by the Minister for Home Affairs banning as 
undesirable all publications of the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society, which 
produced materials for Jehovah’s Witnesses. The case involved a challenge to the 
validity of these orders on the ground that they were contrary to the freedom of 
religion protected by Article 15 of the Singapore Constitution. In response to an 
                                                   
16  376 US 254 (1964). 
17  (1986) 8 EHRR 407. 
18  Above, n 15 at 815–816, [56]. 
19  With the enactment of the Judicial Committee (Repeal) Act 1994 (No 2 of 1994) (Singapore). 
20  [1994] 3 SLR(R) 209, HC (Singapore). 
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argument by the appellants’ counsel based on the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, Yong Pung How CJ referred to the four walls doctrine and said:21
There is a fundamental difference between the right to freedom of religion 
under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and art 15. The 
American provision consists of an ‘establishment clause’ which proscribes any 
preference for a particular religion (Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion) and a ‘free exercise clause’ which is based on the 
principle of governmental non-interference with religion (Congress shall 
make no law prohibiting the free exercise thereof). Significantly, the 
Singapore Constitution does not prohibit the ‘establishment’ of any religion. 
The social conditions in Singapore are, of course, markedly different from 
those in the United States. On this basis alone, I am not influenced by the 
various views as enunciated in the American cases cited to me but instead 
must restrict my analysis of the issues here with reference to the local context. 
Chan Hiang Leng Colin’s invocation of the doctrine was followed in the 
unreported High Court decision of Peter Williams Nappalli v Institute of Technical 
Education,22 in which a teacher was dismissed for refusing on religious grounds to 
take the National Pledge or sing the National Anthem. One of the issues considered 
was the effect of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion on his 
contractual obligations. Referring to Chan Hiang Leng Colin, Tan Lee Meng J 
affirmed the four walls doctrine and noted that there were “differences between the 
American position and the Singapore Constitution and that social conditions in 
Singapore are markedly different from those in the United States”.23 On appeal, the 
doctrine was once again cited with approval by the Court of Appeal.24
Two features of the above decisions warrant mention. First, there is a 
tendency for foreign case law to be dismissed as irrelevant under the rubric of the 
four walls doctrine on the basis of differences in wording between the foreign bill of 
                                                   
21  Id at 231–232, [53]. 
22  [1998] SGHC 351 at [40]–[42], HC. The four walls doctrine was also cited with approval in 
Taw Cheng Kong v Public Prosecutor [1998] 1 SLR(R) 78 at 107–108, [78], HC (Singapore). 
23  Nappalli, id at [42]. 
24  Nappalli Peter Williams v Institute of Technical Education [1999] 2 SLR(R) 529 at 535, [19], 
CA (Singapore). 
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rights and the domestic constitution. Second, this dismissal is often buttressed by a 
declaration that the foreign law is inapplicable locally because conditions (economic, 
political, social or otherwise) in the two jurisdictions differ. If, as has been 
submitted, 25  the four walls doctrine is essentially directed at preventing the 
constitutional text from being disregarded, the second feature is arguably an 
objection to foreign law that stands apart from the four walls doctrine. The point will 
therefore be considered in Part III of this chapter, while the rest of this section will 
examine the first feature. 
A. GENEALOGICAL INTERPRETATION 
The four walls doctrine may be applied without much difficulty where the text speaks 
unambiguously. In Adegbenro v Akintola26 for instance, the main issue arising was 
whether the Governor of the Western Region of Nigeria was entitled to dismiss the 
respondent as Premier following the receipt of a letter signed by 66 out of the 124 
members of the House of Assembly stating that they no longer supported the Premier, 
without any vote adverse to the respondent in the House. The Governor had 
purported to act pursuant to section 33 of the Constitution of Western Nigeria which 
read: “(10) ... the Ministers of the Government of the Region shall hold office during 
the Governor’s pleasure: Provided that — (a) the Governor shall not remove the 
Premier from office unless it appears to him that the Premier no longer commands 
the support of a majority of the members of the House of Assembly…” One of the 
arguments advanced by the respondent was that the Nigerian Constitutions were 
modelled on the constitutional doctrines of the United Kingdom, and, since the 
                                                   
25  Above, nn 5–8 and the accompanying text. 
26  Above, n 5. 
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British Sovereign would not be regarded as acting with constitutional propriety in 
dismissing a Prime Minister from office without an adverse vote in the House of 
Commons, so the Governor in Western Nigeria had to be similarly treated as 
precluded from exercising his power of removal in the absence of a vote of the same 
kind. The Privy Council declined to accept the argument, finding, inter alia, nothing 
in the general scheme or in specific provisions of the Constitution which stated that 
the Governor was legally precluded from forming his opinion upon the basis of 
anything but votes formally given on the floor of the House. 
On the other hand, as bills of rights often embody broad statements of 
principle, it is arguably inaccurate to declare that foreign law can shed no light on the 
text. For example, as we have seen, Article 9(1) of the Singapore Constitution 
provides that “[n]o person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty save in 
accordance with law”. The due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitutions state that no person shall be 
deprived of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”. Despite the 
differences in wording, can it be said that American cases on the due process clauses 
are of no help at all in elucidating the meaning of the terms “life” and “personal 
liberty” in the Singapore Constitution? A court would naturally have to satisfy itself 
that any foreign legal principles referred to are consonant with domestic 
constitutional doctrine, but with that caveat in mind it is reasonable to say that a 
mere difference in the phrasing of domestic and foreign bills of rights should not of 
itself disqualify foreign principles of law from being considered in the interpretation 
of the domestic bills of rights. In fact, Victor Ramraj terms the four walls doctrine 
“legal rhetoric” and observes that it is routinely disregarded by the Singapore courts 
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in practice.27 Using vocabulary developed by Sunit Choudhry,28 Ramraj notes that 
Singapore courts have used foreign case law in “genealogical interpretations” of the 
Constitution. This mode of interpretation holds that relationships of genealogy and 
history that tie constitutions together offer sufficient justification for the importation 
and application of entire areas of constitutional doctrine.29
In Singapore, for instance, it is common for courts to refer to Malaysian and 
Indian case law when interpreting the Constitution; the fundamental liberties in the 
Singapore Constitution were inherited from the Malaysian Constitution, and the 
Malaysian Constitution was itself inspired by the Indian Constitution. 30   As an 
example, it was held in Kok Hoong Tan Dennis v Public Prosecutor 31  that a 
legislative provision does not violate Article 12(1) of the Singapore Constitution, 
which provides that “[a]ll persons are equal before the law and entitled to the equal 
protection of the law”, if it passes the ‘rational nexus’ test. This test requires the 
classification employed by the provision to be founded on an intelligible differentia 
which distinguishes persons that are grouped together from others left out of the 
group, and the differentia to have a rational relation to the object sought to be 
achieved by the law in question; in other words, there must be a nexus between the 
basis of classification and the object of the law in question.32 The rational nexus test 
was adopted from the decision of the Malaysian Federal Court of Criminal Appeal in 
Datuk Haji bin Harun Idris v Public Prosecutor,33 which itself followed the Indian 
                                                   
27  Ramraj, above, n 7 at 309–310. 
28  Sujit Choudhry, “Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative 
Constitutional Interpretation” (1999) 74 Ind LJ 819. 
29  Choudhry, id at 838. 
30  Ramraj, above, n 7 at 311–313. 
31  [1996] 3 SLR(R) 570, HC. 
32  Id at 578–579, [34]. 
33  [1977] 2 MLJ 155, FC (Malaysia). 
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Supreme Court case of Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v Shri Justice S R Tendolkar.34 It 
is to be noted that the wording of Article 12(1) of the Singapore Constitution differs 
slightly from Article 14(1) of the Indian Constitution, which is phrased negatively: 
“The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal 
protection of the laws within the territory of India.” The minor variations in 
phraseology have not deterred the Singapore courts from adopting a useful 
interpretive approach from other jurisdictions. 
A genealogical interpretation appears to assume that if a local bill of rights 
was modelled upon a foreign bill of rights, the legislature must have intended foreign 
legal doctrines to be applicable to the local context as well. However, unless there is 
some evidence pointing to this conclusion such as reports of legislative debates, it is 
submitted that the assumption may not be justifiable. Rather, what a court should be 
asking itself is whether the concepts embodied in the text of a foreign bill of rights 
and the meanings that have been ascribed to the text are able to elucidate the content 
of corresponding provisions in the local bill of rights. 
B. DIALOGICAL INTERPRETATION 
The four walls doctrine has also not deterred Singapore courts from considering, 
both favourably and unfavourably, cases from jurisdictions other than Malaysia and 
India. In Peter Williams Nappalli before the High Court,35 the judge, having referred 
to the doctrine with approval, went on to use foreign cases to buttress his argument, 
citing two American cases, a Sri Lankan case and an English case. On appeal, the 
Court of Appeal again invoked the four walls doctrine, then proceeded to consider 
                                                   
34  AIR 1958 SC 538, [1959] SCR 279 at 296–297, SC (India). 
35  Above, n 22. 
 The Value of a Comparative Approach • 19 
Australian, Philippine, American, English and Canadian cases.36 Indeed, it appears 
that the four walls doctrine is sometimes used as a device to reject certain lines of 
foreign authority while accepting others. 
Ramraj points out 37  that this an eclectic use of foreign case law is what 
Choudhry calls a “dialogical interpretation” of a bill of rights.38 A court taking such 
an interpretive approach engages in dialogue with comparative jurisprudence in 
order to better understand its own constitutional system and jurisprudence.39 The 
court examines comparative case law and doctrine, not primarily to gain an accurate 
picture of the state of the law in the other jurisdiction, but rather to identify the 
assumptions that lie underneath it. The comparative jurisprudence serves as an 
“interpretive foil”: in the process of asking why foreign courts have reasoned a 
certain way, a court will surely ask itself why it reasons the way it does.40 Having 
identified the assumptions underlying the foreign law and its own law, the court is 
then faced with a set of interpretive choices. In cases of constitutional difference, if 
the court rejects foreign assumptions and affirms its own, the exercise has 
nonetheless heightened its awareness and understanding of constitutional difference 
which, in turn, will shape and guide constitutional interpretation. Conversely, in 
cases of constitutional similarity, if the similarity identified is embraced, dialogical 
interpretation grounds the legitimacy of importing comparative jurisprudence and 
applying it as law.41
                                                   
36  Id at 536–539, [23]–[33]. 
37  Ramraj, above, n 7 at 313–317. 
38  Choudhry, above, n 28 at 836. 
39  Id. 
40  Id at 857. 
41  Id at 858. 
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On the other hand, a court may reject shared assumptions in the foreign law 
and the law of its own jurisdiction and stake out a new interpretive approach 
proceeding from radically different premises, or determine cases of apparent 
constitutional difference to be unfounded. Thus, the process of dialogical 
interpretation “can lead the court to fundamentally re-assess its previous judgments, 
and to use comparative jurisprudence as a means to initiate radical legal change”.42 
Foreign constitutional jurisprudence is often considered by Singapore courts 
dialogically, only to be ultimately rejected.43 On the other hand, older lines of foreign 
authority that would not now be referred to in their own jurisdictions have been 
followed in preference to modern jurisprudence. In Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v 
Lee Kuan Yew,44 the Canadian case Tucker v Douglas45 was approved. As this case 
was decided before the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms came into force on 
17 April 1982, the court did not have to balance the public interest in protecting a 
person’s reputation against a constitutional guarantee of free speech.46 Similarly, in 
Chan Hiang Leng Colin,47 the Singapore High Court, after invoking the four walls 
doctrine, referred with approval to Adelaide Co of Jehovah’s Witnesses Inc v 
Commonwealth,48 an Australian case decided during World War II.49 Ramraj admits 
it might be argued that such a selective use of foreign constitutional cases is 
objectionable because the local court is employing these cases in support of its own 
position by taking them out of their legal and historical context. However, he says 
                                                   
42  Id. 
43  Ramraj, above, n 7 at 314. 
44  Above, n 15. 
45  [1950] 2 DLR 827, CA (Saskatchewan, Canada). 
46  Thio Li-ann, “An ‘i’ for an ‘I’? Singapore’s Communitarian Model of Constitutional 
Adjudication” (1997) 27 HKLJ 152 at 183. 
47  Above, n 20. 
48  (1943) 67 CLR 116, HC (Australia). 
49  Ramraj, above, n 7 at 315. 
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this misses the point: the dialogical approach merely uses comparative case law 
“instrumentally, as a means to stimulate constitutional self-reflection”,50 and does 
not purport to make normative claims based on the cases.51
There is certainly something to be said for judges using foreign material as a 
source of inspiration when considering how bill of rights jurisprudence should be 
developed, and this is a point that I return to later in this chapter.52 Further, a key 
advantage of a dialogical approach is that it is unnecessary for the court to acquire a 
deeper understanding of the workings of a borrowed foreign legal doctrine and the 
role that it plays in the legal system from which it is derived. However, while in 
theory it is possible for a judge’s reference to comparative material to be solely for 
instrumental purposes, in many cases it will be hard to imagine that the judge is not 
really preferring one line of authority to another. For a judge to act in this way would 
be undesirable, particularly if he neither articulates why obsolete legal principles are 
being applied, nor provides convincing reasons why modern lines of authority have 
been rejected. A judgment that uses dialogical interpretation thus risks appearing to 
be arbitrary and illogical. 
 
In summary, it has been suggested that the four walls doctrine does not mandate a 
wholesale rejection of comparative constitutional material because jurisdictions such 
as Singapore and Malaysia, which have repeatedly affirmed the doctrine, have 
nonetheless made use of foreign law in genealogical and dialogical interpretations of 
their respective Constitutions, and these are legitimate interpretive approaches. In 
                                                   
50  Choudhry, above, n 28 at 892. 
51  Ramraj, above, n 7 at 315–316. 
52  See the discussion on cross-fertilization below at the text accompanying nn 104–105. 
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this connection, it is interesting to note that the Privy Council no longer takes the 
narrow interpretive approach that it applied in Ong Ah Chuan.53 The issue raised in 
Reyes v The Queen, 54  an appeal from Belize, was whether a mandatory death 
sentence imposed upon the appellant was constitutional. In holding that it was not, 
apart from its own past decisions and those of the courts of Belize, the Privy Council 
referred to cases from Australia, Canada, the European Court of Human Rights, 
Guyana, Jamaica, India, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 
Mauritius, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. 
However, both genealogical and dialogical interpretation suffer from 
weaknesses. Genealogical interpretation is legitimate provided there exists sufficient 
evidence that when the legislature adopted the words of a foreign bill of rights into a 
local statute it intended also to import the meanings given to those words through 
foreign judicial interpretation. Otherwise a more sensible approach is for the local 
court to assess whether comparative material, whether or not originating from an 
‘ancestral’ bill of rights, is capable of illuminating the meaning of the local bill of 
rights text. Dialogical interpretation appears to be notionally acceptable, but 
judgments that refer to foreign cases out of context may come across as irrational. It 
is submitted that the four walls doctrine should be properly understood as a rule 
aimed at ensuring that a foreign legal principle is not applied when it cannot be 
validly accommodated by the text of a bill of rights. The doctrine therefore does not 
altogether exclude the use of comparative constitutional material. If this view is 
accepted, the difficulties with the genealogical and dialogical interpretations 
discussed above do not undermine the point. 
                                                   
53  Above, n 9. 
54  [2002] 2 AC 235, PC (on appeal from Belize). 
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II. CONCERN BASED ON NATIONAL IDENTITY 
Scepticism has also been expressed regarding the use of comparative constitutional 
material on the basis of what Mark Tushnet calls “expressivism”, the idea that 
constitutions help constitute the nation, to varying degrees in different nations, 
offering to each nation’s people a way of understanding themselves as political 
beings.55 Because a constitution is seen as embodying the commitments that define a 
national identity, this is said to speak against constitutional borrowing.56
This was one of the main points made by US Attorney General in his address 
at the University of Chicago Law School. Mr Gonzales noted that the US Constitution 
was built upon the consent of the governed. When the Supreme Court held a law to 
be unconstitutional, it was vindicating the will of a sovereign people embodied in the 
written Constitution against the temporary expression of popular will manifested in 
the particular actions of a legislature. He therefore questioned how the standards of 
anyone other than the people of the US could legitimately be relevant to determining 
the will of the American people.57
The position is also exemplified by the views of Associate Justice Antonin 
Scalia in several United States Supreme Court decisions handed down in the past two 
decades. In Scalia J’s dissent in Thompson v Oklahoma58 as well as in a judgment on 
behalf of the majority in Stanford v Kentucky, 59  both cases dealing with the 
constitutionality of executing felons who were young adolescents at the time the 
                                                   
55  Mark Tushnet, “The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law” (1999) 108 Yale LJ 1225 
at 1228. 
56  Seth F Kreimer, “Invidious Comparisons: Some Cautionary Remarks on the Process of 
Constitutional Borrowing” (1999) 1 U Pa J Const L 640 at 648–649. 
57  Gonzales, above, n 2 at 19. 
58  487 US 815 (1988). 
59  492 US 361 (1989). 
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crimes were committed, 60  he objected emphatically to even the most formulaic 
references to legal rules in other Western democracies.61
The majority in Thompson held that executing a person less than 16 years of 
age at the time of the offence offended civilized standards of decency. It noted that 
this conclusion was consistent with the views of, inter alia, “other nations that share 
our Anglo-American heritage, and by leading members of the Western European 
community”.62 The same stance was taken in Brennan J’s dissenting judgment in 
Stanford.63 Scalia J expressed his disagreement with this approach in footnotes to 
his judgments in the two cases,64 calling it: 
totally inappropriate as a means of establishing the fundamental beliefs of this 
Nation. … We must never forget that it is a Constitution for the United States 
of America that we are expounding. The practices of other nations, 
particularly democracies, can be relevant to determining whether a practice 
uniform among our people is not merely a historical accident, but rather so 
“implicit in the context of ordered liberty” that it occupies a place not merely 
in our mores but, text permitting, in our Constitution as well. But where there 
is not first a settled consensus among our own people, the views of other 
nations, however enlightened the Justices of this Court may think them to be, 
cannot be imposed upon Americans through the Constitution.65
The 1997 case of Printz v United States66 involved the federal Brady Handgun 
Violence Prevention Act, the provisions of which required the Attorney-General to 
                                                   
60  In Thompson v Oklahoma, above, n 58, the Supreme Court held that statutes that permitted 
the imposition of capital punishment on a person under the age of 16 at the time when the offence was 
committed violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. Stanford v Kentucky, 
above, n 59, decided that such punishment was permissible if a person was over the age of 15 but 
under 18 at the relevant time. The latter decision was abrogated in Roper v Simmons 543 US 551 
(2005): below, n 70, and the accompanying text. 
61  Lorraine E Weinrib, “Constitutional Conceptions and Constitutional Comparativism” in Vicki 
C Jackson & Mark Tushnet (eds), Defining the Field of Comparative Constitutional Law (Westport, 
Conn; London: Praeger, 2002), 3 at 5. 
62  Thompson, above, n 58 at 830–831, pointing out that the United Kingdom, New Zealand and 
the Soviet Union did not permit the execution of juveniles; that the death penalty had been abolished 
entirely in Australia (except for New South Wales), West Germany, France, Portugal, the Netherlands 
and all Scandinavian countries; and that it was available only for exceptional crimes such as treason in 
Canada, Italy, Spain, Switzerland and in New South Wales in Australia. 
63  Stanford, above, n 59 at 389. Brennan J’s dissent was joined by Marshall, Blackmun and 
Stevens JJ. 
64  Thompson, above, n 58 at 868 n 4; Stanford, above, n 59 at 369 n 1. 
65  Thompson and Stanford, id. 
66  521 US 898 (1997). 
 The Value of a Comparative Approach • 25 
establish a national system for instantly checking the backgrounds of prospective 
handgun purchasers, and to command the chief law enforcement officer of each local 
jurisdiction to conduct such checks and perform related tasks on an interim basis 
until the national system became operative. The petitioners, who were the chief law 
enforcement officers for counties in Montana and Arizona, challenged the 
constitutionality of the interim provisions on the ground that congressional action 
could not compel state officers to execute federal laws. This submission was accepted 
by a plurality of the Supreme Court. 
In a dissenting opinion, Breyer J found support for his opposing view in the 
fact that the United States was not the only nation that sought to reconcile the 
practical need for a central authority with the democratic virtues of more local 
control. He noted that the federal systems of Switzerland, Germany, and the 
European Union all provided that constituent states, not federal bureaucracies, 
would implement many of the laws, rules, regulations, or decrees enacted by the 
central ‘federal’ body.67 He remarked: 
Of course, we are interpreting our own Constitution, not those of other 
nations, and there may be relevant political and structural differences 
between their systems and our own. … But their experience may nonetheless 
cast an empirical light on the consequences of different solutions to a 
common legal problem…68
Unconvinced, Scalia J, writing the plurality opinion, responded that “such 
comparative analysis [is] inappropriate to the task of interpreting a constitution, 
though it was of course quite relevant to the task of writing one. … The fact is that our 
                                                   
67  Printz, id at 976 (Stevens J joining). 
68  Id at 977. 
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federalism is not Europe’s. It is ‘the unique contribution of the Framers to political 
science and political theory.’ ”69
The Supreme Court returned to the constitutionality of imposing capital 
punishment on juveniles in Roper v Simmons.70 It will be recalled that Stanford v 
Kentucky71 had held that such punishment was permissible if a person was over the 
age of 15 but under 18 at the time of committing the offence. This time, however, a 
majority of the Court found that standards of decency had evolved since Stanford; 
therefore, the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution now forbade 
the imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 at the 
relevant time. For the majority, the fact that the death penalty was disproportionate 
for juvenile offenders was confirmed by a stark reality: that the United States was the 
only country in the world that continued to give official sanction to the juvenile death 
penalty. This reality did not provide a definitive answer, though, for the task of 
interpreting the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and unusual 
punishments” remained the responsibility of the Court. However, the Court had on 
previous occasions referred to the laws of other countries and to international 
authorities as instructive for its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. The United 
Kingdom’s experience was of particular relevance in light of the historic ties between 
the two countries and the Eighth Amendment’s origins in the English Declaration of 
Rights of 1689 which provided: “[E]xcessive Bail ought not to be required nor 
excessive Fines imposed; nor cruel and unusual Punishments inflicted.” 72  The 
majority concluded: “It does not lessen our fidelity to the Constitution or our pride in 
                                                   
69  Id at 921 n 11, citing United States v Lopez 514 US 549 at 575 (1995). 
70  Above, n 60. 
71  Above, n 59. 
72  1 W & M, c 2, s 10: Roper, above, n 60 at 577. 
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its origins to acknowledge that the express affirmation of certain fundamental rights 
by other nations and peoples simply underscores the centrality of those same rights 
within our own heritage of freedom.”73
O’Connor J echoed these sentiments in her dissenting opinion: 
[T]his Nation’s evolving understanding of human dignity certainly is neither 
wholly isolated from, nor inherently at odds with, the values prevailing in 
other countries. On the contrary, we should not be surprised to find 
congruence between domestic and international values, especially where the 
international community has reached clear agreement – expressed in 
international law or in the domestic laws of individual countries – that a 
particular form of punishment is inconsistent with fundamental human rights. 
At least, the existence of an international consensus of this nature can serve to 
confirm the reasonableness of a consonant and genuine American 
consensus.74
Not surprisingly, Scalia J took exception to the reference to foreign and 
international legal materials. In his opinion, the majority’s basic premise – that 
American law should conform to the laws of the rest of the world – ought to be 
rejected out of hand. He noted that in many significant respects the laws of most 
other countries differed from American law. This included not only explicit 
provisions of the Constitution, but even many interpretations of the Constitution 
prescribed by the Supreme Court itself. 75  The Court had to either profess its 
willingness to reconsider all these matters in light of the views of foreigners, or else it 
                                                   
73  Roper, id at 578. 
74  Id at 605. However, as she did not believe that a genuine national consensus against the 
juvenile death penalty had yet developed, and because she did not believe that the majority’s moral 
proportionality argument justified a categorical, age-based constitutional rule, she was of the view that 
the international consensus described by the majority could not be regarded as confirmation of the 
Court’s decision: id at 604. 
75  Id at 624. Scalia J found the majority’s particular reliance on the laws of the United Kingdom 
“perhaps the most indefensible part of its opinion”. Taking a characteristically originalist viewpoint, 
he said it was true that the United States shared a common history with the United Kingdom, and that 
the Court often consulted English sources when asked to discern the meaning of a constitutional text 
written against the backdrop of 18th-century English law and legal thought. If the majority had 
applied that approach, it would have found that the “cruel and unusual punishments” provision of the 
English Declaration of Rights was originally meant to describe those punishments that were not 
authorized by common law or statute, but that were nonetheless administered by the Crown or the 
Crown’s judges. Under that reasoning, the death penalty for under-18 offenders would have easily 
survived the present challenge: id at 626–627. 
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ought to cease putting forth foreigners’ views as part of the reasoned basis of its 
decisions. “To invoke alien law when it agrees with one’s own thinking, and ignore it 
otherwise, is not reasoned decisionmaking, but sophistry.”76  In his view the majority 
had relied on foreign sources, not to underscore the Court’s “fidelity” to the 
Constitution, its “pride in its origins” and its “own [American] heritage”, but to set 
aside the centuries-old American practice – one still engaged in by a large majority of 
the states – of letting a jury decide whether, in the particular case, youth should be 
the basis for withholding the death penalty.77
It needs to be appreciated that in determining whether a particular form of 
punishment is “cruel and unusual” under the Eighth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution, the Supreme Court has stated that it must consider whether 
there is a national consensus that laws allowing such punishment contravene modern 
standards of decency in the country.78 This may explain to some extent why Scalia J 
vehemently opposed references to foreign and international laws in the juvenile 
death penalty cases: he believed that foreign laws could have no bearing on the 
beliefs and practices of the United States. 79  But this does not explain his 
parochialism and opposition to comparative material in Printz, which was not an 
Eighth Amendment case. 
                                                   
76  Id at 627. See also id at 628: “… I do not believe that approval by ‘other nations and peoples’ 
should buttress our commitment to American principles any more than (what should logically follow) 
disapproval by ‘other nations and peoples’ should weaken that commitment.” Eclecticism towards 
foreign law may not objectionable if one appreciates the distinction between legal transplants and 
cross-fertilization; this point is discussed in Part III, below. 
77  Id at 628. 
78  Id at 608–609 per Scalia J (dissenting), citing Trop v Dulles 356 US 86 at 101, 78 S Ct 590 
(1958). 
79  Vicki Jackson, however, notes that foreign and international law have been referred to in 
interpreting the Eighth Amendment since the 19th century: Jackson, “Constitutional Comparisons: 
Convergence, Resistance, Engagement” (2005) 119 Harv L Rev 109 at 109, citing Wilkerson v Utah 99 
US 130 at 134 (1879) (sentence of death by shooting in the Utah Territory constitutional, partly 
because “[c]orresponding rules [that] prevail in other countries” supported the practice); see also the 
cases cited id at n 4. 
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Tushnet 80  is of the view that expressivism and the use of comparative 
constitutional material are not inconsistent, because judges of wide learning – 
whether in comparative constitutional law, in the classics of literature, in economics, 
or in many other fields – may see things about their own society that judges with a 
narrower vision miss. Having seen their society from this broader perspective, such 
judges might then use standard methods of constitutional interpretation such as 
reliance on text, structure, history or democratic theory to reach results that their 
colleagues would not have reached. Hence, comparative constitutional law operates 
in the way that a general liberal education does. If judges are entitled to rely on what 
they take from great works of literature as they interpret the Constitution, they 
should be entitled to rely on comparative constitutional law as well.81
More importantly, expressivism does not preclude the existence of 
constitutional norms that transcend national boundaries. In fact, it is apt to see 
domestic bills of rights as embodying such universally-shared norms. Lorraine 
Weinrib believes a nation-centric approach to constitutional interpretation to be 
incorrect. She sees in the rights-protecting instruments adopted in the aftermath of 
World War II a shared constitutional conception that, by design, transcends the 
history, cultural heritage and social mores of any particular nation-state. The shared 
conceptual foundation of these instruments is to secure democratic government, the 
                                                   
80  Tushnet, above, n 55. 
81  Id at 1236–1237. See also Jackson, above, n 79 at 116–117 (if more than one interpretation of 
the Constitution is plausible from domestic legal sources, approaches taken in other countries may 
provide helpful empirical information in deciding what interpretation will work best; further, 
comparisons can shed light on the distinctive functioning of the domestic legal system); Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, Associate Justice of the US Supreme Court, “‘A Decent Respect of the Opinions of 
[Human]kind’: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication” (2005) 64(3) 
Cam LJ 575 at 580 and 584 (foreign opinions not authoritative, but “add to the store of knowledge 
relevant to the solution of trying questions”, and since judges are free to consult other forms of legal 
commentary such as restatements of law, treatises and law reviews, there should be no objection to 
them considering the analysis of a question contained in a foreign case as well). 
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rule of law, and protection for equal human dignity. They require all states to treat 
each person over whom they hold power as an end, not a means, and to respect his or 
her full and equal humanity and opportunity for self-fulfilment.82 Therefore, she 
advocates that a constitution should not be interpreted to prioritize national 
consensus, but rather in the light of the shared conceptual foundation. Naturally, this 
approach embraces the use of comparative material. 
Weinrib’s view fits in with Choudhry’s “universalist interpretation” of a 
constitution. The latter, however, does not identify any specific shared conceptual 
foundations. As Ramraj explains, a universalist interpretation involves an 
assumption that there exist constitutional norms which transcend jurisdictions; thus, 
the interpretation and articulation of these norms by one particular constitutional 
court can be drawn on by any other constitutional court.83 It is very difficult to argue 
that there is no intersection of constitutional values across jurisdictions at all, and a 
minimal intersection is enough to justify the claim that a universalist approach to 
comparative constitutional jurisprudence is at least sometimes warranted. Once it is 
acknowledged that there are at least some constitutional norms that transcend 
jurisdictions, this justifies a court in looking to foreign constitutional cases for 
assistance in understanding them. 84  In addition, if the potential existence of 
transcendent constitutional norms is accepted, a court is justified in looking to 
                                                   
82  Weinrib, above, n 61 at 15. See also Jackson, above, n 79 at 118 (individual rights embedded in 
national constitutions have ‘universal’ aspects, and foreign or international legal sources may 
illuminate these ‘suprapositive’ dimensions of constitutional rights, as when constitutional text or 
doctrine requires contemporary judgments about a quality of action or freedom, such as the 
‘reasonableness’ of a search or the ‘cruelty’ of a punishment). 
83  Ramraj, above, n 7 at 304. 
84  Id at 325–326. 
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comparative material to search for them, whether or not such norms are ultimately 
uncovered.85
Although expressivism and universalism are not mutually inconsistent, they 
appear to pull in opposite directions. However, it is submitted that a balance between 
them can be struck. This is well illustrated by jurisprudence of the South African 
Constitutional Court. On 27 April 1994, the interim Constitution86 of post-apartheid 
South Africa, which enshrined a non-racial, multiparty democracy based on respect 
for universal rights, came into force. Section 35(1) of chapter 3 of the interim 
Constitution stated: “In interpreting the provisions of this Chapter a court of law 
shall promote the values which underlie an open and democratic society based on 
freedom and equality and shall, where applicable, have regard to public international 
law applicable to the protection of the rights entrenched in this Chapter, and may 
have regard to comparable foreign case law.”87
Thereafter, following extensive discussions and public consultations by the 
Constitutional Assembly, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 199688 was 
adopted and took effect 89  on 4 February 1997. Section 39 of chapter 2 of the 
Constitution is in terms similar to section 35(1) of the interim Constitution. It reads: 
When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum — 
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality and freedom; 
(b) must consider international law; and 
                                                   
85  Id at 329. 
86  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1993 (Act 200 of 1993). 
87  Hoyt Webb, “The Constitutional Court of South Africa: Rights Interpretation and 
Comparative Constitutional Law” (1998) 1 U Pa J Const L 205 at 206–207. 
88  Act 108 of 1996. 
89  Except for one provision relating to the election of chairpersons to municipal councils: 
Proclamation No R 6, 1997. 
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(c) may consider foreign law.90
Hoyt Webb has theorized that South African courts, tribunals and fora, which 
includes the Constitutional Court, were specifically enjoined to consider 
international law and permitted to consider foreign law when interpreting the 
Constitution’s bill of rights because: 
reference to external jurisprudence from “open and democratic” societies 
offered an appropriate method for assuring the public that the “Fundamental 
Rights” described in the [interim and final] Constitutions would be reasonably 
protected from future interpretational mischief or bigotry. 
… 
Given the uniquely terrible history of apartheid under which South Africa’s 
legal and administrative systems were established to enforce and maintain the 
segregation, marginalization and minimization of the majority of South 
Africans of color, the framers of the IC [interim Constitution] wisely ensured 
that the standards applied to the construction of the post-apartheid legal 
system were not drawn from the same well, but from purer waters.91
The operation of section 35(1) of the interim Constitution is exemplified by the 
decision of the Constitutional Court in State v Makwanyane,92 which abolished the 
death penalty in South Africa. For instance, at several points in the lengthy decision, 
international and foreign comparative jurisprudence was examined. Nonetheless, the 
Court was careful to underline the fact that foreign legal principles should not be 
applied blindly. As the then Chief Justice Arthur Chaskalson, who delivered the 
leading judgment, put it: “Although we are told by section 35(1) that we ‘may’ have 
regard to foreign case law, it is important to appreciate that this will not necessarily 
offer a safe guide to the interpretation of Chapter 3 of our Constitution.”93
For instance, in assessing whether the death penalty violated section 11(2) of 
the interim Constitution, which provided that “[n]o person shall be subject to torture 
                                                   
90  Webb, above, n 87 at 206–207. 
91  Id at 208 and 219. 
92  1995 (3) SA 391, Const Ct (S Africa). 
93  Id at 414. 
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of any kind, whether physical, mental or emotional, nor shall any person be subject 
to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”, Chaskalson CJ considered 
cases on the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution 
which prohibit the imposition of cruel and unusual punishments. He noted that 
because this Constitution contemplates the existence of capital punishment,94 the 
Supreme Court of the United States had taken the position that capital punishment 
per se was not unconstitutional but the penalty could be arbitrary in certain 
circumstances and thus unconstitutional. Difficulties with this approach experienced 
in the United States persuaded him that South Africa should not follow the same 
route.95 Further, the different language used in the interim Constitution and the 
United States Constitution merited that each Constitution receive a different 
analysis.96 Nonetheless, elements of the United States Supreme Court’s analysis of 
the issues, especially as they related to the impropriety of arbitrariness and 
inequality in the imposition of the punishment, were informative to the analysis of 
relevant provisions of the interim Constitution.97 In the end, Chaskalson CJ was 
satisfied that in the context of the interim Constitution the death penalty was cruel, 
inhuman and degrading punishment and thus violated section 11(2).98
In Makwanyane, therefore, one of the main issues faced by the South African 
Constitutional Court required it to consider, among other things, what cruel, 
                                                   
94  The Fifth Amendment states that “[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury…” and “nor shall 
any person… be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.” 
95  Makwanyane, above, n 92 at 422. 
96  Unlike the South African interim Constitution, the United States Constitution does not have a 
limitations clause, thus forcing courts to find limits to constitutional rights through a narrow 
interpretation of the rights themselves: Makwanyane, id at 435. On the limitations clause in the 
South African interim Constitution, see below, nn 108-112, and the accompanying text. 
97  Id at 417–421. See Webb, above, n 87 at 238–240. 
98  Makwanyane, id at 433–434. 
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inhuman and degrading punishment is. This consideration may be regarded as a 
transcendental constitutional norm that the Court elucidated by examining 
comparative legal material. Aware that its decision had to be consonant with the 
terms of the Constitution, it did not apply foreign or international legal principles 
unthinkingly but used them to inform the constitutional law of South Africa and, 
eventually, developed its own legal principles. It is submitted that, in this way, the 
Court demonstrated how expressivism and universalism may be successfully 
balanced. 
To recapitulate, accepting an expressivist view of a constitution or a bill of 
rights does not require a judge to refrain from referring to comparative material, for 
such material may in fact assist him to better understand the national identity of his 
country. More significantly, a domestic bill of rights is appropriately viewed as 
encapsulating transcendental constitutional norms. That being the case, it should be 
permissible to use comparative material to seek out such norms, and if they are 
identified, to comprehend them. In referring to comparative material, judges must be 
alive to ensuring that such material is consistent with the text of the domestic bill of 
rights. 
III. CONCERN FOR DIFFERING CONDITIONS 
We have seen that Singapore courts have on a number of occasions declined to 
consider comparative legal material on the basis that social or other conditions in 
Singapore and the foreign country differ. Unfortunately, there is often no explanation 
in the cases as to exactly how the conditions are different or why such differences are 
relevant. As Thio Li-ann has pointed out: “This perfunctory [waving] away of foreign 
cases on the basis of ‘we’re different’ is undesirable. A focused elaboration of the 
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different social conditions of these countries would aid in assessing their relevance to 
the matter at hand.”99
 Nonetheless, the underlying concern is valid. A key reason for referring to 
comparative material is a perception that there may be a certain constitutional 
doctrine or mode of analysis originating from a foreign jurisdiction that is suitable 
for domestic application. However, the comparative material may, in fact, not be 
appropriate if conditions between the domestic and foreign jurisdictions differ to the 
extent that a particular foreign doctrine might operate unpredictably or 
detrimentally. Seth Kreimer cautions that there may be a “problem of translation”: 
borrowing a foreign concept “yields no guarantee, or even likelihood, that the 
concept will mean the same thing to our courts that it does to its originators, or that 
the results reached in the [foreign] context will mirror the results the doctrine yields 
in its home arena, even if we were certain that those results were to be emulated.”100 
It is also risky to predict the way in which a legal doctrine will function in a new legal 
environment based on the way it functioned in its old one.101
Admittedly it is hard, if at all possible, to accurately predict how a foreign legal 
doctrine will fare if applied to the domestic context. However, our concern over 
comparability on the ground of differing conditions may be assuaged by considering 
a distinction drawn by John Bell between legal transplants and cross-fertilization.102 
Transplants involve the transposition of a doctrine from one legal system to 
                                                   
99  Thio, “An ‘i’ for an ‘I’?”, above, n 46 at 176, quoted in Ramraj, above, n 7 at 331. 
100  Kreimer, above, n 56 at 646–647. 
101  Id at 642. 
102  John Bell, “Mechanisms for Cross-Fertilisation of Administrative Law in Europe” in Jack 
Beatson & Takis Tridimas (eds), New Directions in European Public Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
1998) at 147. 
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another.103 There are doubts about the effectiveness of this process; about whether a 
foreign doctrine grafted on to a domestic legal system will take if it is incompatible 
with domestic circumstances.104 On the other hand: 
[c]ross-fertilisation implies a different, more indirect process. It implies that 
an external stimulus promotes an evolution within the receiving legal system. 
The evolution involves an internal adaptation by the receiving legal system in 
its own way. The new development is a distinctive but organic product of that 
system rather than a bolt-on.105
Alan Watson has expressed the opinion that if what is sought in a foreign 
system is an idea that can be transformed into part of the law of one’s own country, a 
systematic knowledge of the law or political structure of a donor system is not 
necessary. 106  In the same vein, the significance of differing social and other 
conditions between the foreign and domestic jurisdictions may be downplayed. 
Therefore, concerns regarding the operation of foreign legal doctrines in the 
domestic context may be addressed if such doctrines are not seen as potential 
material for wholesale transplantation, but rather for inspiring indigenous 
development in the domestic law. 
In the South African Constitutional Court’s decision of Makwanyane, 107  
consideration was given to whether the limitations clause in section 33 of the interim 
Constitution108 would operate to uphold the validity of the death penalty which had 
                                                   
103  Id at 147–148. 
104  See, eg, Alan Watson, “Legal Transplants and Law Reform” (1976) 92 LQR 79 at 81: “Without 
hesitation one can accept the proposition that a foreign legal rule will not easily be borrowed 
successfully if it does not fit into the domestic political context. The word ‘political’ is used… with a 
rather wide meaning, with reference not only to the structure of government and governmental 
institutions but also to powerful organised groups…” 
105  Bell, above, n 102 at 147–148. 
106  Watson, above, n 104 at 79. 
107  Above, n 92. 
108  Section 33(1) states: “The rights entrenched in this Chapter may be limited by law of general 
application, provided that such limitation — 
a. shall be permissible only to the extent that it is —  
i. reasonable; and  
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been found to violate the Constitution as being cruel, inhuman and degrading 
punishment. The Constitutional Court examined the interpretive techniques of the 
Supreme Court of Canada, the German Federal Constitutional Court and the 
European Court of Human Rights, finding that limitations analysis typically consists 
of some form of a balancing test by which the courts review the means and ends of 
the offending legislation.109 However, due to textual differences between the interim 
Constitution on the one hand and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and 
the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany on the other, the Court decided 
against directly adopting the tests used in those jurisdictions.110
As for the proportionality test used by the European Court of Human Rights, 
Chaskalson CJ found it an unsafe guide to the interpretation of section 33 because 
the European Court is obliged to accommodate the sovereignty of its member states 
through the “margin of appreciation” doctrine, under which national authorities are 
allowed by the European Court more discretion to contravene rights in areas 
concerning morals and social policy and less discretion where a law seeks to limit a 
right fundamental to democratic society or interferes with intimate aspects of private 
life. The South African Constitutional Court was under no such constraint.111 The 
Chief Justice then proceeded to articulate a new test, one that involved the weighing 
up of competing values, and ultimately an assessment based on proportionality that 
                                                                                                                                                              
ii. justifiable in an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality; and 
b. shall not negate the essential content of the right in question, and provided further that any 
limitation to —  
(aa) a right entrenched in section 10, 11, 12, 14 (1), 21, 25 or 30 (1) (d) or (e) or (2); or 
(bb) a right entrenched in section 15, 16, 17, 18, 23 or 24, in so far as such right relates to free 
and fair political activity, shall, in addition to being reasonable as required in paragraph 
(a) (i), also be necessary.” 
109  Makwanyane, above, n 92 at 436–439. 
110  Id at 438–439. 
111  Id. 
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required a consideration of the reasonableness and necessity for the limitation of 
constitutional rights.112
Besides the use of comparative material for purposes of legal cross-
fertilization, there is a point that follows from our consideration of transcendent 
constitutional norms. Ramraj indicates that the existence of local, empirical (for 
instance, social, economic or historical) conditions that affect the application of a 
general norm does not in itself present a challenge to comparative constitutional 
methodology or the universalist approach to foreign constitutional cases, if one 
accepts that at least some constitutional norms are transcendent.113 In his view, 
whatever the peculiarities of the local conditions, the courts are nevertheless free and, 
he would argue, duty-bound, to look elsewhere in search of transcendent 
constitutional principles to be applied in a particular case. In doing so, they might 
well realize that not all local conditions are as peculiar as they initially seem to be.114
In other words, the existence of differing social and other conditions in the 
domestic jurisdiction and foreign jurisdictions does not impair the use of 
comparative material for the purpose of seeking out transcendent constitutional 
norms. Once a particular norm is identified, if the local empirical conditions are so 
different that they warrant a departure from the common normative standard, then a 
duty lies on the court to show clearly what these conditions are and why they justify 
the departure. 115  Alternatively, it is justifiable to refer to comparative material 
eclectically in legal cross-fertilization, using it as a catalyst to promote an evolution of 
legal principles within the domestic legal system. 
                                                   
112  Id at 436. See Webb, above, n 87 at 241–243. 
113  Ramraj, above, n 7 at 329–331. 
114  Id at 331–332. 
115  Id at 331. 
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IV. PRACTICAL CONCERNS 
In addition to the concerns over principle that we have seen thus far, the 
consideration of foreign law in the interpretation of bills of rights can raise practical 
concerns. These were referred to by the US Attorney General in his November 2005 
speech. Mr Gonzales noted that the use of comparative legal materials presents “a 
problem of selection and at least the appearance of capriciousness”.116 In his view, if 
it is accepted that foreign law can properly be used in construing the Constitution, at 
a minimum it should be done in a way that comprehensively examines all relevant 
international sources. However, it may be impossible for even the most conscientious 
judge or lawyer to avoid being selective, or at least arbitrary, in the use of foreign 
law.117  Further, even assuming that the necessary sources of foreign law can be 
gathered and translated, it would be an even greater task to understand and evaluate 
them fully.118
Jeremy Waldron would disagree with Gonzales and, by means of his theory for 
the citation of foreign law in the interpretation of the US Constitution, push the 
boundaries a little further. In Waldron’s opinion, it is open to judges to have regard 
to the “ius gentium” – the law of nations – in a broad sense, which he defines as a set 
of legal principles that has established itself as a sort of consensus among judges, 
jurists, and lawmakers around the world, 119 “a body of law purporting to represent 
what various domestic legal systems share in the way of common answers to 
                                                   
116  Gonzales, above, n 2 at 10. 
117  Id. 
118  Id at 11–12. See also Ernest A Young, “Foreign Law and the Denominator Problem” (2005) 119 
Harv L Rev 148 at 165–166 (decision costs (time, effort, and expense involved in deciding cases in a 
particular way) and error costs (likelihood of making mistakes by pursuing a particular method) seem 
likely to be high for American courts dealing with foreign materials, given language and cultural 
barriers and most American lawyers’ lack of training in comparative analysis). 
119  Jeremy Waldron, “Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium” (2005) 119 Harv L Rev 129 at 
132. 
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common problems”.120 He draws an analogy with the world of medical science. If a 
new disease or epidemic appeared within the US, it would be ridiculous to say that to 
address the problem one should only turn to American science. On the contrary, US 
scientists would want to look abroad to see what scientific conclusions and strategies 
had emerged, had been tested, and had been mutually validated in the public health 
practices of other countries. Similarly, a constitutional law problem such as that 
posed by Roper v Simmons121 should be treated as one where the experiences of 
other legal systems in grappling with, untangling and resolving rival rights and 
claims are relevant.122
Waldron stresses that under his theory, the appeal to foreign law is not a 
piecemeal practice, which he regards as open to being discredited.123 Rather, the ius 
gentium represents a consensus similar to that in science, which is not merely an 
accumulation of authorities but a “dense network of checking and rechecking results, 
experimental duplication, credentialing, mutual elaboration, and building on one 
another’s work”.124 And since scientists are expected to consider findings they have 
reason to trust and not look to the work of suspect or disreputable laboratories, a ius 
gentium inquiry may similarly restrict itself to consensus among “civilized” or 
“freedom-loving” countries.125
It is respectfully submitted that in the first place Gonzales overstated the 
problem. The realities of legal and judicial practice mean that a selective approach to 
foreign legal materials is inevitable, but selectivity need not mean that the endeavour 
                                                   
120  Id at 133. 
121  Above, n 70. 
122  Waldron, above, n 119 at 144. 
123  Id. 
124  Id at 145. 
125  Id. 
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is entirely arbitrary. There is nothing wrong with lawyers and judges using skills and 
discernment honed by experience to select foreign laws that are likely to prove more 
useful to the interpretive enterprise. Factors relevant to the selection process might 
include, for instance, whether a foreign legal system and the domestic system share 
similar values such as a respect for democracy, and a concern for the rule of law and 
the protection of individuals’ fundamental liberties; 126  the degree of similarity 
between the issues faced by the two systems; and whether sufficient foreign legal 
materials are available in a language that the judge and the parties appearing before 
him are able to work with. It is to be expected that the foreign jurisdictions more 
likely to be chosen are those the courts of which have had more experience dealing 
with complex constitutional issues, rather than distant lands the laws of which are 
largely unknown. 
Waldron’s ius gentium theory limits the foreign laws that judges may consider 
to those that reflect a harmony of opinion among like-minded nations. Where such 
consensus can be found courts would certainly do well to take it into account. 
However, it is submitted that the discretion of judges should not be unduly restricted 
in this manner. As we have seen in Part III, there is value in a cross-fertilization of 
ideas, in judges gaining insights from other nations’ laws and using them to stimulate 
home-grown development in their own legal systems. To elaborate on Waldron’s 
public health analogy, it is advisable for scientists not to close their eyes to advances 
in other countries that have yet to be taken up generally by the medical community. 
                                                   
126  See, eg, Jackson, above, n 79 at 125–126 (“[P]ractices of countries with commitments to 
human rights, democracy, and the rule of law roughly comparable to ours [the US] are likely to have 
more positive persuasive value as to the empirical consequences of doctrinal rules, the legitimate 
justifications for government action, or the implications of basic constitutional commitments”). 
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By being part of the scientific vanguard rather than merely followers, they may find 
themselves playing a significant role in creating a new consensus. 
According judges a broad discretion to consider foreign laws may open them 
to the charge that the interpretive enterprise becomes, as Young puts it, “profoundly 
manipulable”.127 The fear appears to be that the range of comparative legal materials 
is so vast that if judges hunt around diligently enough they will be able to find 
support for whatever personal predilections they have. However, the objection rests 
on the assumption that there exists a precedent for every point of view under the sun 
– an assumption which, arguably, has not been proved. Besides, the onus would be 
on the judge to give sufficient reasons justifying why he is relying on a particular 
authority and why it should be accorded more weight than other local and foreign 
authorities that take a different point of view. 
Difficulties that judges and lawyers may have understanding comparative 
legal materials should not be exaggerated. As Young admits, the law engages virtually 
the full range of human activity, which means that courts must inevitably dabble in a 
wide range of disciplines in which they may lack training or expertise, for example, 
science and engineering in patent cases, and psychology in criminal cases. What may 
reasonably be insisted upon is that judges should be considerably more careful, 
articulate and thorough when they cite foreign law.128
                                                   
127  Young, above, n 118 at 167. See also Gonzales, above, n 2 at 12: “[I]t cannot be expected that 
the laws of all sovereign nations – or, perhaps, even all the courts of a single nation – will agree on a 
disputed point of constitutional law. The decisionmaker will then be left somehow to choose among 
them. And this, of course, may lead to… judicial activism, or unrestrained judicial discretion…” 
128  Id at 166. 
 The Value of a Comparative Approach • 43 
V. THE VALUE OF A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 
In this chapter we examined four concerns that have been raised against the use of 
comparative material to interpret bills of rights. The first concern is that the text of a 
bill of rights may be overridden if foreign legal principles are applied in the local 
context. The four walls doctrine reflects this concern. However, the doctrine makes 
little sense if all it says is that foreign material is irrelevant because it is not based on 
the local bill of rights. Many courts, including the Singapore and Malaysian courts, 
reject this flawed reasoning: this is borne out by the fact that these courts often refer 
to foreign material in interpreting domestic bills of rights, for instance, where the 
material originates from a legal system linked to the domestic system by ties of 
genealogy and history (a genealogical interpretation), or where it helps judges to 
better understand and express the assumptions behind their own reasoning 
(dialogical interpretation). Rather than treating the four walls doctrine as a general 
injunction against the use of comparative constitutional material, it is submitted that 
the doctrine should be understood as a rule aimed at ensuring that a foreign legal 
principle is not applied when it cannot be validly accommodated by the text of a bill 
of rights. That being the case, the touchstone of whether comparative material should 
be considered is whether it is useful in explicating the local bill of rights text. 
The second concern raised against referring to foreign jurisprudence is that 
since a constitution or bill of rights can be seen as embodying the commitments that 
define a national identity, that identity should be shaped by reference only to home-
grown beliefs and traditions. We saw, though, that accepting such a view of a bill of 
rights does not require a judge to eschew foreign law because such comparative 
material may in fact help to recognize and shape the national identity of the country. 
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Of greater significance is the fact that domestic bills of rights are best seen as 
incorporating universal or transcendental norms – they are, in a sense, specific 
applications of general principles. This being the case, comparative material enables 
such transcendent norms shared by different bills of rights to be sought and 
understood. 
Thirdly, we looked at the concern that comparative bill of rights material may 
be irrelevant to a domestic legal system because local conditions, social or otherwise, 
differ from conditions in foreign jurisdictions. The problem is minimized if we see 
foreign law as facilitating the organic development of domestic law, rather than as 
self-contained solutions to be transplanted into the domestic legal system. Further, 
the existence of transcendent constitutional norms necessarily implies that 
comparative material may be referred to. If a court takes the view that local empirical 
conditions justify departing from a transcendent norm, then the onus lies upon it to 
explain why this is the case rather than to shun foreign law altogether. 
Finally, we looked at some practical concerns, namely, that selective 
references to foreign law are necessarily arbitrary, and that judges and lawyers are ill 
equipped to properly understand and evaluate comparative legal materials. Given the 
nature of legal practice today selectivity may be a necessary evil, but to characterize 
the endeavour as capricious when skill and discernment are applied to the selection 
process is hardly right. In addition, the appraisal of foreign legal materials is 
arguably no more difficult than coming to grips with other areas of human 
experience of which courts and counsel have no specialist knowledge. 
In examining common criticisms of taking a comparative approach to 
interpreting bills of rights, the discussion in this chapter has hinted at some of the 
benefits of such an approach. I propose to highlight two of them. The first is that a 
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judge who has encountered a novel constitutional problem in his jurisdiction need 
not slash his own way through the undergrowth. By referring to foreign material, he 
can gain valuable insights into how other jurisdictions have framed the issues and 
the solutions they have developed. 
Enright v Ireland,129 a decision of the High Court of the Republic of Ireland, is 
a case in point. The plaintiff had been convicted of sexual offences in 1993. Prior to 
his release from prison, the Sex Offenders Act 2001 of Ireland came into force. This 
statute obliged persons coming within the Act to notify the garda authorities of their 
release from prison within seven days of such release; to furnish their name, date of 
birth and home address; and to comply with other continuing obligations with 
respect to their whereabouts. The plaintiff sought declarations that various 
provisions of the Act were unconstitutional, particularly section 7(2) which made the 
Act applicable to persons convicted before the commencement of the relevant parts 
of the Act where at the commencement the persons were still serving sentence. 
The novel issue facing Finlay Geoghegan J was whether the provisions of the 
Act in question contravened Article 38.1 of the Constitution of Ireland,130 which 
states: “No person shall be tried on any criminal charge save in due course of law.” In 
dealing with this issue, two questions had to be answered: first, whether the Article 
included the right only to be punished for a crime in accordance with the law which 
existed at the date of the commission of the crime, and second, whether the 
impugned provisions of the Sex Offenders Act amounted to a criminal penalty. 
                                                   
129  [2003] 2 IR 321, HC (Ireland). 
130  November 2004 edition (enacted by the People 1 July 1937; in operation as from 29 December 
1937). 
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As regards the first question, Geoghegan J examined various cases from the 
United States and concluded that Article 38.1 did indeed prohibit ex post facto 
criminal laws, particularly laws that attempted to subject persons to punishments 
greater than those that existed at the time of their offences. She said: 
This conclusion I consider to be supported … by the long standing view of the 
courts in the United States that the prohibition against ex post facto laws 
includes a prohibition against a law which increases the penalty after the date 
of commission of the offence. The unswerving acceptance of such a principle 
which has long historical origins supports the view that this is a long 
recognised and established right in relation to criminal trials in the common 
law world.131
The judge turned again to United States cases to determine the second 
question regarding the meaning of a ‘penalty’, because she was of the view that there 
were strong similarities between the principles applied by US courts in considering 
certain matters to be penalties for the purposes of the prohibition against ex post 
facto laws, and the principles according to which Irish courts had determined 
whether certain sanctions formed part of the penalty or primary punishment for the 
offence to be taken into account when determining whether an offence was or was 
not a minor offence. 132  Applying the United States Supreme Court decision of 
Kennedy v Mendoza-Martinez,133 the judge held that the Sex Offenders Act was not 
punitive in nature, and hence upheld its constitutionality. 
The case therefore demonstrates how a court may benefit from the experience 
of a foreign jurisdiction by applying what has been learnt to a novel issue that has 
arisen locally. However, the four walls doctrine and the South African experience 
indicate that a judge need not adopt the foreign legal principles wholesale – indeed, 
it would be wrong for him to do so without closely examining whether these 
                                                   
131  Enright v Ireland, above, n 129 at 331. 
132  Id at 334. 
133  372 US 144 (1962), SC (USA). 
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principles are suited to the text of the local bill of rights. In this regard, it is helpful to 
bear in mind certain considerations that John Allison has identified if cross-
fertilization from one jurisdiction to another is not to degenerate into hazardous 
transplantation: 
i. The doctrinal ramifications – how legal rules and doctrines 
might adapt to the external impetus and whether or how they might still fulfil 
the functions we require them to fulfil. 
ii. How the internal adaptation might be justified in the legal and 
political theory or theories underpinning the legal system. 
iii. How domestic judicial (and, one might add, governmental and 
social) institutions and procedures might cope with the proposed doctrinal 
adaptation.134
Another benefit of a comparative approach is that it ensures that important 
judgments concerning the fundamental liberties of individuals are made with an eye 
on evolving national and international standards. We have seen how the Constitution 
of South Africa requires the courts of the Republic to have regard to international 
and foreign laws specifically for the purpose of ensuring that the fundamental rights 
in the Constitution are shielded against distortion by an oppressive future 
government. 
Judges should also take into account foreign legal developments if it is 
acknowledged that domestic bills of rights embody transcendental norms. A South 
African case, Mohamed v President of the Republic of South Africa,135 illustrates this 
                                                   
134  John W F Allison, “Transplantation and Cross-Fertilisation” in Jack Beatson & Takis Tridimas 
(eds), New Directions in European Public Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998), 169 at 175–176. 
135  2001 (3) SA 893, Const Ct (S Africa). 
48 • Chapter One 
point. The applicant in this case was alleged to have been involved in the bombing of 
the United States Embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, in August 1998. He was 
indicted in the United States and had a warrant of arrest issued against him by the 
Federal District Court on various charges. Having been identified in South Africa by 
the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation, he was arrested by members of the 
South African Alien Control Unit operating in conjunction with the United States 
officials. He was then handed over to these officials who transported him to the 
United States where he was now standing trial on capital charges. The applicant 
brought an action alleging that his handing-over to United States authorities had 
infringed his constitutional rights – the rights to life, to dignity and not to be 
subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment – since no prior undertaking 
had been obtained by South Africa from the United States that the death penalty, 
which had been found to be unconstitutional in South Africa, 136  would not be 
imposed or carried out. 
The Constitutional Court studied a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada 
which held that to send a person to a State where he would be subjected to capital 
punishment without assurances that this penalty would not be imposed on him 
unjustifiably violated principles of fundamental justice.137 It also looked at European 
Court of Human Rights cases establishing that to expel or extradite a person to a 
State when there are substantial grounds for believing that he is in danger of being 
subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment there 
                                                   
136  By State v Makwanyane, above, n 92. 
137  United States v Burns [2001] 1 SCR 283, SC (Can): see Mohamed, above, n 135 at 913, [46]–
[47]. 
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violates the European Convention on Human Rights.138 The South African court 
concluded that these cases were consistent with the weight that the Constitution gave 
to the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights and the positive obligation that 
it imposed on the State to “protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of 
Rights”.139 It therefore agreed with the applicant that his removal to the US had 
violated the Constitution, and granted various declarations sought by him. 
It is submitted that in Mohamed’s case what the South African Constitutional 
Court in effect did was to identify a transcendental norm prohibiting a person from 
being sent to another State where it is likely that he will be subjected to torture or to 
cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment. As this norm was embodied 
in the Constitution, the Court was justified in considering the implications that 
foreign courts had ascribed to the norm. 
This is not to say that a domestic court may never decline to follow 
interpretations of transcendental norms prevailing in foreign jurisdictions. However, 
the fact that it is proposing to depart from the practices of other democratic nations 
should give it pause to consider why the laws of other nations have developed in 
those ways, and what are the material differences between those nations and the 
court’s own jurisdiction that require a different approach to be taken. 
Appropriately, this brings us back to the quotation by Rudolf von Jhering 
cited at the start of this chapter. To extend the analogy, imagine the judge as a 
herbalist seeking a cure for a constitutional ailment. To increase the chances of 
finding the right treatment for his patient, the sensible herbalist will gather a 
                                                   
138  Soering v United Kingdom (1989) 11 EHRR 439; Chahal v United Kingdom (1996) 23 EHRR 
413; Hilal v United Kingdom (2001) 33 EHRR 2: see Mohamed, id at 916–917, [56]–[58]. 
139  South African Constitution, above, n 88, s 7(2): see Mohamed, above, n 135 at 58. 
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selection of herbs from a variety of locations. Naturally, it is only prudent for him to 
scrutinize all the plants to determine whether or not there are any noxious weeds 
among them. However, once he has ascertained that a plant can indeed provide an 
efficacious cure, he would be foolish to reject it to his patient’s detriment merely if it 
had not been found in his own garden. 
The methodology outlined here sets the tone for the following chapters. With 
judicious reference to cases and academic writings from common law jurisdictions, 
they will examine the roles performed by the branches of government as regards a 
bill of rights text, the degree of deference appropriately shown by the judiciary to the 
policy choices of the executive and legislature, and approaches that should be taken 
towards the interpretation and construction of bills of rights. 
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Foreign Affairs? (Princeton, NJ; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 1992) at 125. 
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IT IS A TRUISM that in a State with a Westminster-style constitutional system,2 each 
branch of the government – executive, legislature and judiciary – is impressed with a 
duty to uphold the nation’s constitution. The functionaries of each branch are elected 
or appointed to their offices and carry out their tasks in accordance with the rules 
laid down therein, and with the law of the land in general. This is the essence of the 
rule of law. 
In the constitutions of certain jurisdictions the matter is placed beyond doubt. 
The Singapore Constitution,3 for instance, requires the President, each Member of 
Parliament (MP), the Chief Justice and each Supreme Court Judge and Judicial 
Commissioner to make a solemn oath or affirmation to “preserve, protect and defend 
the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore”.4 Similar provisions appear in the 
South African Constitution.5
Where the branches of government have an independent duty to uphold the 
constitution, and the constitution either embodies a bill of rights or the bill of rights 
of the State has the standing of basic law,6 this suggests that each branch must 
determine for itself the meaning of the rights therein when exercising its powers. 
                                                   
2  That is, a system having a constitution which has its origin in an Act of the British Imperial 
Parliament at Westminster or in an Order in Council: Hinds v The Queen [1977] AC 195 at 212, PC (on 
appeal from Jamaica). 
3  Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1999 Reprint). 
4  As to the President, see the Singapore Constitution, id, Art 20(3) and the 1st Sch, Form 1; as to 
Members of Parliament, see Art 61 and the 1st Sch, Forms 2 and 3; as to the Chief Justice, Supreme 
Court Judges and Judicial Commissioners, see Art 97 and the 1st Sch, Form 6. 
5  The texts of the oaths are set out in Sch 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
1996 (assented to on 16 December 1996, commenced on 4 February 1997); the President (s 87) is 
required to “obey, observe, uphold and maintain the Constitution”; Ministers and Deputy Ministers 
(s 95), members of the National Assembly (s 48), permanent delegates to the National Council of 
Provinces (s 62(6)) and members of provincial legislatures (s 107) to “obey, respect and uphold the 
Constitution”; and judicial officers (s 174(8)) to “uphold and protect the Constitution and the human 
rights entrenched in it”. 
6  A bill of rights, by its very nature, may have the status of basic law even if it is only contained 
in an ordinary Act of Parliament: see the text accompanying nn 52–58, below. 
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Absent any specific provision in the constitution,7 this raises the issue of whether the 
determination of the meaning of a fundamental right by any particular branch of 
government ought to be binding on the other branches. In other words, should a 
pronouncement as to the content of a bill of rights by any particular branch be 
authoritative? This is a vital issue, for the roles played by the branches in 
determining the meaning and content of rights are inextricably linked to a proper 
understanding of the approaches that ought to be taken to the interpretive enterprise. 
Part I of this chapter examines certain fundamental concepts, namely, the 
doctrine of the separation of powers, the rule of law, constitutionalism, the status of 
bills of rights as enforceable law, and the independent duty of the branches of 
government to interpret a bill of rights. This lays the groundwork for a discussion of 
the central question in Part II: whether one branch should have final say over the 
other branches as to the meaning of fundamental rights. The orthodox view provides 
an affirmative response to that question, and identifies that branch to be the 
judiciary. This view is to be contrasted with the intriguing argument held by a 
number of US commentators that no particular branch of government should be 
entitled to insist on the other branches accepting its interpretation of the constitution. 
The conclusion of the discussion is that the orthodox view accords better with rule of 
law principles. A common objection to the judiciary being the ultimate interpreter of 
a bill of rights is then considered – the ‘counter-majoritarian difficulty’, which claims 
that judicial review of governmental action is undemocratic and should therefore be 
severely limited. It is submitted that the problem is not as intractable as it appears. 
                                                   
7  See, eg, the South African Constitution, id, s 167(5): “The Constitutional Court makes the final 
decision whether an Act of Parliament, a provincial Act or conduct of the President is constitutional, 
and must confirm any order of invalidity made by the Supreme Court of Appeal, a High Court, or a 
court of similar status, before that order has any force.” 
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Finally, in Part III, the concept of a constitutional conversation or dialogue is 
proposed as a practical model for the relationship between the branches of 
government as regards interpreting a bill of rights. 
I. FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS 
The issue of what roles the branches of government should play in interpreting a bill 
of rights depends on the interplay between certain fundamental concepts relating to 
the constitutional structure of a jurisdiction: the separation of powers, the rule of law, 
constitutionalism and the status of bills of rights as law, and the independent duty of 
the branches of government to interpret the constitution. An examination of these 
foundational concepts will enable us to establish yardsticks against which the issue of 
whether one of the branches of government should be the authoritative interpreter of 
a bill of rights may be measured. 
A. THE DOCTRINE OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 
In Hinds v The Queen 8  Lord Diplock, delivering the majority judgment of the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, noted that Westminster-style constitutions 
were negotiated as well as drafted by persons nurtured in the tradition of that 
branch of the common law of England that is concerned with public law and 
familiar in particular with the basic concept of separation of legislative, 
executive and judicial power as it had been developed in the unwritten 
constitution of the United Kingdom.9
The familiar tripartite separation of governmental powers is commonly traced 
to the 1748 work L’Esprit des Lois (The Spirit of the Laws) by Charles Louis de 
Secondat, Baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu, based on his own understanding of 
                                                   
8  Above, n 2. 
9  Id at 212. 
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the 18th-century English constitution. Montesquieu was certainly not the first to 
have analyzed government according to its functions. John Locke had done so earlier, 
and indeed Montesquieu restated Locke’s division of functions as the legislative 
power and the executive power, the latter being subdivided into the executive power 
in matters pertaining to the law of nations, and the executive power in matters 
pertaining to civil right, which he termed the power of judging.10 However, having 
thus defined governmental powers, Montesquieu went on to restate them as the 
powers “of making the laws, … of executing public resolutions, and… of judging the 
crimes or the disputes of individuals”,11 and it was this restatement that he used 
thereafter. The identification and placement of the power of judging on the same 
analytical level as the legislative and executive powers was, as Melvin Richter put it, a 
“great and lasting innovation”.12
Montesquieu’s concern was to preserve what he termed “political liberty”, 
“that tranquillity of spirit which comes from the opinion each one has of his security, 
and in order for him to have this liberty the government must be such that one 
citizen cannot fear another citizen”.13 He viewed political liberty as being present 
only when power is not abused, and since power is likely to be abused if reposed in 
                                                   
10  Montesquieu; Anne M Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller & Harold Samuel Stone (transls & eds), 
The Spirit of the Laws (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), book 11, ch 6, at 156–157: “In 
each state there are three sorts of powers: legislative power, executive power over the things 
depending on the right of nations, and executive power over the things depending on civil right. By the 
first, the prince or magistrate makes laws for a time or for always and corrects or abrogates those that 
have been made. By the second, he makes peace or war, sends or receives embassies, establishes 
security, and prevents invasions. By the third, he punishes crimes or judges disputes between 
individuals. The last will be called the power of judging, and the former simply the executive power of 
the state.” This definition of executive power does not correspond exactly with how it is understood in 
modern states. See Melvin Richter, The Political Theory of Montesquieu (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1977) at 90. 
11  Montesquieu, id, ch 6 at 157. 
12  Richter, above, n 10 at 90. 
13  Montesquieu, above, n 10, ch 6 at 157. Earlier, in ch 3 at 155, Montesquieu commented: 
“Liberty is the right to do everything the laws permit; and if one citizen could do what they forbid, he 
would no longer have liberty because the others would likewise have this same power.” 
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the hands of one man, “power must check power by the arrangement of things”. 14 In 
an oft-quoted passage, he wrote: 
When legislative power is united with executive power in a single person or in 
a single body of the magistracy, there is no liberty, because one can fear that 
the same monarch or senate that makes tyrannical laws will execute them 
tyrannically. 
Nor is there liberty if the power of judging is not separate from legislative 
power and from executive power. If it were joined to legislative power, the 
power over the life and liberty of the citizens would be arbitrary, for the judge 
would be the legislator. If it were joined to executive power, the judge could 
have the force of an oppressor. 
All would be lost if the same man or the same body of principal men… 
exercised these three powers: that of making the laws, that of executing public 
resolutions, and that of judging the crimes or the disputes of the individuals.15
In the opinion of Montesquieu, therefore, the way to secure the liberty of the 
individual is to ensure that governmental powers are separated and balanced against 
each other. This statement of principle has been interpreted in two main ways. The 
first understands Montesquieu as asserting that for constitutional liberty to exist 
there must be a complete separation of agencies, functions and persons. 16  The 
governmental systems of certain Continental European nations are structured in this 
way. Thus in France, for instance, cases involving the government, other public 
authorities and the administration generally are dealt with by a system of 
administrative courts and not the ordinary civil and criminal court system (l’ordre 
judiciaire),17 while the enforcement of constitutional provisions is handled by the 
Conseil constitutionnel (often translated as the ‘Constitutional Court’).18
                                                   
14  Id, ch 4 at 155. 
15  Id, ch 6 at 157. 
16  Richter, above, n 10 at 91–92. 
17  Catherine Elliott, Catherine Vernon & Eric Jeanpierre, French Legal System (2nd ed) (Harlow, 
Essex: Pearson Education, 2006) at 84–85. 
18  Id at 130 and 135–139. 
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The second interpretation, which is prevalent in common-law countries and 
thus more relevant for our purposes, holds that the separation of powers doctrine 
merely advocates the prevention of tyranny by the conferment of too much power on 
any one person or body, and the check of one power by another. In the words of Eric 
Barendt, “[T]he separation of powers should not be explained in terms of a strict 
distribution of functions between the three branches of government, but in terms of a 
network of rules and principles which ensure that power is not concentrated in the 
hands of one branch.”19
The separation of powers doctrine is given effect in Westminster-style 
constitutions by the establishment of organs of government with functions that are 
generally distinct. Often, there is an explicit vesting of power or authority. The South 
African Constitution, for instance, vests the “legislative authority” of the national 
sphere of government in Parliament, of the provincial sphere of government in 
provincial legislatures, and of the local sphere of government in Municipal 
Councils;20 “executive authority” in the President, who exercises it together with the 
other members of the Cabinet;21 and “judicial authority” in the courts.22 However, 
                                                   
19  Eric Barendt, “Separation of Powers and Constitutional Government” [1995] Pub L 599 at 
608–609; See also Barendt, id at 601 and 606; Richter, above, n 10 at 92–93; O Hood Phillips, Paul 
Jackson & Patricia Leopold, O Hood Phillips & Jackson: Constitutional and Administrative Law (8th 
ed) (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2001) at [1-017]. 
20  South African Constitution, above, n 5, s 43. 
21  Id, s 85. The Cabinet consists of the President, as head of the Cabinet, a Deputy President and 
Ministers: s 91(1). 
22  Id, s 165(1). Compare the Australian Constitution (Commonwealth of Australia Constitution 
Act 1900 (63 & 64 Vict, c 12) (UK)), which vests “executive power” of the Commonwealth of Australia 
in the Queen, which is exercisable by the Governor-General as Her Majesty’s representative (s 61); 
“legislative power” in the Federal Parliament consisting of the Queen, a Senate and a House of 
Representatives (s 1); and “judicial power” in the High Court of Australia, in such other federal courts 
as the Parliament creates, and in such other courts as it invests with federal jurisdiction (s 71). The 
Singapore Constitution, above, n 3, vests “executive authority” in the President which shall be 
exercisable by him or by the Cabinet or any Minister authorized by the Cabinet (Art 23(1); the 
Legislature may by law confer “executive functions” on other persons: sub-s (2)), “legislative power” in 
the Legislature (Art 38; the Legislature consists of the President and Parliament: id), and “judicial 
power” in the Supreme Court and subordinate courts set up by written law (Art 93). The US 
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such express wording is unnecessary. It was held by the Privy Council in Hinds v The 
Queen that 
it is well established as a rule of construction applicable to constitutional 
instruments under which this governmental structure [ie, a Westminster-style 
structure] is adopted that the absence of express words to that effect does not 
prevent the legislative, the executive and the judicial powers of the new state 
being exercisable exclusively by the legislature, by the executive and by the 
judicature respectively.23
A separation of powers is regarded as evident in a Westminster-style system of 
government even though there is often a high degree of overlap between the 
membership of the branches of government, particularly the executive and legislative 
branches. The British constitutional system is the exemplar of this.24 The Prime 
Minister and other Ministers in the Cabinet are also MPs.25 Until constitutional 
reforms in 2005,26 the Lord Chancellor, who is a Cabinet Minister, presided over the 
House of Lords as Lord Speaker and was head of the judiciary in England and Wales. 
Among the reforms introduced, which were aimed at establishing a clearer 
constitutional separation of powers, were the substitution of references in primary 
legislation to the Lord Chancellor in his capacity as Speaker of the House of Lords 
with references to the ‘Speaker of the House of Lords’,27 and the ending of the Lord 
Chancellor’s judicial role.28 The House of Lords’ alternative capacity as the final 
                                                                                                                                                              
Constitution vests “executive Power” in the President (Art II s 1), “legislative Powers” in the Congress 
of the United States which consists of the Senate and the House of Representatives (Art I s 1), and 
“judicial Power” in the Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as Congress may ordain and 
establish (Art III s 1). 
23  Hinds, above, n 2 at 212; see also Liyanage v The Queen [1967] 1 AC 259 at 286–288, PC (on 
appeal from Ceylon). 
24  O Hood Phillips & Jackson, above, n 19 at [2-020]. 
25  Id. 
26  Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (c 4) (UK). 
27  The Act, id, s 18 and Sch 6. It is a matter for the House of Lords itself to determine any 
changes to the current arrangements for the office of its Speaker: see the Explanatory Notes to the Act, 
[12] and [47]. 
28  The Act precludes the office-holder from holding judicial office: Explanatory Notes to the Act, 
[10]. By s 7 of the Act, id, the Lord Chancellor has ceased to be the President of the Supreme Court of 
England and Wales (sub-s (4)), which role has been taken on by the Lord Chief Justice (sub-s (1)). 
Section 15 and Sch 4 of the Act transfer various functions of the Lord Chancellor relating to the 
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court of appeal has been taken on by the new Supreme Court of the United 
Kingdom,29 and the right of members of the House of Lords to sit and vote in the 
Second Chamber for so long as they hold full-time judicial office is restricted.30
Thus, the reforms bring the constitutional position of Great Britain closer to 
those of many Commonwealth countries such as Singapore. 31  Nonetheless, the 
separation of powers doctrine is not given full expression in Westminster-style 
constitutions. Since Cabinet members and other government ministers are also MPs, 
the executive plays a major role in setting the legislative agenda. If the party in 
government has a majority of the seats in Parliament the legislature will not be an 
effective check on the use of executive power, particularly in the light of the whip 
system which is designed to ensure that party members attend and vote as the party 
leadership wishes. 32  However, what the 2005 reforms in Britain achieve is the 
creation of a distinct partition between the executive and legislature on the one hand 
and the judiciary on the other. It is submitted that this particular functional and 
structural separation is crucial. In order for members of the political branches of 
government, particularly elected legislators, to remain in power it is in their interest 
to mostly pursue courses of action that are supported by the majority of the 
electorate. The judiciary therefore has the vital role of ensuring that such actions are 
                                                                                                                                                              
judiciary and the courts to Her Majesty The Queen, the Lord Chief Justice and other persons: 
Explanatory Notes to the Act, [36]–[37]. 
29  The Act, id, s 23. Section 40 provides that the Supreme Court will have the appellate 
jurisdiction of the House of Lords. 
30  Id, s 137(3). See the Explanatory Notes to the Act, [61]–[62]. 
31  Under the Singapore Constitution, above, n 3, there is overlapping membership of the 
executive and legislature. The executive authority of the Republic is vested in and exercisable by the 
President subject to the provisions of the Constitution, or by the Cabinet or any Minister authorized by 
the Cabinet: Art 23(1). The Cabinet, which consists of the Prime Minister and other Ministers that are 
appointed from among the Members of Parliament, has the general direction and control of the 
Government and is collectively responsible to Parliament: Arts 24 and 25(1). The President and 
Parliament together comprise the Legislature: Art 38. 
32  This is the present state of affairs in Singapore. Parliament would, of course, be able to check 
the executive more effectively if the latter was composed of a minority or coalition government. 
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constitutional and, above all, do not seriously impair the fundamental liberties of 
minorities whose voices are less likely to be heeded by the Cabinet and Parliament. 
The separation of the political and judicial branches also conduces to the judiciary 
remaining independent from political pressure, allowing it to check more effectively 
the acts of the Cabinet and Parliament. 
B. THE RULE OF LAW, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE STATUS OF BILLS OF RIGHTS AS 
LAW 
1. The Rule of Law 
The point made in the preceding section is buttressed by another fundamental 
constitutional concept: the rule of law. The concept is regarded as a founding value of 
many nations – it is declared to be such by Canada 33  and South Africa, 34  for 
instance – but its meaning is highly contested. For present purposes, it suffices to 
note that there are formal (‘thin’) and substantive (‘thick’) conceptions of the rule of 
law. Thin conceptions of the rule of law are concerned with matters such as the 
manner in which the law was promulgated (whether it was by a properly-authorized 
person, in a properly-authorized manner, etc), the clarity of the ensuing norm 
(whether it is sufficiently clear to guide an individual’s conduct so as to enable a 
person to plan his or her life, etc), and the temporal dimension of the enacted norm 
                                                   
33  Preamble to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (enacted as Sch B to the 
Constitution Act 1982): “… Canada is founded upon principles that recognize the supremacy of God 
and the rule of law”. There is no mention of the rule of law in the Preamble to the earlier Constitution 
Act 1867 (30 & 31 Vict, c 3; reprinted in RSC 1985, App II, No 5) (UK); however, the Preamble states 
that Canada is to have a “Constitution similar in Principle to that of the United Kingdom”, and that 
phrase was regarded by Supreme Court of Canada in Reference re Language Rights under s. 23 of 
Manitoba Act, 1870 and s. 133 of Constitution Act, 1867 [1985] 1 SCR 721 at 750 as containing an 
implicit recognition of the rule of law: see Peter W Hogg & Cara F Zwibel, “The Rule of Law in the 
Supreme Court of Canada” (2005) 55 U Toronto LJ 715 at 719–720. 
34  South African Constitution, above, n 5, s 1(c): “The Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, 
democratic state founded on the following values… Supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law.” 
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(whether it is prospective or retrospective, etc). The actual content of the law itself – 
whether the law is a good law or a bad law – is not of concern.35 Thick conceptions of 
the rule of law go further. They embody the idea that in order for the rule of law to be 
upheld, individuals have to be accorded certain substantive rights such as equality 
and respect for human dignity.36 As some theory of justice is integral to deciding 
what rights individuals have, this necessitates the articulation of what that theory of 
justice actually is.37 Consequently, what the ‘rule of law’ really comes to mean is the 
particular theory of justice being proffered. 
Significantly, proponents of thick conceptions of the rule of law accept that the 
concept has the formal attributes of the thin conceptions.38 What, then, are these 
attributes? In the view of Peter Hogg and Cara Zwibel, the rule of law has three 
elements: 
(1) [A] body of laws that are publicly available, generally obeyed, and 
generally enforced; (2) the subjection of government to those laws 
(constitutionalism); and (3) an independent judiciary and legal profession to 
resolve disputes about those laws.39
According to the third element listed above, to ensure that the rule of law is upheld 
the judiciary’s independence from the political branches of government must be 
preserved. In Westminster-style systems this is often achieved by providing in the 
constitution for the security of tenure of judges, for instance, that they may not be 
removed from office before they attain a certain age40 or unless certain grounds for 
                                                   
35  Paul P Craig, “Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical 
Framework” [1997] Pub L 467 at 467. 
36  See, eg, T R S Allan, Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001). 
37  Craig, above, n 35 at 480. 
38  Id at 467. 
39  Hogg & Zwibel, above, n 33 at 718. 
40  See, eg, the Australian Constitution, above, n 22, s 72; the Singapore Constitution, above, n 3, 
Art 98(1). Compare the South African Constitution, above, n 5, s 176(1). 
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removal are proved and procedures followed;41 and that judges’ remuneration and 
other terms of office may not be altered to their disadvantage after their 
appointment. 42  The common law also provides for judicial immunity in certain 
circumstances: no judge is liable in damages if acting within jurisdiction, even if 
doing so maliciously;43 and no judge of a superior court is liable for an act done 
outside jurisdiction, provided it was done in the honest belief that he was acting 
within jurisdiction. 44  Liability only attaches if a judge knowingly acts outside 
jurisdiction. 45  In addition, to safeguard the independence of the judiciary, it is 
arguably necessary to keep the membership of the political and judicial branches of 
government distinct. This reflects the importance of the separation of powers 
doctrine. 
2. Constitutionalism and the Status of Bills of Rights as Law 
Hogg and Zwibel’s second element highlights that the concept of constitutionalism is 
situated within the rule of law. Constitutionalism may be expressed as the notion of a 
government ruling according to a constitution or constitutional forms which limit its 
arbitrary power.46 It is a corollary of the idea of limited government, a government 
that is not a law unto itself but which acts in accordance with the laws of the land. As 
the Supreme Court of Canada put it in the Quebec Secession Reference, “the rule of 
                                                   
41  See, eg, the Australian Constitution, id; the New Zealand Constitution (Constitution Act 1986 
(1986 No 114) (NZ)), s 23; Singapore Constitution, id, Arts 98(3)–(5). Compare the South African 
Constitution, id, s 177. 
42  See, eg, the Australian Constitution, id; the New Zealand Constitution, id, s 24; the Singapore 
Constitution, id, Art 98(8). Compare the South African Constitution, id, s 176(3). 
43  Sirros v Moore [1975] QB 118 at 131–133; Re McC (a minor) [1985] AC 528 at 540–541, HL. 
44  Sirros, id at 134–135; McC, id at 541, 550. 
45  Sirros, id at 136, 149; McC, id at 540. 
46  See the definition of the adjective constitutional (sense 4b) from The Oxford English 
Dictionary (2nd ed) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989) from OED Online at <http://dictionary.  
oed.com/cgi/entry/50048135> (accessed 13 November 2006). 
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law provides that the law is supreme over the acts of both government and private 
persons. There is, in short, one law for all.” And further, “the exercise of all public 
power must find its ultimate source in a legal rule”; in other words, “the relationship 
between the state and the individual must be regulated by law.”47
A constitution is logically prior to, and may be regarded as the source of, 
ordinary laws, for it is through the agencies and procedures established therein that 
laws are validly enacted. Moreover, the linking of constitutionalism with the rule of 
law implies that a written constitution is itself a form of law. Indeed, by definition, it 
is the basic or supreme law of a jurisdiction. The nature of a constitution as law is 
often put beyond doubt by the existence of a ‘supremacy clause’. For example, section 
52(1) of the Constitution Act 1982 of Canada states: 
The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is 
inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the 
inconsistency, of no force or effect.48
So, too, Article VI of the US Constitution: “This Constitution… shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in 
the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding.” The Supreme 
                                                   
47  Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 SCR 217 at [72]. 
48  See also the South African Constitution, above, n 5, s 2 (“This Constitution is the supreme law 
of the Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must 
be fulfilled.”). Art 4 of the Singapore Constitution, above, n 3, states: “This Constitution is the 
supreme law of the Republic of Singapore and any law enacted by the Legislature after the 
commencement of the Constitution which is inconsistent with the Constitution shall, to the extent of 
the inconsistency, be void”, and Art 162 states: “Subject to this Article, all existing laws shall continue 
in force on and after the commencement of this Constitution and all laws which have not been brought 
into force by the date of the commencement of this Constitution may, subject as aforesaid, be brought 
into force on or after its commencement, but all such laws shall, subject to this Article, be construed as 
from the commencement of this Constitution with such modifications, adaptations, qualifications and 
exceptions as may be necessary to bring them into conformity with this Constitution”. In addition, the 
word ‘law’ is expressed by Art 2(1) to include “written law”, which is itself defined as meaning, inter 
alia, “this Constitution”. 
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Court of the United States in the landmark decision of Marbury v Madison 49  
declared: 
Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them 
as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and 
consequently the theory of every such government must be, that an act of the 
legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void. This theory is essentially 
attached to a written constitution, and is consequently to be considered, by 
this court, as one of the fundamental principles of our society.50
A bill of rights is a list of the fundamental liberties or rights enjoyed by people 
in a jurisdiction.51 Such a bill is often incorporated into a written constitution, as in 
Canada, India, Ireland, Singapore, South Africa and the United States. In other 
States, bills of rights may be contained in ordinary Acts of Parliament. Thus in New 
Zealand the bill of rights appears in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990,52 and in 
the United Kingdom it is embodied in the Human Rights Act 1998.53 Although such 
statutes are technically not entrenched and may be repealed by the legislature 
without following any special procedures, they may be regarded as having the status 
of basic law. For instance, although there are no provisions entrenching the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act, either in the Act itself or in the New Zealand 
Constitution, 54  it is regarded as part of the constitutional canon, having been 
identified as such by the courts and commentators, and in official government 
publications.55 It has been claimed that the Bill of Rights is practically entrenched 
since implied repeal by subsequent inconsistent enactments is extremely rare and 
                                                   
49  (1803) 5 US (1 Cranch) 137. 
50  Id at 177. 
51  This is a generalization, as bills of rights may limit the enjoyment of rights to certain 
categories of persons. Arts 14(1)(a)–(c) of the Singapore Constitution, above, n 3, for example, restrict 
the exercise of the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to assemble peaceably, and the 
right to form associations to citizens of Singapore. 
52  1990 No 109. 
53  1998 c 42. 
54  Above, n 41. 
55  Paul Rishworth, et al, The New Zealand Bill of Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) 
at 3; see generally id at 2–5. 
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arguably non-existent, and any government intent on repealing or restrictively 
amending the Act would likely suffer extreme political difficulty and opprobrium.56 
Similarly, in Thoburn v Sunderland City Council57 the suggestion (probably obiter) 
was made that in the United Kingdom a distinction should be drawn between 
‘ordinary’ statutes and ‘constitutional’ statutes, and that the latter category includes 
the Human Rights Act 1998. John Laws LJ said that as a constitutional statute, the 
Human Rights Act is not subject to being impliedly repealed by a subsequent 
incompatible statute, though it can nonetheless be expressly derogated from.58
Logically, where a bill of rights is incorporated into a written constitution, the 
fundamental rights therein will also have the status of supreme law. The same may or 
may not be true of bills of rights set out in ordinary statutes, but the key point is that 
all such bills have the status of law and may be enforced as such by the courts.59 This 
has important consequences for the interpretation of bills of rights by the branches of 
government, which will be examined below. 
                                                   
56  Rishworth, id at 4. 
57  [2003] QB 151. The case is commented on in Sophie Boyron, “In the Name of European Law: 
The Metric Martyrs Case” (2002) 27 E L Rev 771; Geoffrey Marshall, “Metric Measures and 
Martyrdom by Henry VIII Clause” (2002) 118 LQR 493; and James Young & David Campbell, Case 
Comment, “The Metric Martyrs and the Entrenchment Jurisprudence of Lord Justice Laws” [2002] 
Pub L 399. 
58  Thoburn, id at 186, [62]. 
59  Theoretically, it is possible that a bill of rights might be established purely as a set of ideals 
which a nation’s government is to aspire to achieve, and thus be made unenforceable in the courts. I 
have not come across such a creature before. Compare, though, Art 45 of the Constitution of Ireland 
(November 2004 ed) (enacted by the People 1 July 1937, in operation as from 29 December 1937) 
which sets out the “directive principles of social policy” that require the State, among other things, to 
secure that citizens may through their occupations find the means of making reasonable provision for 
their domestic needs (cl 2(i)); safeguard the economic interests of weaker sections of the community 
and, where necessary, contribute to the support of the infirm, the widow, the orphan, and the aged 
(cl 4.1°); and endeavour to ensure that the strength and health of workers and the tender age of 
children shall not be abused and that citizens shall not be forced by economic necessity to enter 
avocations unsuited to their sex, age or strength (cl 4.2°). However, the Article commences with the 
following passage: “The principles of social policy set forth in this Article are intended for the general 
guidance of the Oireachtas [ie, the National Parliament]. The application of those principles in the 
making of laws shall be the care of the Oireachtas exclusively, and shall not be cognisable by any Court 
under any of the provisions of this Constitution.” 
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3. The Independent Duty of the Branches of Government to Interpret a Bill of 
Rights 
In a jurisdiction where the constitution contains a bill of rights and persons 
appointed to key positions in the various branches of government are obliged to take 
an oath to uphold the constitution,60 it is clear that a legal duty is impressed on each 
of the separate but co-ordinate branches of government to determine for itself the 
meaning of the provisions in the bill of rights when exercising its powers. However, it 
is submitted that even if the bill of rights only has the status of an ordinary statute 
and no relevant oaths of office are taken, judges are duty-bound to interpret the bill 
of rights in the context of disputes that have been brought before the courts, Cabinet 
members and government ministers must construe the bill of rights to ensure that 
their policies comply with it, and parliamentarians must act in similar fashion when 
deciding whether to enact a particular Bill into law. 
 While it is widely accepted that the judiciary has to interpret the bill of rights 
in fulfilling its constitutional role, it is seldom noted that the executive and 
legislature likewise need to do so. In fact, the constitutional system may contain 
explicit safeguards to ensure that members of the political branches of government 
direct their minds to the issue, and even provide special mechanisms to assist the 
assessment process. In the United Kingdom, for instance, section 19 of the Human 
Rights Act 199861 requires a Minister of the Crown in charge of a Bill in either House 
of Parliament, before the Second Reading of the Bill, to either make a ‘statement of 
compatibility’, that is, one to the effect that in his view the provisions of the Bill are 
compatible with the rights protected by the Act, or to declare that the government 
                                                   
60  See the text accompanying nn 3–5, above. 
61  Above, n 53. 
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wishes the House to proceed with the Bill even though he is unable to make such a 
statement. There is also a permanent Joint Committee on Human Rights comprising 
members of both Houses, a major aspect of the work of which is to scrutinize bills 
passing through Parliament for conformity with the Act. 
Under the Irish Constitution, the President may, after consultation with the 
Council of State, refer to the Supreme Court certain types of Bills passed or deemed 
to have been passed by both Houses of the Oireachtas (National Parliament) and 
presented to him for signature for a decision as to whether such Bills or any specified 
provisions thereof is or are repugnant to the Constitution.62 If the Supreme Court 
decides that any provision of such a Bill is repugnant to the Constitution, the 
President is required to decline to sign the Bill.63
In Singapore, the President is also entitled to refer to a tribunal consisting of 
not less than three judges of the Supreme Court for its opinion any question as to the 
effect of any provision of the Constitution which has arisen or which appears likely to 
arise.64 Although no court has the jurisdiction to question the opinion of any tribunal 
or the validity of any law, or any provision therein, the Bill for which has been the 
subject of a reference to a tribunal by the President,65 unlike Ireland the President of 
Singapore cannot decline to assent to a Bill even if has been determined to be 
unconstitutional. 
                                                   
62  Irish Constitution, above, n 59, Art 26.1.1°. The procedure does not apply to a Money Bill, a 
Bill expressed to be a Bill containing a proposal to amend the Constitution, or a Bill the time for the 
consideration of which has been abridged by Seanad Éireann (the Senate of Ireland, which is the 
upper house of the Oireachtas): id, Art 26. 
63  Id, Art 26.3.1°. 
64  Singapore Constitution, above, n 3, Art 100(1). To date, one such question has been referred 
to a constitutional tribunal: Constitutional Reference No 1 of 1995 [1995] 1 SLR(R) 803. 
65  Id, Art 100(4). 
68 • Chapter Two 
In addition to the advisory opinion procedure, in Singapore another 
procedure exists specifically for ensuring that legislation is not disadvantageous to 
racial or religious communities. This procedure is designed to secure the compliance 
of legislation with constitutional guarantees of equality before the law and equal 
protection of the law.66 Apart from certain exceptions, all Bills which have been given 
a final reading and passed by Parliament must be sent to the Presidential Council for 
Minority Rights before being presented to the President for assent.67 Subsidiary 
legislation must also be sent to the Council by the appropriate Minister within 14 
days of publication.68 It is the Council’s function to examine the legislation and to 
draw attention to any Bill or subsidiary legislation that, in its opinion, is a 
“differentiating measure”, 69  namely, “any measure which is, or is likely in its 
practical application to be, disadvantageous to persons of any racial or religious 
community and not equally disadvantageous to persons of other such communities, 
either directly by prejudicing persons of that community or indirectly by giving 
advantage to persons of another community”.70 If the Council renders an adverse 
report in respect of a Bill, Parliament may either amend the Bill and resubmit it to 
the Council for further consideration, or proceed to present the Bill to the President 
for assent after a motion for that purpose has been passed by the affirmative vote of 
not less than two-thirds of the total membership of Parliament. 71  As regards 
                                                   
66  Art 12(1) states: “All persons are equal before the law and entitled to the equal protection of 
the law.” Art 12(2) prohibits discrimination against citizens of Singapore on the ground only of, inter 
alia, religion and race in any law; or in the appointment to any office or employment under a public 
authority; or in the administration of any law relating to the acquisition, holding or disposition of 
property or the establishing or carrying on of any trade, business, profession, vocation or employment. 
67  Id, Art 76(1). 
68  Id, Art 80(1). 
69  Id, Art 77. 
70  Id, Art 68. 
71  Id, Art 78(6)(c). 
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subsidiary legislation the procedure is similar, except that if Parliament wishes to 
confirm any such legislation in the face of an adverse report, a resolution passed with 
a simple majority suffices.72
The statutory provisions described above demonstrate that systems of 
constitutional government are usually set up in such a way that the executive and 
legislative branches of government must have regard to the constitution and the bill 
of rights in the lawmaking process. The political branches may also be required to 
independently construe the constitutional text in other situations because particular 
provisions have not yet been the subject of court cases.73 This occurred in McCrea v 
Minister for Customs & Justice,74 decided by the Federal Court of Australia. In that 
case, the Singapore Government had requested the Australian Government for the 
extradition of a British national alleged to have committed double murder who had 
fled to Melbourne. Murder is a capital offence in Singapore. Section 22(3)(c)(iii) of 
the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) provides in substance that where an offence for which 
extradition is sought is punishable by penalty of death the eligible person is only to 
be surrendered if, by virtue of an undertaking given by the extradition country to 
Australia, the death penalty, if imposed on the person, will not be carried out. To 
comply with this provision, Singapore sent a diplomatic note to Australia worded 
along its lines. The Minister for Customs and Justice of the Australian 
                                                   
72  Id, Art 80(4)(b). 
73  For one reason or another, certain constitutional issues are not likely to make their way into 
court. In such circumstances, if the executive and legislative branches refrain from interpreting the 
constitution, it is unlikely that the matters will receive serious treatment, if any at all: Neal Devins & 
Louis Fisher, “Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability” (1998) 84 Va L Rev 83 at 102. 
74  (2004) 212 ALR 297, FC (single judge) (Aust); and (2005) 223 ALR 552, 145 FCR 269, FC (full 
ct) (Aust). An application for special leave to appeal to the High Court was dismissed: McCrea v 
Minister for Customs and Justice of the Commonwealth [2005] HCATrans 761, HC (Aust), available 
from the website of the Australasian Legal Information Institute at <http://www.austlii.org> 
(accessed 16 November 2006). 
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Commonwealth then determined that McCrea should be surrendered to Singapore.75 
McCrea challenged this decision on the ground that this determination was beyond 
jurisdiction in that, by reason of section 22(3)(c) of the Act, the Minister’s power to 
determine that he be surrendered was conditional upon the existence of a valid and 
enforceable undertaking given by Singapore by virtue of which it was objectively 
established that, if the death penalty was imposed on him, it would not be carried out. 
The applicant contended that no such undertaking had been given by Singapore and 
that no such undertaking could be given.76 He submitted that this was because under 
Article 22P of the Singapore Constitution, the President may not act to prevent the 
death penalty being carried out prior to conviction and also may not act unless 
certain preconditions have been met. Further, the giving of the undertaking was an 
unlawful attempt to fetter future executive action, involved an improper interference 
with the judicial process, and unlawfully attempted to exempt the applicant from the 
ordinary operation of the law. Consequently, the undertaking was constitutionally 
invalid and unenforceable under either domestic or international law, and was 
therefore incapable of satisfying the objective fact required by section 22(3)(c)(iii) 
that “by virtue of the undertaking... the death penalty will not be carried out”.77
McCrea’s application ultimately failed, a full court of the Federal Court 
holding that an undertaking given pursuant to section 22(3)(c) does not need to be 
legally enforceable.78 However, the aspect of the case material to our discussion is 
                                                   
75  McCrea, FC (full ct), id at [4]–[8]. 
76  Id at [9]. 
77  McCrea, FC (single judge), above, n 74 at [15]. 
78  McCrea, FC (full ct), above, n 74 at [18]–[20]. The applicant was extradited to Singapore, 
where he pleaded guilty to two charges of culpable homicide not amounting to murder and one charge 
of causing the disappearance of evidence with the intention of screening himself from legal 
punishment. He was sentenced to 24 years’ imprisonment: Public Prosecutor v McCrea Michael 
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that the validity of the undertaking provided by Singapore to Australia under 
Singapore constitutional law was at the relevant time, and is still, an issue that has 
yet to be determined by the Singapore courts. Thus, in deciding to provide the 
undertaking to the Australian Government, the Attorney-General’s Chambers of 
Singapore, acting on behalf of the executive branch of the Singapore Government, 
must necessarily have made its own assessment of the matter.79
It can therefore be seen that constitutional systems usually contemplate that 
the branches of government have an independent duty to interpret the constitution 
and bill of rights when exercising their powers. Apart from specific provisions that 
expressly require the constitution to be taken into account, circumstances will arise 
in which the executive and legislature must determine the meaning of constitutional 
provisions in the absence of judgments that are on point. However, where such 
judgments exist, the possibility of a conflict of opinion arises. 
 
In this part of the chapter, we have examined several constitutional concepts. 
The rule of law and the separation of powers doctrines are regarded as cardinal 
elements. At its minimum, the rule of law mandates constitutionalism – the 
subjection of government to a body of clear, publicly-available and regularly-
enforced laws. This includes the bill of rights, which has the status of law, that all 
branches of government have an independent duty to interpret in order to carry out 
their constitutional responsibilities. On the other hand, according to the separation 
of powers doctrine, the exercise of power by one branch of government must be 
                                                                                                                                                              
[2006] 3 SLR(R) 677, HC. The sentence was confirmed by the Court of Appeal without reasons being 
issued: see Chong Chee Kin, “McCrea Fails to Get Jail Term Cut”, The Straits Times (23 August 2006). 
79  This was recognized by Kirby J during the hearing of McCrea’s application for special leave to 
appeal to the High Court of Australia, above, n 74: “Presumably the provisions of the law of Singapore 
were taken into account by the Republic of Singapore in giving the undertaking that it has given.” 
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capable of being checked by one or both of the other branches. In Westminster-style 
legal systems, where it is the norm to have individuals holding membership of both 
the executive and legislature, the rule of law also requires that there be a judiciary 
independent of the political branches to resolve disputes about laws, including the 
bill of rights. 
II. A SINGLE AUTHORITATIVE INTERPRETER? 
A. INTERPRETIVE AND JUDGMENT SUPREMACY DISTINGUISHED 
We can therefore see that the potential exists for a clash between foundational 
concepts. The autonomous duty of the branches of government to interpret the bill of 
rights in the course of their work may result in the branches reaching different 
conclusions as to the meaning and extent of fundamental liberties. In the event of 
disagreement, the question is whether interpretations of the bill of rights by an 
independent judiciary, whose job it is to resolve disputes regarding the law, must be 
regarded by the executive and legislature as authoritative. Or are the executive and 
legislature entitled to prefer their own opinions, a concept termed ‘departmental-
ism’?80
The orthodox view is that the judiciary is the ultimate interpreter of the 
constitution, and thus of any bill of rights embodied in it or having the status of 
supreme law. This position is exemplified by the case of Cooper v Aaron81 decided by 
the Supreme Court of the United States. The case merits examination, not least 
because many of the foundations of constitutional law in common law jurisdictions 
                                                   
80  Gary Lawson & Christopher D Moore, “The Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation” 
(1996) 81 Iowa L Rev 1267 at 1270; Saikrishna Prakash & John Yoo, “Against Interpretive Supremacy” 
(2005) 103 Mich L Rev 1539 at 1543–1544. 
81  358 US 1 (1958). 
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were laid by the US Constitution and decisions of the Supreme Court thereon. 
Cooper v Aaron was decided in the wake of the milestone decision of Brown v Board 
of Education,82 which had held that intentional segregation of school children by 
race violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the US 
Constitution. To comply with the ruling, the school board in Little Rock, Arkansas, 
devised a plan to phase out school segregation. However, the governor of the State 
called out the National Guard, instructing them to bar black children from Central 
High School, the only school scheduled to be integrated in the first year of the school 
board’s plan. He claimed that he had done so to preserve public order; however, no 
genuine threat to order was ever shown. Emboldened by this move, angry white 
crowds surrounded the school, jeered and spat on black children, and blocked their 
access to the school. The President of the United States had to call in troops to 
restore order. However, school administrators continued to face serious problems in 
controlling white students who carried on an organized campaign of harassment 
against black students.83 The State legislature also took steps to perpetuate racial 
segregation by, among other things, passing an amendment to the State Constitution 
commanding the Arkansas General Assembly to oppose “in every Constitutional 
manner the Un-constitutional desegregation decisions of May 17, 1954 and May 31, 
1955 of the United States Supreme Court”. Pursuant to this directive, the General 
Assembly passed various laws, including one relieving school children from 
compulsory attendance at racially-mixed schools. 84  Under these volatile 
                                                   
82  347 US 483 (1957). 
83  See Daniel A Farber, “The Supreme Court and the Rule of Law: Cooper v Aaron Revisited” 
(1982) U Ill L Rev 387 at 390–396. 
84  Cooper v Aaron, above, n 81 at 8–9. 
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circumstances, the school board applied to court for a two-and-a-half-year delay in 
implementing desegregation. 
In denying the application and requiring the school board to proceed with 
desegregation, the Supreme Court noted that the case “necessarily involves a claim 
by the Governor and Legislature of a State that there is no duty on state officials to 
obey federal court orders resting on this Court’s considered interpretation of the 
United States Constitution”.85 The Court refuted this claim. Citing Article VI of the 
US Constitution which makes the Constitution the “supreme Law of the Land” and 
John Marshall CJ’s declaration in Marbury v Madison that “[i]t is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is”,86 it stated: 
This decision [Marbury] declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary 
is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle 
has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent 
and indispensable feature of our constitutional system. It follows that the 
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in the 
Brown case is the supreme law of the land.87
Conversely, an intriguing line of academic opinion from the United States has 
carefully distinguished between what may be called ‘interpretive supremacy’ and 
‘judgment supremacy’.88 According to Saikrishna Prakash and John Yoo, interpretive 
supremacy is the exclusive power to resolve once and for all a constitution’s 
                                                   
85  Id at 4. 
86  Above, n 49 at 177. 
87  Cooper v Aaron, above, n 81 at 18. See also City of Boerne v Flores 521 US 507 (1997),  
concerning the scope of Congress’s enforcement power under the 14th Amdt, s 5. McConnell has 
called City of Boerne “the most judge-centered view of constitutional law since Cooper v. Aaron”: 
Michael W McConnell, “Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores” (1997) 
111 Harv L Rev 153 at 163. 
88  See, eg, Lawson & Moore, above, n 80; Edward A Hartnett, “A Matter of Judgment, Not a 
Matter of Opinion” (1999) 74 NYU L Rev 123; Prakash & Yoo, above, n 80. Contrast Farber, above, 
n 83; Michael Stokes Paulsen, “The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is” 
(1994) 83 Geo LJ 217; Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, “On Extrajudicial Constitutional 
Interpretation” (1997) 110 Harv L Rev 1359. I have adopted terminology used by Prakash & Yoo, id. 
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meaning.89 This was what the US Supreme Court asserted for itself in Cooper v 
Aaron. On the other hand, judgment supremacy is the idea that while the judiciary’s 
orders and judgments must be obeyed by the other branches of government, they 
need not adopt the conclusions about the constitution’s meaning underlying the 
decisions. In fact, a court’s ruling is perfectly valid without reasons being given for it, 
and in the bulk of the caseload of modern courts no grounds are provided for 
decisions.90 Thus, in the view of Prakash and Yoo: 
The political branches are free to articulate, advocate, and act upon 
alternative constitutional understandings. The only thing the political 
branches cannot do is ignore or thwart the final judgments issued by courts. 
Hence, members of Congress may pass legislation contrary to the judiciary’s 
constitutional interpretations so long as they do not impede or overturn a 
particular judgment. Likewise, the President may vigorously and publicly 
disagree with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of some constitutional 
provision so long as she continues to execute the judiciary’s judgments.91
It follows, therefore, that the actions of the Governor and State legislature of 
Arkansas in the events leading up to Cooper v Aaron were unjustified. Even if they 
had disagreed with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the equal protection clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution in Brown v Board of Education, 
they were under a legal duty to carry out court orders implementing the ruling. 
1. The Judiciary as Ultimate Interpreter: An Examination of the Judicial 
Role 
It might be said that for the US Supreme Court in Cooper v Aaron to have asserted 
its own supremacy was self-serving and savoured of circularity. Lawson and Moore 
have called attention to the fact that if the view of one governmental branch as to its 
                                                   
89  Prakash & Yoo, id at 1542 and 1550. 
90  See Hartnett, above, n 88 at 126–127 (“As valuable as opinions may be to legitimize 
judgments, to give guidance to judges in the future, or to discipline a judge’s thinking, they are not 
necessary to the judicial function of deciding cases and controversies.”). 
91  Prakash & Yoo, above, n 80 at 1550–1551. 
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own constitutional powers constrains the interpretative powers of the other branches, 
the first branch effectively gets to act as the judge in its own cause.92 The charge 
would be made out if this branch of government declared its own primacy without 
any basis. It is submitted, though, that the conclusion reached by the Supreme Court 
on the extent of its role is justified by the deductions it made from the text of the US 
Constitution, and that a similar reasoning may be applied to Westminster-style 
constitutions. 
The US Constitution does not declare the Supreme Court to be the 
authoritative expositor of the Constitution’s meaning in so many words. It merely 
states that judicial power extends to various cases and controversies, including all 
“Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United 
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority”.93 This 
suggests that the essence of judicial power is the determination of disputes between 
parties by the making of decisions binding on them. 
The signal contribution of Marbury v Madison to constitutional theory was 
Marshall CJ’s inference from the expression of judicial power in the Constitution that 
it was the responsibility of the courts to interpret the Constitution. One of the main 
issues in the case was whether an Act of the legislature repugnant to the Constitution 
could become the law of the land. 94  Noting that written constitutions are 
                                                   
92  Lawson & Moore, above, n 80 at 1276. 
93  US Constitution, Art III s 2: “The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, 
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under their Authority; – to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public ministers and Consuls; 
– to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; – to Controversies to which the United States 
shall be a Party; – to Controversies between two or more States; – between a State and Citizens of 
another State; – between Citizens of different States; – between Citizens of the same State claiming 
Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, 
Citizens or Subjects.” 
94  Marbury, above, n 49 at 176. 
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contemplated as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, 
Marshall CJ held that an Act repugnant to the constitution had to be void.95 And it 
was clearly the responsibility of the judiciary to make such a determination: 
Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and 
interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide 
on the operation of each. 
So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the 
constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide 
that case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or 
conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law; the court must 
determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very 
essence of judicial duty.96
Put another way, Marshall CJ’s reasoning runs thus. At its heart, judicial power is the 
constitutionally-sanctioned power to resolve disputes. In the process of doing so, the 
court must inevitably interpret the laws that apply to the dispute in question. The 
constitution is law – indeed, the highest law of the land. Therefore, in the event of a 
dispute touching on the constitutionality of a piece of legislation (or, one might add, 
executive action), the court is obliged to determine the meaning of the impugned 
legislation (or the legal basis for the executive action) and, more importantly, the 
meaning of the relevant provision of the constitution that it is alleged to contravene. 
In Marbury it was legislation that the Court declared invalid – the primary means by 
which the legislature expresses its opinion as to the Constitution’s meaning. Thus, 
from the reasoning employed in that case, the necessary (and, it is submitted, correct) 
implication is that judiciary’s views on the legality of actions of the political branches 
and the meaning of the Constitution are authoritative over those of the executive and 
legislature. It was this line of reasoning that enabled the Supreme Court in Cooper v 
                                                   
95  Id at 177. 
96  Id at 177–178. 
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Aaron to declare that “the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of 
the Constitution”.97  
This analysis applies with equal force to Westminster-style constitutions. In 
the High Court of Australia’s decision in Huddart, Parker & Co Pty Ltd v 
Moorehead,98 Samuel Griffith CJ said that the words “judicial power” as used in 
section 71 of the Australian Constitution99
mean the power which every sovereign authority must of necessity have to 
decide controversies between its subjects, or between itself and its subjects, 
whether the rights relate to life, liberty or property. The exercise of this power 
does not begin until some tribunal which has power to give a binding and 
authoritative decision (whether subject to appeal or not) is called upon to take 
action.100
The above formula essentially expresses the meaning of judicial power in the same 
way that the US Constitution does. As this definition was regarded as “classic and 
widely accepted” by the Privy Council in Attorney-General for Australia v The 
Queen, 101  it is fair to regard it as generally applicable to constitutions in 
Westminster-style systems. From this, it follows that a judge from a nation with such 
a system of government also has the responsibility to assess executive actions and 
legislative instruments for compliance with the constitution, and thus the 
concomitant duty to construe the meaning of the bill of rights in the constitution or 
having the status of basic law. 
                                                   
97  Cooper v Aaron, above, n 81 at 18. 
98  (1909) 8 CLR 330. 
99  Above, n 22. 
100  Huddart, above, n 98 at 357. 
101  [1957] AC 288 at 318, PC (on appeal from Aust). In this and later cases, the Privy Council 
fleshed out other aspects of judicial power: therefore we know that in a criminal case it encompasses 
the assessment of guilt or innocence and, after a conviction, the appropriate sentence to be imposed 
(see Liyanage v The Queen, above, n 23; Hinds v The Queen, above, n 8; Mohammed Muktar Ali v 
The Queen [1992] 2 AC 93, PC (on appeal from Mauritius); Browne v The Queen [2000] 1 AC 45, PC 
(on appeal from St Christopher & Nevis); Director of Public Prosecutions of Jamaica v Mollison 
[2003] 2 AC 411, PC (on appeal from Jamaica); Griffith v The Queen [2005] 2 AC 235, PC (on appeal 
from Barbados); and that it excludes arbitral functions (Attorney-General for Australia, id). 
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2. Departmentalism and the Rule of Law 
Marbury, however, did not have to consider the fact that the political branches of 
government also have a legal duty to interpret the Constitution. A possible 
contention, therefore, is that while a court certainly has a duty to construe the 
meaning of the bill of rights in the context of resolving a dispute brought before it, 
there is no reason why the executive and legislature should not also articulate their 
own interpretations of fundamental rights in the course of performing their 
constitutional functions. The unspoken assumption behind this contention is that 
there is nothing particularly problematic about official interpretations of the bill of 
rights laid down by different branches of government that conflict with each other 
existing simultaneously. 
In fact, it has been averred that departmentalism and judgment supremacy 
reinforce the doctrine of the separation of powers: the notion that power should be 
dispersed rather than concentrated in a single entity. Hence, departmentalism 
enables the branches of government to check each other more effectively. 
Furthermore, if the three branches of government can independently interpret the 
bill of rights in carrying out their respective functions, this promotes a constitutional 
dialogue that provides opportunities for the airing of diverse points of view 
concerning important issues. 
What might this mean in practice? We have seen that Prakash and Yoo are of 
the opinion that the legislature is entitled to pass laws that are contrary to the 
judiciary’s constitutional interpretations so long as they do not impede or overturn 
particular judgments, and that the executive may publicly disagree with the Supreme 
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Court’s interpretations.102 This is not especially problematic. However, Lawson and 
Moore push the envelope, arguing that the best understanding of the role of 
judgments in the US constitutional scheme is that the President and Congress can go 
so far as to refuse to enforce a judgment. They caution, though, that such a step must 
only be taken in extreme circumstances: only for constitutional error, and only when 
that error is so clear that it is not open to rational question.103
How a constitutional system along these lines would be workable is difficult to 
imagine. It is open to any person adversely affected by executive or legislative action 
opposed to a judicial understanding of the constitution to apply to a court for a 
review of the constitutionality of such action. The court would be acting within its 
sphere if it then struck down the executive action or legislation by applying principles 
of stare decisis104 and adhering to precedents laid down by superior courts or its own 
prior decisions. As the US Supreme Court remarked in City of Boerne v Flores105 
after having referred to Marbury v Madison: 
When the Court has interpreted the Constitution, it has acted within the 
province of the Judicial Branch, which embraces the duty to say what the law 
is. … When the political branches of the Government act against the 
background of a judicial interpretation of the Constitution already issued, it 
must be understood that in later cases and controversies the Court will treat 
its precedents with the respect due them under settled principles, including 
stare decisis, and contrary expectations must be disappointed.106
                                                   
102  Prakash & Yoo, above, n 80 at 1550–1551. 
103  Lawson & Moore, above, n 80 at 1325–1326. 
104  The principle by which a court is bound to follow decisions in former cases: see Halsbury’s 
Laws of England (4th ed reissue) (London: Butterworths LexisNexis, 2001), vol 37, [1327] at n 1. 
105  Above, n 87. 
106  Id at 536 (citation omitted). Boerne was cited by the Supreme Court in Dickerson v United 
States 530 US 428 at 437 (2000), the Court noting that “… Congress may not legislatively supersede 
our decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution.” 
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Rules regarding stare decisis and ratio decidendi107 serve to regulate the decision-
making process of the court so that the law may develop in an orderly fashion, and 
thus provide a degree of certainty upon which persons may rely in conducting their 
affairs.108 They say nothing about the influence that judicial understandings of the 
constitution and bill of rights should have on the other branches of government. 
However, the application of these rules means that unless the court is convinced 
otherwise, it will stand to its guns. On the other hand, if the political branches find 
themselves in profound disagreement with the court’s interpretation of the bill of 
rights and, instead of taking steps to amend it, the executive refuses to enforce the 
court’s judgment or the legislature enacts statutes inconsistent with the judgment, 
this will lead to an irresolvable face-off between the judiciary and the political 
branches. It is hard to see how this promotes constitutional dialogue in any 
meaningful sense. 
It must not be overlooked that the judiciary is reliant on the executive to carry 
out its judgments. Moreover, the judiciary may declare an Act of Parliament to be 
void for unconstitutionality but is generally powerless 109  to bring ameliorating 
legislation into effect – this is within the legislature’s remit. In the Federalist No 78, 
Alexander Hamilton wrote: 
The executive not only dispenses the honors, but holds the sword of the 
community. The legislature not only commands the purse, but prescribes the 
rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated. The 
                                                   
107  The reason or principle upon which a question before the court has been decided. It has the 
force of law and is binding as a precedent: Osborne v Rowlett (1880) 13 Ch D 774 at 785; Close v Steel 
Co of Wales Ltd [1962] AC 367, HL; see Halsbury’s Laws of England, above, n 104 at [1327]; Farber, 
above, n 83 at 408. 
108  Practice Statement [1966] 1 WLR 1234, HL: see Halsbury’s Laws of England, id. 
109  A court may, however, construe legislation in order to preserve its constitutionality, possibly 
to the extent of reading words into it. This is done to ordinary legislation from time to time: see F A R 
Bennion, Statutory Interpretation: A Code (4th ed) (London: Butterworths, 2002) at 421–438, pt IX 
(‘Filling in the Textual Detail’). 
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judiciary on the contrary has no influence over either the sword or the purse, 
no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society, and can take 
no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor 
WILL, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the 
executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.110
Hence, if the political branches are free to dissent from the judiciary’s decisions and 
to refuse to give effect to them, it is hard to see how the latter could fulfil its 
constitutional role. The element of the rule of law requiring the existence of an 
independent judiciary to resolve disputes 111  – which presupposes an effectual 
judiciary – would be undermined. 
The above scenario also creates an unacceptable degree of uncertainty and 
confusion in the law. Effectively, incongruent meanings will be attributed to 
particular contested provisions of the constitution depending on which branch of the 
government one is dealing with. It is submitted that this undercuts another of the 
elements of the rule of law, namely, that laws are publicly available, generally obeyed 
and generally enforced. This is because a law that is vague, or incomprehensible for 
some other reason, is not publicly available in any real sense and cannot easily be 
obeyed or enforced.112 In Merkur Island Shipping Corporation v Laughton, the 
House of Lords commented: “Absence of clarity is destructive of the rule of law; it is 
unfair to those who wish to preserve the rule of law; it encourages those who wish to 
undermine it.”113
                                                   
110  ‘Publius’ (Alexander Hamilton), “A View of the Constitution of the Judicial Department, in 
Relation to the Tenure of Good Behaviour” (28 May 1788) in Alexander Hamilton, James Madison & 
John Jay, The Federalist (J R Pole, ed) (Indianapolis; Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 2005) 
411 at 412 (describing the power of the judiciary under the text of the US Constitution of 1787). 
111  Hogg & Zwibel, above, n 33 at 718. 
112  Id at 722. 
113  [1983] 2 AC 570 at 612 (criticizing the clarity of drafting of certain statutes). See also the 
judgment of Sir John Donaldson MR in the Court of Appeal, id at 594: “The efficacy and maintenance 
of the rule of law, which is the foundation of any parliamentary democracy, has at least two pre-
requisites. First, people must understand that it is in their interests, as well as in that of the 
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Nonetheless, is there not something in the point that there ought to be 
residual power reposed in the executive and legislature to disagree with the 
judiciary’s interpretation of the constitution in extraordinary cases? This may be 
illustrated by a striking hypothetical scenario developed by Michael Stokes 
Paulsen. 114  Suppose, for example, that a case is brought in the United States 
challenging an exercise of the veto power of the President, and the Supreme Court 
affirms a permanent injunction against any further use of the veto (perhaps coupled 
with a permanent injunction against ever seeking reconsideration of the Court’s 
decision). Would the President truly be bound by that judgment? Again, if the 
Supreme Court issued a permanent injunction against Congress further exercising its 
law-making power, would Congress be bound? If interpretive supremacy held sway, 
Congress would not be able to control the Court through impeachments of judges or 
legislation restricting the Court’s jurisdiction, as the Court could simply declare in a 
further judgment that, upon its interpretation of the Constitution, the Justices were 
not subject to impeachment and the Court had jurisdiction notwithstanding the 
content of any congressional statutes. That judgment would be absolutely binding. 
Thus, by issuing judgments, the courts would be able to take command of all aspects 
of the government. Lawson and Moore comment: “It seems unlikely that the 
Constitution creates an unelected Supreme Court which is bound by nothing but its 
conscience.”115
It is unnecessary to resort to departmentalism for a solution, for one exists in 
most written constitutions. Obviously it is very unlikely that a court would act in such 
                                                                                                                                                              
community as a whole, that they should live their lives in accordance with the rules and all the rules. 
Second, they must know what those rules are. Both are equally important…” 
114  Paulsen, above, n 88 at 284–287. 
115  Lawson & Moore, above, n 80 at 1324. 
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an unrestrained manner, but if one did this would no doubt constitute misconduct 
justifying the institution of proceedings by the political branches of government for 
removal of the judges concerned. For instance, section 72(ii) of the Australian 
Constitution116 states: “The Justices of the High Court and of the other courts created 
by the Parliament… shall not be removed except by the Governor-General in Council, 
on an address from both Houses of the Parliament in the same session, praying for 
such removal on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity”. In any case, it is 
not difficult to conceive of extreme examples unlikely to occur in reality, where the 
only viable solution is some drastic form of regime change. By the same token, it 
might be argued in support of interpretive supremacy that the judiciary is a bulwark 
against a runaway executive or legislature intent on clinging on to power by 
suppressing fundamental freedoms. Such scenarios takes us out of the realm of law 
into political science and philosophy. 
To sum up, we should not lose faith in interpretive supremacy. It is submitted 
that it is impracticable to have a system in which the branches of government can 
rely on conflicting interpretations of the bill of rights, and require persons to suffer 
the consequences of this divergence of opinion in their dealings with the branches. 
And although departmentalism and judgment supremacy are claimed to reinforce 
the doctrine of the separation of powers and promote a constitutional dialogue 
                                                   
116  Above, n 22. See also the Irish Constitution, Art 35.4.1° (“A judge of the Supreme Court or the 
High Court shall not be removed from office except for stated misbehaviour or incapacity, and then 
only upon resolutions passed by Dáil Éireann [ie, the House of Representatives or lower house] and by 
Seanad Éireann calling for his removal.”); and the Singapore Constitution, Art 98(3) (“If the Prime 
Minister, or the Chief Justice after consulting the Prime Minister, represents to the President that a 
Judge of the Supreme Court ought to be removed on the ground of misbehaviour… to properly 
discharge the functions of his office, the President shall appoint a tribunal… and shall refer that 
representation to it; and may on the recommendation of the tribunal remove the Judge from office.”). 
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among the branches of government, it is submitted that these theories ultimately 
have a tendency to undermine the rule of law. 
B. THE COUNTER-MAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY 
Another possible objection to interpretive supremacy exists in the form of the 
‘counter-majoritarian difficulty’, regarded by Barry Friedman to be “the central 
obsession of modern constitutional scholarship”117 in the US. The term, coined by 
Alexander Bickel,118 may be explained thus: to the extent that popular democracy 
entails responsiveness to popular will, how do we justify the fact that the judiciary, a 
branch of government the members of which are unaccountable to the people, has 
the power to overturn popular decisions?119
It can be seen that the counter-majoritarian difficulty rests upon two 
assumptions: 
(a) The electoral process is definitive of democracy, or, otherwise put, 
actions taken by agents of the executive or statutes passed by the 
legislature are necessarily expressions of popular will. 
(b) An unelected judiciary is politically unaccountable to the people.120
1. The Elusive ‘Majority Will’, and Executive and Legislative Action 
As regards the first assumption, it is too simplistic to say that actions taken by the 
political branches of government must inevitably be seen as articulations of what the 
                                                   
117  Barry Friedman, “The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to 
Judicial Supremacy” (1998) 73 NYU L Rev 333 at 334. 
118  Alexander M Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics 
(Indianapolis, In: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962) at 16: “The root difficulty is that judicial review is a counter-
majoritarian force in our system.” 
119  Compare Friedman, “Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One”, above, n 117 at 335. 
120  See Steven L Winter, “An Upside/Down View of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty” (1991) 69 
Tex L Rev 1881 at 1920. 
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majority of the electorate desires. Where the executive is concerned, it is often the 
actions of its agents – police officers and civil servants that staff government 
departments, for example – that are alleged to breach constitutional guarantees.121 
As for the legislature, it is arguable that there may be instances where statutes can be 
regarded as a manifestation of popular will. In particular, this may be the case where 
legislation is put to a referendum, or where a Parliamentary committee has been 
convened to examine the proposed legislation and the views of interested members 
of the public sought and adopted. The latter scenario is a more common feature of 
Westminster-style systems than the former. However, it is difficult to conclude 
whether the Act of Parliament that is passed after a Parliamentary committee’s 
scrutiny necessarily embodies the hopes that a majority of the public has for it. In the 
bulk of cases it is fair to say that the public does not provide any direct input into the 
legislative process. A legislature often enacts laws that the public has no cognizance 
of – in fact, even members of the legislature themselves may have no grasp of what a 
certain law means, and merely follow the lead of the government minister sponsoring 
the law, the directions of the party whip, and colleagues who are apparently more 
knowledgable.122
Further criticisms of the first assumption may be made. Friedman, for 
instance, doubts the existence of such a creature as the ‘majority will’. To him, it is 
too simplistic to say that people are either for or against a policy. “[M]ajorities come 
and go as the public engages in debate. At best there is a constantly shifting tide of 
                                                   
121  Paul C Weiler, “Rights and Judges in a Democracy: A New Canadian Version” (1984) 18 U 
Mich JL Reform 51 at 66, speaking in the context of the Canadian Charter: “[T]he vast majority of 
government slots are filled by professional appointees. The actions taken by these officials under the 
power of their office generate the greatest share of claims subject to judicial scrutiny under a 
constitutional Charter.” 
122  See Barry Friedman, “Dialogue and Judicial Review” (1993) 91 Mich L Rev 577 at 633. 
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public opinion. … [I]n real life, choices arise on a continuum.”123 In any case, a piece 
of legislation whose constitutionality is challenged before the courts may be one that 
was enacted some time ago, before the individuals comprising the current polity were 
even alive. Even if a ‘majority will’ can somehow be accurately identified, is it proper 
to assume that such legislation is supported by a latter-day majority without any 
evidence on the matter? 
The significance of a vote for a representative in a legislature also deserves 
examination. The media has speculated that some presidential and congressional 
elections in the US have been influenced by the views of voters on controversial 
issues such as a woman’s right to an abortion, equality of treatment for gay persons, 
and the continued presence of US troops in Iraq. It might be argued that if the 
President or Congress was subsequently to adopt policies in line with voters’ 
opinions on those issues, such policies could be said to represent the popular will. 
However, short of polling every voter for his or her opinions, it is nigh impossible to 
determine with any degree of precision why voters have chosen particular candidates 
as their representatives. Rather than choosing, say, a legislator based on the latter’s 
opinion on a particular issue, it is likely that the average voter makes a decision on a 
bundle of the legislator’s views on various issues, only some of which the voter agrees 
with. If the legislator later votes in Congress for legislation that the voter disagrees 
with, it cannot meaningfully be claimed that the legislation passed represents the 
majority will.124
We are therefore left with the conclusion that just because members of a 
legislature are elected to their posts by a majority of the voting public, it does not 
                                                   
123  Friedman, “Dialogue and Judicial Review”, above, n 122 at 638–639. 
124  Id at 639–640. 
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follow that it is apt to characterize all legislation enacted by that legislature as 
expressions of the popular will. Rather, what we are really talking about is an 
electoral majority giving its mandate to its chosen representatives in Parliament to 
decide policies on its behalf by enacting new legislation or supporting existing 
legislation. Nevertheless, to claim that judicial review of such policies is 
undemocratic would be countenancing a simplistic and feeble version of democracy. 
It is submitted that democratic government must be more than just rule based on a 
majority mandate, heedless of the burden placed on dissenting minorities. It must 
also encompass appropriate restraints on the legitimate scope of decisions made in 
the name of the majority that flow from a decent respect for the fundamental rights 
of the individual,125 which are enforced by an independent judiciary. 
Furthermore, the nature of the judicial process arguably belies the allegation 
that it is less democratic than legislative proceedings. When a constitutional dispute 
is brought before a court it is determined, usually in a public hearing, by a judge who 
does not have an institutional commitment towards any of the parties, after they 
have had an opportunity to present their respective cases.126
Most importantly, we should question whether ‘democracy’ ought to be the 
yardstick by which the appropriateness of judicial review is evaluated. It is too 
indistinct, too contested a concept. It has also been suggested that democracy should 
be valued, not as a goal in itself because it is somehow intrinsically good, but because 
it leads to other things that are good, such as enhanced feelings of civil participation 
                                                   
125  Weiler, above, n 121 at 67–68. 
126  Id at 66. 
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and belonging, or the reinforcement of equality among citizens.127 Therefore, simply 
pointing to the application of a democratic process is insufficient to justify oppressive 
administrative actions or legislation, as the ultimate aim is not merely the exercise of 
‘democracy’ but a society that is more just.128
2. An Unelected Judiciary – Problem or Protector? 
The second assumption that the counter-majoritarian difficulty rests upon is that an 
unelected judiciary is not politically accountable to the people, and therefore on this 
account judicial review is also undemocratic. In Westminster-style jurisdictions 
judges are generally appointed by the executive and are not elected by the people.129 
Hence, it is fair to say that that the judiciary is not directly accountable to them. 
However, it does not follow that it is therefore problematic for the judiciary to assess 
the actions of the political branches for compliance with the bill of rights. Such an 
assumption misunderstands the function of the judiciary. The fact that judges are 
appointed rather than popularly elected frees them from being beholden to the 
electorate, and thus preserves the independence of the judiciary. We have seen that 
the latter attribute is one of the elements of the rule of law.130 The obvious objection 
is that judges may be beholden to the politicians who appointed them, which is 
possibly worse. Apart from the expectation, of course, that judges will act fairly and 
                                                   
127  Carissima Mathen, “Dialogue Theory, Judicial Review, and Judicial Supremacy: A Comment 
on ‘Charter Dialogue Revisited’” (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall LJ 125 at 142, citing Ronald Dworkin, 
Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000) 
at 187. 
128  Compare Mathen, id, at 142–143. 
129  Thus in Singapore, for instance, the Chief Justice, the Judges of Appeal and Judges of the 
High Court are appointed by the President if he, acting in his discretion, concurs with the advice of the 
Prime Minister: Singapore Constitution, above, n 3, Art 95(1). 
130  See the text accompanying n 39, above. 
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impartially in fulfilment of their oath of office,131 this point is addressed by the fact 
that the law provides judges with immunity from suit and that constitutions normally 
safeguard their independence in various ways, including granting them security of 
tenure. 132  Hence, in theory at least, unless judges are close to the age of 
superannuation at the time of their appointment, they will most likely hold office 
beyond the term of the politicians who recommended their elevation to the bench.133
Vis-à-vis a bill of rights, the duty of an independent judiciary is to ensure that 
actions taken by the political branches of government do not infringe fundamental 
rights of persons. This responsibility is of especial importance where the rights of an 
electoral minority are concerned, as they are less able to influence the political 
system compared to persons comprising the majority.134 Moreover, courts play a 
crucial role in interpreting fundamental rights so as to insulate enduring values and 
principles of the community from transient popular sentiment. 135  Thus the 
judiciary’s lack of direct political accountability is not a flaw in the system but an 
integral part of the design of Westminster-style constitutions. This is not to say that a 
legal system is defective where the legislature is regarded as the ultimate bulwark of 
                                                   
131  For instance, under the Singapore Constitution, above, n 3, Art 97 read with para 6 of the 1st 
Sch, the Chief Justice, Judges and Judicial Commissioners take an oath to “faithfully discharge [their] 
judicial duties, and… do right to all manner of people after the laws and usages of the Republic of 
Singapore without fear or favour, affection or ill-will to the best of [their] ability…” (emphasis added). 
132  As to measures that are usually established to ensure the independence of judges, see the text 
accompanying nn 40–42, above. 
133  This argument would not apply if the same politicians were returned to power for several 
Parliamentary terms. Thus in jurisdictions where such a state of affairs pertains, this may cast a 
measure of doubt as to the independence of the judiciary – assuming that the judiciary also ignores its 
duty of impartiality, which of course it may not. 
134  For this reason Barry Friedman, in his article “The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The 
History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five” (2002) 112 Yale LJ 153 at 226, noted that a 
possible solution to the counter-majoritarian difficulty lay in Justice Harlan Stone’s well-known 
footnote 4 in United States v Carolene Products Co 304 US 144 at 152 (1938), where the judge 
expressed the view that more searching judicial review might be appropriate when specific textual 
protections were at issue, when legislation interfered with the functioning of the political process and 
the ability to find redress there, or when the rights of “discrete and insular” minorities were at stake. 
135  Tom R Hickman, “Constitutional Dialogue, Constitutional Theories and the Human Rights 
Act 1998” [1995] Pub L 306 at 317. 
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individual rights, as is the case in New Zealand and the United Kingdom where the 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty holds sway. However, it is submitted that 
where a deliberate decision has been taken to establish a constitutional system with a 
legally-enforceable written bill of rights, that decision is rendered pointless if judicial 
review by the courts on the basis of the bill of rights is impugned simply because it is 
seen as going against actions taken by the people’s elected representatives. In fact, 
the case for judicial review is arguably stronger in a Westminster-style system 
because there is a greater need for the judiciary to provide a check against the 
executive and legislature, since strict party discipline enables the governing political 
party to impose favoured policies with relative ease.136
It may be contended that in the preponderance of cases it is not problematic 
for the judiciary to review legislation for compliance with a bill of rights, but where 
controversial issues that involve moral judgment are involved, the legislature is more 
competent to deal with them. It is submitted that this is not necessarily the case. Paul 
Weiler has opined that while the legislature may avoid taking a stand on difficult 
moral issues for fear of losing votes, the judiciary is obliged to respond to claims on 
legal merits. In addition, the fact that judges are not compelled by electoral self-
preservation means that instead of simply mirroring existing majority views and 
prejudices, they can move the law forward to a more enlightened position on 
controversial subjects.137
There remains a lingering fear that if judges are accorded wide latitude when 
interpreting bill of rights, they will simply read their personal preferences and 
prejudices into the text. Albie Sachs, a former judge of the Constitutional Court of 
                                                   
136  Weiler, above, n 121 at 69. 
137  Id at 71–72. 
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South Africa, has admitted that when he decided cases, “[m]ixed in with the formal 
logic there has invariably been an enormous amount of random intuitive searching 
and a surging element of unruly, free-floating sensibility”.138 However, this was not a 
reason for alarm because the intuitions of judges appointed to final appellate courts 
are “not based on blind, untutored and highly subjective predilections” but have been 
“filtered and transmuted into an evolving lexicon of legal principles”.139 Furthermore, 
judges are required to provide reasoned justifications for their decisions, ensuring 
conformity with the existing legal principles:140 “A discovery that cannot be justified 
simply cannot stand. … [O]ne does not have a free choice between adopting one’s 
intuitive sense – that intense feeling emerging inside yourself based on a lifetime of 
experience – and following the process of formal reasoning.”141 Ultimately, as judges 
are human beings, we must expect them to bring their individual experiences and 
views to bear on the decisions they make.142 Indeed, this is a positive aspect of 
judicial review because judging lies somewhere between applying cold logic and the 
judge’s personal opinions. According to Sachs there is an “internal dialogue of reason 
and passion”143 – passion referring to the range of emotional and intuitive responses 
to arguments or facts.144 This dialogue does not taint the judicial process but is “in 
                                                   
138  Albie Sachs, “Tock-Tick: The Working of a Judicial Mind” in The Strange Alchemy of Life and 
Law (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009) at 48. 
139  Id at 49. 
140  Compare Weiler, above, n 121 at 71. 
141  Sachs, “Tock-Tick”, above, n 138 at 53. 
142  See also J A G Griffiths, “Judicial Creativity” in The Politics of the Judiciary (5th ed) (London: 
Fontana Press, 1997) at 283–284: “[J]udges, like the rest of us, are not all of a piece… they are liable 
to be swayed by emotional prejudices”. 
143  Sachs, “Reason and Passion” in Strange Alchemy, above, n 138 at 114, citing the views of 
William J Brennan, Jr, former justice of the United States Supreme Court. 
144  Id at 115. 
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fact central to its vitality, and particularly true in constitutional interpretation”, 
because the law must reflect human experience.145
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT 
How, then, should we regard the relationship between the branches of government 
where interpretation of a bill of rights is concerned? One concept has gained 
currency in a number of jurisdictions is that of a constitutional conversation or 
dialogue. In the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision Vriend v Alberta,146 Iacobucci J 
expressed the view that the Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
has given rise to a more dynamic interaction among the branches of 
governance. This interaction has been aptly described as a “dialogue” by 
some… . In reviewing legislative enactments and executive decisions to ensure 
constitutional validity, the courts speak to the legislative and executive 
branches. As has been pointed out, most of the legislation held not to pass 
constitutional muster has been followed by new legislation designed to 
accomplish similar objectives… . By doing this, the legislature responds to the 
courts; hence the dialogue among the branches. 147
He saw the value of such a constitutional dialogue as making the branches of 
government somewhat accountable to each other, which had the effect of enhancing 
the democratic process.148 In the United Kingdom context, too, it has been suggested 
that the principle of “democratic dialogue” is “implicit in the structural features” of 
the Human Rights Act 1998.149 Opportunities for dialogue between the courts and 
the legislature arise when the courts construe legislation compatibly with Convention 
                                                   
145  Id at 114–115. 
146  [1998] 1 SCR 493, SC (Can). 
147  Id at [138], citing Peter W Hogg & Allison A Bushell, “The Charter Dialogue between Courts 
and Legislatures (or Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn’t Such a Bad Thing After All)” (1997) 35 
Osgoode Hall LJ 75. See also Corbiere v Canada (Minister of Indian & Northern Affairs) [1999] 2 
SCR 203 at [116] per L’Heureux-Dubé J (dissenting) (Gonthier, Iacobucci and Binnie JJ, concurring); 
Kent Roach, “Constitutional, Remedial, and International Dialogues about Rights: The Canadian 
Experience” (2005) 40 Tex Int’l LJ 537; Kent Roach, “Dialogue or Defiance: Legislative Reversals of 
Supreme Court Decisions in Canada and the United States” (2006) 4 Int’l J Const L 347. 
148  Vriend, id at [139]. 
149  Richard Clayton, “Judicial Deference and ‘Democratic Dialogue’: The Legitimacy of Judicial 
Intervention under the Human Rights Act 1998” [2004] Pub L 33 at 46. 
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rights under section 3 of the Act,150 or find themselves unable to do so and make 
declarations of incompatibility under section 4, for Parliament may enact fresh 
legislation that modifies a section 3 interpretation or make remedial orders under 
section 10151 to amend legislation.152 In other words, the judiciary on the one hand, 
and the executive and legislature on the other, are seen as interacting by checking 
each other’s actions and, in the process, determining the appropriateness of 
administrative or legislative acts and the meaning of the bill of rights. 
A constitutional dialogue also has an important effect of promoting 
participation in determining the policies which should be adopted for the 
community’s benefit. By setting forth interpretations of fundamental rights, the 
judiciary plays a signalling function, calling on the government, academics and the 
public at large to focus on issues that are of particular importance to society. This has 
the effect of stimulating discussion about the issues. Interested persons may petition 
their representatives in the legislature to adopt one policy or another, to the extent of 
seeking to alter the legislature’s composition by exercising votes during an 
election.153
                                                   
150  The Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), above, n 53, s 3(1), states: “So far as it is possible to do so, 
primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is 
compatible with the Convention rights.” 
151  The Human Rights Act, id, s 10, contains a number of subsections, but its import is conveyed 
by s 10(2), which reads: “If a Minister of the Crown considers that there are compelling reasons for 
proceeding under this section, he may by order make such amendments to the legislation as he 
considers necessary to remove the incompatibility.” The procedure for making remedial orders is set 
out in the Second Schedule to the Act. 
152  Clayton, above, n 149 at 45–46. 
153  Friedman, “Dialogue and Judicial Review”, above, n 122 at 654, 656–657, 668–670. See also 
Christine Bateup, “The Dialogic Promise: Assessing the Normative Potential of Theories of 
Constitutional Dialogue” (2006) 71 Brook L Rev 1109 at 1158–1159; and Bruce A Ackerman, “The 
Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution” (1984) 93 Yale LJ 1013, where he expressed the view 
that the function of judicial review is to act as a check on the people’s representatives – if the 
representatives respond to special interests in ways that jeopardize fundamental duties, a judge’s duty 
is to expose them for what they are: id at 1029–1030. By declaring a statute unconstitutional, the 
court is signalling to the people that their representatives are attempting to legislate in a way that few 
political movements in history have done with credibility. Thus, the time has come for the people to 
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In addition, when engaging in dialogue, the judiciary and political branches of 
government can be said to contribute complementary views on issues because of 
their institutional natures. A court brings to the table its perspective as to whether 
the exercise of power by the political branches unjustifiably limits fundamental 
liberties, since interpreting and defining rights is a central aspect of judicial decision-
making and is a task that the judiciary regularly and specifically performs. The 
executive and legislature, given their access to resources and policy expertise, are 
able to provide insights into the situations where the pursuit of wider policy 
objectives might necessitate a restriction of rights. By having regard to each other’s 
perspectives on an issue, the branches of government may modify their own views154 
and eventually achieve a common understanding of what the bill of rights requires. 
It may be contended that it is more meaningful to speak of a dialogue in 
Canada and the United Kingdom because of structural features in their bills of rights 
that specifically enable the legislatures in those jurisdictions to respond to judgments 
of the courts. In the Canadian Charter, these structural features are said to include 
section 33,155 which entitles Parliament or a legislature to liberate a statute from 
                                                                                                                                                              
decide if they will respond by making the political effort to redefine their collective identity by 
amending the constitution: id at 1050. 
154  Compare Bateup, id at 1170–1172, citing Janet L Hiebert, Charter Conflicts: What is 
Parliament’s Role? (Montréal; London: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002) at 50–72; Hiebert, 
“Parliament and Rights” in Protecting Human Rights: Instruments and Institutions (Tom Campbell, 
Jeffrey Goldsworthy & Adrienne Stone, eds) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) at 231; Hiebert, 
“New Constitutional Ideas: Can New Parliamentary Models Resist Judicial Dominance when 
Interpreting Rights?” (2004) 82 Tex L Rev 1963. 
155  Section 33 of the Canadian Charter, above, n 33, states: 
(1) Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare in an Act of the 
Parliament or of the legislature, as the case may be, that the Act or a provision thereof 
shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of 
this Charter. 
(2) An Act or a provision of an Act in respect of which a declaration made under this 
section is in effect shall have such operation as it would have but for the provision of 
this Charter referred to in the declaration. 
(3) A declaration made under subsection (1) shall cease to have effect five years after it 
comes into force or on such earlier dates as may be specified in the declaration. 
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specified provisions of the Charter for successive five-year periods by expressly 
declaring that the statute shall apply notwithstanding those provisions; and section 1, 
which guarantees that the rights and freedoms set out in the Charter are subject only 
to “such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free 
and democratic society”.156 The UK Human Rights Act preserves the principle of 
parliamentary sovereignty – a judge may not invalidate legislation that is found to 
infringe Convention rights, but only make a declaration of incompatibility under 
section 4. Such a declaration does not affect the validity, continuing operation or 
enforcement of the relevant legislation and is not binding on the parties to the 
proceedings in which it is made.157 It is open to Parliament to decide how it wishes to 
respond. As indicated above, it may make a remedial order under section 10 of the 
Act, amend the legislation or enact new legislation in the ordinary way or, indeed, do 
nothing if it deems fit. 
Such explicit structural features are generally lacking in the United States 
Constitution and Westminster-style constitutions. If, as has been submitted, it ought 
to be accepted that the courts’ interpretations of the bill of rights should be regarded 
by the political branches of government as authoritative, it is not open to the 
                                                                                                                                                              
(4) Parliament or the legislature of a province may re-enact a declaration made under 
subsection (1). 
(5) Subsection (3) applies in respect of a re-enactment made under subsection (4). 
156  Hogg & Bushell, above, n 147, at 82–87. The other provisions of the Charter said to promote 
constitutional dialogue are the rights that are framed in qualified terms – s 7 (right to life, liberty and 
security of the person, but only if deprivation violates “the principles of fundamental justice”), s 8 
(right to be secure against “unreasonable” search and seizure), s 9 (right not to be “arbitrarily” 
detained or imprisoned) and s 12 (guarantee against “cruel and unusual” punishment) – and equality 
rights under s 15: Hogg & Bushell, id at 87–91. Mathen, above, n 127 at 133–134, highlights the risk 
that a dialogic analysis of s 1 confuses the burden imposed on the government to justify a prima facie 
infringement with a privilege or power on the legislature’s part to determine when limits on rights are 
justified. She expresses the view that the government should be restricted to the former role, with 
some latitude granted in cases where evidence is needed or the decision to be made cuts across the 
normal lines of debate (such as where the government confronts an issue of competing rights). 
157  Human Rights Act (UK), above, n 53, s 4(6). 
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legislature to enact statutes inconsistent with such interpretations.158 Despite this, it 
is submitted that it remains meaningful to conceive of the relationship between the 
judiciary and the political branches of government in the terms of a dialogue. In a 
Westminster-style system the dialogue may, for instance, take the following form: 
i. The legislature enacts a statute, which is enforced by the 
executive. A person who perceives that he is detrimentally affected by the 
statute may then choose to challenge it in the courts as violative of his 
fundamental rights. 
ii. An application having been made to a court, a judge then 
assesses the statute against his understanding of the enduring values laid 
down in the bill of rights, after having considered evidence and submissions 
tendered by the applicant and the government. He can either dismiss the 
application and find the statute consistent with the bill of rights, or uphold the 
application. In the latter case, the judge may construe the statute in a way that 
complies with the bill of rights, or declare it to be void and strike it down. The 
matter may work its way through the court hierarchy until a decision is 
rendered by a final appellate court. 
iii. The decision by the highest court in the land does not terminate 
the dialogue. Following this, the executive and legislature must decide how 
they wish to react. They may choose not to take any further action, thus 
accepting the judiciary’s view of the matter. Or they may respond by 
modifying the deprecated statute or by enacting fresh legislation that takes 
into account the court’s concerns, though in so doing it may not override the 
                                                   
158  Unless the bill of rights is itself amended to provide exceptions for the statutes sought to be 
enacted: this is discussed at the text accompanying nn 160–161, below. 
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judgment. People who feel that their fundamental rights are still affected by 
the new or amended legislation may bring further cases to the court, thus 
continuing the dialogue between the judiciary and the political branches of 
government about the values protected by the bill of rights. In the face of 
legislative activity and new evidence about difficulties encountered in 
attempting to implement the judgment, it is open to the court to reconsider 
and adjust – perhaps even overrule – its decision in a subsequent case.159
iv. Alternatively, if the executive and legislature feel strongly 
enough about the importance of the statute they may take steps to amend the 
bill of rights to provide an exception for the statute, thus, in a sense, changing 
the ground rules. The limiting factor will be how easily the bill of rights can be 
amended. It would be very difficult, for instance, for the legislature in the 
United States to take this route, as an amendment to the Constitution requires 
a proposal by two-thirds of both Houses of Congress or the calling of a 
convention on the application of two-thirds of all the states, and ratification of 
the proposal by the legislatures of or conventions in 75% of the states.160 In 
comparison, it would be relatively straightforward for the bill of rights to be 
amended in a jurisdiction such as Singapore which has a unicameral 
legislature and where the number of Parliamentary seats the Government 
presently holds exceeds the two-thirds majority of Members of Parliament 
                                                   
159  Compare Bateup, above, n 153 at 1159. 
160  The relevant portions of the US Constitution, Art V, state: “The Congress, whenever two thirds 
of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the 
Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing 
Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this 
Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions 
in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the 
Congress…” 
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required to amend the Constitution.161 If the political branches do take this 
step, they can be regarded as putting an end to the constitutional dialogue. 
Although the courts have to stay silent, it remains open to people disapproving 
of the action to either petition their Members of Parliament to change the law, 
or to exercise their votes during an election in order to elect new 
representatives who will do so. 
The cases arising out of the 1987 ‘Marxist conspiracy’ in Singapore 
demonstrate a dialogue engaged in by the judiciary, executive and legislature. A 
number of individuals were arrested on the ground that they were allegedly involved 
in a conspiracy to subvert and destabilize the country to establish a Marxist state, 
and were detained without trial under the provisions of the Internal Security Act 
(ISA).162 Section 8(1) of the ISA provides that the Minister of Home Affairs shall 
make a detention order “if the President is satisfied with respect to any person that, 
with a view to preventing that person from acting in any manner prejudicial to the 
                                                   
161  The Singapore Constitution, above, n 3, Art 5(2), states: “A Bill seeking to amend any 
provision in this Constitution shall not be passed by Parliament unless it has been supported on 
Second and Third Readings by the votes of not less than two-thirds of the total number of Members 
thereof.” Art 5(2A), which was introduced in 1991, provides that unless the President, acting in his 
discretion, otherwise directs the Speaker of Parliament in writing, a Bill seeking to amend, among 
other things, the fundamental liberties in Part IV of the Constitution shall not be passed by Parliament 
unless it has been supported at a national referendum by not less than two-thirds of the total number 
of votes cast by electors; however, this Article has yet to be brought into force. In October 2008, in 
response to a question by Nominated Member of Parliament Professor Dr Thio Li-ann, the Prime 
Minister Lee Hsien Loong said that it was the Government’s “clear and stated intention… to refine the 
scheme and to iron out the issues that can arise in the light of experience, before we bring the 
entrenchment provisions into operation and entrench the rules. ... While we have delayed entrenching 
the scheme, we have, over the years, made a practice of consulting the President on any amendment 
which affects his powers, and informing Parliament of the President's view in the Second Reading 
speech. With one exception, in practice, the President has supported all the amendments which 
affected his powers. Over the last two decades, we have fine-tuned and improved the system of the 
Elected President in many ways. ... If after five years, no further major changes are necessary, we will 
consider entrenching the provisions concerning the President's custodial powers.”: Lee Hsien Loong 
(Prime Minister), speech during the Second Reading of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore 
(Amendment) Bill, Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (21 October 2008), vol 85, cols 
532ff. 
162  Cap 143, 1985 Rev Ed (S’pore). 
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security of Singapore…, it is necessary to do so”. The detainees were released, but 
rearrested after they made a media statement protesting their innocence. They then 
applied unsuccessfully to the High Court for writs of habeas corpus. However, their 
appeals were allowed by the Court of Appeal in the case of Chng Suan Tze v Minister 
of Home Affairs.163 The Court held that the Government had not discharged its 
burden of proving that the President had possessed the satisfaction required by 
section 8(1) of the ISA before the Minister made the detention orders. In addition, it 
stated, obiter, that the President’s satisfaction under section 8(1)164 was reviewable 
by a court on objective grounds and that a judge was not bound to accept the 
subjective satisfaction of the President. Among the reasons for this conclusion was 
the fact that since Article 12 of the Constitution provided that “[a]ll persons are equal 
before the law and entitled to the equal protection of the law”, and that the word 
“law” included common law principles of natural justice and fairness,165 Parliament’s 
legislative powers could not be exercised in a manner which authorized or required 
the exercise of arbitrary power in breach of the fundamental rules of natural justice. 
Furthermore, Article 93 vested the judicial power of Singapore in the Supreme Court 
and subordinate courts set up by written law. Thus, section 8 of the ISA was only 
consistent with Articles 12 and 93 of the Constitution if the powers it conferred did 
not authorize arbitrary powers of detention and only if the courts could review the 
exercise of such powers. However, applying a subjective rather than an objective test 
                                                   
163  [1988] 2 SLR(R) 525. 
164  The same argument was made in respect of s 10(1) of the ISA, which states: “At any time after 
an order has been made in respect of any person under section 8(1)(a) the Minister may direct that 
the operation of such order be suspended subject to the execution of a bond and to such conditions… 
as the Minister sees fit; and the Minister may revoke any such direction if he is satisfied that the 
person against whom the order was made has failed to observe any condition so imposed or that it is 
necessary in the public interest that such direction should be revoked.” 
165  Ong Ah Chuan v Public Prosecutor [1981] AC 648 at 670, [1979–1980] SLR(R) 710 at 722, 
[26], PC (on appeal from Singapore). 
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to section 8 would mean giving the executive arbitrary powers of detention, 
rendering such powers unconstitutional and void.166 Although section 8 was not itself 
arbitrary as it provided for the power of detention only for specific purposes which 
bore a reasonable relation to the object of the law, since the discretion in section 8 
was unreviewable by the courts it was actually as arbitrary as if the provision did not 
restrict the discretion to any purpose; the Court noted that “to suggest otherwise 
would in our view be naive”.167 Article 149(1) of the Constitution, which specifically 
provided for the enactment of the ISA, immunized the Act from being invalid 
because of inconsistency with Articles 9 (right to life and personal liberty), 13 
(prohibition of banishment and freedom of movement) and 14 (rights to freedom of 
speech, assembly and association) but not Articles 12 or 93.168
Following the Court of Appeal’s decision the detainees were released from 
custody but were immediately rearrested under the ISA. One of the detainees, Teo 
Soh Lung, applied for habeas corpus on 13 December 1988. On 16 December, the 
Government introduced two Bills in Parliament to amend Article 149 of the 
Constitution and section 8 of the ISA. The Bills were passed and became law on 26 
and 28 January 1989 respectively. The Constitution of the Republic of Singapore 
(Amendment) Act 1989 169  added Articles 11 (protection against retrospective 
criminal laws and repeated trials), 12 and 93 to the list of provisions in Article 149 
that the ISA was protected against, while the Internal Security (Amendment) Act 
1989 170  re-established that a subjective test applied to the executive discretions 
                                                   
166  Chng Suan Tze, above, n 163 at 551, [79]. 
167  Id at 552, [82]. 
168  Id at 551, [79]. 
169  No 1 of 1989. 
170  No 2 of 1989. 
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exercised under the ISA. Attempts were made by Teo and another detainee to 
challenge their detention under the amended laws, but this time the courts held that 
their jurisdiction in the matter had been effectively ousted.171
Regardless of what one may think of laws authorizing detention without trial, 
the events of 1987–1989 in Singapore are an illustration of how a constitutional 
dialogue may unfold. The Court of Appeal found, inter alia, that certain provisions of 
the ISA and executive actions taken under them were unconstitutional. However, the 
Government, believing those provisions to be necessary for the protection of national 
security, initiated legislation in Parliament to reverse the effect of the Court’s 
judgment. It went to the extent of amending the Constitution to prevent the ISA from 
being challenged for inconsistency with, among other provisions, the guarantees of 
equality and equal protection in the bill of rights and the vesting of judicial power in 
the courts. 
In the course of a constitutional dialogue, the meaning of the fundamental 
liberties in a bill of rights may change depending on which branch of government has 
spoken on the issue most recently. Depending on the speed at which the branches act, 
these changes may even occur within short periods of time. Nonetheless, at any time 
only one official interpretation of the law prevails. This honours the element of the 
rule of law that requires the meanings of legal instruments to be clear and 
comprehensible. All things considered, it is submitted that rather than viewing the 
judiciary as locked in a constant battle against the executive and legislature, the three 
branches of government should be regarded as working in collaboration with each 
                                                   
171  See Teo Soh Lung v Minister of Home Affairs [1990] 1 SLR(R) 347, CA (S’pore); Cheng 
Vincent v Minister of Home Affairs [1990] 1 SLR(R) 38, HC (S’pore). 
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other in developing and refining understandings of the bill of rights and fostering 
their acceptance by the people.172
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has sought to establish the principle that the three branches of 
government have an equal and independent duty to interpret the bill of rights in the 
course of fulfilling their constitutional duties. Nonetheless, the judiciary plays a 
special role in the system – it is charged with making legally-binding determinations 
of disputes between parties, including government agencies, and while doing so 
occasions may arise that require it to provide authoritative interpretations of the 
meaning of the bill of rights. It is submitted that such interpretations must be obeyed 
by the executive and legislature, even if they are not parties to the relevant cases. To 
permit a situation where the branches could hold inconsistent views as to the 
meaning of the bill of rights and, further, to entitle the political branches to disobey 
court judgments in certain circumstances, would be to invite anarchy and violate 
principles of rule of law. 
The concept of interpretive supremacy is, however, frequently criticized on the 
ground of the ‘counter-majoritarian difficulty’, the perception that judicial review of 
executive and legislative action is undemocratic because the latter are viewed as 
embodying the majority will, while the judiciary is not directly accountable to the 
people. However, it is questionable whether executive actions and laws passed by the 
legislature can really be said to be actuated by a ‘majority will’. To the argument that 
executive and legislative actions are more democratic because the people have given 
                                                   
172  Hickman, above, n 135 at 317. 
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the political branches a electoral mandate to act on their behalf, it is submitted that 
democracy is more than just majority rule; it calls for solicitude for the fundamental 
rights of minority groups in the community. 
It is submitted that conceptualizing the relationship between the branches of 
government as a dialogue is useful. By this process, the judiciary on the one hand and 
the executive and legislature on the other can be regarded as checking each other’s 
actions, and in doing so establishing the meaning of the bill of rights and the forms of 
administrative and legislative actions that are suitable for the community. Through 
judicial review, the courts draw attention to issues that are of especial significance, 
encourages discussion of them by government and the people, and may stimulate 
direct participation by the people in the adoption or rejection of policies. In the 
course of a constitutional dialogue, there will no doubt be a measure of confrontation 
between the judiciary and the political branches of government over how a bill of 
rights should be interpreted. Nonetheless, the dialogue avoids a stalemate between 
the branches of government, and should be seen as a collaborative effort that enables 
the meaning of the bill of rights to be developed and refined. 
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faith or good sense or special expertise of public officials, whose 
judgments about the implications of rights in specific cases may well 
be wrong.1
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A PROPER APPRECIATION of the scope of judicial interpretation of a bill of rights 
requires an exploration of its boundaries. This chapter examines if, in the course of 
interpreting a bill of rights, there are situations in which the judiciary of a nation 
with a Westminster-style constitution ought to decline to make a decision in 
preference to a prior choice on the matter made by either of the political branches of 
                                                   
1  T R S Allan, “Human Rights and Judicial Review: A Critique of ‘Due Deference’” (2006) 65 
Cam LJ 671 at 675. 
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government. Such choices may assume the form of policies adopted by the executive 
and the actions taken thereon, or statutes and subsidiary legislation enacted by the 
legislature. 
Presently, courts in a number of jurisdictions do apply doctrines that 
circumscribe their ability to subject administrative decisions and legislation to 
in-depth scrutiny for compliance with the standards established by bills of rights. In 
the United Kingdom, for instance, since the entry into force of the Human Rights Act 
19982 in 20003 judges have developed a doctrine of ‘deference’, though it is also 
variously referred to as the “discretionary area of judgment”,4 “latitude”5 of review, 
or “margin of appreciation”6 given to the political branches of government, and the 
“principled distance”7 between the court’s adjudication and the decision-maker’s 
decision. This deference doctrine appears to have been inspired by comparable 
administrative law doctrines that applied prior to the Human Rights Act, which are 
                                                   
2  1998 c 42. 
3  The provisions of the Act apart from s 19 came into force on 2 October 2000: Human Rights 
Act 1998 (Commencement No 2) Order 2000 (SI 2000 No 1851 (C 47)). Section 19 was brought into 
force earlier, on 24 November 1998, by the Human Rights Act 1998 (Commencement No 1) Order 
1998 (SI 1998 No 2882 (C 71)). This section requires the Minister in charge of a Bill in either House of 
Parliament, before its Second Reading, to make and publish a written statement to the effect either 
that in his view the provisions of the Bill are compatible with Convention rights, or that, although he is 
unable to make such a statement, the government nevertheless wishes the House to proceed with the 
Bill. 
4  R v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Kebilene [2000] 2 AC 326 at 380, HL, per Lord 
Hope of Craighead; and Brown v Stott (Procurator Fiscal, Dunfermline) [2003] 1 AC 681 at 703, PC 
(on appeal from Scotland), per Lord Steyn, employing the terminology of Lord Lester of Herne Hill & 
David Pannick (gen eds), Human Rights Law and Practice (London: Butterworths, 1999) at 73. 
5  R (ProLife Alliance) v British Broadcasting Corporation [2004] 1 AC 185 at 257, [138], HL, 
per Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, citing Michael Fordham, Judicial Review Handbook (3rd ed) 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001) at 804–805, [58.2]. 
6  R (Farrakhan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] QB 1391 at 1418, [71], 
CA, per Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers MR; R (Animal Defenders International) v Secretary of 
State for Culture, Media and Sport [2007] EMLR 6 at 194, [111], QBD (Admin Ct), per Ouseley J. This 
is not to be confused with the “margin of appreciation” conceded by the European Court of Human 
Rights to national systems, which recognizes that the European Convention on Human Rights may 
vary in its application in different states according to local needs and conditions. This type of margin 
of appreciation “is not available to the national courts when they are considering Convention issues 
arising within their own countries”: ex parte Kebilene, above, n 4; see also Brown v Stott, above, n 4. 
7  R (Mahmood) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] 1 WLR 840 at 855, [33], 
CA, per Laws LJ. 
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examined in Part I. Part II of the chapter goes on to consider the appropriateness of 
carrying over concepts from administrative law to the interpretation of the Human 
Rights Act. It also considers how doctrines of deference apply in Canada and 
Singapore to immunize certain governmental actions from judicial challenge, and the 
practical difficulties of applying them in a principled manner. 
More significant, though, are the justifications that have been articulated in 
support of judicial deference. Part III explores the arguments that deference is a 
consequence of the doctrine of separation of powers, that certain policy decisions 
should be made by the branches of government directly accountable to the electorate, 
and that the judiciary should show deference to the political branches when it lacks 
institutional competence. It is contended that these conceptual foundations for 
deference doctrines are in fact less stable than they seem. 
Finally, Part IV of this chapter submits that whether doctrines of deference 
should be employed is tied to how the judiciary’s role in interpreting the bill of rights 
is conceptualized. Persons taking the view that the political branches of government 
are the primary protectors of rights in a State are likely to accord to the judicial 
branch a more modest role. A doctrine of deference would therefore be important to 
ensure that the courts do not overstep their mark. On the other hand, one inclined to 
distrust the political branches and thus to advocate that the judiciary should act 
boldly when overseeing the use of executive and legislative power would consider it 
unsound and undesirable for judges to show deference to those branches. Part IV 
also attempts to explain why requiring courts to limit the scope of judicial review by 
applying an expansive doctrine of deference ultimately defeats the rationale behind 
the existence of a legally enforceable bill of rights in a constitutional system. 
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The conclusion of this chapter is that the doctrine of deference should be 
jettisoned altogether. Courts should fulfil their constitutional role of ensuring that 
governmental actions do not contravene guarantees of fundamental liberties, 
regardless of the nature of such actions. It is submitted that in the course of this 
assessment courts may, when appropriate, accept the exercise of discretion by the 
executive or legislature on matters that these branches have greater expertise in. 
However, the judiciary must continue to be responsible for ensuring the existence of 
facts upon which the exercise of discretion is premised, and the ultimate decision as 
to whether the action violates the bill of rights. 
I. DOCTRINES OF LIMITATION IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: NON-JUSTICIABILITY 
AND DEFERENCE 
Before looking at how doctrines of deference operate in different jurisdictions today 
and the difficulties that they create, our understanding of them will be illuminated by 
examining two doctrines of limitation originating from administrative law in the 
United Kingdom: those of non-justiciability and deference. This Part takes United 
Kingdom law as its starting point because other Commonwealth jurisdictions such as 
Canada and Singapore have frequently applied administrative law doctrines 
developed by the British courts to develop their own bodies of administrative law. 
From an analysis of administrative law decisions, in general courts appear to 
accept decisions made by the political branches of government without scrutinizing 
them in two instances. First, they may hold that due to the subject matter of the case, 
it is not amenable to judicial review. This is termed ‘non-justiciability’. Cases 
involving the doctrine of non-justiciability appear not to have been cited in bill of 
rights cases. However, given the intriguing parallel between the non-justiciability 
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and deference doctrines, one wonders whether the former has nonetheless 
influenced the latter. It is therefore instructive to consider the justifications that the 
courts have given for declining to assess certain exercises of administrative power. 
Secondly, assuming that a case clears the justiciability hurdle, the court may, 
again because of its subject matter, decide that it is nonetheless appropriate to act 
deferentially when considering if the decision-maker has acted in a ‘Wednesbury-
unreasonable’ manner. The doctrine of deference employed in this context appears to 
have directly inspired the application of a similar doctrine to human rights law, 
particularly in the United Kingdom. Ironically, following the introduction of the 
Human Rights Act 1998, judges declared that they had to move away from the old 
model of quashing governmental actions only if a high level of irrationality was 
established.8 The continued application of a doctrine of deference, though, provokes 
one to question whether this has indeed been the case. 
A. NON-JUSTICIABILITY 
In Westminster systems, modern discussions of principles of non-justiciability in 
administrative law inescapably begin with the House of Lords’ 1984 decision Council 
of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service (“CCSU”),9 which concerned 
the amenability to judicial review of exercises of the royal prerogative. Prior to the 
case, judicial review as regards prerogative powers was limited to inquiring into 
whether a particular power existed and, if it did, into its extent.10 The exercise of the 
power could not be inquired into. However, beginning with R v Criminal Injuries 
                                                   
8  See Pt II.A.1 below. 
9  [1985] AC 374. 
10  Attorney-General v De Keyser’s Royal Hotel Ltd [1920] AC 508: see Council of Civil Service 
Unions v Minister for the Civil Service (“CCSU”), id at 407 per Lord Scarman. 
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Compensation Board, ex parte Lain11 it was recognized that judicial review ought 
not be thus restricted, and this was confirmed by the House of Lords in CCSU. Lord 
Roskill, for instance, could not see any logical reason why a citizen should be 
deprived of the right to challenge the manner in which a power was exercised simply 
because the source of the power was the royal prerogative and not a statute – “In 
either case the act in question is the act of the executive. To talk of that act as the act 
of the sovereign savours of the archaism of past centuries.” 12  Lord Scarman 
commented on the new principle in this manner: 
… I believe that the law relating to judicial review has now reached the stage where it 
can be said with confidence that, if the subject matter in respect of which prerogative 
power is exercised is justiciable, that is to say if it is a matter upon which the court 
can adjudicate, the exercise of the power is subject to review in accordance with the 
principles developed in respect of the review of the exercise of statutory power. … 
Today, therefore, the controlling factor in determining whether the exercise of 
prerogative power is subject to judicial review is not its source but its subject 
matter.13 [Emphasis added.] 
Put another way, what is determinative today is not whether the power 
exercised stems from the royal prerogative, but whether the subject matter of the 
power is regarded as one inappropriate for the courts to deal with. An exercise of 
power is justiciable if the subject matter affects an individual’s private law rights or 
legitimate expectations.14 This is the position in Canada, the United Kingdom, and 
countries with the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as its final court of appeal. 
Since the CCSU case, the courts in these jurisdictions have affirmed the justiciability 
                                                   
11  [1967] 2 QB 864. 
12  CCSU, above, n 9 at 417. 
13  Id at 407. 
14  An individual’s legitimate expectations are affected if he is deprived of “some benefit or 
advantage which either (i) he had in the past been permitted by the decision-maker to enjoy and 
which he can legitimately expect to be permitted to continue to do until there has been communicated 
to him some rational grounds for withdrawing it on which he has been given an opportunity to 
comment; or (ii) he has received assurance from the decision-maker will not be withdrawn without 
giving him first an opportunity of advancing reasons for contending that they should not be 
withdrawn”: id at 408 per Lord Diplock, cited in Black v Canada (Prime Minister) (2001) 199 DLR 
(4th) 228 at [51], CA (Ont, Can). 
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of, among other matters,15 the decision whether to issue a passport to a citizen;16 the 
failure to consider the form of a pardon that might be conferred on a convicted 
person;17 the discharge of persons from the armed forces on the ground of their 
sexual orientation;18 a committee’s act of assessing whether convicted persons under 
sentence of death should be pardoned or have the sentence commuted, without 
hearing their petitions or providing them with the material before the committee;19 
and a prosecutor’s decision to halt a private prosecution by filing a nolle prosequi.20
On the other hand, in CCSU Lord Diplock identified non-justiciable matters as 
those involving the application of “government policy”: 
The reasons for the decision-maker taking one course rather than another do not 
normally involve questions to which, if disputed, the judicial process is adapted to 
provide the right answer, by which I mean that the kind of evidence that is admissible 
under judicial procedures and the way in which it has to be adduced tend to exclude 
from the attention of the court competing policy considerations which, if the executive 
discretion is to be wisely exercised, need to be weighed against one another – a 
balancing exercise which judges by their upbringing and experience are ill-qualified to 
perform.21
In similar vein, the Federal Court of Canada, in examining what constitutes a 
legislative decision beyond consideration by the court, expressed the view that, at the 
very least, 
                                                   
15  See also R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Fire Brigades Union 
[1995] 2 AC 513, HL (decision not to bring provisions of Act into force and to implement scheme 
inconsistent with Act); R (on the application of Thomson et al) v Minister of State for Children [2005] 
FCR 603, QBD (Admin) (decision to impose temporary suspension on intercountry adoptions of 
children from Cambodia); Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs v The Queen 
(on the application of Bancoult) [2007] EWCA Civ 498, (2007) 151 SJLB 707, CA (use of prerogative 
power of colonial governance). 
16  R v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte Everett [1989] QB 
811, CA. 
17  R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Bentley [1994] QB 439, Div Ct. 
18  R v Ministry of Defence, ex parte Smith [1996] QB 517, HL. 
19  Lewis v Attorney-General of Jamaica [2001] 2 AC 50, PC (on appeal from Jamaica), not 
following Reckley v Minister of Public Safety and Immigration (No 2) [1996] AC 527, PC (on appeal 
from the Bahamas). 
20  Mohit v Deputy Public Prosecutor of Mauritius [2006] 1 WLR 3343, PC (on appeal from 
Mauritius). 
21  CCSU, above, n 9 at 411. 
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the decision must be discretionary, usually, but not always, general in its application, 
based on the exercise of judgment after assessing factors of general policy, of public 
interest and public convenience, morality, politics, economics, international 
obligations, national defence and security, or social, scientific and technical concerns, 
that is, issues of policy which lie outside the ambit of typical concerns or methods of 
the courts.22
The courts therefore regard as non-justiciable matters which involve a 
decision requiring the exercise of discretion or judgment, and which necessitates 
considering policy issues that lie outside the realm of the usual sorts of cases dealt 
with by the courts. The view is taken that judges are not properly equipped to balance 
the various policy issues that must be weighed in order to reach the decision. 
Examples of governmental decision-making that have been held not to be amenable 
to the judicial process are decisions as to what national security requires,23  the 
formulation of criteria for granting a pardon to a convicted person24 and the decision 
whether or not a pardon should be granted,25 advising the Queen or communicating 
to her Canada’s policy on the conferral of an honour on a Canadian citizen,26 and 
decisions involving considerations of policy in the areas of defence and foreign 
affairs.27
                                                   
22  Vancouver Island Peace Society v Canada (1993) 19 Admin LR (2d) 91 at [44], FC (Trial Div) 
(Can) per MacKay J. 
23  CCSU, above, n 9. 
24  Ex parte Bentley, above, n 17. 
25  Lewis v Attorney-General of Jamaica, above, n 19. 
26  Black v Canada (Prime Minister), above, n 14. Contrast Chiasson v R (2003) 226 DLR (4th) 
351, FCA (Can) (court may judicially review actions of committee acting under regulations in 
screening applicant for honour as preliminary to decision by Governor-General actually conferring 
honour). 
27  Chandler v Director of Public Prosecutions [1964] AC 763, HL (demonstrators charged for 
attempting to enter airfield as protest against nuclear weapons not entitled to cross-examine 
prosecution witness or call evidence as to their belief that their acts would benefit State or show that 
their purpose not prejudicial to safety or interests of State); Marchiori v Environment Agency [2002] 
EWCA Civ 3, [2002] Eu LR 225, CA (authorization to Ministry of Defence contractors to discharge 
radioactive waste from two nuclear sites); R v Jones (Margaret) [2007] 1 AC 136, HL (defendants 
charged with trespassing and damaging property on military and nuclear sites relying on defence of 
using reasonable force to attempt to prevent UK’s unlawful actions in preparing for, declaring and 
waging war in Iraq); R (Gentle) v Prime Minister [2007] QB 689, CA (decision not to hold inquiry to 
examine whether UK Government had taken reasonable steps to be satisfied that Iraq invasion lawful 
under international law). See also Vancouver Island Peace Society v Canada, above, n 22 (approval of 
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Much the same assertions are relied upon to justify the application of 
doctrines of deference in bill of rights adjudication, and more will be said about this 
later in the chapter. In the administrative law context, where the judiciary generally 
seeks not to determine if the decision-maker has arrived at a correct decision but 
merely to ensure that it has acted lawfully,28 it may well be that some issues should 
remain non-justiciable. This position may also be justified on other grounds such as 
the need to preserve the principle of the separation of powers. However, as we have 
seen in Chapter Two,29 embodied in the separation of powers principle is the notion 
that the branches of government should act as a check on each other – particularly 
the judiciary on the executive and legislature. It is also worth noting the argument 
that if the courts can conceive of common law standards such as extreme bad faith, 
improper purpose and manifest absurdity against which certain administrative 
decisions can be reviewed, it is difficult to see why the same is not true for decisions 
having a strongly discretionary element.30
                                                                                                                                                              
visits of nuclear-propelled warships and nuclear-carrying vessels belonging to UK and US to Canadian 
ports); Copello v Canada (Minister of Foreign Affairs) (2001) 39 Admin LR (3d) 89, FC (Trial Div) 
(Can) (declaration of diplomat as persona non grata); Aleksic v Canada (Prime Minister) (2002) 215 
DLR (4th) 720, Superior Ct of Justice (Div Ct) (Ont, Can) (executive decision for nation to participate 
in bombing of Yugoslavia); Ganis v Canada (Minister of Justice) (2006) 216 CCC (3d) 337, CA (BC, 
Can) (existence of treaty). 
28  Lord Donaldson MR used a football analogy: “The role of the judiciary is essentially that of a 
referee… In the football World Cup, … the moves made by the players and the tactics employed by the 
teams are matters entirely for them. The referee is only involved when it appears that some player had 
acted in breach of the rules. The referee may then stop play and take some remedial action but, 
tempting though it may be, it is not for him to express any view on the skill of the players or how he 
would have acted in their position. Still less, following a breach of the roles, does he take over the 
position of one of the players. So too with the judiciary.” See R v Secretary of State for the 
Environment, ex parte Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council [1991] 1 AC 521 at 561, 
HL. 
29  See Part I.A. 
30  A[ndrew] P Le Sueur, “Justifying Judicial Caution: Jurisdiction, Justiciability and Policy” in 
Brigid Hadfield (ed), Judicial Review: A Thematic Approach (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1995), 228 at 
245–246. Le Sueur writes: “Even in cases involving strongly discretionary ministerial decisions about 
the allocation of public funds, the court should be prepared to adjudicate on a matter rather than 
abdicate responsibility by turning it away as non-justiciable. The court retains ample scope for caution 
and for giving due weight to the principle of parliamentary sovereignty in the way it sets the standards 
of legality in any given context.” Id at 246. 
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In a legal system with a bill of rights, it is submitted that the court is not 
required to abstain from substantively examining executive and legislative decisions. 
Indeed, cases from Canada, the United Kingdom and Ireland support the principle 
that where fundamental rights are implicated, the political branches may not rely on 
the doctrine of non-justiciability. In the Canadian Supreme Court decision Operation 
Dismantle Inc v R,31 Wilson J, with whom the rest of the judges concurred,32 said: 
[I]f the Court were simply being asked to express its opinion on the wisdom of the 
Executive’s exercise of its defence powers in this case, the Court would have to decline. 
It cannot substitute its opinion for that of the Executive to whom the decision-making 
power is given by the Constitution. … However, if what we are being asked to do is to 
decide whether any particular act of the executive violates the rights of citizens, then 
it is not only appropriate that we answer the question; it is our obligation under the 
Charter [of Rights and Freedoms] to do so.33
Operation Dismantle was cited with approval by the Court of Appeal in the 
United Kingdom in R (Gentle) v Prime Minister. 34  Sir Anthony Clarke MR, 
delivering judgment for the Court, pointed out that “the principle of non-justiciability 
cannot prevent the courts from giving effect to a Convention right once such a right is 
shown to exist.”35 In contrast, Laws LJ, a member of a differently-constituted Court 
of Appeal in Marchiori v Environment Agency,36  took the view that Operation 
Dismantle was not applicable since United Kingdom law had no provisions 
analogous to sections 24 and 32(1)(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms. With respect, this is an insufficient ground for distinguishing the case. 
Section 24(1) provides that anyone whose rights or freedoms guaranteed by the 
                                                   
31  [1985] 1 SCR 441. 
32  Id at [38] per Dickson J (Estey, McIntyre, Chouinard and Lamer JJ concurring): “I agree in 
substance with Madame Justice Wilson’s discussion of justiciability and her conclusion that the 
doctrine is founded upon a concern with the appropriate role of the Courts as the forum for the 
resolution of different types of disputes.” 
33  Id at [64]–[65]. 
34  R (Gentle) v Prime Minister, above, n 27. 
35  Id at 713, [38]. Operation Dismantle was not cited by the House of Lords in R (Gentle) v 
Prime Minister [2008] 1 AC 1356. 
36  Above, n 27 at [35]. 
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Charter have been infringed or denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction 
to obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the 
circumstances, which may include declaring legislation to be void. Courts in the 
United Kingdom are limited to making declarations of incompatibility pursuant to 
section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998. As for section 32(1)(a) of the Canadian 
Charter which makes the Charter applicable to the Parliament and government of 
Canada in respect of all matters within Parliament’s authority, a comparable 
provision is section 22(5) of the Human Rights Act which states tersely: “This Act 
binds the Crown.” Thus, the Human Rights Act does not apply to Parliament. 
Nonetheless, it is submitted that these differences are not adequate reasons for UK 
courts to decline to examine governmental actions for compliance with Convention 
rights to the fullest extent possible under the Act. 
The position taken in Operation Dismantle pertains in Ireland, the 
Constitution of which contains a bill of rights. In Boland v An Taoiseach,37 the issue 
that faced the Supreme Court was whether the Government could be restrained by 
injunction from signing any agreement in the terms of a communiqué issued 
following a conference on the status of Northern Ireland. Griffin J expressed the view 
that if the Government had contravened provisions of the Constitution, it was the 
“duty and right of the Courts, as guardians of the Constitution, to intervene when 
called upon to do so”.38 The principle was affirmed in Crotty v An Taoiseach,39 
Finlay CJ stating: 
                                                   
37  [1974] IR 338 
38  Id at 370–371. See also the less enthusiastic statement of FitzGerald CJ at 362: “[T]he Courts 
have no power, either express or implied, to supervise or intervene with the exercise by the 
Government of its executive functions, unless the circumstances are such as to amount to a clear 
disregard by the Government of the powers and duties conferred upon it by the Constitution.” 
39  [1987] IR 713, SC (Ir). 
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This Court has on appeal from the High Court a right and duty to interfere with the 
activities of the executive in order to protect or secure the constitutional rights of 
individual litigants where such rights have been or are being invaded by those 
activities or where activities of the executive threaten an invasion of such rights.40
In subsequent cases, the Irish courts have vindicated applicants’ personal rights, 
even though the administrative decisions challenged have involved potentially non-
justiciable matters such as the allocation of funding.41
It is submitted that the separation of powers principle is not violated when 
judges assess the political branches’ actions for compliance with rights guarantees, as 
the existence of the bill of rights implies that judges have a duty to do so.42 In the 
premises, it is not open to the executive, either for itself or on behalf of the legislature, 
to submit that a case should be dismissed on the ground that its subject matter is not 
justiciable. For the court to accept this sort of submission would enable the political 
branches to shield crucial activities, including those highly likely to imperil 
fundamental rights, from judicial scrutiny. 
B. DEFERENCE 
“It is important at the outset,” wrote Paul Craig, “to be clear about the limits of 
judicial intervention over discretion: it is not for the courts to substitute their choice 
as to how the discretion ought to have been exercised for that of the administrative 
authority. … Decisions as to political and social choice are made by the legislature, or 
                                                   
40  Id at 773. See also 778 per Walsh J: “It is not within the competence of the Government, or 
indeed of the Oireachtas [National Parliament], to free themselves from the restraints of the 
Constitution or to transfer their powers to other bodies unless expressly empowered so to do by the 
Constitution. They are both creatures of the Constitution and are not empowered to act free from the 
restraints of the Constitution. To the judicial organ of government alone is given the power 
conclusively to decide if there has been a breach of constitutional restraints.” 
41  O’Donoghue v Minister for Health [1996] 2 IR 20, HC (State failing to provide free 
elementary education for physically and mentally disabled child); DB v Minister for Justice [1999] 1 
IR 29, HC (injunction granted against State to establish secure high-support accommodation for 
young offenders and children in need). See also Comerford v Minister for Education [1997] 2 ILRM 
134. 
42  See Chapter Two, Pts I.A and I.B.2. 
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by a person assigned the task by the legislature.”43 This statement neatly sums up the 
prevailing view of courts in the United Kingdom and in other Commonwealth 
jurisdictions that their traditional role in reviewing administrative actions is 
supervisory, not appellate. 44  While a growing realization of the importance of 
protecting individual rights has, in particular, resulted in aspects of administrative 
law being modified to some extent, the basic position has not altered, and it is 
submitted that this mindset has been carried over to judicial analyses under the 
Human Rights Act 1998. 
The change in the way the ‘Wednesbury unreasonableness’ test applies is a 
good example of this. In the well-known case Associated Picture Houses Ltd v 
Wednesbury Corporation,45 it was held that if a decision was so unreasonable that 
no reasonable body could have made it, the court was justified in quashing it. This 
power was only to be employed in exceptional circumstances: in Council of Civil 
Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service (the GCHQ case),46 Lord Diplock said 
that this form of irrationality would only apply to a “decision which is so outrageous 
in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who 
had applied his mind to the question could have arrived at it”;47 and in R v Secretary 
of State for the Environment, ex parte Nottinghamshire County Council 48 Lord 
Scarman, when invited to examine the detail and consequences of guidance given by 
the Secretary of State, said inter alia that “[s]uch an examination by a court would be 
                                                   
43  P[aul] P Craig, Administrative Law (5th ed) (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) at 609 
(emphasis in original). 
44  R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Brind [1991] 1 AC 696 at 757 per 
Lord Ackner; at 765 per Lord Lowry, HL. 
45  [1948] 1 KB 223 at 233–234. 
46  [1985] AC 374, HL. 
47  Id at 410. 
48  [1986] AC 240, HL. 
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justified only if a prima facie case were to be shown for holding that… the 
consequences of his [the Secretary of State’s] guidance were so absurd that he must 
have taken leave of his senses.”49
Furthermore, when deciding whether or not administrative bodies had acted 
unreasonably, courts demonstrated that they would show a high degree of deference 
in certain types of cases. In ex parte Nottinghamshire County Council, for instance, 
it was held that in the absence of some exceptional circumstance such as bad faith or 
improper motive on the part of the Secretary of State it was not appropriate for the 
courts to review the actions taken by the Secretary of State on the ground of 
unreasonableness, since the matter was one of public financial administration that 
was for the political judgment of the Secretary of State and the House of Commons.50
As the significance of civil liberties began to be better appreciated, however, 
the classic Wednesbury standard was modified. Thus, Lord Bridge of Harwich 
expressed the view in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte 
Bugdaycay that within the established limitations of the scope of the court’s power 
of judicial review the court was entitled to subject an administrative decision to “the 
most rigorous examination, to ensure that it is in no way flawed, according to the 
gravity of the issue which the decision determines”.51 And in R v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department, ex parte Brind 52  the same judge, when considering 
whether the Home Secretary could reasonably impose restrictions on broadcasters to 
                                                   
49  Id at 247. 
50  Id at 247 and 250–251 per Lord Scarman. The case was applied in ex parte Hammersmith 
and Fulham London Borough Council, above, n 28 at 595–597, HL, per Lord Bridge of Harwich. See 
also Chandler v Director of Public Prosecutions, above, n 27 at 790 and 798; and Marchiori v 
Environment Agency, above, n 27 at [33]–[38] which, while not being Wednesbury-unreasonableness 
cases, express the view that the courts will not intervene in matters dealing directly with the defence of 
the realm. 
51  [1987] AC 514 at 531, HL. Lord Templeman made similar remarks at 537. 
52  Above, n 44. 
 The Dangerous Doctrine of Deference • 119 
starve terrorist organizations of publicity, said that the court was “perfectly entitled 
to start from the premise that any restriction of the right to freedom of expression 
requires to be justified and that nothing less than an important competing public 
interest will be sufficient to justify it”.53 This was a sea-change: no longer would an 
administrative decision be assumed to be correct and the applicant required to prove 
to a high standard that it was unreasonable; rather, where the applicant’s human 
rights were interfered with by the decision, the starting point was whether the 
interference could be justified by the administrative authority. The legal position 
after the two cases referred to above was summarized in the Court of Appeal decision 
of R v Ministry of Defence, ex parte Smith,54 in which the Armed Forces’ policy of 
discharging personnel on the grounds of homosexuality was unsuccessfully 
challenged as irrational. Sir Thomas Bingham MR stated as follows, adopting the 
words of counsel for three of the applicants: 
The court may not interfere with the exercise of an administrative discretion on 
substantive grounds save where the court is satisfied that the decision is unreasonable 
in the sense that it is beyond the range of responses open to a reasonable decision-
maker. But in judging whether the decision-maker has exceeded this margin of 
appreciation the human rights context is important. The more substantial the 
interference with human rights, the more the court will require by way of justification 
before it is satisfied that the decision is reasonable in the sense outlined above.55
Despite taking bold steps to give prominence to human rights concerns within 
the administrative law framework, ex parte Smith reaffirmed the orthodox position 
in administrative law that it was for the court to decide only if the decision-maker 
had acted irrationally, not if it had made the wrong decision. This is not surprising, 
as Smith was decided before the European Convention on Human Rights had been 
made directly applicable in the domestic law of the United Kingdom through the 
                                                   
53  Id at 748–749. Again, see remarks along the same lines by Lord Templeman at 751. 
54  [1996] QB 517. 
55  Id at 554. 
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Human Rights Act 1998. Once this had taken place, the courts were required not only 
to ensure that public authorities acted according to administrative law principles, but 
that Convention rights were complied with. The latter duty now obliged courts to 
determine if public authorities had in fact taken the correct, rights-consistent 
decisions. This difference explains why the European Court of Human Rights, to 
which the dissatisfied applicants in Smith took their case, duly held in Smith & 
Grady v United Kingdom56 that, among other things, the State was in breach of 
Article 13 of the Convention because it had not provided the applicants with an 
effective remedy in relation to the violation of their right to respect for their private 
lives guaranteed by Article 8.57 In the Court’s view, under United Kingdom law the 
threshold at which the courts could find the policy of the decision-maker in question 
irrational was placed so high that it effectively excluded any consideration of the 
question of whether the interference with the applicants’ rights answered a pressing 
social need or was proportionate to the national security and public order aims 
pursued on the facts.58
Hence, in the light of Smith & Grady, it was clear to the courts that once the 
Convention was given effect in domestic law by Parliament, judges would have to 
conduct inquiries far more extensive than the Wednesbury unreasonableness test 
                                                   
56  (2000) 29 EHRR 493. See also Lustig-Prean & Beckett v United Kingdom (1999) 29 EHRR 
548. 
57  Id at [139]. The relevant portions of Art 13 read: “Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set 
forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority...” 
58  Id at [138]. Following Smith & Grady, the ban on homosexuals serving in the Armed Forces 
was lifted, and a new Code of Conduct for the Armed Forces enshrining the rights of homosexuals to 
fair and equal treatment along with heterosexuals introduced: Tim Butcher & Robert Shrimsley, “Gays 
Invited to Re-enlist as Armed Forces Lift Ban”, The Daily Telegraph (13 January 2000) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/htmlContent.jhtml?html=/archive/2000/01/13/ngay13.html>. The 
applicants subsequently each won damages of £19,000 from the British Government for the intrusion 
into their private lives and compensation for loss of earnings ranging from £40,000 to £94,875: Smith 
& Grady v United Kingdom (Art 41) (2001) 31 EHRR 24; Tim Butcher, “Gays Win Pay-out over 
Sacking by Forces”, The Daily Telegraph (19 June 2001) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ 
main.jhtml?xml=/news/2000/07/26/nsec326.xml> (both newspaper articles accessed 11 July 2007). 
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articulated in ex parte Smith. In the following section, we shall see that the courts did 
recognize this fact. What is unfortunate, it is submitted, is that they continued to 
have a narrow conception of their role in judicial review. 
II. DEFERENCE AND BILLS OF RIGHTS 
A. THE APPLICATION OF DOCTRINES OF DEFERENCE TO BILLS OF RIGHTS 
It is submitted that the nature of bills of rights demands that they should be 
interpreted and applied using an approach radically different from the deferential 
one taken in administrative law generally. Bills of rights make courts responsible for 
articulating the detailed content of fundamental liberties and testing executive 
actions and legislation against these standards. It must be rare indeed for a bill of 
rights to specifically require the judiciary to bow to the policy choices made by the 
political branches of government – none of the texts considered in this chapter (save 
possibly one) do so. Nonetheless, the courts of most of these jurisdictions have 
developed some form of deference doctrine which subjects administrative action or 
legislation to minimal scrutiny for compliance with bills of rights. Why this may be 
the case and how convincing the justifications often put forward are is the subject of 
Part III. In this section, we consider how doctrines of deference operate in various 
jurisdictions in the context of bill of rights adjudication. It is submitted that instead 
of providing a structured manner to help judges determine the sorts of matters they 
should deal with, the doctrines tend to operate in unprincipled and highly subjective 
ways, increasing rather than minimizing uncertainty. 
A survey of deference doctrines applied to bills of rights in a number of 
jurisdictions shows that they function in different ways. On the one hand, there are 
jurisdictions such as Canada and the United Kingdom in which deference is applied 
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within the context of a proportionality test. It is a factor taken into account when 
deciding whether executive action or legislation has excessively impaired a human 
right. The adoption of a doctrine of deference in such jurisdictions appears to be 
influenced by the traditional role of the courts in administrative law. On the other 
hand, the situation in Singapore presents differently. Although no distinct doctrine of 
deference as such has been developed by the courts, when certain conditions set out 
in the Constitution are satisfied, the courts defer to the choices made by Parliament. 
This may be because of the way the bill of rights is drafted; however, an alternative 
way of looking at the fundamental liberties in the Singapore Constitution will be 
suggested. 
In spite of this disparity, the rationalizations given for applying deference 
doctrines in the various jurisdictions tend to be similar. This section goes on to 
consider their sufficiency. 
1. Deference in the Context of Proportionality Analysis 
Following the entry into force of the Human Rights Act 1998 in the United Kingdom, 
the House of Lords recognized in R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department 59  that courts could no longer continue scrutinizing executive and 
legislative actions to the same standard as under traditional principles of 
administrative law. Many of the rights in the European Convention on Human Rights 
may legitimately be abridged by a public authority provide, among other things, that 
such interference is “necessary in a democratic society” in the interests of certain 
legitimate aims that are set out in the Convention. For example, Article 8 states: 
                                                   
59  [2001] 2 AC 532 at 547, [27], HL. 
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1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and 
his correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this 
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, 
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others. 
[Emphasis added.] 
In Daly it was held that in determining whether interference with a 
Convention right is “necessary in a democratic society”, the court must engage in a 
proportionality analysis. Citing the Privy Council decision of de Freitas v Permanent 
Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands and Housing,60 Lord Steyn 
said that the court must ask itself 
whether: (i) the legislative objective is sufficiently important to justify limiting a 
fundamental right; (ii) the measures designed to meet the legislative objective are 
rationally connected to it; and (iii) the means used to impair the right or freedom are 
no more than is necessary to accomplish the objective.61
Lord Steyn then set out three differences between traditional administrative law 
grounds of review and proportionality review under the Human Rights Act. First, the 
doctrine of proportionality may require the reviewing court to assess the balance 
which the decision-maker has struck, not merely whether it is within the range of 
rational or reasonable decisions. Secondly, the proportionality test may go further 
than the traditional grounds of review as it may require attention to be directed to 
the relative weight accorded to interests and considerations. Thirdly, even the 
heightened scrutiny test developed in ex parte Smith62 is not necessarily appropriate 
                                                   
60  [1999] 1 AC 69, PC (on appeal from Antigua and Barbuda). 
61  Id at 80. The proportionality test was also cited in R (Pretty) v Director of Public 
Prosecutions [2002] 1 AC 800 at 844, [93], HL; R (Farrakhan) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, above, n 6 at 1416, [64], CA; and International Transport Roth GmbH v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department [2003] QB 728 at 753, [51], per Simon Brown LJ, and at 789, [181], 
per Jonathan Parker LJ, CA (Civil Div). 
62  Above, n 55. 
124 • Chapter Three 
to the protection of human rights.63 Agreeing, Lord Cooke of Thorndon went so far as 
to say that the day would come when it would be more widely recognized that the 
Wednesbury case 64  was an unfortunately retrogressive decision in English 
administrative law, insofar as it suggested that only a very extreme degree of 
unreasonableness can bring an administrative decision within the legitimate scope of 
judicial invalidation. He went on: “It may well be… that the law can never be satisfied 
in any administrative field merely by a finding that the decision under review is not 
capricious or absurd.”65
However, despite this recognition of the judiciary’s new role under the United 
Kingdom’s bill of rights, the courts appear to cling to familiar conceptions of their 
role in administrative law. In Daly, Lord Steyn was quick to add, without elaboration, 
that the adoption of proportionality analysis “[did] not mean that there has been a 
shift to merits review. On the contrary, … the respective roles of judges and 
administrators are fundamentally distinct and will remain so”.66 And Lord Cooke 
remarked that “[t]he depth of judicial review and the deference due to administrative 
discretion vary with the subject matter”.67
This was not the first time the British courts had affirmed the continued 
relevance of a doctrine of deference in Human Rights Act cases. R v Director of 
Public Prosecutions, ex parte Kebilene, 68  decided in 1999, was the first case to 
articulate the doctrine in the context of the Human Rights Act 1998, though the Act 
had not yet come into force. Lord Hope of Craighead expressed the view that: 
                                                   
63  Above, n 59 at 547, [27]. 
64  Above, n 45. 
65  Above, n 59 at 549, [32]. 
66  Id at 548, [28]. 
67  Id at 549, [32]. 
68  Above, n 4. 
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… difficult choices may have to be made by the executive or the legislature between 
the rights of the individual and the needs of society. In some circumstances it will be 
appropriate for the courts to recognise that there is an area of judgment within which 
the judiciary will defer, on democratic grounds, to the considered opinion of the 
elected body or person whose act or decision is said to be incompatible with the 
Convention.69
In a subsequent case, R (Farrakhan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
it was claimed that the doctrine of deference was a vital aspect in proportionality 
analysis: “When applying a test of proportionality, the margin of appreciation or 
discretion accorded to the decision maker is all-important, for it is only by 
recognising the margin of discretion that the court avoids substituting its own 
decision for that of the decision maker.”70
In deciding whether deference should be shown to the will of Parliament or 
the executive, the existence or otherwise of a number of factors in the case before the 
court is considered. These were summarized by Laws LJ in International Transport 
Roth GmbH v Secretary of State for the Home Department71 in the form of four 
principles: 
i. Greater deference is to be paid to an Act of Parliament than a 
decision of the executive or a subordinate measure. This is because in the 
United Kingdom the legislature is not subordinate to a sovereign text – 
Parliament and not a written constitution bears the “ultimate mantle of 
democracy in the state”.72
                                                   
69  Id at 381. 
70  Above, n 61 at 1417, [67], CA, per Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers MR. Note also Lord 
Steyn’s statement in Daly that “the intensity of review in a public law case will depend on the subject 
matter in hand”: above, n 59 at 548, [28], citing Laws LJ in Mahmood, above, n 7 at 847, [18], CA 
(Civil Div). 
71  Above, n 61. The principles were referred to by Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe in ProLife 
Alliance, above, n 5 at 256, [136]. 
72  International Transport Roth, id at 765, [83]. 
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ii. There is more scope for deference where the Convention 
requires a balance to be struck, and much less scope where a right is stated in 
unqualified terms. But even when a right is unqualified, “there is no sharp 
edge” and what is required may vary according to the context.73
iii. Greater deference may be due when the subject matter is 
particularly within the constitutional responsibility of the democratic powers. 
Correspondingly, there should be less deference shown if the matter lies 
within the constitutional responsibility of the courts. In connection with this, 
the first duty of government is the defence of the realm, while that of the 
courts is the maintenance of law.74
iv. Greater or lesser deference is due according to whether the 
subject matter lies more readily within the actual or potential expertise of the 
democratic powers or the courts. Laws LJ expressed the view that this 
principle was very closely allied to the third principle and possibly an 
emanation of it.75
As regards the third principle, other matters that have been identified by the 
courts to fall within the constitutional responsibility of the democratic powers of 
government include border security and immigration control,76 economic policy,77 
foreign policy, 78  national security 79  and public order. 80  In addition, there has 
                                                   
73  Id at 766, [84]. 
74  Id at 766, [85]. 
75  Id at 767, [87]. 
76  International Transport Roth, id at 766, [86]; Farrakhan, above, n 6 at 1418, [71]. 
77  Kebilene, above, n 4 at 381; Poplar Housing, above, n 130 at 70. 
78  Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rehman [2003] 1 AC 153 at 193, [50], per 
Lord Hoffmann, HL. 
79  Rehman, id at 187, [31], per Lord Steyn, and at 192, [50], per Lord Hoffmann. 
80  Farrakhan, above, n 6 at 1418, [71]. 
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emerged a rather broad and nebulous category of matters involving “pressing social 
problem[s]”,81 “social policy”82 or “social and political judgment”.83
What is significant is that in the identification of these principles of deference, 
cases decided before the Human Rights Act applying traditional administrative law 
principles were relied on. In setting out his third principle, Laws LJ cited non-
justiciability cases such as Chandler v Deputy Public Prosecutor84 – which was 
applied in CCSU85 – and Marchiori v Environment Agency86 for the proposition 
that the matters involving the defence of the realm were for the executive and not the 
judiciary.87 Furthermore, the conventional Wednesbury-unreasonableness cases ex 
parte Nottinghamshire County Council88 and ex parte Hammersmith and Fulham 
London Borough Council 89  were drawn upon under the heading of the fourth 
principle for demonstrating much the same point in respect of government decisions 
in the area of macro-economic policy.90 Given the opinions in Daly91 that courts are 
meant to have broken with the past, it is questionable whether this was an 
appropriate use of precedent. 
The United Kingdom’s proportionality test was formulated on the basis of 
parallel tests in South Africa and Canada. 92  It is therefore broadly similar to 
                                                   
81  Brown v Stott, above, n 4 at 711. 
82  Kebilene, above, n 4 at 381. 
83  R (Animal Defenders International) v Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, above, 
n 6 at 186, [76]. 
84  Above, n 27. 
85  Above, n 9. 
86  Above, n 27. 
87  International Transport Roth, above, n 61 at 766, [85]. 
88  Above, n 48. 
89  Above, n 50. 
90  International Transport Roth, above, n 61 at 767, [87]. 
91  Above, n 59. See the text accompanying nn 59–65 above. 
92  In de Freitas v v Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands and 
Housing, above, n 60 at 80, applied by Daly, above, n 59, the Privy Council cited with approval the 
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proportionality test applied in the context of section 1 of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms.93 Section 1 states that the Charter “guarantees the rights and 
freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can 
be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” According to the 
Supreme Court of Canada in R v Oakes,94 for a legal limitation to be thus justified, 
four elements must exist: 
i. The objective of the measure must be important enough to 
warrant overriding a Charter right; 
ii. there must a rational connection between the limit on the 
Charter right and the legislative objective; 
iii. the limit should impair the Charter right as little as possible; and 
iv. there should be an overall balance or proportionality between 
the benefits of the limit and its deleterious effects.95
The first three elements are virtually identical to the elements of the 
proportionality test applied in the United Kingdom. The heart of the proportionality 
analysis is the third, ‘least intrusive means’, element. In Canada, it is over this 
element that most litigation takes place.96 However it should not be imagined that 
limitations on rights fall simply because it is possible to conceive of another measure 
that may be less intrusive on a protected freedom or right. Rather, some allowance is 
given to Parliament. In Libman v Quebec (Attorney General),97 the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                                                              
proportionality test articulated in the Zimbabwean case of Nyambirai v National Social Security 
Authority [1996] 1 LRC 64 at 75 which had drawn on South African and on Canadian jurisprudence. 
93  Pt I of the Constitution Act 1982 (Can), which was itself enacted as Schedule B to the Canada 
Act 1982 (c 11) (UK) and came into force on 17 April 1982. 
94  [1986] 1 SCR 103, SC (Can). 
95  Robert J Sharpe & Kent Roach, The Charter of Rights and Freedoms (3rd ed) (Toronto: Irwin 
Law, 2005) at 65–66. 
96  Sharpe & Roach, id at 75. 
97  [1997] 3 SCR 659 at [58]. 
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unanimously adopted the following formulation of the test by McLachlin J (as she 
then was) in RJR-MacDonald Inc v Canada:98
The impairment must be “minimal,” that is, the law must be carefully tailored so that 
the rights are impaired no more than necessary. The tailoring process seldom admits 
of perfection and the courts must accord some leeway to the legislator. If the law falls 
within a range of reasonable alternatives, the courts will not find it overbroad merely 
because they can conceive of an alternative which might better tailor objective to 
infringement…99
When applying the least-intrusive-means test, the standard of judicial review 
is lowered in at least two situations. First, the Supreme Court has shown a reluctance 
to closely scrutinize cases involving broad issues of social and economic policy. For 
instance, in McKinney v University of Guelph,100 the Court held that the imposition 
of a mandatory retirement age of 65 years contravened the right not to be 
discriminated against on the ground of age conferred by section 15 of the Charter, but 
upheld the relevant legislation under section 1. The Court used a light-touch 
approach, setting out the issue as “whether the government had a reasonable basis, 
on the evidence tendered, for concluding that the legislation interferes as little as 
possible with a guaranteed right, given the government’s pressing and substantial 
objectives”. 101  In the more recent decision of Chaoulli v Quebec (Attorney 
General)102 the Court has shown a greater willingness to subject matters of social and 
economic policy to stricter analysis. However, the approach taken to judicial 
deference in that case has been criticized as unprincipled.103
The second type of case in which the Supreme Court declines to apply a high 
standard of judicial review is when the impugned legislation represents an attempt 
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by the legislature to reconcile competing claims or protect vulnerable groups. In 
Irwin Toy Ltd v Quebec (Attorney General),104 a distinction was drawn between 
situations where “the government is best characterized as the singular antagonist of 
the individual whose right has been infringed” and those where the government is 
“mediating between the claims of competing groups”, and trying to strike a balance 
that will protect the vulnerable while impinging as little as possible upon protected 
freedoms “without the benefit of absolute certainty concerning how that balance is 
best struck”.105 The judges in the majority stated: 
If the legislature has made a reasonable assessment as to where the line is most 
properly drawn, especially if that assessment involves weighing conflicting scientific 
evidence and allocating scarce resources on this basis, it is not for the court to second 
guess. That would only be to substitute one estimate for another.106
Guy Davidov has noted that, over time, another approach to deference has 
been developed by the Supreme Court of Canada.107 This approach, which he calls 
“flexible deference”, incorporates the above two instances where the judicial review 
standard is lowered into a broader framework. It stems from the dissenting judgment 
by La Forest J in RJR-MacDonald in which the judge suggested that the Oakes test 
should be applied with different levels of deference in different cases.108 Factors 
determining the level of deference include the role of the legislature in striking a 
balance between the interests of competing groups, as distinct from the situation 
where the legislature is the “singular antagonist” of the individual whose Charter 
freedoms have been infringed; the vulnerability of the group that the legislature 
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seeks to protect, and that group’s subjective fears and apprehension of harm; the 
inability to measure scientifically a particular harm in question or the efficaciousness 
of a remedy; and the low social value of the activity suppressed by the legislation.109
In M v H,110 the Supreme Court emphasized that deference is not a kind of 
threshold inquiry under section 1 of the Charter. It quoted Cory J in Vriend v 
Alberta:111 “The notion of judicial deference to legislative choices should not... be 
used to completely immunize certain kinds of legislative decisions from Charter 
scrutiny.”112 In the view of the majority in M v H, deference is intimately tied up with 
the nature of the particular claim or evidence at issue. As such, it can only be 
discussed in relation to such specific claims or evidence and not at the outset of the 
analysis.113
There seems to be a general similarity in the use of the doctrine of deference in 
Canada and the United Kingdom. In both jurisdictions, the doctrine is an element of 
the proportionality test that is applied when determining whether a limitation on 
human rights can be justified in a democratic society. Further, whether deference 
should be shown to the political branches of government depends on the presence or 
absence of a number of factors. The factors considered in the Canada and the United 
Kingdom are not all the same, though there is some broad commonality. For example, 
deference is shown in Canada in cases involving social or economic policy, and in the 
United Kingdom where the subject matter of the case is regarded as lying within the 
constitutional responsibility or expertise of the democratic powers, including matters 
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involving economic policy and requiring social and political judgment. Further, the 
consideration in Canada of whether the political branches have made a decision in 
the face of competing claims or to protect vulnerable groups, or the social value of 
the activity suppressed, can be said to correspond in the United Kingdom to the 
examination of whether the Convention requires a balance to be struck between 
competing interests. 
2. Implicit Deference? The Case of Singapore 
The situation in Singapore114 provides an interesting comparison to the jurisdictions 
that have been discussed thus far. The courts have not articulated any specific 
doctrine of deference to the political branches of government in so many words. 
Nonetheless, the way that many constitutional cases are decided indicates that the 
courts in fact impliedly defer to executive and legislative policy decisions. 
This is likely due to the way in which the bill of rights in the Singapore 
Constitution is drafted – rights are declared, then whittled down by exceptions. 
Significantly, there is no explicit requirement in the bill of rights for a proportionality 
analysis to be undertaken. Article 14 of the Constitution is typical: 
Freedom of speech, assembly and association 
14.—(1) Subject to clauses (2) and (3) — 
(a) every citizen of Singapore has the right to freedom of speech and 
expression; 
(b) all citizens of Singapore have the right to assemble peaceably and 
without arms; and 
(c) all citizens of Singapore have the right to form associations. 
(2) Parliament may by law impose — 
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(a) on the rights conferred by clause (1)(a), such restrictions as it 
considers necessary or expedient in the interest of the security of 
Singapore or any part thereof, friendly relations with other countries, 
public order or morality and restrictions designed to protect the 
privileges of Parliament or to provide against contempt of court, 
defamation or incitement to any offence; 
(b) on the right conferred by clause (1)(b), such restrictions as it 
considers necessary or expedient in the interest of the security of 
Singapore or any part thereof or public order; and 
(c) on the right conferred by clause (1)(c), such restrictions as it 
considers necessary or expedient in the interest of the security of 
Singapore or any part thereof, public order or morality. 
[Emphasis added.] 
Where the freedom of speech and expression are concerned, for example, Article 
14(2)(a) declares that “Parliament may by law impose… such restrictions as it 
considers necessary or expedient” in the interest of various matters set out in that 
provision. There is no reference to limitations on fundamental liberties having to be 
“necessary in a democratic society” as in the European Convention on Human Rights, 
or “reasonable” and “demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society” as in 
Canada. 
The result has been that Singapore courts inevitably defer to choices made by 
the political branches of government so long as they fall within one of the specified 
matters, without balancing any competing interests involved. This is demonstrated 
by the Singapore High Court’s decision in Chee Siok Chin v Minister for Home 
Affairs.115 The applicants and another person held what they termed a “peaceful 
protest”, wearing T-shirts bearing various slogans and holding up placards. The 
police arrived and asked the protestors to disperse. When asked what the legal basis 
for the order was, a senior police officer stated that they had potentially committed a 
public nuisance offence under the Miscellaneous Offences (Public Order and 
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Nuisance) Act.116 The protestors complied, handing over their T-shirts and placards 
to the police. They subsequently commenced proceedings for declarations that the 
Minister for Home Affairs and the Commissioner of Police had acted in an “unlawful 
and/or unconstitutional manner”, and contended inter alia that they had been 
exercising their rights to freedom of speech and expression, and freedom of peaceful 
assembly under Article 14(1) of the Constitution. 
The Court found that the applicants had made a “conscious and calculated 
effort to disparage and cast aspersions” on the integrity and management of certain 
government institutions whose abbreviations had appeared on their T-shirts by 
alleging impropriety against the persons responsible for the finances of these bodies. 
Through the words on the T-shirts and placards they had also called into question 
the dealings of these institutions with the “National Reserves”, and had insinuated 
mismanagement and financial impropriety by linking the institutions to the National 
Kidney Foundation, a charity which, at that time, had been in the news due to 
inexplicable accounting practices, corporate unaccountability, lack of financial 
disclosure and questionable management practices.117
As regards the right to free assembly guaranteed by Article 14(2)(a), the Court 
held that the phrase necessary or expedient conferred on Parliament an extremely 
wide discretionary power and remit that permitted a multifarious and multifaceted 
approach towards achieving any of the specified purposes specified in Article 14(2) of 
the Constitution. The Court could not question whether the legislation was 
reasonable; its sole task was to ascertain whether the impugned law was within the 
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purview of any of the permissible restrictions. Furthermore, the presumption of 
legislative constitutionality would not be lightly displaced.118
Another example is provided by Chan Hiang Leng Colin v Public 
Prosecutor,119 which involved Article 15 of the Constitution. This provision protects 
every person’s “right to profess and practise his religion and to propagate it”.120 On 
the other hand, the provision “does not authorise any act contrary to any general law 
relating to public order, public health or morality”. The appellants in Chan Hiang 
Leng Colin were Jehovah’s Witnesses, and had been tried and convicted in a 
subordinate court for possession of publications that had been banned under the 
Undesirable Publications Act.121 In the course of the proceedings, the appellants 
challenged the deregistration of their organization by the Minister for Home Affairs 
under the Societies Act122 as violating their right to freedom of religion. The High 
Court characterized the matter as a national security issue, as Jehovah’s Witnesses 
refuse to undertake National Service, which is compulsory for Singaporean men.123 It 
then took the view that 
… it was not for this court to substitute its view for the Minister’s as to whether the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses constituted a threat to national security. … This court was not 
here to review the merits of the decision and conclude that the Jehovah’s Witnesses 
were or were not a threat to public order. From the evidence adduced, it appeared 
that the Minister was of the view that the continued existence of a group which 
preached as one of its principal beliefs that military service was forbidden was 
contrary to public peace, welfare and good order.124
The Court equated the concept of public order in Article 15(4) with the notion of 
“public peace, welfare and good order” in section 24(1)(a) of the Societies Act – the 
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provision under which the Singapore congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses had been 
deregistered.125 In other words, without expounding the constitutional meaning of 
public order, the Court accepted the submission on the Minister’s behalf that the 
power granted to him by the Societies Act to order the dissolution of any registered 
society being used for purposes prejudicial to public peace, welfare or good order in 
Singapore is a law relating to public order that limits the right to freedom of religion. 
While the High Courts in Chee Siok Chin and Chan Hiang Leng Colin did not 
use the term ‘deference’ or attempt to develop such a doctrine, unlike in Canada and 
the United Kingdom, what it did in effect was to interpret Articles 14(2)(a) and 15(4) 
of the bill of rights in the Singapore Constitution so as to require absolute deference 
to Parliamentary decisions once a nexus between the object of an impugned law and 
one of the subjects stipulated in Articles 14(2)(a) or 15(4) has been established.126 
Although given the wording of the relevant Articles one can see why the Court might 
have been driven to this conclusion, it will be suggested in Part IV of this chapter that 
it might have been possible for an approach more consonant with the rationale of a 
bill of rights to have been taken. 
B. PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES WITH HOW DOCTRINES OF DEFERENCE ARE APPLIED 
Our survey of deference doctrines demonstrates that in the jurisdictions considered, 
courts look for the presence or absence of several factors on the facts of cases to 
decide whether deference should be shown to decisions made by administrative 
bodies. However, there are practical difficulties with this approach. First, doctrines of 
deference are often used to shut out consideration of a dispute brought before the 
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court altogether, instead of being employed in the course of determining whether an 
infringement of human rights is proportional to the importance of the aim sought to 
be achieved by the infringing action. Secondly, the factors may be so vague that they 
do not provide much guidance at all. In fact, judges are able to pick and choose the 
cases that they wish to intervene in, which leads to inconsistency. 
As to the first type of difficulty, Richard Edwards127 takes the view – correctly, 
it is submitted – that British courts have often failed to apply the doctrine of 
deference correctly. He identifies two stages of judicial review under a bill of rights. 
The first stage focuses on the definition of rights and freedoms,128 while the second 
considers whether such rights are justifiably limited in pursuance of some legitimate 
governmental aim. As we have noted above, it is in the second stage that the 
proportionality test and the doctrine of deference usually come into play. However, 
in some cases what has happened is that deference has been shown by courts at the 
first stage, with the consequence that applications have been dismissed simply 
because their subject matter is regarded as being of such a nature as to warrant 
deference. Thus, the court never considers whether the limitation on rights is 
lawful. 129  In Poplar Housing and Regeneration Community Association Ltd v 
Donoghue,130 for instance, the issue was whether the act of a housing association set 
up by a local housing authority in seeking repossession of property let to the 
defendant, who was determined to have been intentionally homeless, contravened 
the latter’s right to respect for her private and family life and home under Article 8(1) 
of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court of Appeal held that when 
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enacting the legislation governing the matter, Parliament had intended to give 
preference to the needs of those dependent on social housing as a whole over those in 
the defendant’s position. Since “economic and other implications of any policy in this 
area [were] extremely complex and far-reaching”,131 the courts had to treat decisions 
of Parliament as to what was in the public interest with particular deference. In the 
circumstances, therefore, the applicable legislation was held not to breach Article 8. 
The result in the case was reached not because the court had found the defendants 
rights outweighed by the competing interests of Parliament in enacting the 
legislation, but simply because the court had identified this as a ‘no-go area’. We have 
seen that the Canadian Supreme Court in M v H regarded this as an incorrect 
approach.132
Even where the doctrine of deference has been applied in the second stage of 
constitutional review, the proportionality test has not been employed at a level of 
sophistication that might reasonably have been expected, and the courts have bowed 
to the policy choices of the political branches without properly considering whether 
such choices impair rights as little as possible.133 The issue in question in Brown v 
Stott (Procurator Fiscal, Dunfermline), 134  a Privy Council case on appeal from 
Scotland, was whether the privilege against self-incrimination protected by Article 6 
of the European Convention was violated by a provision of the Road Traffic Act 1988. 
This provision made it an offence for a person in charge of a motor vehicle not to 
provide the police with information as to the identity of the vehicle’s driver when the 
driver was alleged to be guilty of an offence. Though the Privy Council did engage in a 
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proportionality analysis, Edwards feels that the court addressed the issue in a 
“superficial and attenuated” manner. There was a rather general discussion of the 
necessity of the relevant provision, and a “somewhat cryptic” reference to balancing 
the rights of the individual against the wider interests of the community. In addition, 
the Crown adduced scant evidence to justify the existence of the provision, and none 
to show why an alternative provision such as a reverse evidential burden would not 
have been just as effective. Conversely, there were many deferential references to the 
need to accept Parliament’s policy choices.135
Another difficulty with doctrines of deference as they are currently employed 
is that they rely on the identification of the existence or otherwise of a number of 
factors. However, these factors have been enunciated by the courts in very expansive, 
general terms. It may be questioned how much guidance they are in fact able to give 
to judges to determine when deference should be shown. For instance, in 
International Transport Roth 136  it will be recalled that the second principle 
articulated by Laws LJ was that there is more scope for deference where the 
European Convention requires a balance to be struck, but less scope where a right is 
stated in unqualified terms. Yet, he stated that even when a right is unqualified, 
“there is no sharp edge” and what is required may vary according to the context.137
Laws LJ’s third and fourth principles were that greater deference may be due 
when the subject matter of a case is particularly within the constitutional 
responsibility of the democratic powers,138 and when the subject matter lies more 
                                                   
135  Edwards, above, n 127 at 870–871. 
136  Above, n 61. 
137  Id at 766, [84]. 
138  Id at 766, [85]. 
140 • Chapter Three 
readily within the actual or potential expertise of the democratic powers.139 These 
principles proved to be unhelpful to Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe in R (ProLife 
Alliance) v British Broadcasting Corporation. 140  In this case, the applicant, a 
political party opposed to abortion, alleged that the BBC’s refusal to broadcast a 
video containing graphic footage of an actual abortion and images of aborted 
foetuses as a party political broadcast infringed its right to freedom of expression 
under Article 10(1) of the Convention. Among other reasons, Lord Walker felt that it 
was disputable that it was the court’s role to act as the constitutional guardian of free 
speech.141 We may surmise that he thus found it hard to decide whether the subject 
matter of the case was “within the constitutional responsibility of the democratic 
powers”. Moreover, in Lord Walker’s view, the principles stated by Laws LJ did not 
allow, at any rate expressly, for the manner (direct and central, or indirect and 
peripheral) in which Convention rights were engaged in the case.142
It has been alleged that in Canada the doctrine of deference has been used 
inconsistently, and that the Supreme Court has rarely followed its own formulations 
of the doctrine.143 A prime example of this is the fact that deference has been shown 
in criminal cases, even though the State is clearly the “single antagonist” of the 
applicants.144 On the contrary, in Eldridge v British Columbia (Attorney General),145 
a case involving the funding of sign-language translators in hospitals which one 
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would have thought was an exemplar of a matter involving the allocation of scarce 
resources and the balancing of the interests of different groups in society, La Forest J 
concluded that even if deference were shown to the government, it had acted 
unconstitutionally.146 In any case, Davidov points out that it is hardly useful for a 
judge to be told that he should defer when legislation strikes a balance between 
different groups in society or allocates scarce resources, since that is what all 
legislation does. Even criminal laws can be regarded as a compromise between the 
interests of the accused, the victims and society as a whole – and the situations dealt 
with by Parliament are often much more complicated, such as laws on abortion or 
pornography.147
In summary, it is submitted that the application of deference doctrines is often 
plagued by practical hitches. Sometimes, deference is used like a non-justiciability 
doctrine, creating zones which courts will not enter. The effect is that the courts then 
do not give any consideration whatsoever to the vital issue of whether the incursion 
into human rights can be justified. Furthermore, the factors that have been 
articulated by courts may generally be too vague to provide much in the way of 
guidance for determining when deference should be shown. This implies that they 
are fairly malleable, and may be used to justify particular outcomes that courts wish 
to reach, with the result that doctrines of deference are unpredictably applied. 
III. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR DEFERENCE 
Apart from the practical issues considered in the preceding section, it is submitted 
that the conceptual foundations for doctrines of deference are also shaky. The 
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adoption of a deferential attitude in certain cases has been justified on a few grounds. 
One is that deference is a consequence of the doctrine of separation of powers. It is 
also said that there are certain kinds of policy decisions which are more appropriately 
made by the democratically-elected branches of government. This justification, when 
unpacked, can be seen to rest on the grounds that such decisions should be made by 
the branches of government which are directly accountable to the electorate, and that 
the judiciary does not have the institutional competence to deal with them. These 
rationalizations will be examined in turn. 
A. SEPARATION OF POWERS 
One justification for the judiciary showing deference to the executive and legislature 
is that by doing so it is giving effect to the doctrine of separation of powers. In 
ProLife Alliance Lord Hoffmann, in the course of explaining why he felt the term 
‘deference’ to be inappropriate, commented that “[i]n a society based upon the rule of 
law and the separation of powers, it is necessary to decide which branch of 
government has in any particular instance the decision-making power and what the 
legal limits of that power are.”148 In his view, decision-making powers are allocated 
among the branches of government according to principles of law, and therefore it is 
for the courts to rule which branch a decision is within the proper competence of.149 
He thus seemed to adopt a rigid conception of the separation of powers, that is, one 
that assigns exclusive competence over particular questions to the executive or 
legislature. 
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Three points arise from Lord Hoffmann’s statement. First, the statement was 
made with reference to the law of the United Kingdom, where the responsibilities of 
the branches of government are, in the main, not set out in a written constitution or 
other written law. Thus there is justification for saying that the court must define 
these responsibilities. On the other hand, in a Westminster-style system having a 
written constitution, it is reasonable to assume that the limits of responsibility, if any, 
are set out in the constitutional text. Indeed, if the text provides that the ultimate 
decision in a matter lies with either the executive or legislative branch of government, 
this allocation of responsibility should be respected by the court. That having been 
said, it must generally be rare for constitutions to explicitly and comprehensively 
state that either of the political branches is solely responsible for making certain 
types of decisions. If the constituent assembly or legislature that enacted the 
constitution has elected against unequivocally giving the final word on an issue to 
one of the political branches, we should ask whether it is right for the judiciary to do 
so on its own motion through a doctrine of deference. 
The second point arising from Lord Hoffmann’s statement is that recognizing 
the doctrine of deference as a corollary of the separation of powers provides no real 
guidance to courts in identifying the circumstances in which deference should be 
shown.150 As we have seen, in the United Kingdom the courts have moved from 
identifying foreign policy and national security as matters to be left to the political 
                                                   
150  “Lord Hoffmann’s dictum correctly summarises the constitutional position, formally 
understood; but it cannot be employed, in practice, as a guide to the determination of concrete cases 
in all their complex particularity”: Allan, above, n 1 at 677–678. 
144 • Chapter Three 
branches, to including the rather indeterminate categories of matters concerning 
“economic policy” and “social and political judgment”.151
Thirdly – and, it is submitted, crucially – both in legal systems with written 
and unwritten constitutions, to hold that certain executive or legislative decisions are 
beyond the pale for the judiciary defeats the scheme of checks and balances that the 
separation of powers doctrine was designed to promote. In ProLife Alliance Lord 
Hoffmann spoke of the need to determine the limits of decision-making power in a 
society based on the rule of law. This remark can be seen as a reminder of the vital 
role that courts play in determining whether the exercise of power by the political 
branches violates the fundamental liberties of persons affected by it. Trevor Allan has 
pointed out that the adoption of a rigid doctrine of separation of powers weakens 
judicial review to the point of futility whenever those questions are relevant to the 
exercise of power.152 Arguably, Westminster-style constitutions are not intended to 
embody a rigid separation of powers – it is submitted that the lack of unambiguous 
textual allocations of responsibilities points to this conclusion. Rather, they establish 
systems where the exercise of power by a branch of government is to be scrutinized 
by one or both of the other branches. 
Thus, the judiciary must be capable of examining even matters touching on 
the allocation of resources, which are clearly within the primary responsibility of the 
political branches, where it is contended that fundamental rights have been infringed 
without sufficient justification. As Allan puts it, “To dismiss such claims as a matter 
of discretion, where the allegations were plausible, would be to render the rights in 
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question non-justiciable – rights without any remedy for infringement.”153 If the 
courts are to play a substantive role in acting as a check on the political branches 
through judicial review, they cannot shrink from testing the actions of the political 
branches for compliance with the bill of rights. 
B. ACCOUNTABILITY AND INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE 
Another reason given for the doctrine of deference is that there are certain types of 
policy decisions more appropriately left to the democratically-elected branches of 
government. Unpacking this idea, we see that it rests on two grounds. First, it is said 
that some policy decisions are only properly made by the branches of government 
that are directly accountable to the electorate. Secondly, the judiciary lacks the 
institutional competence to deal with disputes arising out of the implementation of 
such policies. 
As regards the first ground, it may be recalled that the first principle stated by 
Laws LJ in International Transport Roth was that more deference should be paid to 
an Act of Parliament than to a decision of the executive or a piece of subsidiary 
legislation because the United Kingdom Parliament, and not a written constitution, 
bears the “ultimate mantle of democracy in the state”.154 Without commenting on the 
validity of this principle in the UK context, it may be seen at once that this is not a 
valid justification for deference in jurisdictions where the legislature is not regarded 
as sovereign, and where each of the branches of government are equally subject to a 
written constitution. 
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The rationale given by Lord Hoffmann in Secretary of State for the Home 
Department v Rehman is more apposite to Westminster-style legal systems. He 
noted that decisions on national security matters, 
with serious potential results for the community, require a legitimacy which can be 
conferred only by entrusting them to persons responsible to the community through 
the democratic process. If the people are to accept the consequences of such decisions, 
they must be made by persons whom the people have elected and whom they can 
remove.155
This argument, in his view, also applied to other types of important decisions: in 
ProLife Alliance his Lordship regarded as a “legal principle” the notion that 
“majority approval is necessary for a proper decision on policy or allocation of 
resources”.156
This notion that courts should leave decisions on contentious matters with a 
significant potential impact on the community to the political branches of 
government because they are directly accountable to the electorate, in the sense that 
they can be voted out of office for having made unpopular choices, is not unique to 
the United Kingdom. In the Canadian case of Irwin Toy, it was stated: 
When striking a balance between the claims of competing groups, the choice of means, 
like the choice of ends, frequently will require an assessment of conflicting scientific 
evidence and differing justified demands on scarce resources. Democratic institutions 
are meant to let us all share in the responsibility for these difficult choices. Thus, as 
courts review the results of the legislature’s deliberations, particularly with respect to 
the protection of vulnerable groups, they must be mindful of the legislature’s 
representative function.157
                                                   
155  Above, n 78 at 195, [62]. 
156  Above, n 5 at 240, [76]. To similar effect, Lord Hoffmann also noted: “In a democratic country, 
decisions as to what the general interest requires are made by democratically elected bodies or 
persons accountable to them. … [T]here are many decisions which have to be made every day (for 
example, about the allocation of resources) in which the only fair method of decision is by some 
person or body accountable to the electorate”: R (Alconbury Developments Ltd) v Secretary of State 
for the Environment, Transport and the Regions [2003] 2 AC 295 at 325, [69]–[70], HL. See also 
Kebilene, above, n 4 at 381; Brown v Stott, above, n 4 at 703; Alconbury, above, n 156 at 322–323, 
[60], per Lord Nolan, and at 345–346, [144], per Lord Clyde, HL; Farrakhan, above, n 6 at 1418, [74]. 
157  Above, n 104 at [80]. 
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In other words, it may be appropriate for the judiciary to accept the decision of 
“democratic institutions” such as the legislature where this involves making difficult 
choices between the interests of competing groups in society, since the people are 
seen to have given their imprimatur for the decision through their elected 
representatives. 
It is submitted, though, that there are problems with the accountability 
argument. The political branches of government are accountable to the people for all 
decisions that they make, not simply the ones deemed to have more serious 
consequences, so it is difficult to see why deference should be shown for certain types 
of decisions but not others.158 There also does not seem to be any straightforward 
way to determine which decisions should be regarded as more serious than others. 
Labelling ‘serious’ decisions as those involving ‘policy’ or the ‘allocation of resources’ 
is of no help since all decisions can be thus characterized, except for the most 
straightforward, purely administrative ones. The so-called dichotomy between 
principle and policy is false, the true distinction being between policy decisions that 
are appropriate to a court’s institutional features, competence and legitimacy, and 
those that are beyond the court’s competence.159
The accountability argument is subject to more fundamental objections. When 
the executive and legislative branches exercise power it may be assumed that they 
have assessed whether such action complies with the bill of rights, or if it does not, 
that there is sufficient justification for the abridgment of rights. However, it can be 
                                                   
158  See, eg, Lord Justice Dyson, “Some Thoughts on Judicial Deference” [2006] JR 103 at 107, 
[18]. 
159  Aileen Kavanagh, “Deference or Defiance? The Limits of the Judicial role in Constitutional 
Adjudication” in Grant Huscroft (ed), Expounding the Constitution: Essays in Constitutional Theory 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 184–216 at 197. 
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queried why this assessment should be accepted as inherently more valid or 
legitimate than an evaluation made by the judiciary, particularly when this is the one 
of the key responsibilities of the judiciary.160 Furthermore, a deathly blow is struck at 
the heart of judicial review if it is accepted that courts should defer to difficult 
executive and legislative decisions because these are backed by a majority of the 
population, and that it is inappropriate for judges to inquire into such matters 
because they cannot be voted out of office for unpopular decisions. As we have seen 
in Chapter Two,161 judicial review relies on the judiciary remaining independent of 
the political process. Only if judges are shielded from the whims of the majority can 
they effectively protect the rights of individuals, especially those from minority 
groups. As Martin Redish put it when discussing the American political question 
doctrine that plays a similar role to deference in Commonwealth systems: 
The basic function of unrepresentative judicial review is to assure that the 
Constitution restrains majoritarian will. If the majoritarian branches could act as final 
arbiters of the limits of their own power, there would have been little purpose in 
imposing supermajoritarian constitutional limitations in the first place. Thus, if a 
constitutional provision, reasonably interpreted, prohibits an action by one of the 
political branches, it is unresponsive to argue that the courts should abstain from 
exercising their review power because of their undemocratic nature.162
Besides, it is specious to claim that the people have no opportunity to participate in 
the judiciary’s assessment of governmental action, as compared to the formulation of 
policy by the executive and legislature. In the context of a trial, the executive’s 
appointed representatives have ample opportunity to proffer reasons to the court on 
the people’s behalf as to why administrative action or a piece of legislation should not 
                                                   
160  Compare Richard Clayton, “Judicial Deference and ‘Democratic Dialogue’: The Legitimacy of 
Judicial Intervention under the Human Rights Act 1998” [2004] Pub L 33 at 40: “[I]t is difficult to 
understand why the judicial assessment of a breach of a Convention right or proportionality is 
inherently less valid or legitimate than that initially made by a civil servant.” 
161  Chapter Two, Pt II.B.2. 
162  Martin H Redish, “Judicial Review and the ‘Political Question’” (1984) 79 Nw U L Rev 1031 at 
1045–1046. 
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be regarded as contravening the bill of rights.163 It will also be recalled that the 
relationship between the judiciary and the political branches as regards interpreting 
the bill of rights may be seen as a dialogue. When a court strikes down a piece of 
legislation or an administrative act for infringing an individual’s rights, this signals to 
the political branches and the people at large that Parliament or the executive has 
acted in a way that impacts negatively on cherished freedoms. This focuses the 
attention of the political branches and the people on the issue. Parliament may 
accept the court’s ruling and adapt its policies in line with it or – depending on the 
legal system in question – override the ruling through legislation, possibly by 
amending the bill of rights to provide for exceptions to the rights implicated. The 
people’s elected representatives are active throughout this stage. Members of the 
community may also show their support for or opposition to a court decision by 
participating directly in the process – they may petition their Members of Parliament, 
or vote for or against them in Parliamentary elections.164
The second basis which is said to underlie why the judiciary should defer to 
the executive and legislature on democratic principles has been called its lack of 
‘institutional competence’. In International Transport Roth, Laws LJ’s fourth 
principle was that greater or lesser deference is due according to whether the subject 
matter in question lies more readily within the actual or potential expertise of the 
democratic powers or the courts. The judge regarded this principle as very closely 
allied to, and possibly an emanation of, the principle that deference may be due when 
the subject matter is particularly within the constitutional responsibility of the 
                                                   
163  Compare Robert A Schapiro, “Judicial Deference and Interpretive Coordinacy in State and 
Federal Constitutional Law” (2000) 85 Cornell L Rev 656 at 699: “[T]he adjudicative process itself 
may facilitate a fully considered resolution of constitutional disputes.” 
164  On the idea of a constitutional dialogue, see Chapter Two, Pt III. 
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democratic powers. 165  And Auld J, in R (Animal Defenders International) v 
Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, opined that when faced with a 
complex statutory framework, it was not practicable for the court to say precisely 
whether Parliament had excessively restricted Convention rights: “The court is not 
well equipped, in the adversarial process to which it is confined, to assess the 
practicalities and efficacy of alternative legislative schemes with a different basis or 
reach.”166 The justification has also been recognized by commentators. Speaking 
extra-judicially, John Dyson LJ has termed Laws LJ’s fourth principle as the “relative 
institutional competence principle”167  and opined that while a court can acquire 
knowledge to enable it to decide difficult issues, “it is not the normal function of 
courts to make such judgments, and they are less-well-equipped… to make them.”168 
Jeffrey Jowell has said: 
[I]t is quite appropriate for courts modestly to acknowledge a practical application of 
their own institutional limitations. There will be occasions where other bodies, 
whether Parliament, the executive or a non-departmental public body containing 
specialist expertise, will be better equipped to decide certain questions. The extent 
and degree of concession of course depends upon context and the right and interests 
involved.169
It cannot be denied that the decision-making processes of the judiciary differ 
from those of the executive and legislature. While the courts in adversarial systems 
rely on the evidence and submissions presented to them by the parties to disputes, 
the political branches can appoint committees to gather views and study the 
implications of proposed policies. In addition, the executive branch has at its 
disposal officers and staff who specialize in particular fields such as foreign affairs 
                                                   
165  Above, n 61 at 766, [85], and 767, [87]. 
166  Above, n 6 at 164, [10]. 
167  Dyson, above, n 158 at 105, [8]. 
168  Id at 106, [12]–[13]. 
169  Jeffrey Jowell, “Judicial Deference: Servility, Civility or Institutional Capacity” [2003] Pub L 
592 at 598. 
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and national security, and are therefore well-placed to make recommendations or 
decisions concerning such matters. Nonetheless, the ability of judges to grasp 
complex issues and make decisions upon them, provided they are given sufficient 
information, ought not to be underestimated. Dyson himself, though supportive of 
the deference doctrine, pointed out that judges are routinely obliged to acquire 
sufficient understanding of complex and technical areas which lie well outside their 
usual expertise and experience in order to resolve disputes.170
The more important question, therefore, is whether the judiciary should be 
expected to defer to the executive or legislature because the latter have dedicated 
machinery in place, so to speak, to generate policy outputs from complicated factual 
scenarios. It is submitted that the answer is no. It may well be that in an individual 
case a court will decide that it is sensible to accept the assessment of one of the 
political branches as to whether a certain state of affairs exists, for instance, as to 
whether the nation currently faces an imminent and substantial terrorist risk.171  
However, if one accepts the legitimacy of judicial review and the need for the 
judiciary to subject exercises of power by the political branches to scrutiny for 
compliance with the bill of rights, then it is unsustainable to take the position that 
there exist matters lying beyond the judiciary’s ken that it must not touch at all.172
It has been argued that matters of law and matters of policy must be 
distinguished, the former being the province of judges while the latter the 
                                                   
170  Dyson, above, n 158 at 105–106, [11]. 
171  Compare Redish, above, n 162 at 1051: “The pragmatic arguments made against judicial 
review of a finding of necessity at most establish a varying need for substantive deference, not for the 
total abdication of judicial authority. The level of the deference will presumably vary, depending on 
the severity of both the asserted emergency and of the loss of liberty involved.” 
172  Id. 
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responsibility of administrators and legislators.173 However, as mentioned earlier, 
this is a false dichotomy. By its nature, human rights adjudication involves both 
considerations of policy and law. Determining whether a limitation placed on a 
fundamental liberty is necessary in a democratic society involves weighing of 
opposing interests, which inevitably requires the examination of policy matters. It is 
thus not easy to see how a bright line can be drawn. 
The point is well made by Trevor Allan: even an experienced and well-
qualified public official, or a body accountable to Parliament or the electorate, can 
make an error of judgment as regards the balance of private rights and public 
interest. “Yet a form of deference that deflects attention from the legislative or 
administrative act in order to evaluate the merits of the actor is ill-suited to the 
identification of error.”174 Consequently, the court’s focus should be on the substance 
of the issues arising instead of the characteristics of the decision-maker or its 
procedures. 175  Using Jowell’s memorable phrase, the “crunch constitutional 
question” – whether the political branches could have employed a less restrictive 
alternative to the action taken, and whether the restriction was necessary in a 
democratic society – “cannot simply be left to lay expertise or to majority 
approval”.176
                                                   
173  For instance, J Peter Mulhern notes that some have argued that courts defer to political 
judgments of policy but decide legal questions for themselves: Mulhern, “In Defense of the Political 
Question Doctrine” (1988) 137 U Pa L Rev 97 at 145. 
174  Allan, above, n 1 at 689. 
175  Id at 689–691. 
176  Jowell, above, n 169 at 598. 
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IV. REDEFINING DEFERENCE 
Ultimately, the palatability of doctrines of deference depends on one’s view as to the 
proper scope of the judiciary’s role in interpreting a bill of rights. There is an inverse 
relationship between the two. If one regards the political branches of government as 
the principal protectors of rights in a State and relegates to the judicial branch a 
more modest task, then arguably a doctrine of deference is important in limiting the 
courts’ reach. On the contrary, deference as presently applied is anathema to one 
who believes that the judiciary has the key role of ensuring that executive and 
legislative power is exercised within the confines of the bill of rights. 
It is submitted that in a legal system with a bill of rights, the latter position is 
to be preferred to the former. As we saw in Chapter Two, there are cogent reasons 
supporting the view that the judiciary should be the ultimate interpreter of the bill of 
rights. Chief among them is the independent judiciary’s responsibility to scrutinize 
administrative action and legislation for compliance with fundamental liberties, and 
in particular to safeguard the rights of minorities. Therefore, for courts to limit their 
own remit through a wide-ranging doctrine of deference would render nugatory in 
many circumstances the purpose of having a legally-enforceable bill of rights. 
Doctrines of deference therefore need to be redefined. I do not mean to say 
that the views of the political branches are to be routinely ignored, and that judges 
must always place themselves in the shoes of administrators or legislators and 
consider afresh how the decision in question should have been made. But the 
spotlight should be on examining whether there exists sufficient evidence or 
justification for limiting rights, not whether the matter is one that falls within the 
territory perceived to belong to the political branches. As Jowell has highlighted, in 
154 • Chapter Three 
certain cases it may be appropriate for the court to rely upon evidence that has been 
presented by the executive on the ground of its superior intelligence-gathering 
capacity,177 subject to the court’s power to require further evidence to be adduced 
where deemed fit. The court may also accept the assessment of an administrator on a 
matter of judgment (for instance, whether a criminal offence is required for the 
protection of vulnerable persons), provided that it is supported by convincing 
evidence. It may be reasonable for the political branches to be shown some latitude 
when action is taken in rapid response to a grave public emergency of some kind, 
such as the outbreak of an epidemic or a terrorist attack; or when the potential 
severity of the harm is great if the restriction is not upheld.178
This is not deference by the back door. When a court declines to consider a 
case on the basis of its subject matter, it is effectively applying a doctrine of non-
justiciability. However, we have seen in Part I that courts may not hold that a matter 
is not amenable to judicial review to avoid considering if governmental action has 
contravened fundamental rights. There is a conceptual difference between a court 
simply relying on non-justiciability, and accepting the views or judgment of 
government representatives while examining whether there has been a breach of the 
bill of rights. In the latter case, the court is taking responsibility – as it should – for 
deciding if a less restrictive measure could have been applied and whether the 
restriction was necessary in a democratic society.179
When engaging in this crucial assessment, the proportionality test applied in 
Canada and the United Kingdom provides a logical and systematic framework for the 
                                                   
177  Jowell, above, n 169 at 598. See also Kavanagh, above, n 159 at 196–200. 
178  Davidov, above, n 107 at 161. 
179  Jowell, above, n 169 at 598. 
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courts. It reminds judges that they must ensure the administrative action or 
legislation challenged fulfils a sufficiently-important objective. In addition, it 
underlines the centrality of fundamental rights by requiring the measure taken by the 
executive or legislature to be narrowly-tailored to fulfil the objective. Therefore, as 
regards Westminster-style legal systems such as Malaysia and Singapore where the 
constitutional text is silent on the application of a proportionality analysis, it is 
submitted that it is appropriate for a court to read such a test into the text. The courts 
have, on other occasions, fashioned legal tests in order to give meaning to the 
constitutional text. For example, in interpreting the phrase “equal protection of the 
law” guaranteed by Article 12(1) of the Singapore Constitution,180 the courts apply a 
“rational nexus” test, which requires that the classification employed by the 
impugned legislation be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes 
persons grouped together from others left out of the group, and that there exists a 
rational nexus between the basis of classification and the purpose of the law.181 This 
test was adopted in the absence of any express indication in the Constitution that it 
should be applied, and there is no reason why a proportionality test should not 
similarly be implied into the text.182 The alternative would be an attenuated bill of 
rights – individuals would only enjoy rights so long as they had not been yet been 
                                                   
180  Art 12(1) of the Singapore Constitution reads: “All persons are equal before the law and 
entitled to the equal protection of the law.” 
181  Kok Hoong Tan Dennis v Public Prosecutor [1996] 3 SLR(R) 570 at 578–579, [34], HC 
(S’pore); Public Prosecutor v Taw Cheng Kong [1998] 2 SLR(R) 489 at 506–508, [55]–[59], CA 
(S’pore). 
182  Compare Michael Hor, Case Note, “The Freedom of Speech and Defamation: Jeyaretnam 
Joshua Benjamin v Lee Kuan Yew” [1992] Sing J Legal Studies 542 at 544–549, particularly 547: “… 
Art. 14 expresses a basic commitment to the freedom of speech. Parliament is, however, given the 
power to derogate from this in the interest of the exceptions mentioned. It must be implicit that the 
power of derogation cannot be so broad as to eclipse the basic commitment to free speech altogether. 
The Court must have the supervisory duty to see that such derogations do not get out of hand. It has 
the constitutional role of ensuring that the balance of free speech and, say, the protection of 
reputation is kept.” 
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abridged by Parliament. It is contended that such an interpretation creates de facto 
Parliamentary sovereignty, which was arguably not what the Constitution was 
intended to achieve. This defeats the rationale behind having the bill of rights, which 
is intended to protect fundamental liberties against unjustified encroachment by the 
exercise of executive and legislative power. 
It may be claimed that certain sensitive matters such as foreign policy and 
national security should not be dealt with by the court due to the risk of confidential 
information being revealed. Yet these are the very cases where a high likelihood 
exists that the fundamental liberties of the individual will be at risk. It is contended 
that in appropriate cases the concern can be addressed by applying various 
procedural safeguards, such as the holding of hearings closed to the public; the 
imposition of non-disclosure orders on the parties, witnesses and legal 
representatives backed up by the possibility of contempt of court proceedings in the 
event of breach; the sealing of the record of proceedings; and the making of orders 
that sensitive information be omitted from reports of the proceedings. In one of the 
Pentagon Papers cases, 183  in which the United States government sought an 
injunction against the New York Times to prevent the publication of excerpts from a 
leaked top-secret report on internal government planning and policy decisions 
regarding the Vietnam War, the government was required to prepare special briefs 
for judicial inspection in camera to explain what specific harms would flow from 
publication.184
                                                   
183  United States v New York Times Co 444 F 2d 544 (2nd Cir, 1971). 
184  See Redish, above, n 162 at 1051–1052. 
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CONCLUSION 
The United Kingdom experience suggests that the doctrine of deference, which is not 
expressly provided for in the Human Rights Act 1998, is a hangover from more 
limited conceptions of the judicial role in administrative law. We have seen that the 
doctrine does not provide sufficient guidance to enable courts to determine on a 
principled basis whether to accept the prior decision of the executive or legislature. 
More significantly, the justifications presented by judges and commentators for the 
doctrine’s continued existence can be criticized. While deference may be regarded as 
a corollary of the separation of powers doctrine, this in itself provides no help to a 
judge to decide when deference should be shown to the political branches. What is 
more, a Westminster-style constitution containing a bill of rights arguably 
establishes a legal framework in which the judiciary is responsible for checking that 
the political branches have not infringed rights guaranteed to the people in exercising 
their powers.185
Suffering from similar weaknesses is the argument that there are certain types 
of decisions – those that are policy-laden, for instance – that ought to be reserved to 
the political branches because they are accountable to the people. It fails to provide 
the judiciary with adequate direction as to when to show deference, and generally 
tends to undermine the concept of judicial review. Finally, the justification for 
deference that the judiciary lacks institutional competence to determine certain types 
of cases arguably underrates its capability. The justification also rests on a dubious 
distinction between matters of law and policy where human rights are concerned, 
and diverts attention away from the key issue of whether administrative action or 
                                                   
185  Chapter Two, Pt II.B.2. 
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legislation complies with the bill of rights to an examination of the characteristics of 
the decision-maker. It is not denied that where appropriate a judge may accept 
evidence adduced by the political branches, or an administrative officer’s exercise of 
discretion on a matter of judgment. But in the end, the tasks of ensuring that 
exercises of governmental power are necessary in a democratic society and restrict 
fundamental liberties as minimally as possible cannot be delegated. 
In the ProLife Alliance case,186 Lord Hoffmann expressed disapproval of the 
term ‘deference’ to describe the relationship between the judicial and the other 
branches of government: 
I do not think that its overtones of servility, or perhaps gracious concession, are 
appropriate to describe what is happening. In a society based upon the rule of law and 
the separation of powers, it is necessary to decide which branch of government has in 
any particular instance the decision-making power and what the legal limits of that 
power are. That is a question of law and must therefore be decided by the courts.187
With respect, it could be said that ‘deference’ is indeed an honest term to express 
how doctrines of deference are applied today. Deference is dangerous, for its use is 
largely unprincipled and tends to encourage courts to abdicate their responsibility of 
upholding the bill of rights and acting as a check on the political branches of 
government. It is a doctrine in need of redefinition. 
                                                   
186  Above, n 5. 
187  Id at 240, [75]. 
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Interpretive Approaches: The Nature of the 
Judicial Task 
[B]e sure that you go to the author to get at his meaning, not to 
find yours. ... [T]he metal you are in search of being the 
author’s mind or meaning, his words are as the rock which you 
have to crush and smelt in order to get at it. And your pickaxes 
are your own care, wit, and learning; your smelting furnace is 
your own thoughtful soul. Do not hope to get at any good 
author’s meaning without those tools and that fire; often you 
will need sharpest, finest chiselling, and patientest fusing, 
before you can gather one grain of the metal.1
— JOHN RUSKIN (1819–1900) 
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BILLS OF RIGHTS and constitutions are strange creatures. On the one hand, they are 
legislative in nature, which leads one to suppose that familiar principles of statutory 
interpretation apply to them. On the other hand, they are special types of statutes, 
embodying fundamental principles that are intended to set boundaries for other laws 
and governmental activity. This suggests that different principles should be 
                                                   
1  John Ruskin, “Lecture I – Sesame: Of Kings’ Treasuries” in Sesame and Lilies: Two Lectures 
Delivered at Manchester in 1864 (London: Smith, Elder & Co, 1865), 1–118 at 25 and 27–28. 
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employed when determining the meaning of their provisions and applying them to 
disputes arising before the courts. In the light of the tension created by the dual 
nature of constitutional and bills of rights texts, this chapter aims to consider the 
nature of the judicial task in interpreting such texts, and the general approach that 
judges should take when doing so. 
The role of the court is customarily expressed as implementing the intention 
of the legislature. In Part I of the chapter, we will explore what it means for a such a 
collective body to have an intention, and debunk the notion that legislative intent is 
an illusory concept. We then go on to consider the implications of this for the legal 
meaning of a statutory text. In particular we compare ‘expressed’ and ‘unexpressed’ 
intent, that is, whether the judiciary should adhere to what the legislature has set out 
in the constitutional text, or go on to search for evidence of what the legislature may 
have subjectively believed the text would achieve. In the light of conclusions about 
the appropriateness of these forms of intent, this Part assesses four approaches to 
constitutional interpretation that come under the umbrella of ‘originalism’ – ‘actual 
intention’, ‘counterfactual intention’, ‘original meaning’, and moderate originalism. It 
will be shown that moderate originalism has much to commend it. 
Part II turns to the issue of whether a constitutional text should be given a 
meaning that was fixed at the time it was enacted, or one that is dynamic and 
dependent on present-day needs, values and expectations. Criticisms of the latter 
approach, which has been termed ‘non-originalism’ and seen as opposed to 
originalist approaches, are considered, taking into account how the relationship 
between the legislature and the judiciary as regards statutory interpretation should 
be conceptualized. It will be submitted that it is the nature of the words and phrases 
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appearing in the text that determines whether a fixed or dynamic interpretation 
should be applied. 
I. THE TEXT AT ITS INCEPTION: LEGISLATIVE INTENTION 
A. THE MEANING OF LEGISLATIVE INTENTION 
When a court endeavours to interpret a statutory provision, its goal has long been 
regarded to be to discover the legislative intention in enacting the text. For reasons 
that will be explained shortly, this aptly characterizes the court’s responsibility. One 
might, however, take issue with the term ‘legislative intention’. In Westminster 
systems of government, constitutions and bills of rights come into legal existence in a 
number of ways. First, they may be enacted as statutes by legislatures. Such statutes 
may have the superior status of basic law, or simply be ordinary legislation subject to 
amendment and repeal in the usual manner. Secondly, a constitution or a bill of 
rights may be the product of a constituent assembly specifically convened to create a 
new fundamental law for the nation, often after some significant change of political 
regime. Given the limited mandate of such an assembly and its lack of general law-
making power, using the adjective ‘legislative’ to describe the intent it possesses is, 
strictly speaking, incorrect. Thirdly, a constitution or bill of rights may only become 
law if it has been approved by a requisite majority of the electorate in a referendum. 
Conceptually there is no real difference between how a constituent assembly and a 
legislature can be said to have an ‘intention’ as regards a text, though the same many 
not be true for the electorate as a body as it has no ability to alter the wording of the 
text placed before it for approval. For convenience in this chapter, we will not 
consider the situation involving the electorate. What is said about a legislature and 
individual legislators (or Parliament and individual members of Parliament) should 
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be understood to apply to a constituent assembly and the members of such an 
assembly. 
Francis Bennion calls the ascertainment of Parliamentary intention the “sole 
object” and “paramount criterion” of statutory interpretation,2 and in the Australian 
High Court decision Re Wakim, ex parte McNally,3 Justice Michael McHugh said: 
“The starting point for a principled interpretation of the Constitution is the search for 
the intention of its makers.” It is submitted that the determination of Parliamentary 
intention is a fair description of the judicial role in this respect. This is because 
Parliament is duty-bound to enact laws for the good of the people, and the courts’ 
responsibility is to resolve disputes that arise between parties according to the law, 
including applicable Acts of Parliament. However, this does not advance our 
understanding of the matter much. The crux of the issue is what the intention of 
Parliament, or legislative intent, should properly be understood to mean, and what 
are the appropriate means to identify it. 
When we speak of the “intention of Parliament” in enacting a piece of 
legislation, we are referring to the intention of a collective body. Clearly, this is not 
the same species of beast as the intention an individual legislator has when he votes 
for a bill that has been laid before Parliament. At this point, it is necessary to 
consider why we focus on the intents possessed by legislators rather than on the 
intent of the drafter of the text, who may be a member of Parliament or a civil servant. 
It is submitted that the views that constitute legislative intent are not those of a 
                                                   
2  F A R (Francis Alan Roscoe) Bennion, Statutory Interpretation: A Code (3rd ed) (London: 
Butterworths, 1997) at 365. 
3  (1999) 198 CLR 511 at 551, [40] (footnote omitted). 
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person or group of persons who have chosen the phraseology of the text, but those 
whose understanding and acceptance of the text causes it to become law. 
As a human being, a legislator has the capacity to appreciate the objects that a 
proposed statute is designed to achieve, and the power to consciously resolve to fulfil 
those objects by voting in favour of the statute – or, indeed, vote against it in the 
hope of preventing its enactment. Therefore, each individual legislator is capable of 
having a specific understanding of the statute at the time it was passed. Conversely, 
Parliament – or, more accurately, the segment of Parliament that voted to enact the 
statute – cannot possess volition in the same manner, for it is an artificial assemblage. 
It may comprise of legislators, but it is too blithe to conclude that its “intention” is 
merely an aggregation of the individual intents of those persons. That assumes the 
legislators shared identical understandings of the statute. It is quite possible, though, 
that they might have had varying ideas as to what the legislative text would achieve.4 
In fact, some legislators may have had no specific intent on this issue at all. Their 
own intents may have been to support the party line, please their constituents, 
advance their political careers,5 or simply, as one commentator has pointed out, to 
bring the debate to a speedy conclusion so they could go home for dinner.6 On the 
                                                   
4  “[L]egislatures usually have no determinate collective expectations about many (if any) of the 
concrete issues posed by their statutes”: William N Eskridge, “The New Textualism” (1990) 37 UCLA L 
Rev 621 at 642, referencing the views of Max Radin, “Statutory Interpretation” (1930) 43 Harv L Rev 
863. 
5  Aileen Kavanagh, “The Role of Parliamentary Intention in Adjudication under the Human 
Rights Act 1998” [2006] OJLS 179 at 181. 
6  C Edwin Baker, Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech (New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press, 1989) at 272. See also Stephen Guest, “Interpretation and Commitment in Legal Reasoning” in 
Legislation and the Courts (Michael Freeman, ed) (Aldershot, Hants: Dartmouth, 1997), 133 at 140–
141: “He [the legislator] might have voted for the bill without having understood its provisions, his 
intention in doing so only being to please the whips; or his intention might have been to support the 
bill solely because his wife had business interests that would be furthered; or, more complicatedly, he 
may have had the various intentions of pleasing the whips, furthering the business interests of his wife 
(who is a director of a water authority) and ensuring that the environment would be improved.” 
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basis of this argument, in a 1930 article,7 the legal realist Max Radin concluded that 
it was unrealistic to talk about such a heterogeneous body having an intent.8 This 
view remains influential today.9
However, it has been pointed out – rightly, it is submitted – that it is possible 
to overcome the argument that legislative intent is fictional. One way is to ascribe the 
actual intent of one or more legislators to their colleagues. During the process of 
enactment, a bill is introduced into Parliament by a legislator we may call its 
promoter. This person is most likely a government minister, but in the case of a 
private member’s bill may be an ordinary member of Parliament (a backbencher, in 
the parlance of Westminster-style governments). The promoter, being an individual 
legislator, will possess an actual intent as regards what the proposed legislation is to 
achieve. According to Reed Dickerson, it is not unreasonable to conclude that other 
legislators who subsequently support the legislation, but without having any specific 
intent towards it, can be regarded as having adopted or acquiesced in the promoter’s 
actual intent.10 Apart from being the work of a single promoter, a bill may also be the 
product of a group of legislators; for instance, a committee of Parliament may have 
been appointed to inquire into a matter and prepare draft legislation. In this 
                                                   
7  Radin, above, n 4. 
8  Reed Dickerson, “Statutory Interpretation: A Peek into the Mind and Will of the Legislature” 
(1975) 50 Ind LJ 206 at 207 (referring to Radin’s views, id). 
9  Eskridge, above, n 4 at 642, citing “Comment: Admissibility of Congressional Debates in 
Statutory Construction by the United States Supreme Court” (1937) 25 Calif L Rev 326 at 335–336; J 
A Corry, “The Use of Legislative History in the Interpretation of Statutes” (1954) 32 Can B Rev 624 at 
626; William Robert Bishin, “The Law Finders: An Essay in Statutory Interpretation” (1965) 38 S Cal 
L Rev 1 at 14; Ronald Dworkin, “How to Read the Civil Rights Act” in A Matter of Principle 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1985) at 316; Michael S Moore, “A Natural Law Theory 
of Interpretation” (1985) 58 S Cal L Rev 277. See also Daniel Greenberg, “The Nature of Legislative 
Intention and its Implications for Legislative Drafting” (2006) 27(1) Stat L Rev 15 at 15–16. 
10  Dickerson, above, n 8 at 210–211. See also James M Landis, “A Note on ‘Statutory 
Interpretation’” (1930) 43 Harv L Rev 886 at 889: “[A] mere expression of assent [by the individual 
legislator] becomes in reality a concurrence in the expressed views of another. A particular 
determinate thus becomes the common possession of the majority of the legislature, and as such a real 
discoverable intent.” 
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situation, Dickerson states that even though the views of individual committee 
members on the draft legislation may vary in the details, there is usually a general 
consensus on its meaning which is sufficient to support the existence of legislative 
intent. This intent is then capable of being adopted or acquiesced in by other 
legislators in the manner described above. 11  He concludes, “legislative intent is 
ultimately rooted in individual intents”.12
There is a difficulty with the above argument, though. It may be acceptable to 
regard legislators lacking any proper intent as to the text’s meaning to have 
acquiesced in the promoter’s actual intent. On the other hand, it is unreasonable to 
apply the same analysis to legislators who have merely understood the text in a 
different way from the promoter, particularly those who spoke up against the 
legislation during the debates, even if they later voted in favour of it. To attribute the 
promoter’s intent to such legislators would be disregarding the real possibility that 
members of Parliament can disagree on the specifics of a bill’s meaning and yet 
concur with enough of its overall thrust to support its enactment. In Wilson v First 
County Trust Ltd (No 2),13 Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, when considering whether 
ministerial statements on bills could be attributed to the whole of Parliament, noted: 
[D]ifferent members [of Parliament] may well have different reasons, not 
expressed in the debates, for approving particular statutory provisions. They 
may have different perceptions of the desirability or likely effect of the 
legislation.14
It is submitted that the better way of understanding legislative intent is to hold that it 
is an adoption by legislators, not of the actual intent of the promoter of a bill, but of 
                                                   
11  Id at 211–212. 
12  Id at 213. 
13  [2004] 1 AC 816, HL. 
14  Id at 843, [67]. 
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the intent manifested in the text of the bill.15 In other words, Parliament’s intention 
is “its having decided to pursue a particular course of action in a particular way” 16 
which was embodied in the bill under consideration, and is subsequently reflected in 
the text of the statute.17
1. Legislative Intention and Legal Meaning: Originalism, and Expressed and 
Unexpressed Intent 
The preceding discussion sought to establish that the intention of Parliament is not 
an illusory concept, that it is a key aspect of establishing the legal meaning of a 
statute, and that it is manifested in the statutory text. This has clear implications for 
judges seeking the appropriate means of identifying legislative intention. There are 
two main schools of thought. The first holds that legislative intention must be 
gathered from the actual words in the statute that legislators have jointly agreed to 
express their understandings in. The second requires the actual intents held by 
individual legislators to be discerned. This is the distinction drawn by Aileen 
Kavanagh between what she calls the ‘expressed intent’ and the ‘unexpressed intent’ 
theses. Speaking in the context of constitutional interpretation, she says: 
Roughly speaking, the “expressed intent” thesis argues that judges 
interpreting the Constitution should only defer to those intentions which are 
manifest or “expressed” in the language of the Constitution itself. According 
to the “unexpressed intent” thesis, judges are entitled to go behind the 
constitutional text to find and enforce intentions which accompanied the 
enactment, but are not apparent on the Constitution’s face.18
                                                   
15  Dickerson, above, n 8 at 210–211. 
16  Kavenagh, “Role of Parliamentary Intention”, above, n 5 at 182. 
17  Id; Kavenagh added, “These intentions are not fictional; they are determined by a set of rules 
or conventions, such that the intentions which are expressed in the statutory text (having gone 
through all the requirements of the legislative process) are the intentions of Parliament.” 
18  Aileen Kavanagh, “Original Intention, Enacted Text, and Constitutional Interpretation” (2002) 
47 Am J Juris 255 at 263–264. 
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It is superficially attractive for judges to try and determine what legislators had in 
mind when they enacted a piece of legislation, for this appears to be an endeavour to 
ascertain the ‘truth’. However, this approach is not viable if the intention of 
Parliament as a whole resides in the legislative text and not in the minds of 
individual legislators. Proper interpretive approaches are therefore those governed 
by the expressed intent thesis. 
Bearing this in mind, several approaches to interpreting constitutional and bill 
of rights texts that have been applied by courts or propounded by scholars will now 
be considered. Interpretive approaches are not binding legal rules laid down by 
legislatures or courts. On the contrary, they are methods or techniques that aim to 
guide judges in determining the meaning of statutes. Having identified whether these 
approaches are based on the expressed or unexpressed intent thesis, it will be 
suggested that, for the reasons set out below, interpretive approaches founded on 
unexpressed intent should not be adopted by courts. 
The approaches to interpretation to be examined in this part of the chapter are 
generally regarded as varieties of ‘originalism’. The term originalism is contested. In 
general it connotes the interpretation of a text by determining its original intended 
meaning19 but, as with legislative intention, the difficulty lies in what exactly ‘original 
intended meaning’ means. Academic discourse in the United States speaks of the 
dichotomy between two forms of originalism: ‘textualism’ and ‘intentionalism’.20 The 
                                                   
19  Jeremy Kirk, “Constitutional Interpretation and a Theory of Evolutionary Originalism” (1999) 
27 Fed L Rev 323 at 324. 
20  For use of the term intentionalism see, eg, Paul Brest, “The Misconceived Quest for the 
Original Understanding” (1980) 60 B U L Rev 204; Caleb Nelson, “What is Textualism?” (2005) 91 Va 
L Rev 348. 
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term ‘textualism’ is not always used consistently, 21  but in general it can be 
understood as an interpretive approach that regards the legislative text as the 
primary source for determining the intention of Parliament.22 ‘Intentionalism’, on 
the other hand, advocates that judges identify and enforce what legislators 
understood themselves to be adopting.23 The latter term is less than ideal; after all, 
both textualists and intentionalists are engaged in a quest for the legislative intent, 
and differ only as to how that intent should be identified. Broadly understood, 
intentionalism might be seen to embrace any interpretive approach that tries to 
establish Parliamentary intent. This appears to be Kavanagh’s view, for she sees 
textualism not as the antithesis of intentionalism, but as a particular instance of it.24
Many judges and academics proclaim themselves to be originalists, but an 
examination of their views on constitutional interpretation reveals a diversity of 
approaches. We will examine three of these: ‘actual intention’, ‘counterfactual 
intention’, and ‘original meaning’ originalism. 
(1) Actual and Counterfactual Intentions 
One type of originalist argues that in order to discover the meaning of a text, it is 
necessary to inquire into what the legislators who enacted it actually intended, even 
if this intent was ill expressed in the text. 25  Using terminology developed by 
Kavanagh, we may call this the search for ‘actual intention’. Thus, if the question is 
                                                   
21  See, eg, Kavanagh, “Original Intention”, above, n 18 at 295, noting that “textualism” is 
sometimes seen as antithetical to originalism, sometimes as a form of originalism, and sometimes as 
synonymous with originalism. 
22  Id at 297. 
23  Nelson, above, n 20 at 351–352, citing Richard S Kay, “Adherence to the Original Intentions 
in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses” (1988) 82 Nw U L Rev 226 at 232, 
and Patricia M Wald, “The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in 
the 1988–89 Term of the United States Supreme Court” (1990) 39 Am U L Rev 277 at 301. 
24  Kavanagh, “Original Intention”, above, n 21 at 297. 
25  Kavanagh, above, n 18 at 266. 
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whether caning or flogging violates a constitutional prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishment,26 a historical examination of the views of the legislators who 
approved the bill of rights is required. If the framers’ ‘true intentions’ can be 
discerned – from contemporary records such as reports of legislative debates; and 
possibly extra-statutory documents such as pamphlets and newspaper articles 
written by legislators, early commentaries of the text, and diaries and letters – then 
effect should be given to these intentions, and the text effectively ignored as 
inadequate or inaccurate. 
One difficulty with actual intention originalism is that legislators may not have 
given any thought at all to this specific question so that there is no requisite intent on 
the issue. Therefore, another form of originalism asks hypothetically what the 
legislators would have understood the text to mean if confronted with the issue in the 
present-day context. Kavanagh refers to this as ascribing to the framers of the 
constitution a ‘counterfactual intention’.27
It is clear that these two species of originalism, which can be classed as forms 
of intentionalism, are based on the unexpressed intent thesis. They try to determine 
how the framers of the text understood it, rather than the meaning of the text itself. 
The unexpressed intent thesis can be criticized on a number of grounds. First, 
attempting to establish what was going on in the framers’ minds, or what they would 
have thought if they had been confronted with a particular present-day scenario, is 
highly conjectural. 28  It has been claimed that the framers’ actual beliefs and 
                                                   
26  Eg, US Constitution, 8th Amdt; South African Constitution, s 12(1)(e). 
27  Kavanagh, “Original Intention”, above, n 18 at 266. 
28  Id at 270. See also Daniel A Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Desperately Seeking Certainty: The 
Misguided Quest for Constitutional Foundations (Chicago, Ill.; London: University of Chicago Press, 
2002) at 16 (“If we are asking what a ‘reasonable’ reader of the period would find in the document, 
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intentions may be adequately gleaned from materials relating to a statute’s legislative 
history, including reports of legislative debates and Parliamentary committees, 
superseded drafts of bills, and differences between the statute and the prior law. 
Some would even permit the search to be extended to legislators’ extra-statutory 
writings 29  such as books, newspaper articles, pamphlets, diaries and letters. As 
regards the latter point, it is submitted that reference to such writings is highly 
undesirable. The fact that the views expressed therein have not been considered in an 
official Parliamentary setting renders them a doubtful guide to the actual intent of a 
legislator or group of legislators attributable to Parliament as a whole. 
Additionally, as was pointed out above, 30  the intentions of particular 
legislators towards a statute are not a reliable guide to Parliamentary intention. This 
point was recognized in the Canadian Supreme Court’s decision Reference re s 94(2) 
of the Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia),31 which was cited with approval by the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa in State v Makwanyane.32 In the latter case, the 
Court said: 
Our Constitution is also the product of a multiplicity of persons, some of 
whom took part in the negotiations, and others who as members of 
Parliament enacted the final draft. The same caution is called for in respect of 
the comments of individual actors in the process, no matter how prominent a 
role they might have played.33
In any case, while sufficient documentary evidence of this sort – legislative 
and non-legislative – may be available in certain countries such as the United States, 
other jurisdictions may simply lack such material. What is more, the evidence, where 
                                                                                                                                                              
without limiting ourselves to what various readers did in fact think, then we have cut free from any 
tether to the historical record and entered the realm of speculation.”) 
29  Kavanagh, id at 270. 
30  Above, n 13 and the accompanying text. 
31  [1985] 2 SCR 486 at 508–509, [58]. 
32  1995 (3) SA 391. 
33  Id at 407, [18]. 
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it can be found, may be equivocal. Printz v United States34 is an example of this 
potential ambivalence. The case involved a provision in the Brady Handgun Violence 
Prevention Act 199335 that required state police officers to make a reasonable effort 
to determine whether a proposed gun sale would be illegal.36 In a 5–4 decision of the 
Supreme Court, this provision was found to be an unconstitutional encroachment on 
state sovereignty.37 Two of the dissenting judges, Stevens and Souter JJ, relied on 
historical evidence that suggested that the framers had assumed that state officials 
would be assigned to carry out federal laws.38 However, Scalia J, who wrote the 
majority opinion, distinguished this evidence by contending that some of it referred 
only to the voluntary enforcement of federal laws by the states, while other passages 
could not be read as an acceptance of the federal government’s right to commandeer 
state officials to do their bidding.39 Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry point out: 
[D]ifferent framers expressed different views, and many… changed their views 
over time. Just like people today, the framers were often vague or conflicted in 
their thinking. Thus any perusal of the historical record is bound to yield 
conflicting expressions of intent.40
At the end of the day, since the historical evidence is likely to be seen as 
determinative of what the bill of rights text means, the focus of interpretation shifts 
away from the text towards the evidence. Given the potential ambiguity of the latter, 
it is more likely than not that courts will arrive at a false or contrived answer to the 
question of what the framers intended.41 It is submitted that legal rules that rest on 
                                                   
34  521 US 898 (1997). 
35  Pub L No 103-159, 107 Stat 1536 (30 November 1993), codified at 18 USC §§ 921 and 922. 
36  18 USC § 922(s)(2). 
37  Farber & Sherry, above, n 28 at 32.  
38  Printz, above, n 34 at 939–976. 
39  Farber & Sherry, above, n 28 at 45. 
40  Id at 16. 
41  Kavanagh, “Original Intention”, above, n 18 at 278. 
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the unexpressed-intent thesis fail to provide judges with sufficient guidance in 
deciding cases. 
There are other cogent reasons for rejecting reliance on unexpressed intent. 
For one, judges may inadvertently infer into the constitutional text intentions that 
were insufficient to command majority support in Parliament. In addition, legislators 
may be led to assume that judges will rectify shortcomings in enactments, which may 
act as a disincentive for legislators to carry out their duties diligently and 
responsibly.42 More importantly, as a matter of constitutional law, the only way that 
Parliament can express its will is through the enactment of legislation.43 Trevor Allan 
sees this as one of the consequences of the rule of law: 
It is… a cardinal principle of common law (reflecting the principle of the rule 
of law) that a statute’s authority attaches to its formally enacted text, which 
must be distinguished from the intentions, desires or purposes of legislators, 
whether regarded as separate individuals or as a collective body sharing 
common aims.44
The process by which legislation is drafted, publicly debated and voted upon, and 
ultimately enacted into law possesses significance. It is a safeguard against laws 
being enacted for improper reasons, as Parliament is openly made accountable for 
the legislation it has passed. The process also gives lawmakers control over what has 
been enacted; they know what must formally be done to transform their intentions 
and opinions into law. But if the courts look behind the enactment and seek to 
                                                   
42  Id at 277. 
43  Dickerson, above, n 8 at 221. Thus, for example, Art 58(1) of the Singapore Constitution states 
that “the power of the Legislature to make laws shall be exercised by Bills passed by Parliament and 
assented to by the President”. 
44  T R S Allan, “Legislative Supremacy and Legislative Intention: Interpretation, Meaning, and 
Authority” (2004) 63 Cam LJ 685 at 687. 
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enforce intentions perceived to be held by legislators that are not reflected in the text, 
they undermine this control and subvert the rationale of the enactment process.45
Based on the weaknesses of the unexpressed intent thesis set out above, it is 
submitted that actual and counterfactual intent originalism are not suitable 
interpretive approaches. In particular, counterfactual intent originalism requires 
mental calisthenics that may be unreasonable to expect judges to perform. It is not 
easy to see how a judge would imagine legislators, possibly of a different era, 
deciding issues concerning technologies that had not existed and controversies that 
had never arisen in their time. 
(2) Original Meaning 
There is a sophisticated form of originalism that has been developed by Associate 
Justice Antonin Scalia of the US Supreme Court in cases and extrajudicial writings. 
Scalia does not propose that courts should seek to ascertain the actual intentions of 
the constitution’s framers, or speculate about their hypothetical intentions. Instead, 
he counsels that they should look for the “original meaning” of the constitutional text, 
that is, the way in which the text was originally understood at the time it was 
enacted.46
                                                   
45  Kavanagh, “Original Intention”, above, n 18 at 275, adopting the views of Joseph Raz in The 
Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979); and “The 
Morality of Freedom, Part I” and “Authority, Law and Morality” in Ethics in the Public Domain 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994). See also Aileen Kavanagh, “Pepper v Hart and Matters of 
Constitutional Principle” (2005) 121 LQR 98 at 101, noting that an interpretive strategy of construing 
a statute by reference to what legislators said during debates preceding the passage of the bill into law 
“subverts the rationale of the legislative process. It allows intentions which were not part of the law, 
not a source of law, to trump the enacted intentions contained in the authoritative text. … This 
undermines Parliament’s control over what is enacted into law, as well as their accountability for that 
law.” (Footnotes omitted.) 
46  Id at 280. 
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On the surface, this approach to interpretation would seem fairly 
unobjectionable, if not for a troubling aspect that has far-reaching consequences. 
According to Scalia, long-established traditional practices are the primary 
determinant of the constitutional text’s original meaning, and so cannot themselves 
be unconstitutional. The consequence is that such practices are immunized against 
being held unconstitutional.47 This is evident, for instance, from Scalia’s dissenting 
judgment in Rutan v Republican Party,48 in which he disagreed with the majority 
that the First Amendment right to freedom of speech forbade the government from 
favouring members of one political party in hiring, promotions, transfers and recalls 
for government jobs.49 He reasoned that this practice, known as patronage hiring, 
had been traditionally accepted for so long that it should be regarded as consistent 
with the original meaning of the First Amendment:50
The provisions of the Bill of Rights were designed to restrain transient 
majorities from impairing long-recognized personal liberties. They did not 
create by implication novel individual rights overturning accepted political 
norms. Thus, when a practice not expressly prohibited by the text of the Bill of 
Rights bears the endorsement of a long tradition of open, widespread, and 
unchallenged use that dates back to the beginning of the Republic, we have no 
proper basis for striking it down. … [S]uch a venerable and accepted tradition 
is not to be laid on the examining table and scrutinized for its conformity to 
some abstract principle of first-amendment adjudication devised by this Court. 
To the contrary, such traditions are themselves the stuff out of which the 
Court’s principles are to be formed.51
Although Scalia emphasizes that the constitutional text is the proper object of 
the interpretive enterprise, by expressing the view that traditional practices give 
                                                   
47  Mark D Greenberg & Harry Litman, “The Meaning of Original Meaning” (1998) 86 Geo LJ 
569 at 572. 
48  497 US 62 (1990). 
49  Scalia J’s dissenting judgment was joined in full by Rehnquist CJ and Kennedy J, and in part 
by O’Connor J who did not join the portions discussing the role of tradition. 
50  David A Strauss, “Tradition, Precedent, and Justice Scalia” (1991) 12 Cardozo L Rev 1699 at 
1702–1703. 
51  Rutan, above, n 48 at 95–96; quoted in Board of County Commissioners v Umbehr 518 US 
668 at 687 (1996). 
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meaning to the text, this gives primacy to extratextual factors which suggests that the 
unexpressed intent thesis underlies the approach. 52  Moreover, traditionalism is 
highly majoritarian. In the absence of a narrowly-defined clause in the text, the 
executive or legislature can effectively make any practice constitutional just by 
sustaining it for a time.53 On the other hand, just because a practice has remained 
unchallenged for an extended period should not imply that it is unquestionably 
accepted. The practice may be opposed by a minority of the population, which would 
mean that its members have an uphill task convincing the legislature to overturn it. 
Factors such as expense, inconvenience, stigma, and a legal culture that frowns upon 
vindicating civil liberties through the courts also serve to inhibit moves to challenge 
the status quo. 
We may also query whether the framers meant to indefinitely protect practices 
that were commonplace in their time. 54  Certainly, no such presumption is 
appropriate when the constitutional text makes the bill of rights applicable to 
legislation enacted prior to its coming into force, as the Singapore Constitution55 and 
South African Constitution56 do. The use of expansive, open-ended phraseology in 
preference to a narrower formulation also suggests otherwise. In fact, as early as the 
                                                   
52  Kavanagh, “Original Intention”, above, n 18 at 282. Farber & Sherry, above, n 28 at 52–53 
note: “Interpreting traditions involves many of the same problems as interpreting original intent. We 
are apt to find ambiguities in the historical record if we look carefully enough.” 
53  Strauss, above, n 50 at 1708. 
54  Id at 1710. 
55  The Singapore Constitution, Art 162, states: “Subject to this Article, all existing laws shall 
continue in force on and after the commencement of this Constitution and all laws which have not 
been brought into force by the date of the commencement of this Constitution may, subject as 
aforesaid, be brought into force on or after its commencement, but all such laws shall, subject to this 
Article, be construed as from the commencement of this Constitution with such modifications, 
adaptations, qualifications and exceptions as may be necessary to bring them into conformity with 
this Constitution.” (Emphasis added.) 
56  Item 2(1)(b) of Sch 6 (“Transitional Arrangements”) of the South African Constitution states: 
“All law that was in force when the new Constitution took effect, continues in force, subject to — … 
consistency with the new Constitution.” 
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beginning of the 19th century, Marshall CJ, intoning that “we must never forget that 
it is a constitution we are expounding”, expressed the view in M’Culloch v 
Maryland57 that it is for the court to flesh out the full implications of the broad 
objectives set out in the Constitution:58
A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its 
great powers will admit, and of all the means by which they may be carried 
into execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could 
scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It would, probably, never be 
understood by the public. Its nature, therefore, requires, that only its great 
outlines should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor 
ingredients which compose those objects, be deduced from the nature of the 
objects themselves.59 [Emphasis added.] 
B. MODERATE ORIGINALISM 
It was argued earlier that interpretive approaches based on expressed intent are to be 
favoured over those relying on unexpressed intent. In other words, when courts seek 
to discover the intentions of the framers of a constitutional text, they should only 
follow those intentions that are manifest or ‘expressed’ in the language of the text.60 
This is, in fact, the way statutory interpretation in general has traditionally been 
understood, at least since the 19th century. In the Sussex Peerage case,61 Tindal CJ, 
speaking for the House of Lords, said that the “only rule” for the construction of Acts 
of Parliament was that “they should be construed according to the intent of the 
Parliament which passed the Act”. 62  In particular, if the text was precise and 
unambiguous, then all that was necessary was to give the words their natural and 
ordinary sense: “The words themselves alone do, in such case, best declare the 
                                                   
57  17 US 316 (1819), SC (US). 
58  Id at 407 (original emphasis). 
59  Id. 
60  Above, n 18, and the accompanying text. 
61  (1844) 11 Cl & Fin 85, 8 ER 1034. 
62  Id, 11 Cl & Fin at 143, 8 ER at 1057. 
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intention of the lawgiver.”63 To similar effect was Lord Russell of Killowen CJ’s 
statement in Attorney-General v Carlton Bank:64 “The duty of the Court is… to give 
effect to the intention of the Legislature as that intention is to be gathered from the 
language employed having regard to the context in connection with which it is 
employed.” Judges and academics who support this interpretive approach are often 
called ‘moderate originalists’, in the sense that what it involves is said to be a species 
of originalism that lies between the more extreme approaches considered above, and 
non-originalism which we will look at later on.65
In the High Court of Australia, McHugh J has shown himself to be a strong 
advocate of moderate originalism.66 Setting out his preferred interpretive approach 
in a number of cases, he regards the search for the makers’ intention as the starting 
point for a principled interpretation of the Australian Constitution. In line with the 
traditional approach towards statutory interpretation, the subjective beliefs, hopes, 
expectations or mental states of those who made, approved or enacted the 
Constitution are irrelevant. Intention can only be deduced from the words used in 
the Constitution, in the historical context in which they were used. 67  Materials 
beyond the constitutional text may only be consulted to identify the mischief which 
was sought to be addressed, or whether terms are to be given any specialized 
meanings.68
                                                   
63  Id. 
64  [1899] 2 QB 158 at 164. 
65  Jeffrey Goldsworthy, “Originalism in Constitutional Interpretation” (1997) 25 Fed L Rev 1. 
66  See, generally, B[rad] M Selway, “Methodologies of Constitutional Interpretation in the High 
Court of Australia” (2003) 14 Pub L Rev 234 at 244–246. 
67  Re Wakim, ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511 at 551, [40]; Eastman v R (2000) 203 CLR 1 
at 45–46, [145]–[147]. 
68  Cheng v R (2000) 203 CLR 248 at 292 and 294–295, [129] and [140]–[142]. 
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Moderate originalism requires courts to focus on the constitutional text rather 
than extratextual materials. Apart from certain exceptions that we will look at in the 
next part, courts are not to forsake the text simply because legislators appear to have 
held certain ideas about what the text means or how it should be applied that are not 
borne out by the words they have chosen. A judicial approach that gives the text 
primacy is advantageous as it prompts Parliament to express itself clearly in 
legislation, unless it intends to leave issues of policy or application to the courts.69 
This, in turn, has the beneficial effect of enabling the ordinary meaning of legislative 
texts to be relied on in many cases.70 Statutes would thus be demystified for lay 
persons, who are their ultimate audience. 
In summary it is submitted that legislative intention should primarily be 
discerned on the basis of what is manifest in the statutory text, and the interpretive 
approach that exemplifies this expressed intent thesis is moderate originalism. This 
is not to say that extrinsic materials such as reports of legislative debates and 
Parliamentary committee proceedings are irrelevant. The interpreter must, though, 
be cautious as to the use these materials are put. They may be consulted to 
corroborate the statutory text,71 and to try and establish what purpose Parliament 
sought to achieve by enacting the text. But they should not be used to look for 
indications of what legislators believed the text to mean. 
                                                   
69  Kavanagh, “Pepper v Hart”, above, n 45 at 102–103, citing John F Manning, “Textualism as a 
Non-delegation Doctrine” (1997) 97 Colum L Rev 673 at 708. 
70  Compare s 9A(4)(a) of the Interpretation Act (Cap 1, 2002 Rev Ed) (S’pore), which states: “In 
determining whether consideration should be given to any material in accordance with subsection (2) 
[ie, material not forming part of the written law], or in determining the weight to be given to any such 
material, regard shall be had, in addition to any relevant matters, to… the desirability of persons 
being able to rely on the ordinary meaning conveyed by the text of the provision taking into account 
its context in the written law and the purpose or object underlying the written law…” (Emphasis 
added.) 
71  Dickerson, above, n 8 at 221. 
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II. THE TEXT THROUGH TIME: FIXED AND DYNAMIC MEANING 
We now turn from our discussion of legislative intention and how it is most 
appropriately discerned to an equally significant issue: do the words and phrases that 
Parliament has chosen to express its intent have a meaning that is fixed in time, or 
one that is dynamic? It is often claimed that one consequence of taking a moderately 
originalist approach to constitutional interpretation is that the text must be given the 
meaning that it bore at the time it was enacted. This position is supported by an 
important rationale underlying constitutions and bills of rights – that it is the 
judiciary’s duty to protect certain unchanging core values against the views of 
transient legislative majorities. 72  Jeffrey Goldsworthy also points out that any 
argument that the present generation should not be ruled by the “dead hand of the 
past” is specious, for this amounts to an argument against having a constitution, or 
indeed any law, at all, as the essence of law is that decisions are governed by norms 
laid down in the past.73
However, the consequence of adhering to meanings dating back to the 
promulgation of the text can, especially if the text is of an old vintage, be a result that 
jars with the present-day needs, values and expectations of the people.74 It might be 
said that the solution lies not in the hands of the judiciary but the legislature – that it 
is for the legislature to amend the text following legally-prescribed procedures if it 
feels there exists a situation requiring attention. On the other hand, this may not be 
                                                   
72  Re Wakim, above, n 67 at 549, [35]: “The function of the judiciary, including the function of 
this Court, is to give effect to the intention of the makers of the Constitution as evinced by the terms in 
which they expressed that intention. That necessarily means that decisions, taken almost a century 
ago by people long dead, bind the people of Australia today even in cases where most people agree 
that those decisions are out of touch with the present needs of Australian society.” McHugh J also 
quoted Judge Easterbrook to the effect that a written constitution “is designed to be an anchor in the 
past”: Frank H Easterbrook, “Abstraction and Authority” (1992) U Chi L Rev 349 at 363. 
73  Goldsworthy, “Originalism”, above, n 65 at 27. 
74  Kirk, “Evolutionary Originalism”, above, n 19 at 357. 
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so easily achieved, for legislators may be reluctant to pursue a politically-unpopular 
amendment. Requirements for amending the law may also be practically difficult to 
fulfil. The United States Constitution, for instance, may only be amended if two-
thirds majorities of both Houses of Congress or two-thirds of the states’ legislatures 
propose the amendment, which must then be approved by the legislatures of three-
quarters of the states. 75  In Australia, in general a proposed law to alter the 
Constitution must be passed by an absolute majority of both the Senate and the 
House of Representatives,76 then put to a referendum in all states and territories. For 
the amendment to become law, a majority of the electors in a majority of the states, 
as well as a majority of all the electors voting, are required.77 It may therefore be 
argued that courts should adopt a dynamic interpretation of the text rather than one 
strictly rooted in the past, in order to maintain public confidence in the judiciary and 
in the constitution or bill of rights. In addition, it is submitted that regardless of how 
easy or difficult it is in practice for the text to be altered, the courts’ important 
signalling function in their constitutional dialogue with the political branches of 
government78 requires a bold approach. If judges discover deficiencies in the law, 
they should endeavour to interpret the text in a manner that rectifies the deficiencies 
rather than wait for Parliament to act. 
In contradistinction to originalism, the view that a statutory text’s meaning at 
any time depends on the concepts, values and purposes of that time rather than those 
                                                   
75  US Constitution, Art V. 
76  If either House of Parliament passes a proposed law to amend the Constitution by an absolute 
majority but the other House rejects or fails to pass it or passes it with any amendment to which the 
first-mentioned House will not agree, provided certain procedures are followed the Governor-General 
may submit the proposed law as last proposed by the first-mentioned House to the electors for 
approval, either with or without any amendments subsequently agreed to by both Houses: Australian 
Constitution, s 128. 
77  Australian Constitution, s 128. 
78  See Chapter Two, Pt III at 94. 
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of legislators has been termed ‘non-originalism’. 79  Goldsworthy identifies two 
versions of non-originalism. The first, which he has called “contemporary 
intentionalism”,80 holds that the text should be interpreted as if it has just come into 
force. In other words, to determine the meaning of the text, the court asks itself what 
intentions the legislature most likely had or what purposes were to be served if the 
statute had been newly enacted.81 This question resembles one that is asked in a 
dubious form of originalism we examined earlier: “counterfactual intention” 
originalism, in which the court considers how the framers of the text would have 
applied it to a present-day issue.82 Contemporary intentionalism therefore suffers, as 
counterfactual intention originalism does, from the problem of requiring the court to 
indulge in a difficult exercise in speculation. 
Goldsworthy’s second version of non-originalism, termed “contemporary 
literalism” by him,83 is one that has been most prominently championed in Australia 
by Justice Michael Kirby of the High Court. The judge has often disagreed with his 
colleagues on the bench as to how the Australian Constitution should be interpreted, 
rejecting the view that their role is to give effect to the intention of the Constitution’s 
makers according to the terms in which they expressed that intention. Instead, he 
has opined that once the draft of the Constitution had been settled, approved by 
popular referendum and enacted into law, the text “took upon itself its own existence 
                                                   
79  See, eg, Stephen M Griffin, “Theories of Constitutional Interpretation” in American 
Constitutionalism: From Theory to Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 140 at 
155 (describing debate in the United States as characterizing theories of constitutional interpretation 
in terms of dichotomy between originalism and non-originalism); Goldsworthy, “Originalism”, above, 
n 65 at 35. 
80  Jeffrey Goldsworthy, “Interpreting the Constitution in its Second Century” (2000) 24 Melb U 
L Rev 677 at 687. 
81  Id at 37. 
82  Above, nn 28–45 and the accompanying text. 
83  Goldsworthy, “Constitution in its Second Century”, above, n 80 at 687. 
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and character as a constitutional charter”.84 The framers’ intents are relevant but not 
conclusive,85 as the text has been “set free from the ‘intentions’ of its draftsmen” and 
must be read “by contemporary Australians… with the eyes of their generation 
expecting it to fulfil (so far as the words and structure permit) the rapidly changing 
needs of their times”.86 Further, the makers of the Constitution did not intend, nor 
had the power to require, that their wishes and expectations as to the meaning of the 
text should control its interpretation.87
The effect of this approach is that the meaning of the text is only 
circumscribed by the current literal meaning of the words used, as determined by 
their dictionary definitions and the rules of English grammar. Otherwise, it is up to 
judges to decide how best to interpret the text in the public interest. 88  To 
Goldsworthy, this is objectionable as it subverts constitutional amendment 
procedures and accords too much discretion to judges. 89  Moreover, it leads to 
uncertainty in judicial interpretation because reference to what the framers of the 
text intended by the words they used is often necessary to resolve difficulties created 
by ambiguity or inconsistency in the text. If the framers’ intentions are disregarded, 
judges are given excessive leeway in ascribing meaning to the text.90
These criticisms levied against contemporary literalism are justified to the 
extent that they highlight the dangers of untethering the meaning of the text from the 
                                                   
84  Re Wakim, above, n 3 at 599–600, [186] per Kirby J (dissenting). 
85  Singh v Commonwealth [2004] HCA 43 at [248]. 
86  Re Colina, ex parte Torney (1999) 200 CLR 386 at 423, [96]. See also Eastman, above, n 67 
at 80, [242]. 
87  Re Wakim, above, n 3 at 600, [186]. See also Grain Pool of Western Australia v 
Commonwealth (2000) 202 CLR 429 at 522–523, [111]–[112]; Michael Kirby, “Constitutional 
Interpretation and Original Intent: A Form of Ancestor Worship?” (2000) 24 Melb U L Rev 1. 
88  Goldsworthy, “Originalism”, above, n 65 at 36 and 38. 
89  Id at 38–39. 
90  Goldsworthy, “Originalism”, id; Goldsworthy, “Constitution in its Second Century”, above, 
n 80 at 688. 
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legislative intent. Kirby J takes the view that the Constitution’s framers had neither 
intention nor power to insist that what they hoped to achieve through the language 
they used should be adhered to by the courts. With respect, it is submitted there is no 
good reason to suppose that when constitutions and bills of rights are interpreted, 
the normal goal of statutory interpretation – determining Parliament’s intention – is 
to be abandoned entirely. After all, such texts are embodied in written law. 
Kirby J has also overstated his case. It is common in Westminster-style 
constitutions to find that the legislature has used words and phrases embodying 
concepts at high levels of abstraction. For instance, Article 12(1) of the Singapore 
Constitution provides that “[a]ll persons are equal before the law and entitled to the 
equal protection of the law”, and section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms states: “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person 
and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of 
fundamental justice.” It is submitted that where the text contains reference to such 
abstract moral concepts, it should be inferred that Parliament’s intention was for the 
courts to exercise their discretion in giving meaning to these concepts to the best of 
their ability when applying the concepts to factual situations before them.91 It is thus 
unnecessary to take the extreme position that Parliament’s intentions towards the 
text are to be ignored altogether. In the High Court of Australia, McHugh J has stated 
that the inference is consistent with the idea that since a constitution is intended to 
provide for the future governance of a nation in the face of new and unforeseen 
circumstances,92 it should generally be given a broad interpretation.93 Under this 
                                                   
91  Re Wakim, above, n 67 at 552, [43]–[44]; Eastman, above, n 67 at 50, [154]. 
92  Re Wakim, id at 550, [39] (citing M’Culloch v Maryland, above, n 57); Eastman, id at 43, [136] 
(citing Victoria v The Commonwealth (1971) 122 CLR 353 at 396–397); and 50, [154]. 
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view of Parliamentary intention, the term ‘non-originalism’ is a misnomer, since the 
judiciary is acting in accordance with the intent manifested in the constitutional 
text.94
Opposed to what he sees as judicial usurpation of the legislature’s role, 
Goldsworthy proposes that there should at least be a “strong presumption” against 
interpretations of constitutional concepts that are relative – that change over time. 
He says this presumption ought to be rebuttable only by clear evidence that the 
founders had a contrary intention, since the rationale for entrenching basic norms in 
a constitution is to ensure that their implementation does not vary according to 
changing values.95 However, Goldsworthy writes in the context of the Australian 
Constitution which, he notes, “contains few abstract moral principles” and “is 
concerned almost entirely with structures and procedures, rather than with 
substantive principles”. 96  It is arguable, therefore, that this presumption is not 
applicable, or at least not rebutted, when constitutional concepts are expressed in 
general, expansive terms, and there is no indication in the text of how the concepts 
were intended to be applied to specific situations. In this scenario, it should be 
acknowledged that Parliament has left the elucidation of these concepts to the good 
judgment of the courts. An oft-cited metaphor is one employed by the Privy Council 
on appeal from Canada in Edwards v R97 that likens a constitution to “a living tree 
capable of growth and expansion within its natural limits”, which justifies its 
                                                                                                                                                              
93  Eastman, id at 42–43, [135]. 
94  See also Robert J Sharpe & Kent Roach, The Charter of Rights and Freedoms (3rd ed) 
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005) at 52: “Even if there were concrete evidence to help in determining the 
original understanding of the right, it would be wrong to fasten on to that meaning without question, 
for the original drafters themselves in all likelihood considered this to be an inappropriate method of 
interpretation.” 
95  Goldsworthy, “Originalism”, above, n 65 at 43. 
96  Id at 22. 
97  [1930] AC 124. 
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provisions being given a “large and liberal interpretation”.98 This reasoning was 
affirmed by the Canadian Supreme Court in Reference re s 94(2) of the Motor 
Vehicle Act (British Columbia), which held that it is undesirable to freeze the 
meaning of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms at a particular time “with little or no 
possibility of growth, development and adjustment to changing societal needs”.99
Issue must be taken with the view that the courts trespass into Parliament’s 
domain when they interpret constitutional texts dynamically. We need to recognize 
that the judiciary has a substantive and not merely a subordinate role to play in 
statutory interpretation. It is not simply the “faithful agent” of the legislature, limited 
to carrying out the latter’s bidding according to laws that have been passed. Rather, it 
is a “co-equal partner” with the legislature in establishing and developing the 
meaning of legislative texts. 100  This is because legislative intent should be 
understood as a construct – the judiciary’s abstract conception of an intent that is 
reasonable to attribute to Parliament based on the text, 101  taking into account 
relevant matters such as the purpose sought to be achieved by statute and applicable 
rules of interpretation and canons of statutory construction. Perhaps that is the sense 
in which the words of Chief Justice Edward Coke in the 17th-century English decision 
                                                   
98  Id at 136–137. 
99  Reference re s 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia), above, n 31 at 509, [60]. 
100  Jonathan T Molot, “The Rise and Fall of Textualism” (2006) 106 Colum L Rev 1 at 7–23 
(describing the tussle in the US from the 18th to 2oth centuries between judges being viewed as 
“faithful agents” and “coequal partners” of Congress). 
101  Allan, “Legislative Supremacy”, above, n 44 at 710. See also T R S Allan, “Legislative 
Supremacy and Legislative Intent: A Reply to Professor Craig” (2004) 24 OJLS 563 at 568: “A 
constructive intent is attributed to the legislature on the basis of the text enacted, interpreted so far as 
possible in the light of our settled principles of fairness or procedural legality, embodied or 
summarized in common law doctrine. … A constructive interpretation makes no claims to reflect the 
actual wishes or expectations of anyone, as regards the statute’s application to any particular case; but 
insofar as it respects the statute’s text, purpose (or apparent purpose), and overall regulatory scheme, 
it embodies the pertinent legislative ‘intention’, properly – coherently – understood.” In similar terms, 
Stephen Guest speaks of interpretation as a “joint venture between an author (which may be a group) 
and an interpreter”, and sees it as akin to “‘finishing off’ a work of literature or music by someone 
other than the composer”: Guest, above, n 6 at 133 and 146. 
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Dr Bonham’s Case – “[W]hen an Act of Parliament is against common right and 
reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the Common Law will controul 
it and adjudge such Act to be void”102 – should be understood. Put another way, the 
court strives to avoid attributing an unreasonable legislative intent to an Act.103 Since 
what is relevant is the terms in which legislators have expressed themselves and not 
their subjective intentions, the present generation of judges may see that provisions 
of the text have meanings that escaped the legislators’ actual understandings or 
intentions.104 In R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex parte Spath Holme 
Ltd,105 Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead said: 
The task of the court is often said to be to ascertain the intention of 
Parliament expressed in the language under consideration. This is correct and 
may be helpful, so long as it is remembered that the “intention of Parliament” 
is an objective concept, not subjective. The phrase is a shorthand reference to 
the intention which the court reasonably imputes to Parliament in respect of 
the language used. It is not the subjective intention of the minister or other 
persons who promoted the legislation. Nor is it the subjective intention of the 
draftsman, or of individual members or even of a majority of individual 
members of either House.106 [Emphasis added.] 
This notion of the relationship between the legislature and the judiciary is 
consistent with what was described in Chapter Two. There, it was argued that in the 
context of a Westminster-style written constitution, all three branches of government 
have an equal and independent duty to interpret the constitutional text, including the 
bill of rights contained in it or otherwise having the status of basic law, when 
fulfilling their constitutional functions. It was further submitted that the relationship 
between the political and judicial branches of government is best seen as a dialogue, 
                                                   
102  (1610) 8 Co Rep 113b at 118a, 77 ER 646 at 652, Ct of Common Pleas. 
103  Compare Allan, “Interpretation, Meaning, and Authority”, above, n 101 at 709, n 71, 
commenting on Dr Bonham’s Case thus: “It could be safely assumed that the authors of statutes made 
‘against law and right’ would not truly intend their apparent consequences.” 
104  Eastman, above, n 67 at 46, [147]. 
105  [2001] 2 AC 349, HL. 
106  Id at 395. 
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in which the branches act collaboratively to develop the meaning of the bill of rights. 
Therefore, when judges use their discretion to develop the meaning of constitutional 
provisions, they are not acting extravagantly but carrying out their constitutional role. 
We should not reach the conclusion that all words and phrases in a 
constitutional text require dynamic interpretations. In the first instance, it is for a 
judge to consider whether or not a word in question connotes an abstract moral 
concept. If it does not, all that may be needed is to give the word its natural or 
ordinary meaning, bearing in mind that the constitutional text may also contain by 
necessary implication all matters that are necessary to the existence and 
understanding of its provisions.107 Where a term is ambiguous – that is, it has more 
than one reasonable meaning – it may be necessary to have regard to the purpose 
that the text was intended to achieve, to the extent that a strained meaning can be 
given to the term if a literal reading of it does not give effect to the relevant 
purpose.108 The taking of a purposive approach in the context of a constitutional text, 
as well as the use of dynamic interpretation, will be discussed further in Chapter Five. 
To sum up, it is submitted that approaching the interpretation of a 
constitutional text correctly does not involve choosing between moderate originalism 
and non-originalism. Depending on the nature of the language used in the statute, it 
may be appropriate in some cases to understand the text at the time it was enacted, 
and in other cases for greater discretion to be exercised by the court in giving 
meaning to the statute. 
                                                   
107  Eastman, id at 48, [150]. See also Bennion, who agrees that “the finding of proper 
implications within the express words of an enactment is a legitimate, indeed necessary, function of 
the interpreter”: Bennion, Statutory Interpretation, above, n 2 at 384, s 173. 
108  Cheng, above, n 68 at 291, [126], citing, inter alia, Sutherland Publishing Co Ltd v Caxton 
Publishing Co Ltd [1938] Ch 174 at 201. 
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CONCLUSION 
The primary goal of statutory interpretation is correctly seen as the establishment of 
the legislative intention underlying the statute. Notwithstanding contemporary views 
from some quarters, it is submitted that legislative intention is not an illusory 
concept. However, it is not to be regarded as some sort of aggregation of the actual 
intents of individual legislators, nor the acquiescence by these persons of the intent 
of the promoter of a bill. Rather, it is best seen as the legislators’ adoption of the 
intent manifested in the text of the bill, and subsequently of the statute when it is 
enacted. Holding that the intention of Parliament is embodied in the statutory text 
implies that interpretive approaches relying on an ‘unexpressed intent’ thesis – 
namely, that it is necessary to discern what legislators actually understood the statute 
to mean – are to be rejected. These include the actual intention and counterfactual 
intention types of originalism, and original meaning originalism insofar as the 
doctrine requires traditional practices existing when the bill of rights came into force 
to be immune from challenge. (We will see in Chapter Five that a version of original 
meaning originalism without this requirement is consistent with moderate 
originalism.) 109  The unexpressed intent thesis suffers from various problems, 
including the potential ambivalent nature of extrinsic material and the possibility 
that legislators’ intentions that are not supported by a Parliamentary majority may be 
read into the constitutional text. Of greater importance, though, is the fact that the 
unexpressed intent thesis subverts the constitutional principle that Parliament can 
only express its will through the enactment of legislation. 
                                                   
109  Chapter Five, Pt II.A.2. 
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Moderate originalism, on the other hand, is based on an ‘expressed intent’ 
thesis. It also has advantages over the other forms of originalism, principal among 
which is its emphasis on discerning legislative intent from the statute. This obviates 
the need to speculate about what the framers of the text may or may not have actually 
intended to achieve, and hence minimizes this facet of uncertainty.110 Further, this 
interpretive approach encourages clarity in legislation. 
Moderate originalism’s reliance on an expressed intent thesis is often claimed 
to require the text to be interpreted as at the time it was enacted. On the other hand, 
interpreting the text dynamically, with reference to present-day attitudes and values, 
has been criticized as a judicial usurpation of the legislative role. This is disputable, 
for the judiciary plays a substantive and not a subordinate role in statutory 
interpretation. Legal meaning is constructed, not discovered, and both the legislature 
and the judiciary have something to bring to the table in this process. Whether a 
fixed or dynamic interpretation should be given to the statutory language depends on 
whether the words and phrases used connote abstract moral principles. Moderate 
originalism appreciates that the use of expansive language is a signal by the framers 
to successive generations of judges that the text should be interpreted flexibly with 
regard to contemporary situations and values.111
                                                   
110  Goldsworthy, “Originalism”, above, n 65 at 20. 
111  Id at 20–21. 
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Fidelity to Origins: Text, Context and Application 
in Constitutional Interpretation 
[T]he intolerable wrestle / With words and meanings.1
— T S ELIOT (1888–1965) 
I entirely concur in the propriety of resorting to the sense in 
which the Constitution was accepted and ratified by the nation. 
In that sense alone it is the legitimate Constitution. And if that 
be not the guide in expounding it, there can be no security for a 
consistent and stable, more than for a faithful, exercise of its 
powers. If the meaning of the text be sought in the changeable 
meaning of the words composing it, it is evident that the shape 
and attributes of the Government must partake of the changes 
to which the words and phrases of all living languages are 
constantly subject. What a metamorphosis would be produced 
in the code of law if all its ancient phraseology were to be taken 
in its modern sense.2
— JAMES MADISON (1751–1836) 
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IN THE LAST CHAPTER, it was submitted that approaches to interpreting constitutions 
and bills of rights that are based on the expressed intent thesis are to be preferred 
over those based on unexpressed intent. Put another way, since the framers of a 
constitution or bill of rights have expressed their intent through a legally-binding 
text, a court’s emphasis should be on determining the meaning of the text rather than 
conjecturing about what the framers actually believed it to mean. For this reason, 
various forms of originalism were considered and rejected, and moderate originalism 
suggested to be the most appropriate interpretive approach. Moderate originalism 
establishes the text as the primary source for determining Parliamentary intention; it 
is thus a textualist approach to interpretation. Nonetheless, it gives due recognition 
to the need for dynamic interpretation where the textual language is open-ended. 
Indeed, the difficulties faced by judges are clearest when they are confronted with 
language in bills of rights that express broad concepts. What, for instance, constitutes 
“inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”?3 Does the right to “life, liberty 
and security of the person” 4  require the state to recognize that a terminally-ill 
individual has a right to have someone assist him to end his life? 
 The aim of this Chapter and the next is to set out a suggested approach that 
judges should take in establishing the meaning of a constitutional or bill of rights 
provision, and how that provision applies to a particular factual matrix. The 
                                                   
3  European Convention on Human Rights, art 3. 
4  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 7. 
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arrangement of the chapters takes its lead from an analysis of constitutional meaning 
by Lawrence Solum. In an article entitled “Semantic Originalism”,5 Solum expresses 
the view that, among other things, constitutional law includes rules with content 
fixed by the conventional semantic meaning of the words and phrases used in 
context. The semantic meaning of a constitutional text is fixed at the time of its 
adoption (the ‘fixation thesis’), and the semantic meaning of the text is the ordinary 
and conventional public meaning that it would have had to its intended audience 
when it came into force as law (the ‘clause meaning thesis’).6 He uses the term 
constitutional interpretation to describe what happens when a court identifies the 
semantic content of the text.7 Further – and, it is submitted, crucially – Solum 
distinguishes the semantic content of the text from its legal content. Rules of 
constitutional law are derived by the court through a process of constitutional 
construction,8 which requires judges to transform the semantic meaning of the text 
into legal rules.9 However, semantic content does not fully determine the content of 
constitutional law, but merely contributes towards it (the ‘contribution thesis’).10 At 
this point, other legal criteria may come into play. 
                                                   
5  Lawrence B Solum, “Semantic Originalism” (Illinois Public Law and Legal Theory Research 
Papers Series No 07-24, 22 November 2008) <http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1120244> (accessed 
27 August 2009). 
6  Solum, id at 2. 
7  Id at 68. 
8  Id. 
9  In another article, Solum notes that the use of the interpretation–construction distinction “is 
rooted in the common law and traditional legal scholarship, most prominently in contract law. 
William Leiber employed the distinction in 1837. Corbin relied on the interpretation–construction 
distinction in his influential 1919 article [Arthur L Corbin, “Conditions in the Law of Contract” (1919) 
28 Yale LJ 739], … and Williston [Samuel Williston & George J Thompson, A Treatise on the Law of 
Contracts (Rev ed) (New York, NY: Baker Voorhis & Co, 1936–1938)] adopted a similar distinction”: 
Lawrence B Solum, “A Reader’s Guide to Semantic Originalism and a Reply to Professor Griffin” 
(Illinois Public Law and Legal Theory Research Papers Series No 08-12, 19 June 2008) <http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1130665> (accessed 24 November 2009) at 15–16. 
10  Solum, “Semantic Originalism”, above, n 5 at 6. 
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This Chapter proposes how the ‘meaning’ of a certain term or provision should 
be understood, and how this meaning should be determined. To this end, it examines 
Solum’s fixation and clause meaning theses, and relates it to the concepts of 
legislative intention and taking a purposive approach to interpretation. Chapter Six 
then goes on to look at Solum’s contribution thesis, and considers legal criteria that 
judges should apply in constructing legal rules in the light of the meaning of the 
text.11
I. LEGISLATIVE INTENTION AND THE MEANING OF MEANING 
When a legal dispute that raises constitutional issues is brought before a court, the 
judge’s task is to determine the bearing, if any, that the constitutional text has on the 
resolution of the dispute. In doing so, the judge must determine what the 
constitutional text means. Some competent rule-making body – the members of 
which we may call the framers of the constitution – drafted the text or had it drafted 
at its behest, then gave it the force of law by formally adopting it. This body may take 
diverse forms in different jurisdictions; for instance, it may be a legislature, or a 
constituent assembly specifically assembled to craft a constitution and bring it into 
being. For convenience, this chapter will refer to the body as a legislature. 
Establishing the legislature’s intent as regards the meaning of the text is thus 
universally regarded as the objective of interpreting the text. Francis Bennion states: 
“An enactment has the legal meaning taken to be intended by the legislator. In other 
                                                   
11  For reasons of space and on the assumption that the point is relatively uncontroversial, this 
thesis does not examine Solum’s ‘fidelity thesis’, which holds that since the semantic content of a 
constitutional text is part of the supreme law of the land, courts are obligated to give effect to it unless 
there is an overriding moral reason to the contrary: id at 8. 
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words, the legal meaning corresponds to the legislative intention.”12 It is to be noted 
that the terms legislative intention and meaning (including legal meaning) require 
further unpacking to determine their implications. 
Despite the fact that legislators have a multitude of distinct intents, we 
concluded in the previous chapter that one can sensibly speak of the legislature as a 
whole possessing intent. Reed Dickerson identifies two forms of legislative intent. 
Actual or subjective intent is the intent that a legislator possesses to enact the text of 
a statute as he understands it, and this is coupled with an assumption that the typical 
audience of the statute shares his understanding.13 On the other hand, manifest 
intent is intent that is objectively manifested by the language of the statutory text.14 
While Dickerson prefers to confine the meaning of the term legislative intent to 
actual or subjective intent,15 to avoid confusion the term actual intent will be used to 
describe this sort of intent. While one might have the impression that what a text 
means ought to reflect the actual intentions of individual legislators, it was submitted 
in Chapter Four that the only meaningful way of aggregating these discrete 
intentions into a single intention of the entire legislature towards the text is to 
understand it as the legislators’ adoption of the intention manifested in the text of 
the bill that is subsequently reflected in the statutory text. 16  What is more, the 
manifest intent of the text may differ from the actual intent.17 Parliament may, for 
instance, happen to choose words which do not fully express what it intends to do, or 
it may not have foreseen that the words can be comprehended in different ways. 
                                                   
12  F[rancis] A[lan] R[oscoe] Bennion, Statutory Interpretation: A Code (5th ed) (London: 
LexisNexis, 2008) at 469, s 163. 
13  Reed Dickerson, “Statutory Interpretation: A Peek into the Mind and Will of the Legislature” 
(1975) 50 Ind LJ 206 at 209. 
14  Id at 208. 
15  Id at 210. 
16  Chapter Four, Pt I.A.1 at 165–166. 
17  Dickerson, above, n 13 at 218. 
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Nonetheless, because it is impossible for judges to read the minds of legislators, they 
cannot but construe a statute as if its manifest intent is the same as the legislators’ 
actual intent.18 The foregoing reflects the essence of the expressed intent thesis – 
that discernment of legislative intention should be based primarily on what is evident 
in the statutory text. 
The identification of legislative intention as the manifest intent of the text, and 
the drawing of the connection between manifest intent and the ‘meaning’ of the text, 
are only the first steps of the journey. A key question requiring consideration is: what 
are the matters that the legislature has an intent towards? The word meaning can be 
understood in different ways. Solum points out that when one speaks about the 
meaning of a constitutional provision, for example, one could be referring to the 
factual scenarios that the provision may apply to. For instance, it may be asserted 
that the right to equal protection of the law means – or implies – that an armed 
forces policy prohibiting women from being employed in combat capacities is 
unconstitutional.19  The ‘meaning’ of a provision could also be a reference to its 
function or purpose. One could thus talk about the right to equal protection meaning 
the equal treatment of persons to preserve human dignity and promote justice in 
society.20
Finally, meaning can refer to the linguistic or semantic sense of a term or 
provision.21 Strictly speaking, Solum is referring to what linguists would regard as 
embodied by semantics and pragmatics, and not semantics alone. 22  Semantics 
concerns the literal meaning of words and the meaning of the way they are 
                                                   
18  Id. 
19  Solum refers to this as the ‘applicative sense’ of meaning: Solum, above, n 19 at 2. 
20  Referred to by Solum as the ‘teleological sense’ of meaning: id at 2–3. 
21  Id at 2. 
22  Id at 33: “When we seek the meaning of a legal text, characteristically the issues are semantic 
and pragmatic.” 
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combined,23 while pragmatics is a study of the additional information taken from the 
context which is required to understand what a speaker meant in uttering a 
particular expression. 24  The distinction is well illustrated by a famous example 
formulated by the philosopher Paul Grice, who developed a theory of inferences that 
hearers draw upon when trying to understand utterances. Suppose A is writing a 
testimonial for a pupil, X, who is applying for a philosophy teaching position. A 
writes: “Dear Sir, Mr X’s command of English is excellent, and his attendance at 
tutorials has been regular. Yours, etc”. Semantically, the letter is unambiguous: it 
asserts that X is fluent in reading and writing in the English language, and that he 
has not missed any significant number of classes conducted by A. On the other hand, 
when consideration is given to pragmatics, it is clear that the testimonial in fact 
speaks negatively about A. In the context, the recipient of the letter would have 
expected A to comment about matters such as X’s knowledge of philosophy and 
ability to communicate this effectively to others. The failure to do so sends a tacit but 
obvious message to the reader that A does not think much about X’s abilities as a 
philosopher.25 The point to note, which we will consider in more detail below, is that 
determining the linguistic sense of a term or provision of a law requires 
consideration of its context. To avoid misconceptions, we will use the terms semantic 
meaning and pragmatic meaning, and when referring to these meanings together, 
the term linguistic meaning.26
According to Dickerson, in general legal usage the word intent is used to 
signify the immediate purpose that a statute is supposed to “directly express and 
                                                   
23  Kate Kearns, Semantics (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan Press, 2000) at 1. 
24  Id at 254. 
25  Id at 254 and 256. 
26  Bennion refers to this as grammatical meaning, defining it as “the meaning it bears when, as 
a piece of English prose, it is construed according to the rules and usages of grammar, syntax and 
punctuation, and the accepted linguistic canons of construction”: above, n 12 at 443, s 151. 
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immediately accomplish”, while purpose refers to an “ulterior purpose” that the 
legislature wishes the statute to accomplish or help to accomplish.27 However, when 
we speak of the intent of individual legislators and of Parliament as a whole, the 
intrinsic sense of the concept of intention is ambiguous. Its meaning is more a matter 
of definition than anything else. Therefore, it might be given the sense that Dickerson 
ascribes to it, which assigns to the concept of intent the legislature’s immediate 
purpose. However, it is submitted it is more natural and in keeping with the literal 
meaning of the word intention to regard the text of a constitution as manifesting its 
framers’ intent with respect to linguistic and applicative meaning. As regards 
linguistic meaning, there is an intent as to the semantic meaning of the words used, 
and the purposes that the provisions of the constitution were to achieve. Were it not 
so, it would be difficult to see why the framers bothered to bring the constitutional 
text into existence as law at all. It would be as if the legislature had said, “Here’s the 
constitution, but we didn’t enact it for any particular reason, and you can interpret 
the words we used any way you wish to.” It seems likely that the framers generally 
also possess an actual intent as to the factual scenarios that the text was intended to 
deal with. As a matter of common sense it would be highly artificial to hold, for 
example, that the framers had no intent at all as to the potential applications of the 
text, and yet possessed intentions concerning the sense of the text and the mischief 
that it was enacted to address. However, an applicative intent of this nature may not 
be manifested clearly in the text, especially if the framers have chosen to express 
themselves in vague terms.28 When enacting a constitutional provision stating that 
all persons are “equal before the law and entitled to the equal protection of the 
                                                   
27  Dickerson, above, n 13 at 224–225. The legislature’s specific purpose is “coextensive with the 
legislative intent to effectuate the specific purpose”: id at 224. 
28  As regards vagueness, see Pt II.A.2(1) below. 
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law”, 29  legislators may have, say, intended to target unwarranted forms of 
discrimination against disabled persons. However, if they elected not to specifically 
mandate the equal protection of disabled persons under the law in the text, it may 
not be possible for a court to discern such a legislative intent from the constitution. 
In a nutshell, the opinion proffered in this Part is that when a court seeks to 
establish the meaning of a constitutional provision by identifying the framers’ 
intention, it should not be trying to discover what the framers actually intended as 
this intention may not ultimately have been expressed in the text. Instead, the goal 
must be an intention manifest in the text. There is a legislative intention concerning 
three types of meaning – linguistic, purposive and applicative – and these are all 
relevant to the court’s task. 
II. DETERMINING MEANING 
We now move on to consider how the different types of meaning of terms in a 
constitutional or bill of rights text should be established by courts. Linguistic 
meaning has what are termed semantic and pragmatic aspects. These are technical 
concepts developed by language scholars, and doubtless we are not using them here 
with their precision. Nonetheless, the concepts, despite being understood in an 
elementary and simplified manner, are helpful in shaping our thoughts about 
constitutional meaning. For these purposes, we can broadly understand the semantic 
meaning of a term to mean its grammatical or literal meaning (that is, the meaning 
obtained from matters such as the term’s dictionary meaning, and the grammar and 
                                                   
29  Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1999 Reprint), Art. 12(1). Cf the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms (Constitution Act 1982 (Can), Pt I), s 15(1) (“Every individual is equal before 
and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without 
discrimination…”); South African Constitution 1996, s 9(1) (“Everyone is equal before the law and has 
the right to equal protection and benefit of the law”); US Constitution, 14th Amdt (“nor shall any 
State… deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”). 
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punctuation of the sentence and provision that it appears in). Pragmatics refers to 
contextual aspects of meaning, and I submit that this encompasses purposive 
meaning. Finally, we will look at how applicative meaning can be discerned. 
A. LINGUISTIC MEANING 
1. Semantic Meaning: The Natural and Ordinary Meaning of Terms 
The semantic meaning of a text is its literal meaning without any consideration of the 
context in which it is uttered. Although it is insufficient to interpret a text purely with 
regards to its semantic meaning alone, establishing this meaning is nonetheless an 
essential step in the interpretive enterprise. Where no special meaning has been 
conferred on a term by prior judicial decisions,30 the general rule is that it should be 
given what is generally called its natural and ordinary meaning,31 that is, it should be 
ascribed the meaning that a literate layperson would have given to it at the time the 
text was enacted into law. Francis Bennion, for instance, takes the view that “the 
standard must be at least that of the ordinary person of good education”32 and cites 
Benson (Inspector of Taxes) v Yard Arm Club Ltd33 with approval, where it was said 
                                                   
30  As to this, see Part III.A below. 
31  See, for instance, Attorney-General v Winstanley (1831) 2 Dow & Cl 302 at 310, 6 ER 740 at 
744, HL (“when we look at the words of an Act of Parliament, which are not applied to any particular 
science or art, we are to construe them as they are understood in common language”); Becke v Smith 
(1836) 2 M & W 191 at 195, 150 ER 724 at 726, (“It is a very useful rule, in the construction of a statute, 
to adhere to the ordinary meaning of the words used”); Grey v Pearson (1857) 6 HL Cas 61 at 106, 10 
ER 1216 at 1234, QB (“in construing… statutes…, the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is 
to be adhered to”); Selvey v DPP [1970] AC 304 at 339, HL (“The words of the statute must be given 
their ordinary natural meaning”); Exxon Corporation v Exxon Insurance Consultants International 
Ltd [1981] 1 WLR 624 at 633, Ch D (“On general principles of construction, the words must be treated 
as having their ordinary English meaning as applied to the subject matter with which they are 
dealing”): Bennion, above, n 12 at 1182, s 363. See also Trustees of the Kheng Chiu Tin Hou Kong and 
Burial Ground v Collector of Land Revenue [1992] 1 SLR(R) 117 at 124, [16], CA (S’pore) (“If[ ] the 
words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous the court must give effect to them 
according to their natural and ordinary meaning”), citing Peter Benson Maxwell & G[eorge] 
F[rederick] L[eslie] Bridgman, Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes (7th ed) (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1929) at 1–3. 
32  Bennion, id at 1184, s 363. 
33  [1979] 1 WLR 347, CA. 
 Fidelity to Origins • 201 
 
that a term which not a term of art must be interpreted by a court “as a man who 
speaks English and understands English accurately but not pedantically”.34
In Football Association Premier League Ltd v Panini UK Ltd,35 the court held 
that in considering whether the inclusion of copyrighted material in an artistic work 
was “incidental”,36 the question was not answered by, among other things, rushing to 
dictionaries, searching the Internet for substitute words and expressions, using a 
non-statutory checklist of possible indicators, looking at earlier legislation or 
Hansard reports of parliamentary debates preceding the enactment of the legislation 
in question, or working through a range of hypothetical situations. As incidental was 
an ordinary descriptive English word it was unnecessary for the courts to define it, 
and “[t]he range of circumstances in which the word ‘incidental’ is commonly used to 
describe a state of affairs is sufficiently clear to enable the courts to apply it to the 
ascertainable objective context of the particular infringing act in question”.37 This 
case suggests that where a statutory term is commonplace and familiar, the court 
may feel able to determine its linguistic meaning without resorting to extrinsic 
materials. But it is submitted the decision should not be read as preventing a court 
faced with less straightforward terms from consulting a broad range of written 
materials contemporary to the text, including legislation, legislative debates and 
committee reports, books, dictionaries and newspapers, to establish how the term 
was ordinarily understood at the time. 
Where a term has already been the subject of prior definition in a relevant 
context by a court, that definition will usually be applied in preference to a dictionary 
                                                   
34  Id at 351. 
35  [2004] 1 WLR 1147, CA. 
36  Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (c 48) (UK), s 31(1). 
37  Football Association, above, n 35 at 1158–1159, [39]. 
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definition. 38  Otherwise, it is submitted that the senses of the term stated in 
dictionaries published contemporaneously39 are of especial relevance. “I am quite 
aware,” said Lord Coleridge CJ in R v Peters,40 “that dictionaries are not to be taken 
as authoritative exponents of the meanings of words used in Acts of Parliament, but 
it is a well-known rule of courts of law that words should be taken to be used in their 
ordinary sense, and we are therefore sent for instruction to these books.” 41  
Comprehensive dictionaries usually attempt to capture all the known linguistic 
meanings of terms. Though it may be difficult to know what the intended sense is 
until the context of the provision in which the term appears and the statute as a 
whole is considered, the dictionary senses of the term at least establish the 
boundaries of its linguistic meaning. Thus, they act as a limitation on judicial 
discretion, constraining the court from giving the term a meaning it cannot 
linguistically bear. 
It is to be borne in mind that terms should ultimately be given the meanings 
that they are understood to have by reasonable persons. These meanings can 
sometimes trump more precise, ‘technical’ definitions provided by dictionaries.42 In 
                                                   
38  Midland Railway Co v Robinson (1889) LR 15 App Cas 19 at 34, HL; see also Kerr v Kennedy 
[1942] 1 KB 409 at 413 (“In the absence of any judicial guidance or authority… dictionaries can be 
consulted”), both cited in Bennion, above, n 12 at 1223, s 376. 
39  Hardwick Game Farm v Suffolk Agricultural and Poultry Producers Association Ltd [1966] 1 
WLR 287 at 324, CA (“I do not think that the ordinary educated Englishman would call pheasants 
‘poultry.’ If he consulted the Oxford Dictionary, as it is permissible for the court to do, he would find 
this view confirmed by the express exclusion of pheasants from the term. Only if he consulted the 1961 
edition of an American dictionary [Webster’s] which in view of its date and provenance is inadmissible 
to construe a United Kingdom Act of Parliament of 1926 would he find any support for the view that 
pheasants were included in the word ‘poultry.’”); R v Bouch [1983] QB 246 at 252, CA. See Bennion, 
id. 
40  (1886) LR 16 QBD 636, cited in Bennion, id at 1222, s 376. 
41  Id at 641. Examples of Singapore cases in which dictionary definitions of terms were 
considered include Dow Jones Publishing Co (Asia) Inc v Attorney-General [1989] 1 SLR(R) 637, CA; 
Ong Jane Rebecca v Lim Lie Hoa [2008] 3 SLR(R) 189, HC; and Pan-United Marine Ltd v Chief 
Assessor [2008] 3 SLR(R) 569, CA. 
42  Forward Food Management Pte Ltd v Public Prosecutor [2002] 1 SLR(R) 443 at 453–454, 
[29], HC (S’pore). 
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Black-Clawson International v Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg AG,43  Lord 
Diplock noted: 
The acceptance of the rule of law as a constitutional principle requires that a 
citizen, before committing himself to any course of action, should be able to 
know in advance what are the legal consequences that will flow from it. Where 
those consequences are regulated by a statute the source of that knowledge is 
what the statute says. In construing it the court must give effect to what the 
words of the statute would be reasonably understood to mean by those 
whose conduct it regulates. That any or all of the individual members of the 
two Houses of Parliament that passed it may have thought the words bore a 
different meaning cannot affect the matter. Parliament, under our 
constitution, is sovereign only in respect of what it expresses by the words 
used in the legislation it has passed.44 [Emphasis added.] 
In this passage, his Lordship referred to another important point: the weight that 
should be accorded to Parliament’s views as to the meaning of statutory terms. The 
Canadian case Reference re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act, RSBC 1979, 
c 28845 sounds a similar salutary note of caution. The constitutional issue raised by 
this case was whether an absolute liability offence for which imprisonment could be 
imposed offended principles of fundamental justice and violated the right to liberty 
under section 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.46 The government sought to 
rely on the testimony of federal civil servants from the Department of Justice and the 
federal Minister of Justice given during proceedings of the Special Joint Committee 
of the Senate and House of Commons on the Constitution, which preceded the 
enactment of the Charter. The testimony indicated that, in the government’s eyes, the 
term “fundamental justice” in section 7 meant no more than procedural due 
process.47 The Supreme Court, while finding such evidence to be admissible,48 held 
                                                   
43  [1975] AC 591, HL. 
44  Id at 638, cited in Forward Food Management, above, n 42 at 453–454, [29]. 
45  [1985] 2 SCR 486, SC (Can). 
46  Section 7 of the Charter reads: “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the 
person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of 
fundamental justice.” 
47  Reference re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act, above, n 45 at 504–505, [35]–[37]. 
48  Id at 505–507, [38]–[46]. 
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that it should be given minimal weight.49 This was for two reasons. First, since the 
Charter was the product of many individuals who had played major roles in 
negotiating, drafting and adopting it, legislative intent could not be properly inferred 
from the comments of a small number of federal civil servants.50 Secondly, it was 
said that 
[a]nother danger with casting the interpretation of s. 7 in terms of the 
comments made by those heard at the Special Joint Committee Proceedings is 
that, in so doing, the rights, freedoms and values embodied in the Charter in 
effect become frozen in time to the moment of adoption with little or no 
possibility of growth, development and adjustment to changing societal needs. 
… If the newly planted “living tree” which is the Charter is to have the 
possibility of growth and adjustment over time, care must be taken to ensure 
that historical materials, such as the Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of 
the Special Joint Committee, do not stunt its growth.51
This position taken in this case accords with the expressed intent thesis. It would be 
improper for a court to rely on intentions that legislators had left unexpressed in the 
text, even if they had commented on the matter in Parliament. The constitutional 
text should be given primacy over such comments. 
2. Pragmatic Meaning 
Establishing the semantic meaning of a statutory term is not particularly significant 
without going on to consider the term’s pragmatic meaning. Recall that in order to 
properly grasp what a speaker meant in uttering a particular expression, it is 
necessary to gather further information from the context of the utterance. According 
to Solum, subject to certain refinements that we will consider shortly, a court’s task 
when interpreting a constitutional provision is to establish its ‘clause meaning’; that 
is, the ordinary and conventional public meaning that the provision would have had 
                                                   
49  Id at 508–509, [52]. 
50  Id at 507–508, [47]–[51]. 
51  Id at 509, [53]. 
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to its intended audience at the time it became law. For instance, where the United 
States Constitution is concerned, one would ask: “How would the Constitution of 
1789 have been understood by a competent speaker of American English at the time 
it was adopted?”52
This is essentially the ‘original meaning’ form of originalism that was 
considered in Chapter Four, but shorn of the dubious proposition that the original 
public meaning of the constitutional text should be determined with reference to 
long-established traditional practices. 53  It is therefore consistent with moderate 
originalism, which holds that judges are not to search for legislators’ unexpressed 
intent – what they themselves understood the statute to mean – but the legislative 
intent that is manifest in the language of the text.54 In the usual case, the text should 
be interpreted according to the common usage of the language prevailing when it was 
enacted. Much of the time there will probably be no difference between the ordinary 
public meaning of the text then and today. However, where such a difference exists 
and it becomes necessary to determine the text’s former public meaning, evidence 
such as legislative debates and committee reports, political writings and newspapers 
of the time can be consulted to gain an insight as to how the text was generally 
understood.55
                                                   
52  Solum, above, n 5 at 51. 
53  Chapter Four, Pt I.A.1(2). 
54  Id, Pt I.A.1 at 165–166. 
55  Solum, above, n 5 at 51. 
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(1) Text and Context 
(a) The Paucity of Literalism 
Solum recognizes that his theory of clause meaning requires certain refinements, 
which he calls “modifications”. The first modification is that the framers of a 
constitution assume that the text will be interpreted by readers who possess 
information about the publicly available context in which the text was adopted.56
On one view, though, if the meaning of a statutory provision is clear after the 
employment of textualist techniques such as canons of construction and dictionary 
definitions of terms,57 the court has no business examining contextual matters such 
as the purpose of the provision.58 This has been termed “aggressive textualism”.59 
Aggressive textualism tends towards literalism, the idea that it is possible to 
determine the meaning of a text simply by considering how key words have been 
lexicographically defined, and their grammatical sense within the sentences and 
statutory provisions in which they appear. This is sometimes what judges mean when 
they speak of establishing the ‘ordinary meaning’ or the ‘plain meaning’ of texts.60 
But literalism is a faulty notion as linguists now accept that language is not simply a 
conduit through which meaning can be perfectly transmitted without distortion from 
one person to another. 61  This is because language is often inherently vague or 
indeterminate,62 and it is only when the context that the communication takes place 
                                                   
56  Id at 52–53. 
57  Jonathan T Molot, “The Rise and Fall of Textualism” (2006) 106 Colum L Rev 1 at 44. 
58  Id at 45. 
59  Id. 
60  Ruth Sullivan, “Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court of Canada” (1998–1999) 30 
Ottawa L Rev 175 at 195–197, citing, inter alia, R v McIntosh [1995] 1 SCR 686; and Ontario v C P Ltd 
[1995] 2 SCR 1028 at 1050–1051, 1054–1055, per Lamer CJ (using “plain meaning” and “literal 
meaning” interchangeably). 
61  Sullivan, “Statutory Interpretation”, id at 203–204. 
62  G B Simpson & C Burgess, “Implications of Lexical Ambiguity Resolution for Word 
Recognition and Comprehension” in Steven L Small, Garrison W Cottrell & Michael K Tanenhaus 
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within is considered that a reader can correctly understand what a writer means.63 
This was recognized by Butler-Sloss LJ in Re C and another (minors) (parent: 
residence order),64  in which the English Court of Appeal had to determine if a 
natural father qualified as a “parent” within the meaning of section 10(4)(a) of the 
Children Act 1989.65 The applicant was seeking a residence order in respect of his 
child who had already been freed for adoption by court order. Her Ladyship noted 
that the natural and ordinary meaning of a word changed according to the context in 
which it was used. Thus, parent in a school prospectus encompassed a person who 
was not a natural parent but had de facto parental responsibility over a child, while 
in a work on genetics it meant a child’s biological parents, including a father who had 
no connection to the child other than the initial act of fertilization. She held that 
parent in the provision in question did not include a person in the applicant’s 
position.66
The indeterminacy of language is seldom noticed by readers because they 
subconsciously make assumptions and inferences about the meaning of the text. In 
many cases this raises no issues as the writer of the text and the readers share beliefs 
and make assumptions that are the same, or so similar that differences are 
insignificant. However, disjunctures can occur when readers hold different 
                                                                                                                                                              
(eds), Lexical Ambiguity Resolution: Perspectives from Psycholinguists, Neuropsychology, and 
Artificial Intelligence (San Mateo, Calif: Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, 1988), 271 at 276–277, cited 
in Sullivan, “Statutory Interpretation”, id at 205. 
63  See also Molot, above, n 57 at 35, stating that “modern textualists do not, in principle, object 
to the notion that judges should look to context as well as text”, and citing Frank H Easterbrook, 
“Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation” (1994) 17 Harv JL & Pub Pol’y 61 at 64; 
Jonathan R Siegel, “Textualism and Contextualism in Administrative Law” (1998) 78 B U L Rev 1023 
at 1028; and John F Manning, “Constitutional Structure and Statutory Formalism” (1999) 66 U Chi L 
Rev 685 at 688. 
64  [1994] Fam 1, referred to in Rupert Cross, John Bell & George Engle, Statutory Interpretation 
(3rd ed) (London: Butterworths, 1995) at 63–64. 
65  1989 c 41. 
66  Above, n 64 at 7. 
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assumptions from the writer and from each other. 67  Consider, for example, the 
guarantee in Article 5(1) of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia that “[n]o person 
shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty save in accordance with law”.68 In the 
1979 case Government of Malaysia v Loh Wai Kong,69 the Federal Court, Malaysia’s 
highest appellate court, interpreted personal liberty to mean only liberty concerning 
the body of the individual; that is, liberty from physical restraint.70 It therefore held 
that Article 5(1) did not confer on the respondent a fundamental right to leave the 
country and to travel overseas, or to be issued with a passport. However, almost 20 
years later, the Malaysian Court of Appeal in Sugumar Balakrishnan v Pengarah 
Imigresen Negri Sabah 71 decided that the term personal liberty was a “dynamic 
[concept]”72 and that one of its “many facets” was the fundamental liberty of free 
access to independent justice to obtain redress. Thus, in order not to fall afoul of 
Article 5(1), an ouster clause in a statute had to be read as only immunizing 
administrative acts and decisions that were not infected by errors of law. 73  In 
reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeal relied on two of its earlier decisions, 
Tan Teck Seng v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Pendidikan 74  and Hong Leong 
Equipment Sdn Bhd v Liew Fook Chuan,75 and the Federal Court decision R Rama 
Chandran v The Industrial Court of Malaysia.76 These cases had concluded that 
                                                   
67  Compare Sullivan, “Statutory Interpretation”, id at 206. See also Cross, Bell & Engle, 
Statutory Interpretation, above, n 64 at 32. 
68  Article 9(1) of the Singapore Constitution is identically worded, having been imported from 
the Malaysian Constitution. 
69  [1979] 2 MLJ 33. 
70  Id at 35, applying A K Gopalan v State of Madras AIR 1950 SC 27 at 96, SC (India), per 
Mukherjee J. A similar approach was taken in Singapore in Lo Pui Sang v Mamata Kapildev Dave 
[2008] 4 SLR(R) 754, HC, though Loh Wai Kong was not cited. 
71  [1998] 3 MLJ 289, CA (Kuala Lumpur, M’sia). 
72  Id at 305. 
73  Id at 308. 
74  [1996] 1 MLJ 261, CA (Kuala Lumpur, M’sia). 
75  [1996] 1 MLJ 481, CA (Kuala Lumpur, M’sia). 
76  [1997] 1 MLJ 145, FC (Msia). 
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“life” in Article 5(1) did not mean mere existence – the absence of death – but 
incorporated “all those facets that are an integral part of life and those matters which 
go to form the quality of life”, including the right to live in a reasonably healthy and 
pollution-free environment,77  and to seek and be engaged in lawful and gainful 
employment.78 In the Court of Appeal’s view, to adopt an expansive approach to the 
meaning of life but a narrow approach to personal liberty would “necessarily 
produce an incongruous and absurd result”.79 However, on appeal the Federal Court 
disagreed with the Court of Appeal and reinstated the narrow interpretation of 
personal liberty applied in Loh Wai Kong. 80  The Federal Court expressed 
puzzlement over the Court of Appeal’s failure to consider Loh Wai Kong (which was 
binding on it), and pointed out that although the Court of Appeal had followed the 
Federal Court’s approach of interpreting Article 5(1) broadly in R Rama Chandran, 
unfortunately that case also failed to have regard to Loh Wai Kong.81
Despite the potential breadth of the concept of personal liberty, the Federal 
Court in Loh Wai Kong and Sugumar Balakrishnan felt that the term only had a 
narrow ambit. On the contrary, a more expansive view of the provision was taken by 
Court of Appeal in the Sugumar Balakrishnan case. It is significant that there was no 
attempt in any of these cases to consider the publicly available context of Article 5(1), 
such as the purpose of the Constitution’s framers in introducing the provision, and 
the law relating to personal liberty at the time when the Constitution came into force. 
                                                   
77  Tan Teck Seng, above, n 74 at 288. 
78  Tan Teck Seng, id; Hong Leong Equipment, above, n 75 at 510; R Rama Chandran, id at 190. 
79  Sugumar Balakrishnan, above, n 71 at 305. 
80  Pihak Berkuasa Negeri Sabah v Sugumar Balakrishnan [2002] 3 MLJ 72, FC (M’sia), 
applied in Harmenderpall Singh a/l Jagara Singh v Public Prosecutor [2005] 2 MLJ 542, HC (Johor 
Bahru, M’sia); Sivarasa Rasiah v Badan Peguam Malaysia [2006] 1 MLJ 727, CA (Putrajaya, M’sia); 
and Tennet v Kaka Singh Dhaliwal (Secretary of the Malayan Racing Association) [2007] 3 MLJ 67, 
HC (Kuala Lumpur, M’sia). 
81  Id at 101. 
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The Malaysian cases show that judges can reach divergent conclusions as to the 
meaning and scope of a text if they do not decide on the basis of shared assumptions 
and inferences. It is possible that such differences of opinion might have been 
reduced if attempts had been made to identify the common, publicly available 
context of the constitutional provision in question. Nonetheless, it is not suggested 
that examining the context would definitely have been enabled a full understanding 
of the scope of the vague term personal liberty. Sometimes context will provide only 
limited guidance, in which case it will be necessary for a judge to engage in 
constitutional construction to determine the applicable rules of law arising from a 
provision of a constitution. The distinction between constitutional interpretation and 
construction will be examined in Chapter Six. 
It is submitted that at a minimum the context of a constitutional provision 
includes the following facts: 
i. The situation prevailing at the time the constitution was enacted, 
and in particular why it was necessary to bring the constitution into 
existence.82 
ii. Relevant existing law – both legislation and the common law – 
in force at the enactment of the constitution that constitutes a backdrop for it. 
This encompasses legal conventions associated with interpreting constitu-
tions,83 such as relevant common law canons of statutory construction and 
other interpretive rules and presumptions. 
                                                   
82  Solum, above, n 5 at 54. Note, however, that in his 2008 article Solum stated that he would 
“provide neither the criteria nor an enumeration of the facts that meet the criteria. Rather, the limited 
purpose of this discussion is to introduce the public context as a modification of the conception of 
clause meaning”: id at 53. 
83  Compare Sullivan, “Statutory Interpretation”, above, n 60 at 206. 
 Fidelity to Origins • 211 
 
iii. The entire text of the constitution,84 including the manner in 
which its provisions are organized in relation to each other. 
iv. The purpose of the constitution as a whole, and of each of its 
provisions.85 
It is reasonable to assume that these are publicly known facts surrounding the 
coming into force of a constitution, and that their existence is a matter of common 
knowledge shared by both the framers and interpreters of the text. Therefore, 
interpreters should be taken to be aware of these matters forming the context within 
which constitutional terms are to be comprehended. 
(b) Purposive Meaning 
What does taking a purposive approach involve? According to Dickerson, to a 
statutory text one may attribute “ever-widening purposes” – which we may liken to 
the ripples of water spreading out from where a pebble has been dropped into a pond 
– “beginning at the inner extreme with the specific purpose of taking [a particular] 
action and ending at the outer extreme with the very general purpose of helping to 
advance the total public good”.86 The specific purposes of statutory provisions are 
probably more helpful for a court’s interpretive task. 
A reference to a statute’s ‘purposes’ or the taking of a ‘purposive approach’ to 
statutory interpretation is effectively a modern reformulation and application of the 
                                                   
84  Solum, above, n 5 at 54. 
85  Id at 53. 
86  Dickerson, above, n 13 at 224. Francis Bennion said to similar effect: “Each enactment has its 
own limited purpose, to be understood within the larger purpose of the Act containing it – or 
sometimes within a broader purpose still, when the subject is dealt with by several Acts. Beyond this 
again is the general purpose of the law as an instrument serving the public welfare.” See Bennion, 
above, n 12 at 947, s 304, example 304.2 (footnotes omitted). 
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common law rule in Heydon’s Case,87 which dates to the 16th century or earlier.88 
This case held that judges are to construe an Act of Parliament to suppress the 
“mischief and defect” in the common law which the legislation was enacted to 
address, and to advance the remedy appointed by Parliament.89 Note, though, that 
the modern purposive approach is wider than the holding of Heydon’s Case. The case 
presumes that legislation is enacted to address defects in the common law, but of 
course “mischiefs” may arise from statutes and other forms of law as well.90 As the 
Law Commissions of Scotland and England and Wales highlighted in a joint report of 
1969, the case also gives the impression that legislation is only designed to deal with 
defects in the law, whereas it may be to further positive social purposes.91
In other words, taking a purposive approach towards interpreting a 
constitutional provision entails considering the mischief that the provision seeks to 
remedy, or the beneficial aim it promotes. This encompasses both the particular 
mischief or benefit and any wider or ulterior purposes, in the sense that the text 
should be interpreted in a way that also fulfils any broader purposes that the 
                                                   
87  (1584) 3 Co Rep 7a, 76 ER 637. 
88  Ruth Sullivan regards the rule in Heydon’s Case as an expression of the doctrine of equitable 
construction that dominated interpretation in 16th-century England. As “every thing which is within 
the intent of the makers of the Act, although it be not within the letter, is as strongly within the Act as 
that which is within the letter…” (Stowel v Lord Zouch (1569) 1 Plowd 353 at 366, 75 ER 536 at 556), 
courts could effectively rewrite legislation to promote what they believed to be Parliament’s true 
intent. However, the doctrine did not survive the rise of Parliamentary sovereignty following the 
Glorious Revolution. Nonetheless, the rule in Heydon’s Case survived since knowing the purpose for 
which words are used helps in understanding their meaning: Sullivan, Driedger on the Construction 
of Statutes (3rd ed) (Toronto: Butterworths, 1994) at 37; cf Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of 
Statutes (5th ed) (Markham, Ont: LexisNexis Canada, 2008) at 256–257. 
89  Heydon’s Case, id, 3 Co Rep at 7b, 76 ER at 638. See also Salkeld v Johnson (1848) 2 Exch 
256 at 273, 154 ER 487 at 495 per Pollock CB (“It is proper also to consider the state of the law which 
it [the Act of Parliament] proposes or purports to alter, the mischiefs which existed, and which it was 
intended to remedy, and the nature of the remedy provided…”); Blackwell v England (1857) 8 El & Bl 
541 at 543–544, 120 ER 202 at 203 per Lord Campbell CJ (“The meaning of the words used in a 
particular Act is to be ascertained by seeing what was the object of the Legislature in that Act, and the 
means by which that object was to be attained.”); Bennion, above, n 12 at 918–919, s 291. 
90  Bennion, id at 919, s 291. 
91  The Interpretation of Statutes (Law Com no 21; Scottish Law Com no 11) (London: HMSO, 
1969) at 49, n 177. See Cross, above, n 67 at 17–18. 
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legislature may have had for the constitution in question. Since the purposes of a 
provision are the legislature’s perception of why the provision was enacted, and they 
are a facet of the legislative intent towards the provision, it should come as no 
surprise that these purposes share the characteristics of intention. Therefore, the text 
of the statute is also the primary source for ascertaining purpose. Given the modern 
trend against wordy preambles and long statute titles, an explicit statement of 
purpose – or at least one useful for interpretation – is probably a rarity. Courts will 
most likely have to discern the purpose from the phraseology of the text and what 
reading the various provisions of the constitution together reveals about the 
legislature’s aims. There may also be occasion to consider secondary legislative 
sources, such as superseded and related legislation, the reports of Parliamentary 
committees tasked to consider law reform, and speeches made in Parliament during 
debates on the relevant bill. Here, the note of caution that was sounded regarding 
legislative intention should be heard: the views of a few outspoken legislators should 
not be assumed to be those of the legislature as a whole without good reason. 
The justifications given above for rejecting literalism cast doubt on the 
desirability of focusing on the literal meaning of the text – that is, a meaning 
divorced from the context. To do so creates the temptation to conclude that if the 
semantic meaning of the text is ‘clear’, there is no need to consider the purpose of the 
text. Tindal CJ took such a position on behalf of the House of Lords in the Sussex 
Peerage case.92 He said: 
If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then 
no more can be necessary than to expound those words in that natural and 
ordinary sense. The words themselves alone do, in such case, best declare the 
intention of the lawgiver. But if any doubt arises from the terms employed by 
                                                   
92  (1844) 11 Cl & Fin 85, 8 ER 1034. 
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the legislature, it has always been a safe means of collecting the intention, to 
call in aid the ground and cause of making the statute…93 [Emphasis added.] 
This approach is still taken by judges from time to time.94 However, appreciating the 
multifaceted nature of legislative intention belies the approach, as well as attempts to 
draw distinctions between the ‘literal construction’ and ‘purposive construction’ of a 
text.95 If linguistic meaning and purposive meaning are both aspects of legislative 
intention, then one cannot be considered in isolation of the other. For this reason, it 
is submitted that Brad Selway’s concern that there does not appear to be any criteria 
to determine whether a statutory provision should be read purposively or not96 is 
illusory. Provisions should always be read purposively. The same conclusion has 
been reached in jurisdictions where the purposive approach has been placed on a 
statutory footing, such as sections 15AA and 15AB of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 
(Cth)97 of Australia and section 9A of the Interpretation Act98 of Singapore which 
                                                   
93  Id, 11 Cl & Fin at 143, 8 ER at 1057. 
94  See, for example, Re How William Glen [1994] 2 SLR(R) 357 at 362–363, [16], where the 
Singapore High Court held: “I am also mindful of s 9A of the Interpretation Act (Cap 1) introduced by 
Act 11 of 1993. That section does not in any way affect the rule stated by Tindal CJ in the Sussex 
Peerage claim. Accordingly, where the words of the statute are plain and free from ambiguity the 
courts cannot call in aid the various extrinsic material enumerated in that section. Further, the rule of 
purposive approach in interpreting a statute comes in only where the words of the statute are 
ambiguous.” The case was overruled on this point by the Court of Appeal in Planmarine AG v 
Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore [1999] 1 SLR(R) 669. In the Canadian case R v Multiform 
Mfg Co (1990) 79 CR (3d) 390 at 394, SC (Can), Lamer CJ stated: “When the words of a statute are 
clear and unambiguous, no further step is needed to identify the intention of Parliament. There is no 
need for further construction when Parliament has clearly expressed its intention in the words it has 
used in the statute.” See also R v McCraw [1991] 3 SCR 72 at 80 per Cory J, SC (Can). Sullivan sees 
such statements as “entirely rhetorical” and made when the court feels that the literal meaning of a 
statutory provision is appropriate and requires no adjustment: Sullivan, Driedger on the Construction 
of Statutes (3rd ed), above, n 88 at 5; cf Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes (5th ed), 
above, n 88 at 19–21. 
95  Such terminology was used in, eg, Kammins Ballrooms Co Ltd v Zenith Investments 
(Torquay) Ltd [1971] AC 850 at 879 per Lord Diplock, HL; A-G of New Zealand v Ortiz [1982] QB 
349 at 361 per Staughton J. 
96  B[rad] M Selway, “Methodologies of Constitutional Interpretation in the High Court of 
Australia” (2003) 14 Pub L Rev 234 at 246. 
97  Section 15AA of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (No 2, 1901) (Cth), as amended, states: “In 
the interpretation of a provision of an Act, a construction that would promote the purpose or object 
underlying the Act (whether that purpose or object is expressly stated in the Act or not) shall be 
preferred to a construction that would not promote that purpose or object.” 
98  Cap 1, 2002 Rev Ed. 
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was modelled after it. In the Singaporean context, it was held in Constitutional 
Reference No 1 of 199599 that section 9A required a purposive interpretation to be 
applied to the Constitution (which contains a bill of rights),100 and that such an 
approach is applicable whether or not there is any ambiguity in the text.101 Section 
9A(2) specifically provides that material not forming part of the written law that is 
capable of assisting in the ascertainment of the meaning of a provision may be 
considered “to confirm that the meaning of the provision is the ordinary meaning 
conveyed by the text of the provision taking into account its context in the written 
law and the purpose or object underlying the written law”.102 This is akin to one 
category of what Bennion calls a “purposive-and-literal construction” – the court 
should give effect to the “literal meaning”103 of a provision when this is clear and 
reflects the provision’s purpose.104
                                                   
99  [1995] 1 SLR(R) 803, Const Tribunal. 
100  Id at 814–815, [44]: “It is well established and not disputed by either parties that a purposive 
interpretation should be adopted in interpreting the Constitution to give effect to the intent and will of 
Parliament. The principle to be applied is that the words of the Act are to be read in their entire 
context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense, harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the 
object of the Act and the intention of Parliament”. The meaning of this passage is slightly obscured 
because the Tribunal did not explain what it meant by “the intent and will of Parliament”. The 
reference to both “the object of the Act” and “the intention of Parliament” suggests that the Tribunal 
understood the intention of Parliament to mean Parliament’s intent as to the meaning of the 
Constitution – that is, only one of the two facets of intention identified in this chapter. For the reasons 
given, it is submitted that this is an incomplete understanding of Parliamentary intention. 
101  Id at 816, [47]. Mills v Meeking (1990) 169 CLR 214, HC (Aust), was cited with approval; this 
case dealt with s 35(a) of the Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 (Vic) (No. 10096 of 1984, as 
amended), which is in pari materia with s 15AA of the relevant Australian Commonwealth legislation 
and Singapore’s s 9A. The principle has been applied in, among other cases, Planmarine AG v 
Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore, above, n 94; The “Seaway” [2005] 1 SLR(R) 435, CA; JD 
Ltd v Comptroller of Income Tax [2006] 1 SLR(R) 484, CA; and Public Prosecutor v Low Kok Heng 
[2007] 4 SLR(R) 183, HC. 
102  This provision is in pari materia with the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), s 15AB(1). 
103  Bennion, above, n 12 at 455, s 156, defines the literal meaning of an enactment in relation to 
the facts of the instant case (taking the enactment in isolation from any other enactment) as, (1) where 
the enactment is clear (that is, with one grammatical meaning only), the grammatical meaning; (2) 
where the enactment is ambiguous (that is, grammatically capable of two or more meanings), any of 
the grammatical meanings; and (3) where the enactment is semantically obscure (that is, without any 
straightforward grammatical meaning), the grammatical meaning of the corrected version or, where 
the corrected version is grammatically capable of two or more meanings, any of those meanings. 
Bennion’s definition of grammatical meaning was set out at the text accompanying n 26, above. 
104  Id at 951–952, s 305. 
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How, then, should the purpose of a constitutional provision be taken into 
account when determining the clause meaning of the provision? Jonathan Molot 
proposes that since textualism requires the text to be the primary source for 
determining Parliament’s intention, substantial weight should be given to the use of 
textualist criteria to determine what the text means.105 Such criteria, it is submitted, 
take in traditional methods of interpreting statutes such as applying canons of 
construction. In the course of employing these criteria, a judge should strive to give 
the text its natural and ordinary meaning. However, as the purpose of the text must 
always be taken into account, this should not be understood as a mere literal or 
grammatical meaning divorced from the context. Instead it is, as the authors of Cross 
on Statutory Interpretation put it, “a meaning appropriate in relation to the 
immediate obvious and unresearched context and purpose in and for which they [the 
words of a statute] are used”.106 The text should, as far as possible, be construed in 
the manner that an ordinary person competent in the language of the text would 
generally understand it.107 It is eminently reasonable to presume that the legislature 
intends for statutory provisions to be understood in this way, for the rule of law is 
promoted; as Lord Simon of Glaisdale stated in Stock v Frank Jones (Tipton) Ltd:108
[I]n a society living under the rule of law citizens are entitled to regulate their 
conduct according to what a statute has said, rather than by what it was 
meant to say or by what it would have otherwise said if a newly considered 
situation had been envisaged…109
The same sentiment is expressed in Australia’s Acts Interpretation Act and 
Singapore’s Interpretation Act. Both of these statutes provide that in determining 
whether certain extrinsic materials should be consulted when interpreting written 
                                                   
105  Molot, above, n 57 at 65. 
106  Cross, Bell & Engle, Statutory Interpretation, above, n 64 at 32. 
107  Id at 28; and see nn 32–34 and the accompanying text, above. 
108  [1978] 1 WLR 231, HL. See Cross, Bell & Engle, id. 
109  Stock v Frank Jones, id at 237. 
 Fidelity to Origins • 217 
 
law, regard shall be had to “the desirability of persons being able to rely on the 
ordinary meaning conveyed by the text of the provision taking into account its 
context in the written law and the purpose or object underlying the written law”.110 If 
employing textualist criteria leads to the conclusion that a provision has a sole 
meaning which is consistent with the statutory purpose, this may safely be regarded 
as its proper meaning. 
Conversely, when the sole natural and ordinary meaning of the text is not 
congruent with the statutory purpose and produces “injustice, absurdity, anomaly or 
contradiction”, 111  the judge may adopt a meaning that is less obvious but still 
supported by the textual phraseology, and which fulfils the purpose of the text and 
accords with legal policy. Thus, for instance, in the High Court of Australia Justice 
Michael McHugh has advocated that the constitutional text be interpreted 
purposively, to the extent that a strained meaning can be given if a literal reading of 
the text does not give effect to the relevant purpose sought to be achieved.112
In addition, if textualist criteria are equivocal and suggest that the text is 
capable of bearing more than one plausible meaning, to break the deadlock the 
purpose of the statute and policy considerations should be given more weight.113 
However, some courts have pointed out limits to judges’ discretion in this regard, 
                                                   
110  Interpretation Act (S’pore), s 9A(4)(a); s 15AB(3)(a) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) 
is identical, except that the word “Act” appears in place of “written law”. 
111  Stock v Frank Jones, above, n 108 at 236. 
112  Cheng v R (2000) 203 CLR 248 at 291, [126], citing, inter alia, Sutherland Publishing Co Ltd 
v Caxton Publishing Co Ltd [1938] Ch 174 at 201. In similar vein, Bennion, above, n 12 at 944, s 304, 
contends that a court should either follow the literal meaning of the text where this accords with the 
legislative purpose, or give the text a strained meaning where it does not. See also McBratney v 
McBratney (1919) 59 SCR 550 at 561 per Duff CJ, SC (Can): “[W]here you have rival constructions of 
which the language of the statute is capable you must resort to the object or principle of the statute…; 
and if one finds there some governing intention or governing principle expressed or plainly implied 
then the construction which best gives effect to the governing intention or principle ought to prevail 
against a construction which, though agreeing better with the literal effect of the words of the 
enactment runs counter to the principle and spirit of it.” 
113  Molot, above, n 57 at 65. 
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stemming from the need to preserve the constitutional separation of powers 
principle and hence the distinction between statutory construction and legislation. In 
Inco Europe Ltd v First Choice Distribution 114  the House of Lords, citing with 
approval Jones v Wrotham Park Settled Estates, 115  held that before applying a 
purposive approach to add, omit or substitute words in a statutory provision, the 
court must be “abundantly sure” of (1)  the intended purpose of the provision in 
question; (2) the fact that by inadvertence the draftsman and Parliament had failed 
to give effect to that purpose in the provision; and, most crucially, (3)  the substance 
of the provision Parliament would have made had the error been noticed, though it 
need not be sure of the precise words Parliament would have used.116
It is vital to note, though, that the words of a provision can give rise to two 
kinds of uncertainty. It is submitted that the caution expressed by the House of Lords 
in the preceding paragraph is relevant to only one of them. Randal Graham 
distinguishes between ambiguity and vagueness.117 A text is ambiguous when two or 
more different and specific constructions can be given to it, and the uncertainty in 
meaning cannot be resolved by looking at the immediate context. Graham gives the 
following example of an ambiguous statement: “Universities must have dormitories 
for male and female students.” This could either mean that universities must have 
co-educational facilities catering to both male and female students, or that there 
must be living quarters for male students only and separate accommodation for 
                                                   
114  [2000] 1 WLR 586. 
115  [1980] AC 74. 
116  Inco Europe, above, n 114 at 592; Jones, id at at 105–106. The latter case was also applied in 
Bermingham v Corrective Services Commission of New South Wales (1988) 15 NSWLR 292 at 302; R 
(Confederation of Passenger Transport UK) v Humber Bridge Board [2004] QB 310, CA. See also 
Miles v Meeking, above, n 101 in which the same point was made. 
117  Randal N Graham, “A Unified Theory of Statutory Interpretation” (2002) 23(2) Stat L Rev 91, 
citing Reed Dickerson, “The Diseases of Legislative Language” (1964) 1 Harv J Leg 10. 
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female students.118 It could also mean that universities must provide accommodation 
for students of both sexes, and that it is immaterial whether such facilities are 
combined or segregated. In contrast, a text is vague when the language used is so 
broad that it is capable of a range of meanings that may or may not be consistent 
with each other.119  Vagueness is often a characteristic of bills of rights, as they 
contain terms embodying abstract concepts such as “freedom of speech and 
expression”120 and “right to respect for… private and family life”.121 As ambiguity is 
usually inadvertent and due to a drafting error,122 the cautious approach espoused in 
Jones and Inco may be suitable for ambiguous texts. However, it is simply inapt for 
statutory provisions that are vague. Vagueness cannot be characterized as 
inadvertence by either the draftsman or the legislature as it is usually deliberate and 
signals the legislature’s intention to give discretion to the judiciary to develop the 
meaning of the text.123 Further, as such texts require the judiciary to apply standards 
rather than rules – to make judgments based on principles or policies124  – the 
legislature intended a judge to use his discretion to reach a just decision, not merely 
to look for evidence as to how Parliament might have applied the text to a given 
factual situation. Indeed, the application of purposivism to the broad language of 
constitutions and bill of rights should not be unduly limited. In R v Big M Drug Mart 
Ltd,125 Dickson CJ spoke about interpretation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms in these terms: 
                                                   
118  Graham, id at 116. 
119  Id at 118. 
120  Singapore Constitution, Art 14(1)(a). 
121  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Art 8(1). 
122  Graham, above, n 117 at 130–131. 
123  Id at 121–124. 
124  Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, above, n 88 at 44. 
125  [1985] 1 SCR 295, SC (Can). 
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The meaning of a right or freedom guaranteed by the Charter [is] to be 
ascertained by an analysis of the purpose of such a guarantee; it [is] to be 
understood, in other words, in light of the interests it was meant to protect. 
In my view, this analysis is to be undertaken, and the purpose of the right or 
freedom in question is to be sought by reference to the character and the 
larger objects of the Charter itself, to the language chosen to articulate the 
specific right or freedom, to the historical origins of the concepts enshrined, 
and where applicable, to the meaning and purpose of the other specific rights 
and freedoms with which it is associated within the text of the Charter.126
He went on to consider the rationale for the inclusion of freedom of conscience and 
religion in section 2(a) of the Charter, finding that rights associated with freedom of 
individual conscience are fundamental in the Charter because they are central to 
basic beliefs about human worth and dignity, and to a free and democratic political 
system. They are an essential aspect of the political tradition underlying the 
Charter.127 Ultimately, the court held that the Lord’s Day Act,128 which prohibited 
retail sales on Sundays, was unconstitutional as its purpose of compelling observance 
of the Sabbath offended religious freedom. 
To sum up the discussion thus far, textualism, properly understood, always 
requires due consideration to be given to statutory purpose. Establishing the 
linguistic meaning of a term requires an appreciation of the term’s context, which 
includes the purposive meaning of the term. Assuming the existence of separate and 
opposing ‘literal’ and ‘purposive constructions’ of a text incorrectly implies that it is 
possible to interpret a text literally without regard to its purpose. The primary source 
for discerning both semantic meaning and purpose is the statutory text, because 
accepting moderate originalism as the most appropriate approach to interpreting 
constitutions and bills of rights involves a rejection of an unexpressed intent thesis in 
                                                   
126  Id at 344, [117]–[118] (emphasis in original), citing Hunter v Southam Inc [1984] 2 SCR 145, 
SC (Can). 
127  Id at 346, [121] and [123]. 
128  RSC 1970, c L-13. 
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favour of expressed intent. Nonetheless, a careful use of secondary legislative 
materials is permissible. In determining the clause meaning of a text, substantial 
weight should be given to the use of textualist criteria. Courts should strive to give 
the text its natural or ordinary meaning, understood not as a meaning apart from 
context but generally the meaning an ordinary person fluent in the language of the 
text would give to it. This ordinary meaning must be consistent with the purpose of 
the text. If textualist criteria lead to the conclusion that the text has more than one 
possible clause meaning, or the purpose of the text is not compatible with a single 
meaning, then the purpose and policy considerations come to the fore. Such a 
nuanced approach respects the primacy of the text while ensuring that the context is 
not overlooked. 
(2) Terms of Art 
The intended audience of a statute is made up of the inhabitants of a jurisdiction who 
are subject to its laws. They are assumed to be bound by a statute that has been 
properly enacted and promulgated by the legislature; a person who contravenes the 
statute cannot expect to be excused on a plea that he was ignorant of its existence. 
That having been said, legislation is not always drafted in a manner that is readily 
understandable by laypersons. Comprehending it properly requires some knowledge 
of how statutes are generally laid out (for example, how to understand interpretation 
sections and provisos), applicable canons of construction, whether there are related 
pieces of legislation that must be read together with the statute in question, the 
existence of relevant precedents that have interpreted certain provisions, and so on. 
A more accurate assumption is therefore that legislatures intend statutes to be 
understood by members of the public with the assistance of legally-trained persons. 
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These may be lawyers or, if a party appears unrepresented before a court, the role 
may have to be filled by the judge having charge of the matter. As Lord Diplock put it 
in Fothergill v Monarch Airlines Ltd,129 legal certainty “demands that the rules by 
which the citizen is to be bound should be ascertainable by him (or, more 
realistically, by a competent lawyer advising him)”.130 For this reason, it is necessary 
to distinguish terms of art, which are terms that have gained distinct legal meanings 
through usage,131 and other terms which are to be given their natural and ordinary 
meaning. 
Parliament does not legislate in a vacuum; it will often be the case that prior 
case law has given a special meaning to a term used in a statutory text. The prima 
facie rule is that the legislature should be regarded as having intended the term to 
have the established meaning it has gained through judicial pronouncement.132 This 
is Solum’s “second modification” to clause meaning – that a “division of linguistic 
labor” is to be recognized when terms of art are used in a constitutional text. The 
linguistic meaning to be attributed to such a term is not that which laypersons would 
give to it, but the publicly available meaning of the term to members of a relevant 
group in the community (persons with legal training such as judges, lawyers and law 
academics) and others who share the group’s understandings.133
                                                   
129  [1981] AC 251, HL. 
130  Id at 279. 
131  In Brooks v Brooks [1996] AC 375 at 391, HL, a term of art was defined as a term with “one 
specific and precise meaning”: see Bennion, above, n 12 at 1200, s 366. 
132  See, for example, Attorney-General (NSW) v Brewery Employés’ Union of New South Wales 
(1908) 6 CLR 469 at 531, HC (Aust): “Where words have been used which have acquired a legal 
meaning it will be taken, prima facie, that the legislature intended to use them with that meaning 
unless a contrary intention clearly appears from the context.” See also R v Slator (1881) 8 QBD 267 at 
272; Fisher v Bell [1961] 1 QB 394. However, the legislature may have intended the ordinary or 
popular meaning of a term: see, for example, British Columbia Development Corp v Friedman 
(Ombudsman) and Attorney General for British Columbia [1984] 2 SCR 447, SC (Can). Applying a 
purposive approach can help to determine whether an ordinary or legal/technical meaning is 
intended: Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes (5th ed), above, n 88 at 283. 
133  Solum, above, n 5 at 55. 
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That having been said, a court should not take for granted that simply because 
a term has been judicially interpreted in a particular way in the context of an 
ordinary statute, this interpretation should be carried over if the same term is 
subsequently employed by the framers of a bill of rights or constitution, particularly 
if the interpretation has the effect of cutting down rights. Constitutions and bills of 
rights are qualitatively different from other statutes. In Singh v Commonwealth,134 
Gleeson CJ held that the Australian Constitution is an instrument of government, 
expressed in broad and general terms, designed to speak to a future that is in many 
respects beyond the capacity of the founders to foresee. Changing times and new 
problems might require the High Court to explore the potential inherent in the 
meaning of the words, applying established techniques of legal interpretation.135 In 
particular, as a bill of rights exists to secure the fundamental liberties of the people – 
a matter of utmost legal importance – and it is intended to endure and remain 
relevant from age to age, this mandates that it be regarded as possessing a special 
status attracting the application of special interpretive criteria. This was recognized 
by the Privy Council in Ong Ah Chuan v Public Prosecutor,136 their Lordships stating 
that 
the way to interpret a constitution on the Westminster model is to treat it not 
as if it were an Act of Parliament but “as sui generis, calling for principles of 
interpretation of its own, suitable to its character… without necessary 
acceptance of all the presumptions that are relevant to legislation of private 
law.”137
                                                   
134  [2004] HCA 43, HC (Aust). 
135  Id at [16] and [18]. 
136  [1981] AC 648, [1979–1980] SLR(R) 710, PC (on appeal from S’pore). 
137  Id, [1981] AC at 669–670, [1979–1980] SLR(R) at 721, [23], citing Minister of Home Affairs v 
Fisher [1980] AC 319 at 329, PC (on appeal from Bermuda). The Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council spoke in the context of Westminster-style constitutions, but their remarks are apposite to all 
written constitutions. 
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This statement applies in equal measure to bills of rights. Constitutionally, the 
judiciary plays a qualitatively different role when it is required to uphold 
constitutional principles and fundamental rights, compared to when it gives effect to 
an ordinary piece of legislation. The framers of a bill of rights or constitution may 
spell out the meaning of a term in detail in the text. But in the absence of evidence of 
this nature, it should not be assumed that simply by employing in the bill of rights or 
constitution a certain term contained in an ordinary Act of Parliament that has 
previously been interpreted in a certain way by the courts, the legislature intends to 
cabin judicial discretion to protect rights. 
In the Canadian Supreme Court decision of R v Therens,138 Le Dain J, with the 
majority’s implicit support,139 stated that “the premise that the framers of the Charter 
[of Rights and Freedoms] must be presumed to have intended that the words used by it 
should be given the meaning which had been given to them by judicial decisions at the 
time the Charter was enacted is not a reliable guide to its interpretation and 
application”.140 Among other justifications, he noted that the nature of the Charter was 
such that it had to use general language capable of being developed and adapted by the 
courts.141 In Therens, it was held that the respondent had been “detained” within the 
                                                   
138  [1985] 1 SCR 613. 
139  See Reference re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act, above, n 45 at 510, [55]. 
140  Therens, above, n 138 at 638, [48], cited in Reference re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle 
Act, id. 
141  Therens, id. In that case, the issue was whether the judicial definition of the word detention in 
the Canadian Bill of Rights (SC 1960, c 44), an ordinary statute, should be applied to the Charter. Le 
Dain J also said (less convincingly, it is submitted) that if the Charter’s framers had reservations about 
the meaning that had been given to the word in the Bill of Rights, assuming they had considered it at 
all, it would be “quite inappropriate, and indeed impracticable”, in a constitutional document like the 
Charter to make detailed qualifications to provide for issues such as that which arose in the case. That 
process of reconsideration had, “of necessity”, to be left to the courts: Therens, id. With respect, it is not 
clear why it would have been wrong or impractical for the Charter’s framers to have expressed the rights 
and freedoms in more detail if they had wished to do so. A further ground that Le Dain J relied on was the 
fact that in the past the courts had felt some uncertainty or ambivalence in applying the Bill of Rights 
because the document did not reflect a clear constitutional mandate to make judicial decisions which had 
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meaning of section 10 of the Charter142 when he complied with a demand under the 
Criminal Code143  to accompany a police officer to a police station and submitted 
himself to a breathalyser test. Therefore, he had been entitled to be informed of his 
right to retain and instruct counsel without delay. It was not determinative that the 
word detention in the Canadian Bill of Rights,144 an ordinary Act of Parliament, had 
been interpreted in the earlier decision Chromiak v The Queen145 to mean compulsory 
restraint by due process of law, with the consequence that a person who was merely 
required by law to accompany a police officer for a breath test to be taken was not 
“detained” until he was arrested and charged with having committed an offence.146 The 
Therens holding was extended in Reference re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act, 
RSBC 1979, c 288147 from prior case law to the views of civil servants as to the meaning 
of Charter terms that had been expressed during the process of adopting the Charter. 
As mentioned above, the majority in that case cast doubt on the implication that such 
views could properly be taken to represent Parliament’s intention on the matter.148
Thus, in determining the clause meaning of a term in a bill of rights or 
constitution, a court should consider if the statutory term was a term of art at the 
time the text was enacted. If so, the general rule is that the term should be 
interpreted to give effect to the term of art. However, mechanistically reaching such a 
conclusion should be resisted, especially if applying the general rule has the effect of 
restricting fundamental liberties. 
                                                                                                                                                              
the effect of limiting or qualifying the traditional sovereignty of parliament. On the other hand, the 
Charter now gave the courts a clear mandate to do so: Therens, id at 638–639, [48]. 
142  The provision relevant in the case, s 10(b), states: “Everyone has the right on arrest or 
detention… to retain and instruct counsel without delay and to be informed of that right…” 
143  RSC 1970, c C-34. 
144  SC 1960, c 44. 
145  [1980] 1 SCR 471. 
146  Id at 478–479. 
147  Above, n 45. 
148  Id at 508–509, [51]. 
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(3) Implications and Stipulations 
Solum’s third and fourth modifications of the clause meaning of a constitution can be 
dealt with fairly briefly at this stage. The third modification is that the publicly 
accessible meaning of the text may include matters that are to be implied rather than 
read on the printed page.149 The issue of constitutional implications will be discussed 
in Chapter Six.150 The fourth modification is that terms used in the constitutional 
text can be given stipulated meanings by the constitution itself. 151  For example, 
section 6 of the Australian Constitution defines the term Original States to mean 
states that were part of the Commonwealth of Australia at its establishment. It may 
well be that just prior to the Constitution coming into force in 1900, the term would 
not have been commonly understood as possessing this linguistic meaning. 
B. APPLICATIVE MEANING 
It was contended earlier that in enacting a constitution, the legislature has an 
intention regarding the proposed applications of its provisions. To comply with the 
expressed intention thesis, this intention must be discerned primarily from the text. 
Statutes sometimes contain illustrations,152 though this is not the norm; few if any 
written constitutions have such a feature. The potential cases to which a provision 
applies may also be clear from the way it is worded, perhaps seen in a particular 
factual matrix such as a prior court decision that the legislature has expressed doubts 
about. However, it may not always be possible for a court to identify a provision’s 
                                                   
149  Solum, above, n 5 at 56. 
150  Chapter Six, Pt II.B. 
151  Solum, above, n 5 at 57. 
152  For example, the Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed) (S’pore), s 300(a), states: “Except in the 
cases hereinafter excepted culpable homicide is murder… if the act by which the death is caused is 
done with the intention of causing death”. Under the heading “Illustrations”, para (a) reads: “A shoots 
Z with the intention of killing him. Z dies in consequence. A commits murder.” 
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applicative meaning. There may be a temptation for a judge to examine Hansard to 
see if the promoter of the relevant bill or other legislators spoke about the cases that 
they foresaw the bill applying to. As where it is sought to establish the linguistic 
meaning of a term,153 circumspection must be shown towards legislators’ views that 
are not ultimately reflected in the text. 
III. MEANING – FIXED OR CHANGING? 
When the text of a constitution or bill of rights is laid down by its framers, they 
naturally assume that the words and phrases they use will be understood by the 
interpreters of the text in the manner the framers themselves understand them. This 
is more likely to be true at the point of the text’s enactment and within the next few 
years, even decades. However, as time passes, “drift” or “slippage” in meaning154 may 
occur. A word that had a certain meaning in the past may come to be used in new 
situations. Section 51(xxi) of the Australian Constitution empowers the 
Commonwealth Parliament to “make laws for the peace, order, and good government 
of the Commonwealth with respect to… marriage”. In Re Wakim, ex parte 
McNally,155 Justice Michael McHugh recognized that when the Constitution came 
into force in 1901, the word marriage bore the meaning ascribed to it in 1866 by 
Lord Penzance in Hyde v Hyde156 – “the voluntary union for life of one man and one 
woman, to the exclusion of all others”. 157  This remains the classic definition of 
marriage at common law. However, McHugh J noted obiter dicta that if the meaning 
of the word was construed at that level of abstraction today, “it would deny the 
                                                   
153  See the text accompanying nn 45–51 and 139–148, above. 
154  Christopher Birch, “The Connotation–Denotation Distinction in Constitutional Interpreta-
tion” (2003) 5 J App Prac & Process 445 at 458. 
155  (1999) 198 CLR 511, HC (Aust). 
156  (1866) LR 1 P & D 130. 
157  Id at 133. 
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Parliament of the Commonwealth the power to legislate for same sex marriages, 
although arguably ‘marriage’ now means, or in the near future may mean, a 
voluntary union for life between two people to the exclusion of others”.158 It may be 
asked whether the courts should recognize such semantic shifts. 
Another possibility is that the linguistic meaning of a term may not have 
altered, but because of changes in attitudes and values there may be disagreement 
with the text’s framers as to the scenarios that are covered or not covered by the 
term. The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits, among 
other things, the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments”. In 1791, when the 
Amendment came into force, subjecting juveniles who had committed heinous 
crimes to the death penalty was regarded as neither cruel nor unusual. Were the 
views of the Amendment’s framers regarding the application of the term binding on 
the Supreme Court in 2005? In Roper v Simmons159 a majority of the Court thought 
not. 
The issues arising from the situations detailed above are, first, whether a judge 
should apply to a term a new meaning that has arisen over time; and second, whether 
a court is bound to accept the applicative rather than linguistic meaning given to a 
term by the framers. In his theory of semantic originalism, Solum contends that the 
linguistic meaning of a constitutional text is fixed at the time it comes into force as 
law. On the other hand, the theory does not make any assertions about whether 
purposive meaning is fixed. It was previously argued that when interpretation of a 
                                                   
158  Id at 553, [45]. The OED Online, the Internet version of the venerable Oxford English 
Dictionary, defines marriage as “[t]he condition of being a husband or wife; the relation between 
persons married to each other; matrimony”, and attests this with quotations dating back to the 14th 
century. However, it adds in a recent note: “The term is now sometimes used with reference to long-
term relationships between partners of the same sex”. See “marriage, n.” (September 2008 draft 
revision), OED Online (Oxford: Oxford University Press) <http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/ 
00302422> (accessed 25 October 2008). 
159  543 US 551 (2005). 
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text is involved, the purpose of a text should be regarded as part of its context. It is 
submitted that, generally speaking, a text’s purpose also ought to be seen as fixed at 
the time of adoption. The theory does not claim that the applicative meaning remains 
unchanged over time. In other words, courts temporally removed from the time of 
adoption of the text are not bound to agree with the text’s framers as to the factual 
scenarios to which the text applies.160
A. SEMANTIC OPPORTUNISM 
The framers of a constitution or a bill of rights are powerless to prevent semantic 
shifts – changes over time in meanings – in the terms in which they have chosen to 
express their intention. Where this has occurred, in theory the legislature may amend 
the law in an attempt to ensure that its understanding of the text is duly conveyed to 
the judiciary. The legislature may not, however, always be at liberty to so act. It may 
be unable to garner sufficient support from legislators to have the amending statute 
passed, or it may be politically inexpedient to propose such changes. It may have 
more pressing matters to deal with on its legislative agenda, with the consequence 
that the statute remains unchanged for some years. Where the constitutional or bill 
of rights text remains unchanged in the face of a slippage in meaning, the judiciary 
must decide whether, and if so how, the slippage should be taken into account in the 
interpretation of the text. 
One possible approach is for courts to ignore the original meaning of the word 
or phrase that has undergone a semantic shift, and simply interpret it according to its 
present meaning. This is essentially the “contemporary literalism” approach 
                                                   
160  Solum, above, n 5 at 66. 
230 • Chapter Five 
discussed in Chapter Four.161 We noted there that one proponent of this approach is 
Justice Michael Kirby of the High Court of Australia. He has taken the view that the 
text of the Australian Constitution, once enacted into law, “took upon itself its own 
existence and character as a constitutional charter”,162 and hence has been “set free 
from the ‘intentions’ of its draftsmen” and must be read “by contemporary 
Australians… with the eyes of their generation expecting it to fulfil (so far as the 
words and structure permit) the rapidly changing needs of their times”.163 The result 
is that a judge is not required to give effect to the original meaning of the term in 
question, so long as the new meaning he gives the term comports with current usage. 
This may be a highly convenient way of dealing with semantic shifts. However, 
it should be questioned whether, without some supporting evidence, it is reasonable 
to assume the framers of a text intend that the phraseology they have employed be 
construed in this way. A writer generally uses words in order to express certain 
meanings and, he hopes, to achieve certain purposes. It is improbable that he intends 
for his words to have whatever meaning they happen to have at the time in the future 
when they are read and interpreted. Richard Ekins terms such an approach 
“semantic opportunism” as it would authorize courts to “frustrate Parliament’s 
judgment, as communicated in the intended meaning of the statutory language, 
whenever there is another semantically available meaning which is compatible with 
the judges’ own moral views”.164 He continues: 
Communication proceeds not on the basis simply of sentence meanings alone 
but by listeners, or readers, building theories as to what the communicator 
intended the words to mean. Conventions of language are of course an 
                                                   
161  Chapter Four, Pt II at 181–182. 
162  Re Wakim, above, n 155 at 599–600, [186] per Kirby J (dissenting). 
163  Re Colina, ex parte Torney (1999) 200 CLR 386 at 423, [96]. See also Eastman v R (2000) 
203 CLR 1 at 80, [242]. 
164  Richard Ekins, “A Critique of Radical Approaches to Rights Consistent Statutory 
Interpretation” [2003] EHRLR 641 at 648. 
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important factor in determining meaning, as they outline the available scope 
of possible intended meanings that a speaker who is familiar with the 
conventions might wish to use. But interpretation and communication do not 
stop there. We do not simply choose the most convenient semantically 
possible sentence meaning. If we are required to obey the person, or 
institution, that is communicating then we have to ascertain what they meant 
to say, not what particular semantic meaning we would like their words to  
bear.165
Semantic opportunism would cause the meaning of terms to be entirely fortuitous; 
readers would be able to ascribe to terms meanings not envisaged by writers if it 
turned out that the terms had altered in sense. For a court to do so would be 
tantamount to it introducing a principle unsupported by the text. 166  Michael 
McConnell has said, “The only difference between the unintended meaning and the 
extratextual principle is verbal happenstance.”167
B. THE CONNOTATION–DENOTATION DISTINCTION 
If semantic opportunism is to be rejected, it is necessary to consider whether there 
exists a more palatable manner to deal with shifts in linguistic meaning and 
scenarios over time. It is contended that the distinction, well established in 
Australian jurisprudence, that is drawn between the ‘connotation’ and ‘denotation’ of 
a term is of assistance here. These concepts were drawn from the writings of John 
Stuart Mill (1806–1873), 168  who regarded the connotation of a term as the 
information that a term conveys, which consists of a bundle of attributes;169 and the 
                                                   
165  Id at 648–649. See also Solum, above, n 5 at 3–4. 
166  Michael McConnell, “The Role of Democratic Politics in Transforming Moral Convictions into 
Law” (1989) 98 Yale LJ 1501 at 1528, cited in Jeffrey Goldsworthy, “Originalism in Constitutional 
Interpretation” (1997) 25 Fed L Rev 1 at 38. 
167  Id. 
168  John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive: Being a Connected View of 
the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation (9th ed) (London: Longmans, 
1875) at 31–42: see Street v Queensland Bar Association (1989) 168 CLR 461 at 537 per Dawson J. 
169  Birch, above, n 154 at 455. 
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term’s denotation as the things that the term is the name of. 170  In Jeffrey 
Goldsworthy’s words, a term’s connotation is the criteria that define the term, while 
its denotation is made up of all the things in the world to which the term refers.171
1. Connotation and Clause Meaning 
Case law establishes that while the denotation of a term may enlarge as new things 
falling within the connotation come into existence or become known, the connotation 
itself remains constant from the time the text was enacted (referred to here as the 
time of framing).172 This is arguably justified by the presumption that legislators 
generally intend to convey a certain essential meaning through the words they 
choose, and do not desire the words to simply bear whatever meaning they happen to 
have or can possibly have at the time when they fall to be interpreted. The conclusion 
would be otherwise if there is cogent textual and secondary evidence that Parliament 
had in fact intended to empower the court to disregard the meaning a term had when 
it was first enacted, but in the absence of such evidence it is submitted the 
presumption is reasonable. In a common law jurisdiction, written laws serve to 
introduce a degree of rigidity into its jurisprudence. The final appellate court is 
                                                   
170  Christopher R Green, “Originalism and the Sense–Reference Distinction” (2006) 50 St Louis 
U LJ 555 at 565. 
171  Goldsworthy, “Originalism”, above, n 166 at 31–32. See also Reed Dickerson, The 
Interpretation and Application of Statutes (Boston, Mass: Little, Brown, 1975) at 128 (“The 
connotations of words define their meanings, whereas their denotations consist merely of specific 
instances falling within those meanings.”), cited in Sullivan, Driedger on the Construction of Statutes 
(3rd ed), above, n 88 at 142; and Eastman v R (2000) 203 CLR 1 at 45, [142], in which McHugh J, 
quoting Leslie Zines, The High Court and the Constitution (4th ed) (Sydney: Butterworths, 1997) at 
17, explained that the connotation of a term refers to “those qualities and only those qualities that a 
thing must have in order to come within the term”, while the denotation consists of “those objects or 
classes that have all the requisite qualities”. 
172  Re Wakim, above, n 155 at 551–552, [42], citing R v Commonwealth Conciliation and 
Arbitration Commission, ex parte Association of Professional Engineers, Australia (1959) 107 CLR 
208 at 267, HC (Aust) (‘Professional Engineers Case’); Eastman, id at 43, [137]. See also the 
Australian High Court decisions King v Jones (1972) 128 CLR 221 at 229 per Barwick CJ; Cheatle v R 
(1993) 177 CLR 541; Sue v Hill (1999) 199 CLR 462. See also Goldsworthy, id at 31; Jeffrey 
Goldsworthy, “Australia: Devotion to Legalism” in Jeffrey Goldsworthy (ed), Interpreting 
Constitutions: A Comparative Study (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 106 at 122. 
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empowered to overrule the judgments of lower courts, and usually regards itself as 
entitled to depart from its own previous decisions in appropriate cases.173 The court 
may quite easily reconsider and modify common law principles, but it has restricted 
discretion as regards legal principles contained in statutes. It may, to a limited 
extent, interpret statutory provisions differently from previous judgments, but it 
cannot ignore the text entirely. Thus, major changes to the statute can only be 
effected by the legislature. This is a fortiori true of constitutions and bills of rights 
contained within them, since written laws as these are often amendable only if more 
onerous procedures are followed. For instance, a constitutional amendment bill may 
need to achieve a special majority of legislators’ votes or be approved at a national 
referendum to be passed. This implies that the court should regard the linguistic 
meaning of a statutory text as the one it had at the time it was adopted by legislators 
and enacted into law. To hold otherwise would essentially be disregarding the words 
chosen by the legislature.174 Justice David Brewer of the US Supreme Court noted in 
South Carolina v United States:175
The Constitution is a written instrument. As such its meaning does not alter. 
That which it meant when adopted, it means now. Being a grant of powers to 
a government, its language is general; and, as changes come in social and 
political life, it embraces in its grasp all new conditions which are within the 
scope of the powers in terms conferred. In other words, while the powers 
granted do not change, they apply from generation to generation to all things 
to which they are in their nature applicable. This is no manner abridges the 
fact of its changeless nature and meaning. Those things which are within its 
                                                   
173  See, for instance, the Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent) [1966] 1 WLR 1234 (UK) and 
the Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent) [1994] 2 SLR 689 (S’pore). Lower courts are normally 
bound by the rules of stare decisis to apply the decisions of higher courts in the same judicial 
hierarchy: see, for example, Cassell & Co Ltd v Broome [1972] AC 1027, HL; Favelle Mort Ltd v 
Murray (1976) 133 CLR 580, HC (Aust); Jusri bin Mohamed Hussain v Public Prosecutor [1996] 2 
SLR(R) 706, HC (S’pore). 
174  Compare Solum, above, n 5 at 3: “Why is constitutional meaning fixed at the time of 
origination? One common answer to this question focuses on the fact that the constitution is written 
and the notion that the function of a writing is to fix meaning through time.” 
175  199 US 437 (1905). 
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grants of power, as those grants were understood when made, are still within 
them; and those things not within them remain still excluded.176
Another reason for regarding the connotation of a statutory term as fixed at 
the time of framing has to do with the nature of legislation as a tool for 
communication across time. By enacting a statute, the legislature is attempting to 
convey legal rules it has laid down to present and future generations of persons who 
may be affected by them. In order for this communication to be effective, it follows 
that the terms used by the legislature in the statute must be understood to have the 
linguistic meaning that they had at the time of enactment. If the terms could be 
construed with changed meanings, this would distort the sense of what the 
legislature was attempting to get across.177 Thus it was said in Attorney-General 
(NSW) v Brewery Employés’ Union of New South Wales that when assessing the 
scope of the legislative powers of the Commonwealth of Australia Parliament, “it is to 
the meaning in 1900 that we must look, for the plain reason that the Constitution 
previously framed in Australia became law in that year, and the framers cannot, of 
course, have had in their minds meanings which had not then come into 
existence”.178 And Windeyer J commented in R v Commonwealth Conciliation and 
Arbitration Commission, ex parte Association of Professional Engineers, Australia: 
“Law is to be accommodated to changing facts. It is not to be changed as language 
                                                   
176  Id at 448, cited in Brewery Employés’ Union, above, n 132 at 534. See also Barnett, above, n 2 
at 105–106: “With a constitution, as with a contract, we look to the meaning established at the time of 
formation and for the same reason: If either a constitution or a contract is reduced to writing and 
executed, where it speaks it establishes or ‘locks in’ a rule of law from that moment forward. Adopting 
any meaning contrary to the original meaning would be to contradict or change the meaning of the 
text and thereby to undermine the value of writtenness itself. Writtenness ceases to perform that 
function if meaning can be changed in the absence of an equally written modification or amendment.” 
177  Solum, id at 66: “Fixation explains how reliable communication across time is possible. 
Absent fixation, communication becomes impossible in cases in which the conventional semantic 
meanings of utterance types happen to change.” 
178  Brewery Employés’ Union, above, n 132 at 521; see also id at 501: “The meaning of the terms 
used in that instrument [the Australian Constitution] must be ascertained by their signification in 
1900.” 
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changes.”179 From the foregoing, an intimate link between connotation and linguistic 
meaning can be discerned – determining a term’s connotation is fundamentally a 
search for its clause meaning which remains unaltered over time.180
There is, however, an exception to the basic rule: a court may legitimately 
determine that the connotation of a term has ‘changed’ if fresh information shows 
that certain existing attributes of the term should never have been regarded as part of 
the connotation; or that the existing attributes do not fully delineate the term the and 
that additional, new attributes must be included. This point is considered below.181
2. Denotation and Applicative Meaning 
Disagreement exists over whether the denotation of a term changes over time. 
Christopher Birch, for instance, maintains that “Mill’s concept simply does not 
permit the denotation of a general name to change while the connotation remains the 
same”.182 On the other hand, Goldsworthy says it is “undeniable that the denotation 
of a constitutional term can change”, 183  a position also taken by the Australian 
courts.184 The opposing opinions may be one of the reasons why in Eastman v R 
                                                   
179  Professional Engineers Case, above, n 172 at 267, HC (Aust). 
180  For this reason, it is respectfully contended that Jeremy Kirk’s “evolutionary originalism” 
theory is of doubtful merit. Kirk, speaking in the context of the Australian Constitution, has proposed 
that while judges should be limited to giving effect to original ideas in the text, interpretation should 
not be fixed according to the strict understanding at the time when the Constitution came into force. 
Rather the “ultimate test” is “what is it now reasonable, meaningful and appropriate to regard as 
covered or required by the idea or concept conveyed by the text?”, and it is possible for the original 
essential meaning of the constitutional term in issue to change: Jeremy Kirk, “Constitutional 
Interpretation and a Theory of Evolutionary Originalism” (1999) 27 Fed L Rev 323 at 358–359, 360. 
181  See Pt III.B.3(1), below. 
182  Birch, above, n 154 at 453. 
183  Goldsworthy, “Originalism”, above, n 166 at 31. 
184  See the cases mentioned in n 172 above, and compare Brewery Employés Union, above, n 132 
at 501 per Griffith CJ: “The meaning of the terms used in that instrument [the Constitution] must be 
ascertained by their signification in 1900. … On the other hand, it must be remembered that with 
advancing civilization new developments, now unthought of, may arise with respect to many subject 
matters. So long as those new developments relate to the same subject matter the powers of the 
Parliament will continue to extend to them. For instance, I cannot doubt that the powers of the 
legislature as to posts and telegraphs extend to wireless telegraphy and to any future discoveries of a 
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Kirby J called the connotation–denotation distinction “disputable” and said that he 
contested it.185
The disagreement appears to stem from differing understandings of what is 
meant by the denotation of a term. As indicated above, Birch takes the view that both 
the connotation and denotation of the term are fixed and unchanging at the time 
when the term is enacted into law. Taking his cue from Mill, he appears to regard 
denotation as a description of the class of all things to which the term can possibly 
refer. The scope of the class is determined by the attributes of the term, that is, the 
term’s connotation. For example, he notes that the word person, if used in its general 
sense in a 1900 text, may denote the class of all beings belonging to the species 
Homo sapiens, whether they existed in the past, present or future.186 In his eyes, the 
denotation of the word person is the label “all beings belonging to the species Homo 
sapiens”. Therefore, whether one is interpreting the meaning of person in 1900 or in 
the present, the denotation of the word is constant as the description of the class of 
things answering to the name ‘person’ does not change. 
Conversely, those who regard a term’s denotation to be capable of changing 
over time equate denotation with the class of things that comprise it, and not the 
description of the class itself. Under this view, the denotation widens when things 
possessing the bundle of attributes that make up the term’s connotation come into 
existence, even if they did not when the text was enacted and were not contemplated 
by the text’s framers. Similarly, the denotation shrinks if it is discovered that things 
which were believed to be within the class should no longer be so regarded because 
                                                                                                                                                              
like kind, although in detail they may be very different from posts and telegraphs and telephones as 
known in the nineteenth century.” 
185  Eastman, above, n 171 at 80–81, [244]. 
186  Birch, above, n 154 at 452–453. 
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they lack one or more of the attributes of the class.187 An example given by McHugh J 
involves the term internal carriage in section 92 of the Australian Constitution. He 
said that the connotation of the term is any method of inland transport; it is 
submitted that the corresponding denotation is a group of related elements which are 
the various means of transportation used within Australia’s borders. In 1900, when 
the Constitution came into force, the term’s denotation included transport by horse-
drawn carriages and trains, but today it also includes the carriage of goods within 
Australia by aeroplane.188 The denotation can therefore be said to have widened, in 
that the number of elements in the group or class has increased. 
Seen thus, there is no significant difference in principle between the opposing 
views of denotation. Provided semantic opportunism is rejected, there is consensus 
that the connotation of a term generally does not change over time, but that things 
having the attributes that form the connotation can come into or go out of existence. 
The disagreement over denotation arises from some persons focusing on the 
description of the class of things in question, and others on the class of things itself. 
While a Millian purist would probably find fault with the way the word denotation 
has been used by the Australian courts, since this is a well established usage it will be 
employed in the rest of this chapter. 
Just as the connotation of a term and its clause meaning are connected, a 
term’s denotation and its applicative meaning are coextensive. Consequently, unlike 
clause meaning, applicative meaning is not fixed at the time of framing. The potential 
                                                   
187  For authority that a denotation can contract as well as expand, see Australian National 
Airways Ltd v The Commonwealth (1945) 71 CLR 29 at 81, HC (Aust); Professional Engineers Case, 
above, n 179 at 267; Lansell v Lansell (1964) 11o CLR 353 at 366, HC (Aust); R v Federal Court of 
Australia, ex parte WA National Football League (1979) 143 CLR 190 at 233–234, HC (Aust); Street, 
above, n 168 at 532–538; Theophanous v Herald and Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 104 at 197, 
HC (Aust); and Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v The Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 513 at 645–646, 
HC (Aust), cited in Kartinyeri v Commonwealth (1998) 195 CLR 337 at 341, HC (Aust). 
188  Eastman, above, n 171 at 45, [143]. 
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scenarios falling within the scope of a constitutional term can change over time, 
depending on whether they possess the essential attributes of the term. It is 
contended that there are insufficient grounds for the view that a term’s denotation or 
applicative meaning must always be confined to that which existed at the time of 
framing or to scenarios that the framers foresaw, since constitutions and bills of 
rights are intended to set down fundamental principles of law that are assumed to 
endure for extended periods.189 For instance, arguing a term such as forced labour190 
can only refer to types of forced labour known to the framers is also illogical as it 
goes against the open-ended nature of the term.191 In her dissenting judgment in 
Canada (Attorney General) v Mossop,192 Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé said that 
even if Parliament had in mind a specific idea of the scope of a particular term in the 
Canadian Human Rights Act,193
in the absence of a definition in the Act which embodies this scope, concepts 
of equality and liberty which appear in human rights documents are not 
bounded by the precise understanding of those who drafted them. Human 
rights codes are documents that embody fundamental principles, but which 
permit the understanding and application of these principles to change over 
time. These codes leave ample scope for interpretation by those charged with 
that task.194
As we will see later, whether the denotation of a term is narrow or wide depends on 
the level of abstraction of the concept that the term embodies.195
 
                                                   
189  Cf Marbury v Madison (1803) 5 US (1 Cranch) 137 at 176, SC (US), where Chief Justice John 
Marshall said that the exercise of the people’s “original right to establish, for their future government, 
such principles as, in their own opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness… is a very great 
exertion; nor can it, nor ought it, to be frequently repeated. The principles, therefore, so established, 
are deemed fundamental. And as the authority from which they proceed is supreme, and can seldom 
act, they are designed to be permanent.” 
190  Singapore Constitution, Art 10(2): “All forms of forced labour are prohibited, but Parliament 
may by law provide for compulsory service for national purposes.” 
191  The conclusion may be different if the word or phrase is a term of art: see nn 217–222 and the 
accompanying text, below. 
192  [1993] 1 SCR 554, SC (Can). 
193  SC 1976–77, c 33, as amended by SC 1980–81–82–83, c 143. 
194  Mossop, above, n 192 at 621, [110]. 
195  See Pt III.B.3(2), below. 
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According to McHugh J, the connotation–denotation concept is now regarded by 
philosophers as outdated. 196  However, Christopher Green has pointed out that 
McHugh J relied on Professor Leslie Zines’ statement in The High Court and the 
Constitution (4th ed, 1997) that “the court has drawn a now outdated philosophical 
distinction between connotation and denotation”,197 but that Zines did not elaborate 
on why he felt the distinction was outdated nor cited any sources.198 It is submitted 
that the connotation–denotation distinction continues to be relevant, at least for the 
purposes of statutory interpretation. Dawson J noted in Street v Queensland Bar 
Association: 
[T]he attributes which the words signify will not vary, but as time passes new 
and different things may be seen to possess those attributes sufficiently to 
justify the application of the words to them. … [T]he principle which lies 
behind it… has never been doubted. It is that the limits within which a 
constitutional prescription operates do not change, however much changing 
circumstances may allow it to be applied to new situations.199
A word or phrase naturally lends itself to a conceptual division between its ‘meaning’ 
(connotation) and ‘applications’ (denotation) in various contexts.200 We might say, 
for example, that the meaning or connotation of the word religion is the belief in a 
supernatural Being, Thing or Principle and the acceptance of canons of conduct to 
give effect to that belief.201 The applications or denotation of the word would be the 
things or scenarios that are signified by the connotation, in this case, faiths such as 
Buddhism, Christianity and Islam. 
                                                   
196  Re Wakim, above, n 155 at 552, [43]. 
197  Zines, The High Court and the Constitution, above, n 171 at 17: see Green, above, n 170 at 578. 
198  Green, id. 
199  Street, above, n 168 at 537–538. 
200  See Alexander Reilly, “Reading the Race Power: A Hermeneutic Analysis” (1999) 23 Melb U L 
Rev 476 at 482, for the use of the terms meaning and applications to explain the connotation–
denotation distinction. 
201  Church of the New Faith v Commissioner for Pay-Roll Tax (1983) 154 CLR 120 at 137, HC 
(Aust), per Mason ACJ and Brennan J. 
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3. Applying a Connotation–Denotation Analysis 
(1) Establishing Connotation 
In applying a connotation–denotation analysis to determine whether a term should 
be given a dynamic interpretation, the first step is to establish the connotation of the 
term in question. Following Mills’ understanding of connotation, the task at hand is 
to identify the bundle of attributes constituting the term’s meaning. It is necessary to 
discern attributes that are central to the meaning of the term, and to put aside those 
that are not. To try and capture this idea, Australian judges have used a multiplicity 
of phrases, speaking about identifying a term’s “really essential characteristics”,202 
“fundamental conception”, 203  “essential particulars”, 204  “essential differentia”, 205  
“essential feature”206 and “essential meaning”.207 This issue is significant because the 
selection of an attribute as part of the term’s connotation has a profound impact on 
the scope of the denotation. For instance, the term adult person in section 41 of the 
Australian Constitution could mean either “person of or over 21 years of age” or 
“person recognized by law as of mature age”. If the court determines that being at 
least 21 years of age is an attribute of an adult person within the meaning of section 
41, then people aged between 18 and 21 years will not be regarded as such, even if the 
                                                   
202  Brewery Employés Union, above, n 132 at 560 per Isaacs J, and 535 per O’Connor J: “[T]he 
true line of inquiry is first to ascertain what were the essential characteristics of a ‘trade mark’ in 
Australia at the time when the Constitution was passed, disregarding all conditions, qualifications, 
and attributes, which were not of its very nature and essence…”. See also Grain Pool of Western 
Australia v Commonwealth (2000) 202 CLR 479 at 528, [123], HC (Aust) (“really essential 
characteristics”); Re Patterson, ex parte Taylor (2001) 207 CLR 391 at 495, [312], HC (Aust) 
(“essential characteristics”); and Shaw v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 
218 CLR 28 at 61, [94], HC (Aust) (“essential character”). 
203  Id at 577. 
204  Id at 581 per Isaacs J (dissenting), citing People v Fisher 50 Hun 552, 3 NY Supp 786 (1889). 
205  Brewery Employés Union, id at 606. 
206  Cheatle, above, n 172 at 560, cited in McGinty v Western Australia (1996) 186 CLR 140 at 
200–201 per Toohey J. 
207  McGinty, id at 221 per Gaudron J. 
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general age of majority has been lowered by ordinary legislation from 21 to 18 
years.208
The task of identifying the “essential characteristics” of a term has a somewhat 
metaphysical air to it. The remarks of Justice Antonin Scalia of the United States 
Supreme Court in PGA Tour, Inc v Martin209 may be noted; he said that “to say 
something is ‘essential’ is ordinarily to say it is necessary to the achievement of a 
certain object”.210 And in the Brewery Employés’ Union case, Justice Isaac Alfred 
Isaacs explained: 
To ascertain the really essential characteristics… it is necessary to distinguish 
what is merely occasional, though frequent, and to strip the expression of 
everything that is not absolutely fundamental. If we find some attribute 
universally attaching to the idea in all circumstances, that attribute is 
probably indispensable; but if any feature, however usual its presence may be, 
is not invariably existent, … it cannot, I apprehend, be asserted that the 
fundamental concept includes the variable feature.211
Beyond these statements, it is probably futile to try and lay down rigid guidelines for 
determining when the attributes or characteristics of a term are essential to its 
meaning. Nevertheless, it is to be borne in mind that the court is embarking on a 
quest for the term’s meaning, so this brings into play the principles that have been 
discussed earlier. The broad task at hand is to establish the term’s clause meaning – 
the ordinary public meaning it would have had when the constitution became law. 
This will involve considering the natural and ordinary meaning of the term in 
context, which in turn necessitates looking at the legislative purpose of the provision 
that the term appears in. The court should adopt a connotation that best promotes 
                                                   
208  Which is what the Australian High Court decided in King v Jones, above, n 184: see 
Goldsworthy, “Originalism”, above, n 167 at 32. 
209  532 US 661 (2001). 
210  Id at 700. 
211  Brewery Employés’ Union, above, n 132 at 560 per Isaacs J (dissenting). 
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this purpose. 212  It has been suggested by Sullivan that when a question of 
interpreting the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms arises, courts in that 
jurisdiction do not regard the original purpose of the Charter as binding. Instead, it is 
said that they “construct a purpose that is appropriate, having regard to the current 
social and ideological climate as well as the historical evolution of the Charter”, thus 
enabling a “progressive approach” to be adopted towards Charter interpretation.213 
In support of this, reliance was placed on comments by Justice Antonio Lamer in 
Reference re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act, RSBC 1979, c 288 relating to 
interpreting the Charter by reference to comments made by officers of the Executive. 
He said that “in so doing, the rights, freedoms and values embodied in the Charter in 
effect become frozen in time to the moment of adoption with little or no possibility of 
growth, development and adjustment to changing societal needs”.214 It is submitted 
that as a reminder that judges should not interpret constitutional terms too 
narrowly, the Supreme Court’s holding is laudable and consistent with the 
presumption in favour of generosity.215 It is quite another thing, though, to read it as 
providing justification for a court to ignore the original legislative purpose of a 
statutory provision and to formulate a new purpose as the basis for interpreting 
terms in the provision. As was pointed out in Big M Drug Mart, legislative purpose 
“is a function of the intent of those who drafted and enacted the legislation at the time, 
                                                   
212  Goldsworthy, “Originalism”, above, n 167 at 32, citing Leslie Zines, “Characterisation of 
Commonwealth Laws” in H P Lee & George Winterton (eds), Australian Constitutional Perspectives 
(North Ryde, NSW: Law Book Co Ltd, 1992), 33 at 40, 41–42. Geraldine Chin, “Technological Change 
and the Australian Constitution” (2000) 24 Melb U L Rev 609 at 640, argues that the purpose of a 
statutory provision should be used to determine the essential meaning of a term in place of the 
connotation–denotation distinction. It is submitted that an undesirable consequence of this approach 
is that a court may be tempted to ignore the clause meaning of a term in order to fulfil the purpose of 
the provision that it appears within. 
213  Sullivan, Driedger on the Construction of Statutes (3rd ed), above, n 88 at 48–49. The point 
no longer seems to appear in the 5th edition of the work (above, n 88). 
214  Above, n 45 at 509, [53]. 
215  See Chapter Six, Pt I. 
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and not of any shifting variable”. 216  Although this was said with reference to an 
ordinary statute and not the Canadian Charter, there is no reason why the logic should 
not equally apply to a constitutional document. Moreover, a provision’s purpose is an 
integral part of the context which should be considered when interpreting the 
provision. It is to be discerned in the first place from the text itself, and secondarily 
from other sources such as legislative debates. If the court were to accept fresh 
explanations of a provision’s purposes from the executive branch, this would provide a 
novel and unorthodox avenue for the interpretation of the provision to be manipulated 
without the matter being debated by the legislature. It is contended that the latter is the 
appropriate method for the legislature to imbue an existing provision with a new 
purpose. If Parliament has had occasion to reconsider a provision and there is cogent 
evidence that it has decided to retain it unchanged for fresh purposes, this ought to be 
taken into account by the court. However, absent such a scenario, even though 
constitutional provisions should be interpreted liberally since they are intended to 
remain relevant in changing times and circumstances, this is no warrant for a court to 
ignore the original legislative purpose and construct a largely fictitious one. 
We should not overlook Solum’s modifications to clause meaning. The 
constitutional text may in fact stipulate the meaning of the term in question (no 
doubt to the great relief of judges), or there may be implications to be drawn from 
the text. Where a word or phrase is a term of art, it may be necessary to give it the 
technical meaning that it has gained at common law. Such a meaning was given by a 
majority of the High Court of Australia in the Brewery Employés’ Union case217 to 
the term trade marks in section 51(xviii) of the Australian Constitution, which 
                                                   
216  Above, n 125 at 335, [91]. 
217  Above, n 132. 
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authorizes the Parliament “to make laws for the peace, order, and good government 
of the Commonwealth with respect to… [c]opyrights, patents of inventions and 
designs, and trade marks”. The majority examined in detail how the term was 
understood in legislation and court decisions and by the commercial community at 
the time the Constitution came into force. In the later decision of Sue v Hill,218 one of 
the issues was whether in 1999 the United Kingdom was a “foreign power” for the 
purposes of section 44(i) of the Australian Constitution, which provides that any 
person who “is a subject or citizen or entitled to the rights or privileges of a subject or 
a citizen of a foreign power; ... shall be incapable of being chosen or of sitting as a 
senator”, though it was certainly not regarded as such at the time the Constitution 
was framed. Justice Mary Gaudron identified the first question arising as whether 
the term foreign power “bears its ordinary meaning or is used in some special sense 
which forever excludes the United Kingdom”.219 She went on to find that it was not 
used in a special sense as the Constitution was a foundational document clearly 
intended to serve the Australian people well into the future. Furthermore, “foreign 
power” was an abstract concept apt to describe different nation states at different 
times according to their circumstances.220 Therefore, since the relationship between 
Australia and the United Kingdom had evolved over time, at the present it was 
appropriate to regard the United Kingdom as a foreign power. This is a reminder of 
the lesson taught by Therens:221 where fundamental liberties would be abridged, one 
must be wary of assigning to a constitutional expression the technical meaning 
accorded by the courts to a term appearing in ordinary legislation (or, by extension, a 
                                                   
218  Above, n 172. 
219  Id at 524, [161]. 
220  Id at 524–525, [162]. 
221  Above, n 138. 
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term defined at common law). As Gaudron J noted in Sue v Hill, since a constitution 
is intended to retain relevance over the longue durée, it may not have been the 
intention of the framers to restrict the potential extent of the document in this 
manner.222
The legislature is not entitled to alter the meaning of a constitutional term by 
way of ordinary legislation enacted after the time of framing either. It was held in 
Brewery Employés’ Union that the Parliament of the Australian Commonwealth was 
not entitled to enlarge its legislative powers “by calling a matter with which it is not 
competent to deal by the name of something else which is within its competence”.223 
It could not, therefore, purport to treat workers’ trade marks defined in the Trade 
Marks Act 1905 (Cth)224 as “trade marks” within the meaning of section 51(xviii) of 
the Constitution, which authorizes the Parliament “to make laws for the peace, order, 
and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to… [c]opyrights, patents 
of inventions and designs, and trade marks”. Permitting a legislature to redefine 
constitutional terms through ordinary legislation amounts to a circumvention of the 
statutory procedure established for amending a written constitution. Of course, the 
executive and legislature both have a duty of interpreting the constitution when 
carrying out their functions, and the courts are entitled to take such interpretations 
                                                   
222  Cf the comments of Kirby J in Shaw, above, n 202 at 59–60, [89]: “[T]he task of this Court is 
to give meaning to the constitutional word ‘aliens’ not for some other purpose but solely for the 
purpose of defining the operation of the fundamental law of the Australian nation and people.” Thus, 
in his Honour’s view, the term aliens appeared in the Australian Constitution in a different context 
from the concept of alienage as expressed in old English common law cases from the times of the 
Stuart kings (Calvin’s Case (1608) 7 Co Rep 1a, 77 ER 377) or the Hanoverian succession (In re 
Stepney Election Petition, Isaacson v Durant (1886) 17 QBD 54 at 59–60), and in United States cases 
immediately after the American Revolutionary War (Re Patterson, above, n 202 at 482, [274], and the 
US cases referred to therein). 
223  Brewery Employés’ Union, above, n 131 at 501. See also Pochi v Macphee (1982) 151 CLR 101 
at 109 per Gibbs CJ, HC (Aust): “the Parliament cannot, simply by giving its own definition of ‘alien’, 
expand the power under s 51(xix) [of the Australian Constitution] to include persons who could not 
possibly answer the description of ‘aliens’ in the ordinary understanding of the word”. 
224  No 20 of 1905. 
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into account. However, the views of the political branches on this matter are not 
conclusive. Ultimately it is the courts’ responsibility alone to authoritatively 
determine the meaning of terms.225
Considering a term’s applicative meaning may also assist in the ascertainment 
of its essential characteristics, to the extent that it is possible to discern potential 
applications of the term that the constitution’s framers had in mind.226 This is to be 
distinguished from the practice, said to have been adopted by some courts, of 
developing the connotation of a term from familiar examples (that is, the elements of 
the denotation) known at the time when the matter is brought before the court.227 As 
a result, the essential meaning of the term is distorted, possibly to achieve a desired 
result.228 The practice creates a bootstrapping problem – a term’s denotation is 
determined by its connotation, which is fixed at the time the constitution was 
enacted into law. However, the connotation would constantly change if modern 
scenarios are used to determine its essential characteristics. Arguably, the problem 
can be avoided if modern examples are judiciously considered to see only what light 
they shed on the essential meaning of the term as it was understood at the time of 
framing. 
Although connotation is supposed to remain unchanged, some judges have 
stated that the framers of the constitution or earlier judges may not have correctly or 
fully appreciated the import of the text. In Re Wakim, McHugh J noted that 
the meanings that we now place on the Constitution may not entirely coincide 
with the meanings placed on it by those who drafted, approved or enacted 
that document. … Experience derived from the events that have occurred 
                                                   
225  See generally Chapter Two, Pt II. 
226  See nn 152–153 and the accompanying text, above. 
227  Chin, above, n 212 at 632, citing Zines, The High Court and the Constitution, above, n 171 at 
19; and P[atrick] H[arding] Lane, Lane’s Commentary on the Australian Constitution (2nd ed) (North 
Ryde, NSW: LBC Information Services, 1997) at 911–912. 
228  Chin, id at 633–634. 
 Fidelity to Origins • 247 
 
since its enactment may enable us to see more in the combination of 
particular words, phrases or clauses or in the document as a whole than would 
have occurred to those who participated in the making of the Constitution.229
The point is fairly taken, since it is unreasonable to assume that the framers and 
prior interpreters of the text are infallible. 230  McHugh J’s view also provides a 
possible justification for Kirby J’s remarks in Grain Pool of Western Australia v 
Commonwealth that “the Court’s search has become one for the contemporary 
meaning of constitutional words, rather than for the meaning which those words 
held in 1900. … What constitute such ‘really essential characteristics’ may grow and 
expand, or may contract over time”,231 which otherwise express his preference for 
semantic opportunism. However, accepting that courts have the power to redefine 
connotations from time to time is an acknowledgement that judges exercise 
significant discretion in this regard. It is submitted this should not be regarded as 
undesirable as it is simply a feature of Westminster constitutional systems. Judges 
must not act like amanuenses of the political branches in deciding difficult cases; 
they are expected, and guaranteed independence, to exercise personal discernment. 
By conducting themselves in this manner, they fulfil their role in the constitutional 
                                                   
229  Re Wakim, above, n 155 at 553, [46], citing Victoria v The Commonwealth (1971) 122 CLR 
353 at 396 and Theophanous, above, n 187 at 197. See also McGinty, above, n 206 at 221 per Gaudron 
J (“The words… are to be approached on the basis that, although their essential meaning is 
unchanged, ‘their full import and true meaning can often only be appreciated when considered, as the 
years go on, in relation to the vicissitudes of fact which from time to time emerge’”, citing James v The 
Commonwealth (1936) 55 CLR 1 at 43); Eastman, above, n 171 at 46, [147], per McHugh J (“[T]he 
present generation may see that the provisions of the Constitution have a meaning that escaped the 
actual understandings or intentions of the founders or other persons in 1900”). 
230  Goldsworthy notes that unexpected developments can change the understanding of what a 
word means, revealing that a characteristic previously associated with it was never really essential. He 
cites the example of the discovery of black swans, which showed that swans need not be white: see 
Goldsworthy, “Australia: Devotion to Legalism”, above, n 172 at 151. 
231  Grain Pool, above, n 202 at 525, [117], and 530, [129] (footnote omitted). See also Kirby J’s 
opinion in Re Patterson, above, n 202 at 495, [311]: “It is entirely consonant with my approach to the 
interpretation of the Constitution to accept that the meaning of constitutional words vary over time. 
That meaning is to be ascertained by reference to the essential characteristics of the concept signified 
by the words, not by searching, as such, for how the framers in 1900 would have read them or 
intended them to operate.” 
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dialogue that takes place between the judiciary and the political branches of 
government.232
Admittedly, the task of establishing the essential characteristics, and thus the 
connotation, of a term will sometimes be less than straightforward.233 Despite the 
court’s best efforts, there may be insufficient information for it to determine with 
certainty the attributes by which the framers of the text intended the term’s 
connotation to be constituted. In this case, it is submitted that the court should apply 
the presumption in favour of generosity and articulate a reasonable connotation that 
maximizes rights. In addition, it should bear in mind the need for pragmatism and 
avoid a result that is excessively inconvenient or unworkable. 
(2) Determining Denotation 
The connotation of a term determines its denotation. Having identified the attributes 
and thus the essential meaning of the term, the court’s task is then to determine 
whether a particular scenario raised by a dispute falls within the essential meaning. 
In this respect, the ambit or scope of a term’s denotation depends on the extent to 
which the term embodies abstract concepts. Where a term has a broad connotation 
and expresses one or more concepts at a high level of abstraction, it will have a wider 
denotation. This makes it more likely that a scenario at hand will come within the 
denotation of the term. The word religion referred to previously is a prime example 
of such a term. On the other hand, a term narrow in meaning will have a similarly 
                                                   
232  Chapter Two, Pt III. 
233  Goldsworthy, for instance, has taken the view that the connotation–denotation distinction 
“can be very difficult, and perhaps in some cases impossible, to apply”: Goldsworthy, id. See also 
Goldsworthy, “Australia: Devotion to Legalism”, above, n 172 at 151, citing Zines, “Characterisation of 
Commonwealth Laws”, above, n 212 at 35: “[W]hen a word enacted in 1900 must be applied, many 
decades later, to circumstances not envisaged by the framers, it is often difficult if not impossible to 
know what criteria they themselves – if they had envisaged those circumstances – would have 
regarded as essential for its correct application.” 
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restricted denotation. It may even be the case that the denotation of the term 
contains only a single scenario. 
It might be argued that denotation, like connotation, is fixed at the time when 
the term in question is enacted into law. Taking this view would mean, for example, 
that the denotation of the phrase cruel and unusual punishment in the Eighth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution is limited to those forms of 
punishment regarded as cruel and unusual when the Amendment came into force in 
1791. It is submitted the correctness of the statement depends on the ambit of the 
term’s connotation. A term with a narrow meaning may indeed have a denotation 
limited to scenarios existing at the time of enactment, and no others. On the other 
hand, such a conclusion is unwarranted if the framers of the text have chosen to use a 
term bearing a wide connotation without qualification. In Re Wakim, McHugh J 
noted that many words and phrases of the Australian Constitution “are expressed at 
such a level of generality that the most sensible conclusion to be drawn from their 
use in a Constitution is that the makers of the Constitution intended that they should 
apply to whatever facts and circumstances succeeding generations thought they 
covered”.234
An example of how the court may find a connotation–denotation analysis 
useful when deciding if a statutory term is applicable to a novel scenario is provided 
by Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Association, though the analysis was not expressly 
                                                   
234  Re Wakim, above, n 155 at 552, [44]. See also Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of 
Statutes (5th ed), above, n 88 at 502–503: “A text that is written in general or abstract language 
invites an organic approach… In so far as an ‘organic’ approach consists of adapting legislation to 
evolving conceptions of society and its basic values, it is a normal and appropriate part of 
interpretation. Courts are bound to respect the meaning of words used by the legislature, but given the 
plastic character of language, especially the general language typically found in human rights codes, 
this constraint does not prevent the courts from taking a flexible and adaptive approach.” 
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adverted to.235 The plaintiff had lived with the protected tenant of a flat in what the 
House of Lords found to be a stable and permanent homosexual relationship. One of 
the issues that arose was whether the plaintiff could take over the tenancy of the flat 
from his partner after the latter’s death as “a member of the original tenant’s family”, 
pursuant to paragraph 3(1) of Schedule 1 of the Rent Act 1977.236 Lord Slynn of 
Hadley noted that the tenancy succession provision had first appeared in the 
Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act 1920. 237  Essentially 
conducting a connotation–denotation analysis, his Lordship therefore stated that the 
questions to ask were what the characteristics of the term family in the 1920 Act 
(which was not a term of art) were, and whether two same-sex partners could satisfy 
those characteristics.238 To identify the characteristics of the term, it was necessary 
to determine the purpose sought to be achieved by Parliament through the 
legislation.239 Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead cited Royal College of Nursing of the 
United Kingdom v Department of Health and Social Security to similar effect:240
                                                   
235  [2001] 1 AC 27, HL. See also Attorney-General v Edison Telephone Company of London 
(Limited) (1880–1881) LR 6 QBD 244, Ex D (telephone falling within the definition of telegraph in 
the Telegraph Act 1869 (32 & 33 Vict, c 73) even though the device had not been invented at the time 
the Act came into force); Lake Macquarie Shire Council v Aberdare County Council (1970) 123 CLR 
327, HC (Aust) (reference in legislation to powers of council to provide “gas” included supply of 
liquefied petroleum gas, even though only coal gas available at time when legislation enacted; per 
Barwick CJ at 331: “I can see no reason why, whilst the connotation of the word ‘gas’ will be fixed, its 
denotation cannot change with changing technologies.”), cited in D C Pearce & R S Geddes, Statutory 
Interpretation in Australia (4th ed) (Sydney: Butterworths, 1996) at 92–93, [4.8]; R v Ireland [1997] 
QB 114, CA (appellant who caused psychological harm to women victims by making repeated 
telephone calls to them and remaining silent when they answered committed “assault” within 
meaning of Offences against the Person Act 1861 (24 & 25 Vict, c 100), s 47); and Victor Chandler 
International v Customs and Excise Commissioners [2000] 1 WLR 1296, CA (s 9(1)(b) of Betting and 
Gaming Duties Act 1981 (c 63), which prohibits issuing, circulation or distribution in the United 
Kingdom of any advertisement or other document inviting the making of bets, breached if Gibraltar 
company broadcasts betting odds on teletext in the UK by direct electronic transmission from 
terminal in Gibraltar). 
236  1977 c 42 (UK). 
237  10 & 11 Geo V, c 17: see Fitzpatrick, above, n 235 at 40. 
238  Fitzpatrick, id at 35. 
239  Id at 38. 
240  [1981] AC 800 at 822 per Lord Wilberforce, HL. 
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A statute must necessarily be interpreted having regard to the state of affairs 
existing when it was enacted. It is a fair presumption that Parliament’s 
intention was directed at that state of affairs. When circumstances change, a 
court has to consider whether they fall within the parliamentary intention. 
They may do so if there can be detected a clear purpose in the legislation 
which can only be fulfilled if an extension is made. How liberally these 
principles may be applied must depend upon the nature of the enactment, and 
the strictness or otherwise of the words in which it was expressed.241
Lord Slynn held that the intention in 1920 had not just been for a protected 
tenant’s legal wife but also other members of the family unit occupying the property 
on the death of the tenant to succeed to the tenancy. In his view, a transient 
superficial relationship or mere cohabitation by friends for convenience did not 
amount to a family;242 the hallmarks of the relationship were a degree of mutual 
interdependence, sharing of lives, caring and love, and commitment and support.243 
Lord Nicholls spoke of the sharing of lives together in a single family unit living in 
one house;244 while Lord Clyde referred to bonds of love and affection, not of a casual 
or transitory nature but in relationships which were permanent or at least intended 
to be so.245 Here, the judges were establishing the attributes of the term which 
determined its connotation. A majority of the House went on to find that the plaintiff 
should be regarded as a member of the tenant’s family for the purposes of the Act – 
the relationship between the plaintiff and the tenant thus fell within the denotation 
of the term family in the Act.246
                                                   
241  Fitzpatrick, above, n 235 at 45. 
242  Id at 40. 
243  Id at 38. 
244  Id at 44. 
245  Id at 51. Lord Clyde added that as a result of the personal attachment, other characteristics 
followed, such as a readiness to support each other emotionally and financially, to care for and look 
after the other in times of need, and to provide a companionship in which mutual interests and 
activities could be shared and enjoyed together. He noted it would be difficult to establish such a bond 
unless the couple were living together in the same house, and if there was not an active sexual 
relationship between them or at least the potentiality of such a relationship. While the existence of 
children were not a necessary element, if the couple had or were caring for children whom they regard 
as their own this made the family designation more immediately obvious: id. 
246  In Fitzpatrick, the House of Lords held that the plaintiff did not succeed to the tenancy as the 
“spouse” of the original tenant, even though that term had been statutorily extended to mean persons 
252 • Chapter Five 
In Fitzpatrick, Lord Slynn said that another way of approaching the matter 
was to ask whether the meaning of the term family needed to be updated so as to be 
capable of including persons who today would be regarded as being a member of 
another’s family, whatever the term might have meant in 1920. 247  However, he 
eventually did not rely on this approach. Instead of regarding the meaning of the 
word family as having changed, he was of the opinion it was better to say that the 
situations capable of falling within the words had changed.248 It is submitted that 
this view is correct. The “updating construction” approach appears to derive from 
Bennion, who has stated that there is a common law presumption that Parliament 
intends the court to apply to an ongoing Act249 “a construction that continuously 
updates its wording to allow for changes since the Act was initially framed”. 250  
Bennion views the presumption as reflecting the principle that an ongoing Act is to 
be taken to be “always speaking”:251 “[I]n its application on any date, the language of 
the Act, though necessarily embedded in its own time, is nevertheless to be construed 
in accordance with the need to treat it as current law.”252 The careful wording of 
Bennion’s explanation deserves to be noted, and preferred to looser formulations 
                                                                                                                                                              
living with the original tenant “as his or her wife or husband”. Following the entry into force of the 
Human Rights Act 1998 (c 42) (‘HRA’), in Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] 2 AC 557, the House of 
Lords took a different view, holding that such an interpretation violated the respondent’s rights under 
Arts 8 and 14 of the European Convention. In the view of a majority of their Lordships, s 3 of the HRA, 
which mandates that legislation be read and given effect in a way compatible with Convention rights 
so far as is possible, required that the term spouse be interpreted to include a same-sex partner. 
247  Id at 35. 
248  Id at 39. Lord Clyde, too, expressed the view that what had changed was not the essential 
meaning of the word family, but the precise personal associations to which the concept might now be 
applied: id at 50. 
249  According to Bennion, an ongoing Act is an Act intended to develop in meaning with 
developing circumstances, and is to be distinguished from a fixed-time Act which is intended to be of 
unchanging effect: Bennion, above, n 12 at 889–890, s 288. 
250  Id at 890, s 288. Bennion was expressly cited in R v Westminster City Council, ex parte A 
(1997) 9 Admin LR 504 at 509; in Fitzpatrick, id at 35 and 50; and in Victor Chandler, above, n 235 at 
1303, paras 27–28, and 1305–1306, [35]. 
251  Citing Lord Thring, Practical Legislation (London: John Murray, 1902) at 83: see Bennion, id 
at 891, s 288. 
252  Bennion, id at 890, s 288. 
 Fidelity to Origins • 253 
 
such as that proposed by D C Pearce and R S Geddes in the Australian context: 
“[W]ords in an Act are to be interpreted in accordance with their current 
meaning”.253 Inasmuch as it may be argued that an updating construction implies 
the essential meaning of a statutory term changes over time, it is submitted that this 
is erroneous. Construing the presumption in favour of an updating construction in 
this manner would promote semantic opportunism, which we have already rejected. 
A court may also be confronted by a situation where semantic drift has 
occurred – the modern meaning of a term is no longer the same as that when it was 
enacted. This modern meaning can be detected by having regard to, among other 
things, the term’s present semantic meaning in the context of the legislation it 
appears in, judicial notice and, where appropriate, the testimony of witnesses. In line 
with the general principle that a term’s connotation does not change, the court is 
bound to give effect to the original meaning. This is akin to Bennion’s “box 
principle”, which he explains as follows: 
An Act uses a term T1. The meaning of T1 at the date when the Act is passed 
indicates that it comprises A, B, C and D. (In other words, T1 is like a box 
containing those four elements and no others.) By the time the instant case is 
heard, the meaning of T1 has changed. Now the box contains A, B, E and F, 
and nothing else. However, another term T2 is now in use. The box which is 
T2 contains, at the date of the instant case, the elements A, B, C and D (and no 
others). For the purposes of that case, the Act is to be read as if instead of T1 it 
used the term T2. (If there was in fact no new term T2, it would be necessary 
to use instead a form of words which embraced A, B, C and D, and nothing 
else.)254
The box principle is entirely in line with the connotation–denotation analysis. The 
elements A, B, C and D in Bennion’s exposition are equivalent to the attributes 
comprising a term’s connotation, which are regarded as fixed. On the other hand, 
Pearce and Geddes suggest a different test: “Would the legislature have intended to 
                                                   
253  Pearce & Geddes, above, n 235 at 91, [4.6]. 
254  Bennion, above, n 12 at 907, s 288. 
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include the activity or thing in the expression if it had known about it?”255 With 
respect, it is submitted that this test is unacceptably speculative. Basically, it requires 
a counterfactual intention to be imputed to the legislature, a method doubted in 
Chapter Four.256 The connotation–denotation analysis, reflected in Bennion’s box 
principle, is to be favoured. 
Applying this analysis to the example concerning the interpretation of section 
51(xxi) of the Australian Constitution raised by McHugh J in Re Wakim,257 if the 
connotation of the term marriage at the time of framing was a voluntary union for 
life of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others, this remains 
unchanged. Hence, these are the essential attributes of the term that will decide its 
denotation. Even if at the time the issue comes up for decision the word marriage 
has gained a wider meaning in the community, it is submitted that it would be 
incorrect for the court to depart from the original understanding of the term.258
CONCLUSION 
A court will find assistance in interpreting a constitutional term by considering its 
linguistic, purposive and applicative meanings. It is submitted that when it is sought 
to establish a term’s linguistic meaning, it is necessary to consider both semantic and 
                                                   
255  Pearce & Geddes, above, n 235 at 94, [4.9]. 
256  Chapter Four, Pt I.A.1(1). 
257  See nn 155–158 and the accompanying text, above. 
258  Interpreting the term marriage in this way would not necessarily mean that the Australian 
Commonwealth Parliament has no power to legislate to, say, authorize same-sex unions. By s 51(xxi) 
of the Australian Constitution, the Parliament is empowered to “make laws… with respect to… 
marriage” [emphasis added]. Arguably, a law authorizing same-sex unions is a law “with respect to” 
the traditional understanding of marriage because it confers on such unions a status comparable to 
that of marriage. In Re Wakim, above, n 155 at 554, [47], McHugh J said that “the indeterminate 
nature of the words ‘with respect to’… may result in subjects now falling within the scope of the 
Commonwealth power although most people in 1901 would have denied that the Commonwealth had 
power in respect of such subjects”. Thus, because the legal profession now had connections with 
almost every aspect of trade and commerce, taxation, trading and financial corporations, banking, 
insurance, copyrights, patents, bankruptcy, insolvency and matrimonial causes, the Commonwealth 
Parliament might have regulatory powers over the profession that would have been regarded as 
unthinkable in 1901: id. 
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pragmatic aspects. In most cases, a term’s semantic or grammatical meaning is the 
natural and ordinary meaning that a reasonable person would understand it to have. 
In Chapter Four, it was stated that textualism can be understood as an interpretive 
approach that regards the text of a statute as the primary source for determining 
Parliamentary intention. 259  As this understanding is applicable to moderate 
originalism, that form of originalism is a textualist approach to interpretation. 
However, the definition, which was crafted to avoid textualism’s excesses, does not 
say that only the text may be referred to. Thus, the court may refer to a range of 
secondary materials, including dictionaries which are useful for setting the outer 
limits of the term’s meaning. However, courts ought not unquestioningly accept the 
views of legislators on the matter as expressed in Hansard. 
Also essential to the interpretive task is the pragmatic meaning of a term. It is 
necessary to ascertain what Solum calls the term’s clause meaning – the ordinary and 
conventional public meaning that the term would have had to its intended audience 
when it was enacted into law. This necessitates an appreciation of the term’s context 
which, it was argued, includes the purpose of the provision it appears in. In addition, 
clause meaning is shaped by the use of terms of art, implications and stipulations. 
Finally, a term’s meaning involves the potential applications that were 
foreseen by legislators. Although such applications are useful if they can be discerned 
from the constitutional text, instances of this nature will be uncommon. Courts must 
proceed with trepidation and not infer applicative meaning from reports of legislative 
debates where Parliament has decided not to refer explicitly to potential applications 
in the text. 
                                                   
259  Chapter Four at Pt I.A.1 at 168. 
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There are compelling reasons why the clause meaning of a constitutional 
provision should be regarded as fixed as at the time of framing rather than changing. 
Arguably, when a legislature enacts a statute, its central intent is to create binding 
legal rules and communicate them to present and future generations of 
administrators, lawmakers and judges, and the public at large. Thus, barring specific 
textual and secondary evidence to the contrary, it is unlikely that the framers of a 
constitution intended to confer on the courts the discretion to completely ignore the 
message they were trying to convey. If the courts did act in this manner, they would 
be practising ‘semantic opportunism’. Constitutional terms would be subject to 
reinterpretation only if their linguistic meanings happened to have altered over time. 
This would make the interpretive process highly fortuitous. 
On the other hand, the presumption should be that the applicative meaning of 
terms and provisions is not frozen as at the time of framing. The potential scope of 
application of a term depends on whether it embodies abstract concepts or not. If it 
does not, there is a possibility that the term may indeed apply only to scenarios 
existing or foreseen at the time of framing. The converse is true when the legislature 
has chosen to express itself in vague terms and has neither attempted to define them 
nor indicated their scope. There is every reason to suppose that framers intended to 
leave it to the court to determine how such terms and provisions should be applied 
on a case-by-case basis, particularly in view of the fact that constitutions and bills of 
rights lay down fundamental principles that are supposed to persist for extended 
periods. 
In Australian jurisprudence, the connotation of a term is the unchanging 
bundle of attributes that constitutes its meaning, while its denotation is the collection 
of things or scenarios to which the term refers. Hence, the concepts of connotation 
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and denotation reflect the views expressed above, with connotation corresponding to 
clause meaning and denotation to applicative meaning. Applying a connotation–
denotation analysis is therefore a practical way to determine how a term should be 
interpreted in the light of a semantic shift in the meaning of the term, or changed 
circumstances. Ascertaining connotation entails discerning the attributes that are 
central to the term’s meaning. This is by no means always a straightforward task, and 
it is probably unrealistic to try and articulate rigid rules for determining whether a 
particular attribute is an essential characteristic of a term. It should be appreciated 
that the task of identifying the connotation of a term is basically the ascertainment of 
the term’s clause meaning. However, where there is a lack of convincing evidence 
indicating what the framers of the text regarded as the essential meaning of the term, 
the court should apply a presumption of generosity and articulate a connotation that 
maximizes rights while trying to avoid impractical results. 
The connotation of a term determines the scope of its denotation – the 
denotation will be wider (that is, more things or scenarios will come within the 
term’s meaning) when the term expresses abstract concepts. This is line with the 
view taken in Chapter Four that a moderately originalist approach to the 
interpretation of constitutions and bills of rights should not require courts to always 
read the legislative text as it was understood at the time of its enactment. Depending 
on the language of the text, it may be appropriate for a dynamic interpretation to be 
adopted.260
The method of interpretation proposed here might be criticized for focusing 
on the technicalities of how meaning should be attributed to the words and phrases 
used in the text, rather than encouraging the taking of a broad-brush approach. It is 
                                                   
260  Chapter Four, Pt II. 
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submitted that we must not overlook the fact that constitutions and bills of rights are 
statutes, and must generally be treated as such except where their special nature 
requires otherwise. The method mandates fidelity to the clause meaning of the text at 
the time of framing, which is consistent with the requirements of moderate 
originalism. In any case, it is evident that the interpretive method discussed also 
reposes significant discretion in judges to determine the meaning of constitutional 
terms. For instance, fresh knowledge or factual scenarios coming to the court’s 
attention since the text was framed may justify a judge in holding that the prior 
formulation of a term’s connotation is inaccurate and should be revised, even though 
connotation is understood to be constant and unchanging. Furthermore, courts have 
much leeway in deciding how vague terms appearing in the text should be applied. 
This should not cause dismay, for it is submitted that this is precisely the 
responsibility that is envisaged for judges in Westminster-style systems with written 
constitutions and bills of rights. 
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When the Text Runs Out: The Role of the Court 
in Constitutional Construction 
[T]he courts are not charged solely with the adjudication of 
individual cases. That is, of course, one role. It [judicial 
independence] is also the context for a second, different and 
equally important role, namely, as protector of the Constitution 
and the fundamental values embodied in it – rule of law, 
fundamental justice, equality, preservation of the democratic 
process, to name perhaps the most important.1
— BRIAN DICKSON (1916–1998), 
Chief Justice of Canada 
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THE PROCESSES OF constitutional interpretation and constitutional construction 
should be distinguished. Interpretation describes what happens when a court 
identifies the semantic content of the constitutional text.2 Semantic content does not 
                                                   
1  R v Beauregard [1986] 2 SCR 56 at 70, [24], SC (Can). 
2  Lawrence B Solum, “Semantic Originalism” (Illinois Public Law and Legal Theory Research 
Papers Series No 07-24, 22 November 2008) <http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1120244> (accessed 
27 August 2009) at 68. 
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fully determine the content of constitutional law; it merely contributes towards it.3 
Rules of constitutional law are derived by the court through a process of 
construction,4 which requires judges to transform the semantic meaning of the text 
into legal rules. It may be that by interpreting a particular provision, the court is able 
to establish its ‘clause meaning’ – the ordinary and conventional public meaning that 
the provision would have had to its intended audience at the time it became law5 – 
and that this meaning enables the court to apply the provision to determine the issue 
that has come before it. In this case, the court has been able to establish the relevant 
constitutional law rule to apply to the issue through interpretation alone. In contrast, 
it must resort to construing the text when it has ‘run out’; in other words, when its 
clause meaning fails to provide sufficient assistance. For instance, determining the 
semantic meaning of the sentence “No person shall be deprived of his… personal 
liberty save in accordance with law”6 alone provides little indication as to whether a 
statute criminalizing the commission in private of an “act of gross indecency” 
between two male persons7 infringes the fundamental liberties of a gay man. Part I of 
the chapter re-examines the well-established presumption in favour of generosity 
which, it is submitted, is a basic rule of construction that acts as a tie-breaker in cases 
when competing considerations are finely balanced. Part II goes on to briefly 
consider the distinction between ambiguity and vagueness in written law, and argues 
that vagueness – a common feature of constitutions and bills of rights – is 
intentional rather than inadvertent. It then attempts to justify why courts may 
                                                   
3  Id at 6. Solum refers to this as his “contribution thesis”. 
4  Id at 68. 
5  Id at 51. 
6  Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1999 Reprint), Art 9(1). 
7  Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed) (Singapore), s 377A: “Any male person who, in public or 
private, commits, or abets the commission of, or procures or attempts to procure the commission by 
any male person of, any act of gross indecency with another male person, shall be punished with 
imprisonment for a term which may extend to 2 years.” 
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construe vague terms and provisions by drawing implications from the text and 
structure of the constitution, as well as from fundamental common law rules and 
principles. It concludes with some thoughts about the limits of constitutional 
implication and what courts should do about this. 
The foregoing assists judges to decide the scope of terms and provisions, but 
once it is determined that a particular factual scenario is within scope, the rules do 
not indicate whether the court should find that the applicant’s rights have been 
legitimately restricted. A different form of analysis is required, since there are few 
fundamental liberties that are absolute. Part III thus proposes that after an activity 
that a litigant claims he has a constitutional right to engage in is found to fall 
plausibly within the scope of the right, the court must go on to consider if the 
government has presented sufficient public interest reasons showing that limitations 
on the right are reasonable and proportional. 
I. THE PRESUMPTION IN FAVOUR OF GENEROSITY RE-EXAMINED 
Constitutions and bills of rights differ qualitatively from ordinary statutes. Speaking 
in the House of Representatives on the bill that would eventually become the 
Judiciary Act 19038 and create the High Court of Australia, Alfred Deakin (later 
Prime Minister of Australia) said: 
[The] Constitution was drawn, and inevitably so, on large and simple lines, 
and its provisions were embodied in general language, because it was felt to 
be an instrument not to be lightly altered, and indeed incapable of being 
readily altered; and, at the same time, was designed to remain in force for 
more years than any of us can foretell, and to apply under circumstances 
probably differing most widely from the expectations now cherished by any of 
                                                   
8  Act No 6 of 1903 (Cth). 
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us. Consequently, drawn as it of necessity was on simple and large lines, it 
opens an immense field for exact definition and interpretation.9
Indicating that it was desirable to view the Constitution’s grant of powers to 
the Australian Commonwealth liberally, O’Connor J, in Jumbunna Coal Mine NL v 
Victorian Coal Miners’ Association,10 stated in similar vein: 
[I]t must always be remembered that we are interpreting a Constitution broad 
and general in its terms, intended to apply to the varying conditions which the 
development of our community must involve. 
For that reason, where the question is whether the Constitution has used an 
expression in the wider or in the narrower sense, the Court should, in my 
opinion, always lean to the broader interpretation unless there is something 
in the context or in the rest of the Constitution to indicate that the narrower 
interpretation will best carry out its object and purpose.11
These quotations highlight one ground for the presumption in favour of 
generosity: constitutions and bills of rights (particularly those embedded within 
constitutions) are designed to be relevant to changing views and circumstances. 
Therefore, courts should not shrink the scope of such texts through narrow, legalistic 
interpretations. Thus, the High Court of Australia has stated that the Australian 
Constitution should not be given a “narrow or pedantic interpretation”,12 but should 
be construed “with all the generality which the words used admit”.13
The same conclusion can be derived from the fact that a bill of rights has a 
special status because it secures individuals’ fundamental liberties, the protection of 
                                                   
9  Australia, House of Representatives, Parliamentary Debates (18 March 1902) at 10965, cited 
in Singh v Commonwealth (2004) 222 CLR 322 at [16], HC (Aust). 
10  (1908) 6 CLR 309. 
11  Id at 367–368, cited in Eastman v R (2000) 203 CLR 1 at 42–43, [135] per McHugh J. See 
also Victoria v The Commonwealth (1971) 122 CLR 353 at 396–397 per Windeyer J, cited in Eastman, 
id at 43, [136]: “[T]he Constitution is not an ordinary Statute: it is a fundamental law. In any country 
where the spirit of the common law holds sway the enunciation by courts of constitutional principles 
based on the interpretation of a written constitution may vary and develop in response to changing 
circumstances.” 
12  Singh v Commonwealth, above, n 9 at [53] per McHugh J, citing Australian National 
Airways Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth (1945) 71 CLR 29 at 85. 
13  Singh v Commonwealth, id at [155] per Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ, citing R v Public 
Vehicles Licensing Appeal Tribunal (Tas), ex parte Australian National Airways Pty Ltd (1964) 113 
CLR 207 at 225. 
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which are generally regarded as central to legal systems on the Westminster model. 
This principle was given expression in Ong Ah Chuan v Public Prosecutor,14 the 
Privy Council noting that the fundamental liberties in the Singapore Constitution 
should be given “a generous interpretation avoiding what has been called ‘the 
austerity of tabulated legalism,’15 suitable to give to individuals the full measure of 
the [fundamental liberties] referred to”.16 In the Canadian Supreme Court decision  
Canadian National Railway Co v Canada (Human Rights Commission),17 Dickson 
CJ said: 
I recognize that in the construction of [human rights] legislation the words of 
the Act must be given their plain meaning, but it is equally important that the 
rights enunciated be given their full recognition and effect. We should not 
search for ways and means to minimize those rights and to enfeeble their 
proper impact.18
The presumption in favour of generosity may be regarded as a special 
application of the presumption against the abrogation of rights which applies to 
legislation generally. Under the latter presumption, courts will not assume that the 
legislature intends to curtail fundamental freedoms unless it has clearly and 
unambiguously expressed its intention to do so.19 Francis Bennion subsumes the 
                                                   
14  [1981] AC 648, [1979–1980] SLR(R) 710, PC (on appeal from S’pore). 
15  The words in quotation marks, left unattributed by Lord Wilberforce in Minister of Home 
Affairs v Fisher [1980] AC 319 at 328, PC (on appeal from Bermuda), appear to be those of Stanley A 
de Smith, The New Commonwealth and its Constitutions (London: Stevens & Sons, 1964) at 194: see 
Paul Rishworth et al, The New Zealand Bill of Rights (South Melbourne, Vic; New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 2003) at 43, n 109. 
16  Ong Ah Chuan, above, n 14, [1981] AC at 670, [1979–1980] SLR(R) at 721, [23], citing 
Minister of Home Affairs v Fisher, id. See also Attorney-General of the Gambia v Momodou Jobe 
[1984] AC 689 at 700, PC (on appeal from the Gambia) (“A constitution, and in particular that part of 
it which protects and entrenches fundamental rights and freedoms to which all persons in the state 
are to be entitled, is to be given a generous and purposive construction.”), which was applied in 
Vasquez v R [1994] 1 WLR 1304 at 1313, PC (on appeal from Belize). 
17  [1987] 1 SCR 1114. 
18  Id at 1134. See also Canadian Odeon Theatres Ltd v Saskatchewan Human Rights 
Commission and Huck [1985] 3 WWR 717 at 735, CA (Sask, Can) (“[A] statute which guarantees 
fundamental rights and freedoms and which prohibits discrimination to ensure the obtainment of 
human dignity should be given the widest interpretation possible.”) 
19  Coco v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 427 at 437. See also Sargood Bros v Commonwealth (1910) 
11 CLR 258 at 279, HC (Aust) (“It is a well recognised rule in the interpretation of Statutes that an Act 
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presumption of generosity under the common law principle against doubtful 
penalization, under which a person should not be penalized unless the law is clear.20 
It is submitted that both the presumptions rest on the centrality of fundamental 
liberties to individual contentment and fulfilment within society as well as to 
democracy and the rule of law, the truth of which all branches of government are 
assumed to accept. 21  Should Parliament wish to depart from this shared 
understanding and, say, hedge a fundamental right with exceptions or make it 
inapplicable in certain situations, it must say so expressly in the statute. The process 
of inserting into the bill of rights the words needed to effectuate this intention has 
the potential to trigger political discussion on the matter both within and without the 
debating chamber – “what these presumptions ensure is that a law that appears to 
transgress our basic political understandings should be clearly expressed so as to 
                                                                                                                                                              
will never be construed as taking away an existing right unless its language is reasonably capable of no 
other construction.”); Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (1977) 143 CLR 499 
at 509, citing Allen v Thorn Electric Industries Ltd [1968] 1 QB 487 at 505 (“[A] construction of a 
statute which interferes with the legal rights of the subject to a lesser extent and produces the less 
hardship is to be preferred to another, having the opposite effect.”): see D C Pearce & R S Geddes, 
Statutory Interpretation in Australia (4th ed) (Sydney: Butterworths, 1996) at 129, para 5.1, and at 
145, [5.22]. The same position pertains in Canada and the United Kingdom: see, eg, Morguard 
Properties Ltd v City of Winnipeg (1983) 3 DLR (4th) 1 at 13, SC (Can) (“[T]he courts require that, in 
order to adversely affect a citizen’s right, … the Legislature must do so expressly. … The resources at 
hand in the preparation and enactment of legislation are such that a court must be slow to presume 
oversight or inarticulate intentions when the rights of the citizen are involved.”); and Wheeler v 
Leicester City Council [1985] AC 1054 at 1065, HL (“I do not consider that general words in an act of 
Parliament can be taken as authorising interference with these basic immunities which are the 
foundation of our freedom. Parliament (being sovereign) can legislate so as to do so; but it cannot be 
taken to have conferred such a right on others save by express words.”) 
20  F[rancis] A[lan] R[oscoe] Bennion, Statutory Interpretation: A Code (5th ed) (London: 
LexisNexis, 2008) at 825, s 271; and 827, Example 271.1 (“It is because of the principle against 
doubtful penalisation that the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council [in Momodou Jobe, above, n 
16] has advised that human rights provisions in constitutions should be construed in favour of the 
subject.”). At 826, Bennion expresses the view that the principle is an application to statutory 
interpretation of “the just principle that a person is not to be put in peril upon an ambiguity” (citing 
Tuck & Sons v Priester (1887) LR 19 QBD 629 at 638, CA, which was applied in R v Z [2005] 2 AC 645 
at 654–655, [16], HL). 
21  “It is considered appropriate for courts to rely on [common law] norms because the values 
and aspirations they embody are derived from the intellectual tradition that has fostered western style 
democracies and economies. … In so far as common law norms reflect the shared values and 
aspirations of this tradition, they may be relied on by the legislature in devising legislation and by the 
courts in interpreting and applying it.”: Ruth Sullivan, Driedger on the Construction of Statutes (3rd 
ed) (Toronto: Butterworths, 1994) at 318. 
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invite the debate which is the lifeblood of Parliamentary democracy”, as La Forest JA 
remarked in R in right of New Brunswick v Estabrooks Pontiac Buick Ltd.22 The 
corollary to the presumptions in favour of generosity and against the abrogation of 
rights is a presumption against exceptions to fundamental freedoms. In Zurich 
Insurance Co v Ontario (Human Rights Commission),23 Sopinka J expressed the 
following opinion: 
Human rights legislation… is often the final refuge of the disadvantaged and 
the disenfranchised. As the last protection of the most vulnerable members of 
society, exceptions to such legislation should be narrowly construed.24
To sum up, the interpretive criterion favouring a generous reading finds 
justification in the raison d’être of a bill of rights in a legal system. If rights are 
construed narrowly, there is a risk that such fundamental liberties will be sidelined, 
thus rendering the bill of rights empty rhetoric. We must not overlook the fact that 
the criterion is only a presumption that may be displaced by the use of clear words in 
the statute. But in their absence, as the Jumbunna Coal Mine decision25 indicates, 
the practical implication of the criterion is that courts should come down in favour of 
expanding rather than contracting rights. In cases where other factors are evenly 
balanced, the presumption in favour of generosity may well prove to be decisive. 
II. TEXTUAL VAGUENESS AND CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 
A. AMBIGUITY AND VAGUENESS 
Since the framers of a constitution or bill of rights have expressed their intent in the 
form of a legally-binding text, a court’s emphasis should be on determining the 
meaning of the text rather than conjecturing about what the framers actually 
                                                   
22  (1982) 44 NBR (2d) 201 at 210–211, CA (New Brunswick, Can). 
23  [1992] 2 SCR 321, SC (Can). 
24  Id at 339. 
25  Above, n 10. 
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believed it to mean. For this reason, it is submitted that moderate originalism is the 
most appropriate interpretive approach for a court to take. This approach focuses on 
the text as the primary source for determining Parliamentary intention, but gives due 
recognition to the need for looking beyond the text when its language is open-
ended.26
Therefore, in the first instance, a judge should pay substantial attention to 
extracting whatever meaning he can from the given text. He or she should strive to 
give a provision its ‘clause meaning’ – the ordinary and conventional meaning that it 
was understood to have when it was enacted. 27  This involves considering the 
semantic meaning of the provision in context, including its purpose. However, this 
approach ceases to be of much assistance where a provision as a whole is vague or 
contains vague terms. For instance, knowing the clause meaning of a provision such 
as Article 12(1) of the Singapore Constitution, which states that “[a]ll persons are… 
entitled to the equal protection of the law”,28 does not get a court very far in deciding 
whether the right to equal protection is infringed by a statute that prohibits Muslim 
women from wearing the niqāb or full face veil when accessing public services.29
Vagueness should be distinguished from ambiguity. A text can be regarded as 
ambiguous if two or more different and specific constructions can be given to it, and 
one cannot dispel its semantic uncertainty by considering the context. On the other 
                                                   
26  Chapter Four, Pt I.B. 
27  Solum, above, n 2 at 51. See Chapter Five, Pt II.A.2 at 204–205. 
28  Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1999 Reprint), Art 12(1). 
29  See, for example, Lizzy Davies, “French Cross-party Committee to Recommend Partial Ban on 
Full Veil: Report Given to Parliament Dismisses Outright Ban in Favour of Barring Anyone Using 
Public Services who Refuses to Uncover Face”, The Guardian (25 January 2010) <http://www. 
guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jan/25/france-report-veil-burka-ban> (accessed 9 April 2010, archived 
at <http://www.webcitation.org/5oqF7VoXU>); Michael White, “France, Don’t Ban the Niqab: You 
Need a Much Better Reason than Personal Discomfort to Outlaw Something in a Free Society”, The 
Guardian (1 February 2010) <http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/blog/2010/feb/ 01/france-dont-
ban-niqab-michael-white> (accessed 9 April 2010, archived at <http://www.webcitation.org/ 
5oqEsrwXW>). 
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hand, a provision is vague when the language used is so broad that it is capable of a 
range of meanings, some of which may be mutually inconsistent.30 While ambiguity 
is the product of the drafter’s inadvertence, vagueness is frequently intentional31 – in 
Re Wakim, ex parte McNally,32 McHugh J observed that many words and phrases of 
the Australian Constitution “are expressed at such a level of generality that the most 
sensible conclusion to be drawn from their use in a Constitution is that the makers of 
the Constitution intended that they should apply to whatever facts and circumstances 
succeeding generations thought they covered”.33 The provisions of bills of rights are 
often vague because they embody abstract concepts.34
B. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 
A challenge commonly faced by judges in constitutional cases is the meaning and 
scope that should be accorded to vague terms and provisions. A related issue is what 
a court should do when the text contains no specific provisions that are directly on 
point. This is when it may become necessary to engage in constitutional construction 
by drawing reasonable implications from the text and structure of the constitution 
and, it is submitted, from fundamental common law rules and principles. The 
publicly accessible meaning of a constitutional text may include matters that are to 
                                                   
30  Randal N Graham, “A Unified Theory of Statutory Interpretation” (2002) 23(2) Stat L Rev 91 
at 118, citing Reed Dickerson, “The Diseases of Legislative Language” (1964) 1 Harv J Leg 10. See also 
Solum, above, n 2 at 69–72. 
31  Graham, id at 121–124. 
32  (1999) 198 CLR 511, HC (Aust). 
33  Id at 552, [44]. See also Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes (5th ed) 
(Markham, Ont: LexisNexis Canada, 2008) at 502–503: “A text that is written in general or abstract 
language invites an organic approach… In so far as an ‘organic’ approach consists of adapting 
legislation to evolving conceptions of society and its basic values, it is a normal and appropriate part of 
interpretation. Courts are bound to respect the meaning of words used by the legislature, but given the 
plastic character of language, especially the general language typically found in human rights codes, 
this constraint does not prevent the courts from taking a flexible and adaptive approach.” 
34  Chapter Five, Pt II.A.2(1)(b). 
268 • Chapter Six 
be implied rather than read on the printed page.35 There is nothing unusual about 
this. Judges make constitutional implications as a matter of course when fulfilling 
their responsibility of determining the meaning of constitutional terms and 
provisions. Implications are justifiable because the framers of the constitution would 
have expected its readers and interpreters to construe the text against a backdrop of 
language usage, historical circumstances, and existing statutory and common law 
rules and principles. It would have been impossible – or at least highly impractical –  
for the framers to have, for example, attempted to foresee and write into the text all 
the linguistic and legal rules and principles that courts might have need to rely upon 
when interpreting the text. Furthermore, the framers would have regarded this a 
pointless task, assuming that such matters were obvious to judges. The accuracy of 
the assumption recedes as times passes, but does not change the fact that when 
construing the constitutional text a judge should consider what rules and principles 
were reasonably applicable to the text at the time it came into force, and apply them 
to draw proper implications from the text. In M’Culloch v Maryland,36 Chief Justice 
John Marshall gave an example of how implications may be made. Article I, section 
8, clause 7, of the Constitution of the United States provides: “The Congress shall 
have Power… To establish Post Offices and post Roads”. Marshall CJ said: 
This power is executed by the single act of making the establishment. But 
from this has been inferred the power and duty of carrying the mail along the 
post road from one post office to another. And from this implied power has 
again been inferred the right to punish those who steal letters from the post 
office, or rob the mail.37
Rather than try to anticipate all the powers required by Congress to establish a postal 
system, the framers of the US Constitution took the view that it was only necessary to 
                                                   
35  Solum, above, n 2 at 56. 
36  17 US 316 (1819), SC (US), cited in Solum, id at 56–57. 
37  McCulloch, id at 417. 
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authorize the establishment of post offices and post roads, trusting that this was clear 
enough to empower the legislature to do all things incidental as well. 
1. Implications from Text and Structure 
When determining what implications are appropriately drawn from the text, a court 
must of course take into account all relevant factors, including the provision in 
question and related provisions; other parts of the constitution (including, where 
appropriate, the history of its enactment); and statute law and the common law. The 
first and second categories of factors are arguably applications to the constitutional 
realm of the well established principle that a provision must be construed in the light 
of the statute in which it is found.38 Consideration should be given to the relation 
between the provision in question and other provisions of the constitution39 and, 
indeed, provisions in statutes with related subject-matter. Article II, section 1, of the 
US Constitution states in part that “No Person except a natural born Citizen… shall 
be eligible to the Office of President”. In the context of Article II, the Constitution as 
a whole and the circumstances of its drafting and adoption,40 and the common law of 
                                                   
38  “The broad general rule for the construction of statutes is that a section or enactment must be 
construed as a whole, each portion throwing light, if need be, on the rest”: Greenshield v The Queen 
[1958] SCR 216 at 225, SC (Can), cited in Sullivan, above, n 33 at 359; see also Bennion, above, n 20 at 
1155–1156, s 355. 
39  “[T]he question whether s 122 [of the Australian Constitution] is subject to the freedom of 
political communication… is one that must be answered by ascertaining the meaning and operation of 
that provision in its constitutional setting. In particular, its meaning and operation must be 
ascertained by having regard to the Constitution as a whole.”: Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 
CLR 1 at 118 per Gaudron J. 
40  It has been suggested that the clause was derived from Art IX, s 1, of a plan of government 
submitted on 18 June 1787 by Alexander Hamilton to the Philadelphia Convention: “No person shall 
be eligible to the office of President of the United States unless he be now a Citizen of one of the 
States, or hereafter be born a Citizen of the United States.”; see Jill A Pryor, “The Natural-born Citizen 
Clause and Presidential Eligibility: An Approach for Resolving Two Hundred Years of Uncertainty” 
(1988) 97 Yale LJ 881 at 889. The clause may also have come from a letter of 25 July 1787 sent by 
John Jay to George Washington, the presiding officer of the Convention: “Permit me to hint whether it 
would not be wise and seasonable to provide a strong check to the admission of Foreigners into the 
administration of our national Government, and to declare expressly that the Command in Chief of 
the American army shall not be given to nor devolve on, any but a natural born Citizen.”; see William 
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England,41 it is highly implausible that the term natural born refers to birth by 
means of an ordinary delivery as opposed to a Caesarean delivery. Rather, the factors 
point to the implication that the term refers to some birth-related legal doctrine 
determining citizenship such as jus soli or jus sanguinis.42
Implications from the text and structure of the Australian Constitution have 
enabled Australian courts to infer the existence of certain implied freedoms and 
rights in the Constitution, despite the charter lacking a comprehensive bill of rights 
(or, perhaps, for this very reason).43 The High Court clarified in Lange v Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation 44  that a “freedom of communication on matters of 
government and politics” can be inferred from the form of “representative and 
responsible government” that is indicated by various constitutional provisions 
requiring members of the Senate and House of Representatives to be chosen by the 
people of the States and the Commonwealth respectively by way of periodic direct 
elections.45 The Court emphasized that the since the freedom is an implication from 
sections of the Constitution, the implication validly extends only so far as is 
necessary to give effect to those sections. “Under the Constitution, the relevant 
                                                                                                                                                              
Jay, The Life of John Jay: With Selections from his Correspondence and Miscellaneous Papers (New 
York, NY: J & J Harper, 1833), vol II, at 194; Michael Nelson, “Who Vies for President?” in Alexander 
Heard & Michael Nelson (eds), Presidential Selection (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1987), 
120 at 122–123. 
41  When interpreting the 14th Amdt, s 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they 
reside. …”, the US Supreme Court referred to English common law in the cases of Minor v Happersett 
88 US 162 at 167–168 (1874) and United States v Wong Kim Ark 169 US 649 at 658 (1898) after 
noting that the Constitution was silent on the indicia for a citizen or natural born citizen. The 
Supreme Court has not yet ruled directly on the meaning of natural born Citizen in Art II, s 1. 
42  The example is from Solum, above, n 2 at 55–56, who treats natural born Citizen as a term of 
art. 
43  Scattered throughout the Australian Constitution are a limited number of ‘express rights’ such 
as the requirement for a jury trial when a Commonwealth offence is tried on indictment (s 80), and 
the prohibition against the Commonwealth establishing a religion or prohibiting the free exercise of 
religion (s 116): Adrienne Stone, “Australia’s Constitutional Rights and the Problem of Interpretive 
Disagreement” (2005) 27 Syd L Rev 29 at 31–32. 
44  (1997) 189 CLR 520. 
45  Id at 557–562. 
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question is not, ‘What is required by representative and responsible government?’ It 
is, ‘What do the terms and structure of the Constitution prohibit, authorise or 
require?’”46 Individual judges of the Court have accepted the existence of implied 
freedoms of association and movement,47 and of an implied right to legal equality,48 
though the latter has been expressly rejected by a majority of the Court.49
A number of conclusions on the process of drawing implications from the text 
and structure of a constitution may be reached from an examination of the 
Australian and Privy Council cases referred to above. First, while such implications 
must by definition be ultimately grounded in the constitutional text, they may be 
indirect. In other words, it is acceptable to draw implications from other 
implications, so long as they can eventually be traced back to the text. In Kruger v 
Commonwealth,50 Justice Mary Gaudron noted it was accepted that the Constitution 
required freedom of political communication between citizens and their elected 
representatives, and between citizen and citizen. From this, she concluded that 
“[f]reedom of political communication depends on human contact and entails at least 
                                                   
46  Id at 567. 
47  Kruger, above, n 39 at 91–92 per Toohey J, 115–121 per Gaudron J, and 142 per McHugh J 
(two judges left the point undecided but held that there was no textual or structural foundation in the 
Constitution to demonstrate that the Commonwealth Parliament’s power under s 122 to legislate for 
territories was limited by the freedoms: at 45 per Brennan CJ, and at 69–70 per Dawson J). The 
implied freedom of association was confirmed to exist in Mulholland v Australian Electoral 
Commission (2004) 220 CLR 181 at 225–226, [113]–[116] per McHugh J, at 234, [148] per Gummow 
and Hayne JJ (Heydon J concurring), and at 277–278, [284]–[286] per Kirby J. 
48  Kruger, id at 94–97 per Toohey J, following the minority opinion of Deane J and himself in 
Leeth v Commonwealth (1991) 174 CLR 455 at 485–490. 
49  Kruger, id at 44–45 per Brennan CJ, at 63–68 per Dawson J (McHugh J concurring at 142), 
and at 153–155 per Gummow J. Gaudron J, at 112–114, expressed the view that there is a limited 
constitutional guarantee of equality before the courts, but no general immunity from discriminatory 
laws. 
50  Id. 
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a significant measure of freedom to associate with others. And freedom of association 
necessarily entails freedom of movement.”51
Secondly, an implication cannot be made in the face of inconsistent 
provisions. It is primarily for this reason that the existence of an implied right to 
legal equality in the Australian Constitution has not been accepted by most judges of 
the High Court. Justice Daryl Dawson commented in Kruger that the Constitution 
was inconsistent with such a doctrine in many respects. The Commonwealth 
Parliament, for instance, is empowered by sections 51(xix) and 51(xxvi)52 respectively 
to enact laws discriminating in favour of or against aliens, and benefiting or 
discriminating against the people of any race. In addition, where the Constitution 
requires equality, it specifically prohibits discrimination, preference or lack of 
uniformity.53 Another case in point is the decision of the European Court of Human 
Rights in Pretty v United Kingdom. 54  The applicant, who suffered from motor 
neurone disease, submitted that the refusal by the Director of Public Prosecutions to 
give an undertaking not to prosecute her husband for assisting her to commit suicide 
infringed, inter alia, her right to life under Article 2(1) of the European Convention 
                                                   
51  Id at 115; see also 91 per Toohey J (“While the freedom [of association] has many facets, it is 
an essential ingredient of political communication”) and 142 per McHugh J (“The reasons that led to 
the drawing of the implication of freedom of communication lead me to the conclusion that the 
Constitution also necessarily implies that ‘the people’ must be free from laws that prevent them from 
associating with other persons, and from travelling, inside and outside Australia for the purposes of 
the constitutionally prescribed system of government and referendum procedure”). 
52  Australian Constitution, ss 51(xix) and 51(xxvi): “The Parliament shall, subject to this 
Constitution, have power to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the 
Commonwealth with respect to… naturalization and aliens [s 51(xix)]; [and] the people of any race for 
whom it is deemed necessary to make special laws [s 51(xxvi)]”. As regards the particular 
interpretation of s 51(xxvi) mentioned by Dawson J, see Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 
1 at 273, HC (Aust) (the Tasmanian Dam Case); and Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen (1982) 153 CLR 168 
at 186, 209, 244 and 261, HC (Aust). 
53  Kruger, above, n 39 at 64–65. 
54  (2002) 35 EHRR 1. 
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on Human Rights. 55  She argued that the Article protected her right to choose 
whether or not to go on living and thus, as a corollary, protected her right to die to 
avoid inevitable suffering and indignity. 56  The Court considered the wording of 
Article 2(1), pointing out that it was phrased differently from Article 11(1) which 
guaranteed the “right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association 
with others”. Thus, while the freedom of association involved a corresponding right 
not to be compelled to join an association because “the notion of a freedom implies 
some measure of choice as to its exercise”, Article 2(1) was silent about the quality of 
a person’s life or what a person chose to do with his or her life. It could not, without 
distorting the language, be interpreted as conferring a right to die – “the 
diametrically opposite right” – or a right to choose death instead of life.57
Similarly, it would be improper for the right not to be deprived of property 
without adequate compensation to be implied from the Singapore Constitution. 
When Singapore gained independence from Malaysia in 1965, the legislature, 
requiring a working constitution at short notice, enacted the Republic of Singapore 
Independence Act 196558 to provide for the continuance in force of the Federal 
Constitution of Malaysia, including the fundamental liberties therein, subject to 
certain exceptions.59 One of the excepted provisions was Article 1360 which protected 
                                                   
55  The European Convention, Art 2(1), states in part: “Everyone’s right to life shall be protected 
by law.” 
56  Pretty, above, n 54 at 27. 
57  Id at 29. 
58  No 9 of 1965 (1985 Rev Ed). 
59  The Republic of Singapore Independence Act, s 6(1), states: “The provisions of the 
Constitution of Malaysia, other than those set out in subsection (3), shall continue in force in 
Singapore subject to such modifications, adaptations and qualifications and exceptions as may be 
necessary to bring them into conformity with the independent status of Singapore upon separation 
from Malaysia.” 
60  The Malaysian Constitution, Arts 13(1) and (2), state: “No person shall be deprived of 
property save in accordance with law” and “[n]o law shall provide for the compulsory acquisition or 
use of property without adequate compensation”. 
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the right to property. 61  In view of this legislative history demonstrating a clear 
Parliamentary intention not to adopt a right to property,62 any judicial attempt to 
infer one from the text or structure of the Constitution would be inappropriate. 
Thirdly, a distinction has been made between implications made from the text 
of a constitution and from its structure. In Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v 
Commonwealth,63 it was said: “In cases where the implication is sought to be derived 
from the actual terms of the Constitution it may be sufficient that the relevant 
intention is manifested according to the accepted principles of interpretation. 
However, where the implication is structural rather than textual it is no doubt correct 
to say that the term sought to be implied must be logically or practically necessary for 
                                                   
61  By the Republic of Singapore Independence Act, above, n 58, s 6(3). In Parliament when the 
enactment of this statute was being debated together with a constitutional amendment, the Prime 
Minister Lee Kuan Yew explained: “Clause 13 – we have specifically set out to exclude. … [O]nce we 
spell out that no law shall provide for the compulsory acquisition or use of property without adequate 
compensation, we open the door for litigation and ultimately for adjudication by the Court on what is 
or is not adequate compensation. Last year… we moved a Bill to change the law regarding the 
acquisition of land in which we laid down that where land was compulsorily acquired for public 
purpose, no compensation shall be payable to the owner for any appreciation in value of the land 
which has been brought about by development expenditure of the Government. … [O]ur Land 
Acquisition Bill… went to Select Committee and was allowed to lapse because of the doubt as to 
whether or not it could be said to be in compliance with Article 13… Now the jurisdiction again reverts 
to this House and it is our intention that the Land Acquisition Bill shall be proceeded with and Article 
13 excluded.” Lee Kuan Yew, speech during the Second Reading of the Constitution (Amendment) Bill, 
Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (22 December 1965), vol 24, cols 435–436. 
62  Developments after 1965 on the matter are, it is submitted, less clear. In 1966 a Constitutional 
Commission was appointed by the Government to examine how the rights of racial, linguistic and 
religious minorities could be adequately safeguarded in the Constitution. In its report (Report of the 
Constitutional Commission, 1966 (Chairman: Wee Chong Jin) (Singapore: Government Printer, 
1966)), the Commission recommended that a provision along the lines of Article 13 be reintroduced 
into the Constitution, with clause (2) of the Article reworded thus: “No law shall provide for the 
compulsory acquisition or use of property except for a public purpose or a purpose useful or 
beneficial to the public and except upon just terms.” The Government initially agreed to such a 
provision in principle, and only objected to the words “and except upon just terms” at the end of 
clause (2): E[dmund] W[illiam] Barker (Minister for Law and National Development), “Constitutional 
Commission Report (Statement by the Minister for Law and National Development)”, Singapore 
Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (21 December 1966), vol 25, cols 1053–1054. However, the 
provision was eventually dropped without explanation from the Constitution (Amendment) Bill 1969 
(No B 5/1969) which amended the Constitution in 1969. No mention was made of the provision 
during Parliamentary debates on the bill: Second Reading of the Constitution (Amendment) Bill, 
Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (12 June 1969), vol 29, cols 60–74; Third Reading 
of the Constitution (Amendment) Bill, Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (23 
December 1969), vol 29, cols 276–284. 
63  (1992) 177 CLR 106, HC (Aust). 
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the preservation of the integrity of that structure.” 64  It is submitted that when 
‘structure’ is spoken of in this context, what is meant are the fundamental 
institutions and fundamental common law principles that collectively undergird the 
constitutional system, such as the concept of representative democracy or the 
doctrine of the separation of powers. Such elements of the system are seldom 
explicitly mentioned in the constitutional text, but may be inferred from express 
provisions, as was done in Lange. A more stringent standard is arguably necessary 
for implications from structure because the text does not act as much of a constraint 
on the courts’ discretion. 
On the other hand, the fact that the text provides minimal guidance means 
that once implications have been drawn, it is inevitable that judges will need to look 
to principles external to the constitutional text and structure to flesh out the 
consequences of implications in particular cases. It has been pointed out that 
following the identification of a freedom of political communication in the Australian 
Constitution, the High Court has had to determine what standard of review to apply 
to it. Some cases have applied a proportionality analysis, while others a two-tiered 
review approach.65 However, it is difficult for the Court to decide which approach is 
more appropriate by scrutinizing the constitutional text alone as it provides few 
insights. Some reference to values underlying the freedom of political 
communication is necessary in this regard.66 This point is taken up again below. 
                                                   
64  Id at 135 per Mason CJ, cited in McGinty v Western Australia (1996) 186 CLR 140 at 168–
169, HC (Aust); and Kruger, above, n 39 at 152. 
65  Adrienne Stone, “The Limits of Constitutional Text and Structure: Standards of Review and 
the Freedom of Political Communication” (1999) 23 Melb U L Rev 668 at 675–681. 
66  Id at 698. 
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2. Implications from Common Law Rules and Principles 
One source of extratextual principles that courts might wish to look to is the 
repository of accumulated knowledge we call the common law. When the term is 
used without a qualifier, what is generally meant is the English common law. 
However, where Westminster-style jurisdictions are concerned, references to the 
common law should be taken to refer to the English common law insofar as it 
continues to apply in the jurisdiction, as well as the jurisdiction’s own developing 
body of judge-made law. Key questions arising are whether referring to common law 
principles is appropriate when there exists a written constitution, and whether such 
principles can be regarded as so fundamental in nature that they can override 
statutes. 
In a legal system possessing a written constitution, it is submitted that at least 
three – and possibly more – types of legal rules and principles (which can be 
collectively referred to as ‘legal criteria’) exist in a hierarchy, the criteria higher in the 
hierarchy overriding inconsistent ones that are lower down. At the bottom are 
ordinary common law rules and principles, such as those making up the law of 
contract and tort. Rules set out in statutes are superior to these. At, or perhaps near, 
the top – the reasons for the qualifying words will be explained shortly – are legal 
criteria that have been embodied in the constitution. Many constitutions will have a 
supremacy clause specifically declaring that the provisions of the constitution are 
supreme law,67 though such a clause is arguably redundant since by its nature a 
                                                   
67  For example, the Singapore Constitution, Art 4: “This Constitution is the supreme law of the 
Republic of Singapore and any law enacted by the Legislature after the commencement of this 
Constitution which is inconsistent with this Constitution shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be 
void.” 
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written constitution is superior and logically prior to other legal criteria. As the US 
Supreme Court noted in the 19th century in Marbury v Madison:68
The constitution is either a superior, paramount law, unchangeable by 
ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and like other 
acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it. 
If the former part of the alternative be true, then a legislative act contrary to 
the constitution is not law: if the latter part be true, then written constitutions 
are absurd attempts, on the part of the people, to limit a power, in its own 
nature illimitable. 
Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them 
as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and 
consequently the theory of every such government must be, that an act of the 
legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void.69
Thus far, what has been said is uncontroversial. However, as mentioned, an 
important question arising is whether there exist common law legal criteria that are 
identified by the courts as so basic and crucial as to be capable of overriding 
inconsistent statutes. If so, such criteria might prove to be helpful in the construction 
of constitutional provisions. The existence of such criteria raises the issue of where in 
the hierarchy of legal criteria they lie. Are there criteria superior to ordinary legal 
rules and principles, but must yield to incompatible statutory and constitutional 
criteria (I will call these ‘important common law criteria’); and even criteria that 
restrict even the ability of Parliament to amend statutes and the constitution 
(‘fundamental common law criteria’)? For present purposes it is only necessary to 
establish the existence of important common law criteria and what courts may do 
with them, but some preliminary thoughts on fundamental common law criteria will 
be given as well. 
The relationship between the common law, statute law and written 
constitutions has been considered in the academic debate concerning the ‘common 
                                                   
68  5 US (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), SC (US). 
69  Id at 177. 
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law constitution’, the idea that the content of written constitutions is at least partly if 
not entirely determined by unwritten common law principles.70 Stripped to its core, 
the problem is one of identifying the branch (or branches) of government authorized 
to declare what the foundational principles of the legal system are. There seem to be 
two opposing choices. The first is to regard the constitution’s framers and those 
authorized by its terms to alter the text later on – generally the political branches of 
government (with or without the participation of the electorate, but certainly with 
the exclusion of the judiciary) – as the sole institutions authorized to lay down 
fundamental principles of constitutional law. The courts’ role is simply to apply the 
provisions enacted in the text. 
The second choice is to perceive a written constitution as a specific 
manifestation of general principles pre-existing in the common law. Trevor Allan, for 
instance, takes the view that fundamental freedoms such as those relating to 
property, religion, speech, thought and conscience, precede and therefore restrict 
governmental power: 
[L]iberty rights are absolute constraints on government’s pursuit of the 
common good. … [A]ll legitimate authority bows to these rights, suitably 
characterised, by acknowledging the constraints they necessarily impose on 
the enactment and execution of positive law. … If measures that contravene 
the fundamental freedoms are invalid, as violations of the common will, they 
cannot impose obligations binding in Law; and it must be open to a court (or 
indeed any citizen or subject) to draw that conclusion in a particular case.71
Thus, a court’s power to enforce the rule of law is not derived from a written 
constitution but from the common law: “Although the familiar codes of rights of 
modern constitutions strengthen the judicial enforcement of the rule of law, they do 
                                                   
70  Jeffrey Goldsworthy, “Unwritten Constitutional Principles” in Grant Huscroft (ed), 
Expounding the Constitution: Essays in Constitutional Theory (Cambridge; New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008), 277 at 279. 
71  T[revor] R S Allan, “In Defence of the Common Law Constitution: Unwritten Rights as 
Fundamental Law” (2009) 22 Can J L & Juris 187 at 191–192, also available as LSE Law, Society and 
Economy Working Papers 5/2009 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1331375> (accessed 9 July 2010). 
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not in themselves delineate the content of Law… [T]he principles are prior to, and 
independent of, the enacted formulas in which they are contingently expressed. In 
essence, the written constitutions of liberal democracy summarise the progressive 
development of the common law.”72 Mark Walters describes the interaction between 
the specific propositions in a written constitution and the general common law 
principles they presuppose as an “interpretive oscillation”. While the political 
branches of government may enact specific constitutional rules, the judiciary plays a 
key role in determining through “inductive ascent” what are the fundamental general 
principles upon which the particular textual manifestations of these principles are 
grounded, and then, where required, engineering “a descent back to the level of 
specifics” by articulating new rules or rights that are consistent with the existing 
specific provisions and general principles.73
It is submitted that the connection between a written constitution and the 
common law posited by the second option is generally preferable to the first, that is, 
a written constitution is better seen as embodying specific manifestations of general 
principles pre-existing in the common law, rather than pure statutory principles 
unconnected with the common law that have been imposed by the constitution’s 
framers. The second option acknowledges that due to the highly abstract nature of 
constitutional texts, ascertaining their meaning is significantly different from dealing 
with ordinary statutes. Saying that all which is required of a judge is to ‘apply’ the 
enacted text is too glib. The expansive character of the text necessitates the judge 
seeking guidance from sources external to the text, including the common law. 
Indeed, as indicated previously, the adoption of vague terminology is appropriately 
                                                   
72  Id at 202. 
73  Mark D Walters, “Written Constitutions and Unwritten Constitutionalism” in Huscroft (ed), 
Expounding the Constitution, above, n 70, 245 at 253–254. 
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seen as a direction from the text’s framers that the courts should develop the 
meaning of the text over time in the course of applying it to various factual 
scenarios.74
Furthermore, the second option is consistent with the principle noted by Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte 
Pierson that “Parliament does not legislate in a vacuum: statutes are drafted on the 
basis that the ordinary rules and principles of the common law will apply to the 
express statutory provisions”. 75  Though these remarks were made in respect of 
ordinary legislation, their transposition to constitutional texts should not be in doubt 
as such texts are also drafted and enacted against a backdrop of pre-existing 
statutory and common law rules and principles. Most of these will not be explicitly 
set out in the written constitution, the natural assumption being that it is 
unnecessary to do so since it is understood they continue to apply if consistent with 
the wording of the constitution as seen in the context of its adoption. A majority of 
the High Court of Australia held in Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide 
Steamship Co Ltd:76 “The one clear line of judicial inquiry as to the meaning of the 
Constitution must be to read it naturally in the light of the circumstances in which it 
was made, with knowledge of the combined fabric of the common law, and the 
statute law which preceded it, and then lucet ipsa per se.” 77  The choice of 
                                                   
74  See the text accompanying nn 31–33 above. 
75  [1998] AC 539 at 573, HL. 
76  (1920) 28 CLR 129, HC (Aust). 
77  Id at 152, per Knox CJ, Isaacs, Rich and Starke JJ, cited in Attorney-General (Cth); Ex rel 
McKinlay v The Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 1 at 17, HC (Aust); and in Eastman, above, n 11 at 
47–48, [149]. Lucet ipsa per se means “it shines with a brilliance of its own”, and appears to be a 
quotation from Cicero: “Bene praecipiunt qui vetant quicquam agere quod dubitas aequum sit an 
iniquum; aequitas enim lucet ipsa per se, dubitatio significat cognitionem injuriae.” (It is, therefore, 
an excellent rule that they give who bid us not to do a thing, when there is a doubt whether it be right 
or wrong; for righteousness shines with a brilliance of its own, but doubt is a sign that we are thinking 
of a possible wrong.) Marcus Tullius Cicero; Walter Miller (transl), De Officiis (Loeb Classical Library; 
30) (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1913), bk I, pt 9, at 30. See also Cheatle v The Queen 
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unambiguous contradictory wording must be seen as a reflection of the framers’ 
intent to disapply incompatible legal criteria. 
At this point, it becomes necessary to distinguish between ordinary and what 
we have termed ‘important’ common law rules and principles. It is submitted that 
cases dealing with what are called ‘principles of constitutional law’ in the context of 
the United Kingdom’s unwritten constitution shed light on this issue. The reference 
here to principles of UK constitutional law denotes common law principles of the 
same nature as the ‘constitutional rights’ referred to by Laws LJ in R v Lord 
Chancellor, ex parte Witham.78 In that case, his Lordship noted that in the absence 
of a written constitution that was logically and legally prior to the power of the 
executive, legislature and judiciary, there was no hierarchy of rights in the common 
law in the sense that any right was more entrenched by the law than any other. 
Nonetheless, one could speak of ‘constitutional rights’ in such a system if “the right 
in question cannot be abrogated by the state save by specific provision in an Act of 
Parliament, or by regulations whose vires in main legislation specifically confers the 
power to abrogate. General words will not suffice.” 79 Such rights are “creatures of the 
common law” as they are logically prior to the democratic political process and not a 
consequence of it.80
In ex parte Pierson,81 Lord Steyn cited a passage from Cross on Statutory 
Interpretation82 to the effect that when interpreting a statute, the courts assume that 
                                                                                                                                                              
(1993) 177 CLR 541 at 552, HC (Aust) (“It is well settled that the interpretation of a constitution such 
as ours is necessarily influenced by the fact that its provisions are framed in the language of the 
English common law, and are to be read in the light of the common law’s history”); Theophanous v 
Herald & Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 104 at 141–142, HC (Aust). 
78  [1998] 1 QB 575. 
79  Id at 581. 
80  Id. 
81  Above, n 75. 
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“long-standing principles of constitutional and administrative law” are taken for 
granted by Parliament to be applicable. The courts apply these principles in the form 
of presumptions, such as the presumption that statutory powers must be exercised 
reasonably. What is important is the recognition by the authors of Cross on 
Statutory Interpretation (and hence the court) of the existence of “fundamental 
principles governing both civil liberties and the relations between Parliament, the 
executive and the courts” which “operate at a higher level… as constitutional 
principles which are not easily displaced by a statutory text”.83 It is manifest that 
such constitutional principles are qualitatively different from ordinary common law 
rules. 
This succinctly describes the character of important common law criteria 
which, it is submitted, are functionally equivalent to constitutional principles and 
rights in the United Kingdom. Where a written constitution exists, the appellation 
‘constitutional’ is arguably best reserved for legal criteria either expressly found in 
the text or necessarily implied from it, so we will continue to use the term important 
common law criteria to refer to common law principles and rules existing in a legal 
system with a written constitution that are analogous to UK ‘constitutional law 
principles’. Cases from the United Kingdom suggest that one type of important 
common law criteria are rules and principles protecting human rights, such as 
equality under the law,84 the freedom of speech,85 a right for an offender to be 
                                                                                                                                                              
82  Rupert Cross, John Bell & George Engle, Statutory Interpretation (3rd ed) (London: 
Butterworths, 1995) at 165–166. In ex parte Pierson, id, Lord Steyn noted that the passage was in all 
material aspects the same as what Cross wrote in the first edition of the work: Cross, Statutory 
Interpretation (London: Butterworths, 1976) at 142–143. See also R v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, ex parte Simms at [2000] 2 AC 115 at 130, HL. 
83  Ex parte Pierson, id at 588. 
84  Fitzpatrick v Stirling Housing Association [1998] Ch 304 at 337 per Ward LJ (“… I am 
entitled to presume that Parliament always intends to conform to the rule of law as a constitutional 
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treated fairly when the executive determines the minimum term of imprisonment he 
should serve,86 and a right of access to the courts.87
Rules and principles necessary to provide a framework for the constitutional 
order in the jurisdiction comprise another type of fundamental common law criteria. 
A prime example is the rule of law.88 Another is the doctrine of separation of powers. 
In Liyanage v The Queen89 the Privy Council held that although the Constitution of 
Ceylon did not contain any provision expressly vesting judicial power in the courts, it 
could be inferred that judicial power was not to pass to or be exercisable by the 
executive or legislative branch of government. First, judicial power had lain in the 
hands of the judiciary for more than a century prior to the new Constitution coming 
into force. Secondly, clauses of the Constitution indicated that the political branches 
of government were not to interfere with the judiciary. The Constitution stated that 
judges were to be appointed by a Judicial Service Commission, which legislators were 
barred from being members of; and an attempt to influence any decision of the 
Commission was a criminal offence. Furthermore, judges could not be removed from 
office except by the Governor-General on an address of both the Senate and House of 
                                                                                                                                                              
principle and accordingly to respect the constitutional rights of the individual to enjoy equality under 
the law.”). 
85  Attorney General v Observer Ltd (also known as Attorney General v Guardian Newspapers 
Ltd) [1990] 1 AC 1o9 at 283–284, HL, cited with approval in ex parte Simms, above, n 82 at 125–126  
(a prisoner has a fundamental or basic right to seek through oral interviews to persuade a journalist to 
investigate the safety of his conviction and to publicize the findings in an effort to gain access to justice 
for the prisoner). 
86  Ex parte Pierson, above, n 75; and R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte 
Venables and Thompson [1998] AC 407, HL. 
87  Ex parte Witham, above, n 79. 
88  For example, Fitzpatrick, above, n 84 at 337; see also Reference re Language Rights under 
s 23 of Manitoba Act, 1870 and s 133 of Constitution Act, 1867 [1985] 1 SCR 721 at 748, [63], SC (Can) 
(the rule of law “a fundamental principle of our Constitution”); Reference re Secession of Quebec 
[1998] 2 SCR 217 at 240, [32], SC (Can); and compare the Singapore cases Chng Suan Tze v Minister 
for Home Affairs [1988] 2 SLR(R) 525 at 553, [86], CA (S’pore) and Lim Teng Ee Joyce v Singapore 
Medical Council [2005] 3 SLR(R) 709 at 714, [15], HC, where the principle was referred to but nothing 
expressly said about its fundamental status.
89  [1967] 1 AC 259, PC (on appeal from Ceylon). 
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Representatives.90 The reasoning in Liyanage was applied by the Privy Council to 
the Jamaican Constitution in Hinds v The Queen,91 Lord Diplock stating that the new 
independence constitutions of former British colonies “were evolutionary not 
revolutionary”. Thus, under these constitutions the executive, legislative and judicial 
institutions continued to exercise powers of a character similar to those exercised by 
the corresponding pre-independence institutions they had replaced, and it was to be 
“taken for granted that the basic principle of separation of powers will apply to the 
exercise of their respective functions by these three organs of government”. 92 In both 
Liyanage and Hinds, the Privy Council accepted that the fundamental common law 
principle of separation of judicial power from the powers exercised by the political 
branches of government applied on the facts, with the consequence that legislation 
establishing special courts which effectively deprived the judiciary of aspects of its 
judicial power was invalid. The principle, while not expressly mentioned in either 
constitution, was found to have been intended to apply in view of the provisions 
consistent with it. The two cases also demonstrate that implications drawn from the 
text and structure of a constitution may sometimes, though not inevitably, lead to the 
conclusion that important common law criteria must be applied to give proper 
meaning to the text. 
The Supreme Court of Canada delivered a significant judgment in this regard 
in 1998. In Reference re Secession of Quebec, 93  the Court noted that while 
constitutional texts94 have a primary place in determining constitutional rules, they 
                                                   
90  Id at 286–288. 
91  [1977] AC 195, PC (on appeal from Jamaica). Liyanage’s case was cited id at 213. 
92  Id at 212. 
93  Above, n 88. 
94  Specifically those mentioned in s 52(2) of the Constitution Act 1982 (Sch B to the Canada Act 
1982 (1982 c 11) (UK)). 
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are not exhaustive. The Constitution also “embraces unwritten, as well as written 
rules”.95 It continued: 
These supporting principles and rules, which include constitutional 
conventions and the workings of Parliament, are a necessary part of our 
Constitution because problems or situations may arise which are not 
expressly dealt with by the text of the Constitution. In order to endure over 
time, a constitution must contain a comprehensive set of rules and principles 
which are capable of providing an exhaustive legal framework for our system 
of government. Such principles and rules emerge from an understanding of 
the constitutional text itself, the historical context, and previous judicial 
interpretations of constitutional meaning.96
It was thus acknowledged that where the constitutional text did not by itself provide 
an explicit answer to an issue arising, the courts could look to basic principles and 
rules that the courts could infer as existing based on the text seen in historical 
perspective. Among the “fundamental and organizing principles of the Constitution” 
identified in the Secession of Quebec case were democracy, and constitutionalism 
and the rule of law.97
Given the structural and liberty-protecting character of important common 
law criteria, it is submitted that courts are likely to find them the foundation upon 
which constitutional provisions rest, and thus of assistance in construing the 
meaning of such provisions. In doing so, they effectively elevate the common law 
criteria to the level of constitutional criteria. In this regard, Ong Ah Chuan98 is a 
leading case applicable to Singapore. Article 9(1) of the Constitution, which was 
referred to earlier, prohibits the deprivation of life or personal liberty “save in 
                                                   
95  Provincial Court Judges Association (Manitoba) v Manitoba (Minister of Justice) (sub nom 
Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island) [1997] 3 SCR 
3 at [92], SC (Can). See also New Brunswick Broadcasting Co v Nova Scotia (Speaker of the House of 
Assembly) [1993] 1 SCR 319, SC (Can) (Parliamentary privileges part of the fundamental law of the 
land, and thus constitutional). 
96  Secession of Quebec, above, n 93 at 240, [32]. 
97  Id. The Supreme Court also identified as relevant to the question before it the fundamental 
principles of federalism and respect for minorities (the latter, it is submitted, may be regarded as a 
principle concerning human rights protection). 
98  Above, n 14. 
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accordance with law”; Article 12(1) states: “All persons are equal before the law and 
entitled to the equal protection of the law”. The Privy Council held: 
In a Constitution founded on the Westminster model and particularly in that 
part of it that purports to assure to all individual citizens the continued 
enjoyment of fundamental liberties or rights, references to “law” in such 
contexts as “in accordance with law”, “equality before the law”, “protection of 
the law” and the like…, refer to a system of law which incorporates those 
fundamental rules of natural justice that had formed part and parcel of the 
common law of England that was in operation in Singapore at the 
commencement of the Constitution. It would have been taken for granted by 
the makers of the Constitution that the “law” to which citizens could have 
recourse for the protection of fundamental liberties assured to them by the 
Constitution would be a system of law that did not flout those fundamental 
rules.99
The Board did not merely interpret provisions of the Singapore Constitution 
consistently with pre-existing English common law rules of natural justice. It termed 
these rules “fundamental” and raised them to the status of constitutional principles 
by inferring their existence from the meaning of the word law in Articles 9(1) and 
12(1) of the Constitution. 
In view of the foregoing, it is submitted that the existence of important 
common law criteria, which are comparable to constitutional principles and rights in 
the United Kingdom, is consistent with written constitutions in other parts of the 
Commonwealth. In addition to such criteria being a source of principles for 
                                                   
99  Id, [1981] AC at 670–671, [1979–1980] SLR(R) at 722, [26], applied in Haw Tua Tau v Public 
Prosecutor [1982] AC 136 at 147–148, [1981–1982] SLR(R) 133 at 137, [7], PC (on appeal from 
S’pore); S Kulasingam v Commissioner of Lands, Federal Territory [1982] 1 MLJ 204 at 206 (M’sia); 
Che Ani bin Itam v Public Prosecutor [1984] 1 MLJ 113 at 114–115, FC (M’sia); Jeyaretnam Joshua 
Benjamin v Attorney-General [1987]  SLR(R) 472 at 481–482, [39], HC (S’pore); Public Prosecutor v 
Mazlan bin Maidun [1992] 3 SLR(R) 968 at 973, [15], CA (S’pore); Tan Tek Seng v Suruhanjaya 
Perkhidmatan Pendidikan [1996] 1 MLJ 261 at 282–283, CA (M’sia); Mohd bin Ahmad v Yang Di 
Pertua Majlis Daerah Jempol, Negeri Sembilan [1997] 2 MLJ 361 at 368, FC (M’sia); Public 
Prosecutor v Ottavio Quattrocchi [2003] 1 MLJ 225 at 240–241, HC (M’sia); Nguyen Tuong Van v 
Public Prosecutor [2005] 1 SLR(R) 103 at 125, [82], CA (S’pore); Lee Kwan Woh v Public Prosecutor 
[2009] 5 MLJ 301 at 315, [17], FC (M’sia). In Haw Tua Tau, id, [1982] AC at 154, [1981–1982] SLR(R) 
at 144, [26], the Court stated that “what may properly be regarded by lawyers as rules of natural 
justice change with the times”, thus departing from the view expressed in Ong Ah Chuan that only 
fundamental rules of natural justice that were part of the common law of England in operation in 
Singapore at the commencement of the Constitution could be applied into the term law in the 
Constitution. 
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construing constitutional provisions, in jurisdictions such as Singapore and Malaysia 
where certain constitutional rights are expressed only to be enjoyed by citizens,100 
important common law criteria afford to non-citizens an additional measure of 
protection compared to ordinary common law rules, since the former can only be 
overridden by unambiguous language in statutes. 
Reference was made earlier to the possibility that there may exist another 
category of ‘fundamental common law criteria’ that prevail over conflicting 
legislation, and perhaps even constitutional provisions. The existence of such legal 
principles has been postulated by some Commonwealth courts, though it may be 
significant there are currently no instances of statutes that have actually been 
overruled in this manner. In Taylor v New Zealand Poultry Board,101 Justice Robin 
Cooke commented obiter that “[s]ome common law rights presumably lie so deep 
that even Parliament could not override them”, and suggested that it would be 
beyond Parliament’s lawful powers to compel a person to answer questions using 
torture.102 Citing Taylor and other New Zealand cases, in Union Steamship Co of 
Australia Pty Ltd v King,103 a unanimous decision of the High Court of Australia, the 
possibility was left open that “the exercise of… legislative power is subject to some 
                                                   
100  Under the Singapore Constitution, Arts 12(2), 13, 14 and 16(1), only citizens are guaranteed 
the right not to be discriminated against on the ground only of religion, race, descent or place of birth 
in the appointment to any office or employment under a public authority, in the administration of 
specified laws, and in respect of education; the right to freedom of movement within the country and 
not to banished; and the rights to freedom of speech and expression, assembly and association. 
101  [1984] 1 NZLR 394, CA (NZ). 
102  Id at 398. In Westco Lagan Ltd v AG [2001] 1 NZLR 40 at [91], HC (NZ), where the 
possibility of overriding fundamental human rights was concerned McGechan J said: “I leave open, as 
should be left open in perpetuity, the possibility of extreme situations postulated from time to time by 
Lord Cooke of Thorndon.” See also New Zealand Drivers’ Association v New Zealand Road Carriers 
[1982] 1 NZLR 374 at 390, CA (NZ); Fraser v State Services Commission [1984] 1 NZLR 116 at 121, CA 
(NZ); Anne Twomey, “Fundamental Common Law Principles as Limitations upon Legislative Power” 
(2009) 9 Oxford U C’wealth LJ 47 at 49–50. Note also Jeffrey Goldsworthy’s view that judges are 
justified in disobeying “truly wicked legislation”, though this is “an extraordinary response – a remedy 
of last resort – that should be reserved for quite exceptional circumstances”: Goldsworthy, above, n 70 
at 284. 
103  (1988) 166 CLR 1, HC (Aust). 
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restraints by reference to rights deeply rooted in our democratic system of 
government and the common law”.104  
The Singapore Court of Appeal has also made obiter statements apparently 
recognizing the existence of fundamental common law criteria and their application 
to the Constitution in its 2010 judgment in Yong Vui Kong v Public Prosecutor.105 
Article 9(1) of the Singapore Constitution states: “No person shall be deprived of his 
life or personal liberty save in accordance with law.” Although in 1969 the 
Government had decided, contrary to the recommendation of a 1966 constitutional 
commission,106 against amending the Constitution to expressly prohibit torture and 
inhuman treatment, the Court of Appeal held that this did not mean an Act of 
Parliament which permits torture forms part of ‘law’ for Article 9(1) purposes.107 The 
Court pointed out that in Ong Ah Chuan,108 decided by the Privy Council in 1980 
when it was still the island nation’s final appellate court, the Board had not been 
“disposed to find that article 9(1) justifies all legislation whatever its nature”,109 and 
this statement might refer to ad hominem statutes or “legislation of so absurd or 
arbitrary a nature that it could not possibly have been contemplated by our 
constitutional framers as ‘law’ when they crafted the constitutional provisions 
protecting fundamental liberties”.110
                                                   
104  Id at 10. In Durham Holdings Pty Ltd v New South Wales (2001) 205 CLR 399 at 409–410, 
[11]–[14], a majority of the High Court (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ) held that the 
alleged right to “just” or “properly adequate” compensation upon deprivation of property was not a 
right “deeply rooted” in the United Steamship sense as to operate as a restraint upon the legislative 
power of the New South Wales Parliament. 
105  [2010] 3 SLR 489. 
106  Report of the Constitutional Commission, 1966 (Chairman: Wee Chong Jin) ([Singapore: 
Printed by Government Printer], 1966). 
107  Yong Vui Kong, above, n 105 at 524–525, [75]. 
108  Above, n 14. 
109  Id, [1981] AC at 659.  
110  Yong Vui Kong, above, n 105 at 500, [16]. This view may be contrasted with the position taken 
by the Privy Council in the earlier decision of Hinds, above, n 91 at 214. In that case, the Board noted 
that the people, acting through their elected representatives in Parliament, were entitled to alter 
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Indeed, statements of the House of Lords in R (Jackson) v Attorney-
General 111  may be consistent with the above stance. While acknowledging that 
Parliamentary supremacy is “still the general principle” 112  of the British 
Constitution, Lord Steyn expressed the view that since the principle is “a construct of 
the common law … it is not unthinkable that circumstances could arise where the 
courts may have to qualify a principle established on a different hypothesis of 
constitutionalism”. In exceptional circumstances such as an attempt to abolish 
judicial review or the ordinary role of the courts, it would be necessary for the court 
to consider if there existed fundamental common law principles that even Parliament 
could not abolish.113
A concluded view on this point is beyond the scope of this paper, but I will 
make some observations. First, if the existence of fundamental common law criteria 
is accepted, the courts will need to develop some legal test to distinguish them from 
important common law criteria that remain inferior to statutory and constitutional 
provisions. This may not be straightforward. One solution may be to dispense with 
the concept of important common law criteria, and recognize all legal rules and 
principles concerning basic rights and liberties and the structure of the legal system 
as fundamental in nature. This would mark a profound shift in the balance of power 
between the judicial and political branches. Secondly, the rejection by some cases114 
                                                                                                                                                              
constitutional provisions “whether relating to fundamental rights and freedoms or to the structure of 
government and the allocation to its various organs of legislative, executive or judicial powers”; and if 
an ordinary law conflicted with an entrenched provision of the Constitution (that is, a provision made 
more difficult to amend, such as by requiring the votes of a supermajority of the legislature or the 
approval of the electorate at a referendum), it could be “validly passed only after the Constitution has 
been amended by the method laid down by it for altering that entrenched provision”. 
111  [2006] 1 AC 262, HL. 
112  Id at 302 (original emphasis). 
113  Id at 302–303. 
114  The basic features doctrine was rejected by the Singapore High Court in Teo Soh Lung v 
Minister for Home Affairs [1989] 1 SLR(R) 461 at 475–479, [33]–[47] (applying the Malaysian 
Federal Court decision Phang Chin Hock v Public Prosecutor [1980] 1 MLJ 70); the point was left 
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of the notion, first adopted in the Indian decision Kesavananda Bharati v State of 
Kerala,115 that there exist ‘basic features’ of written constitutions unamendable by 
legislatures may have to be reconsidered. Lastly, it might be argued that it is quixotic 
for a court to invalidate statutory and constitutional provisions on the basis of 
common law criteria, since the political branches of government which have seen fit 
to enact draconian provisions are unlikely to heed such judgments, and the judiciary 
lacks the power to force compliance. It is more prudent for the court to leave such 
matters to the wisdom of the electorate at the ballot box. Such a view may be unduly 
pessimistic, though – the court’s rulings may well jolt an executive and a legislature 
that have some modicum of residual respect for the rule of law, or feel constrained by 
political factors, to back down and reverse impugned measures. And even if judicial 
decisions are ignored by the other branches of government, citizens may be 
prompted by these independent opinions to demand change from their elected 
representatives, and may ultimately rely on them at the polls when deciding whether 
to support the current government or not. 
3. The Limits of Constitutional Implications 
To recapitulate at this point, it is submitted that when a court encounters a vaguely 
worded constitutional text and does not obtain enough guidance from the linguistic 
meaning of the terms used, it must resort to construction to derive rules and 
principles from the text that will enable it to resolve disputes brought before it. In 
construing the text, a judge may draw implications from the text as well as the 
structure of the constitutional system established by the text. In addition, because 
                                                                                                                                                              
open on appeal in Teo Soh Lung v Minister for Home Affairs [1990] 1 SLR(R) 347 at 367–368, [44], 
CA. 
115  AIR 1973 SC 1461, SC (India). 
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the text is enacted on the assumption that pre-existing common law criteria that are 
consistent with it continue to apply, the court is entitled to refer to them to elucidate 
the meaning of the text. Important and fundamental common law criteria should be 
distinguished from ordinary common law rules and principles because they form the 
framework upon which the structure of the constitutional system is built. 
There may, however, be a limit to which these techniques will be of assistance. 
In certain cases, no substantive guidance can be gained from the semantic meaning 
of a term in the context of the provision in which it appears, or from common law 
criteria. It is submitted the court will have to endeavour to construct a meaning 
according to its own best understanding of the text and its objective, illuminated by a 
consideration of extratextual values justifying the concepts embodied in the text. 
Assistance can often be gained from judicial analyses of analogous terms and 
provisions in other jurisdictions. For instance, the Singapore Constitution contains 
no definition of the term equal protection of the law in Article 12(1). In order to 
apply this provision to concrete cases, the courts have applied a ‘rational nexus test’ 
– the classification employed by a statute must be founded on an intelligible 
differentia that bears a rational nexus or relation to the object sought to be achieved 
by the statute.116 To arrive at this result, the High Court in Kok Hoong Tan Dennis v 
Public Prosecutor117 applied Datuk Haji Harun bin Haji Idris v Public Prosecutor,118 
a decision of the Federal Court of Malaysia, since Article 12(1) is worded identically 
                                                   
116  Public Prosecutor v Taw Cheng Kong [1998] 2 SLR(R) 489 at 506–508, [54]–[59], CA 
(S’pore). See also Ong Ah Chuan, above, n 14, [1981] AC at 673–674, [1979–1980] SLR(R) at 725, [35] 
and [37], cited in Kok Hoong Tan Dennis v Public Prosecutor [1996] 3 SLR(R) 570 at 577–578, [32], 
HC (S’pore). 
117  Kok Hoong Tan Dennis, id at 578–579, [34]. 
118  [1977] 2 MLJ 155, FC (M’sia). 
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to Article 8(1) of the Malaysian Constitution.119 The Malaysian case had, in turn, 
relied on a number of judgments of the Supreme Court of India, including Chiranjit 
Lal v Union of India,120 which ultimately derived the rational nexus test from the 
United States Supreme Court decision Southern Railway Co v Greene.121 Another 
example is provided by the nascent right to vote which the Singapore Government 
asserts to be implied from various constitutional provisions, including those 
mandating regular Parliamentary elections.122 While it remains to be seen whether 
the courts will confirm that such a right may be implied into the text,123 if this is done 
it will be incumbent on the courts to map out the nature and scope of the right in the 
face of constitutional provisions that do not provide much assistance. They may have 
to look beyond the constitutional text and the common law to political science 
                                                   
119  Singapore’s Art 12(1) was imported into the Constitution from the Malaysian Constitution by 
the Republic of Singapore Independence Act, above, n 58, s 6(1), upon the nation’s separation from 
Malaysia in 1965. 
120  AIR 1951 SC 41, SC (India): see Datuk Haji Harun bin Haji Idris, above, n 118 at 159–160 
(cited in Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v Shri Justice S R Tendolkar AIR 1958 SC 538, SC (India)) and 
166. 
121  216 US 400 at 412 (1910), SC (US): see, for instance, Chiranjit Lal, id at 116 per Mukherjea J 
and 119 per Das J. 
122  The Singapore Constitution, Art 65(4), states that “Parliament, unless sooner dissolved, shall 
continue for 5 years from the date of its first sitting and shall then stand dissolved”, and Art 66 that 
“[t]here shall be a general election at such time, within 3 months after every dissolution of Parliament, 
as the President shall, by Proclamation in the Gazette, appoint”: see Wong Kan Seng (Minister for 
Home Affairs), “Is Voting a Privilege or a Right?”, Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report 
(16 May 2001), vol 73, col 1726 (citing the Attorney-General’s opinion on the matter); K Shanmugam 
(Minister for Law), “Head R – Ministry of Law”, Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report 
(13 February 2009), vol 85, cols 3157–3161; Thio Li-ann, “Westminster Constitutions and Implied 
Fundamental Rights: Excavating an Implicit Constitutional Right to Vote” [2009] Sing J Legal Studies 
406 at 411–414. 
123  In Taw Cheng Kong v Public Prosecutor [1998] 1 SLR(R) 78 at 102, [56], the High Court 
expressed the obiter view that the right to vote was not a constitutional right but a “privilege[ ]… 
enjoyed because the legislature chooses to confer [it]”, and thus merely an “expression[ ] of policy and 
political will”. The Singapore courts have shown great reluctance to draw implications from the 
Constitution. In Rajeevan Edakalavan v Public Prosecutor [1998] 1 SLR(R) 10 at 18–19, [21], the 
High Court declined to hold that there is a constitutional right to be informed of the right to counsel 
guaranteed by Art 9(3) because the provision is silent on this issue. It stated: “Any proposition to 
broaden the scope of the rights accorded to the accused should be addressed in the political and 
legislative arena. … If anybody has the right to decide, it is the people of Singapore.” See also Mazlan 
bin Maidun, above, n 99 at 973–974, [13]–[15], CA (S’pore); Sun Hongyu v Public Prosecutor [2005] 
2 SLR(R) 750 at 760, [34], HC (S’pore). If the courts decline to infer a right to vote from the 
Constitution, then the right will remain legally unenforceable and purely theoretical as the 
Government has indicated that it is unnecessary for the right to be expressly stated in the 
Constitution: Shanmugam, “Head R – Ministry of Law”, id. 
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theories about the role played by the franchise in a democratic system. However, as 
was mentioned in Chapter One,124 foreign legal principles – and, it is submitted, 
theories from other academic disciplines – should not simply be transplanted into 
the domestic legal system without thought having been given to whether such 
principles and theories are consonant with existing domestic rules and principles of 
law, and suited to local circumstances. 
Concern has been expressed by Thio Li-ann about the United States Supreme 
Court giving “apparently limitless reading[s]” of vague terms such as “life, liberty and 
property” in the Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution, as this “portend[s] a 
debasement of the currency of ‘rights’ insofar as any political claim can be couched as 
a right, to insulate it from political contestation”.125 She suggests that the Australian 
approach to drawing implications from the text and structure of a constitution is 
more principled.126 Yet, as was pointed out above,127 this will not be sufficient in 
certain situations. The heart of the matter is the courts’ responsibility to divine the 
meaning of the constitutional text for the purpose of applying it to concrete factual 
scenarios. The fact that the framers of the text have chosen terms such as equality 
and liberty which are highly abstract concepts indicates that they expected the courts 
to articulate the implications of these concepts in specific cases. It is eminently 
reasonable to suppose that in fulfilling their responsibility, judges have discretion to 
consider relevant legal principles and values lying outwith the text. 
The foregoing highlights the fact that constitutional construction reposes 
much discretion in the judiciary. This raises the concern that judges effectively have a 
                                                   
124  Chapter One, Pt III at 35–37. 
125  Thio, above, n 122 at 416–417. 
126  Id at 423. 
127  See the text accompanying nn 65–66. 
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free hand in permitting their personal prejudices to influence decisions. To maintain 
theoretical consistency, it does make sense for courts to articulate a framework of 
general principles that will guide their decision-making, such as the avowal in 
Footnote Four of United States v Carolene Products Company128 of the need to 
strictly scrutinize legislation restricting the fundamental liberties and political rights 
of minorities, which was taken up and built upon by subsequent United States 
Supreme Court cases. However, we have seen that where the constitution’s framers 
have crafted a broadly-worded text, it is reasonable to infer that their intention was 
to confer substantial discretion upon judges to determine how fundamental liberties 
should be applied to the circumstances of cases. Furthermore, if courts have a duty to 
uphold minority interests, we must expect some decisions to be countermajoritarian. 
This is not overreaching on the judiciary’s part; it is simply how the system is 
designed to work. The judiciary is engaged in a constitutional dialogue with the 
executive and legislative branches, 129  at least in jurisdictions where it is not 
practically impossible for the political branches to seek a constitutional amendment 
to reverse a court decision they disagree with. By this process, the meaning of the 
text is worked out and refined over time. Consequently, the exercise of judicial 
discretion in this regard should not be regarded with suspicion, but as a natural 
reflection of the co-equal participation by all branches of government in the process 
                                                   
128  304 US 144 (1938), SC (US). 
129  On constitutional dialogue generally, see Barry Friedman, “Dialogue and Judicial Review” 
(1993) 91 Mich L Rev 577; Peter W Hogg & Allison A Bushell, “The Charter Dialogue between Courts 
and Legislatures (or Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn’t Such a Bad Thing After All)” (1997) 35 
Osgoode Hall LJ 75; Kent Roach, “Constitutional, Remedial, and International Dialogues about 
Rights: The Canadian Experience” (2005) 40 Tex Int’l LJ 537; Christine Bateup, “The Dialogic 
Promise: Assessing the Normative Potential of Theories of Constitutional Dialogue” (2006) 71 Brook L 
Rev 1109. 
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of establishing constitutional principles and rules. These were points underscored in 
Chapter Two.130
III. PROPORTIONALITY 
The foregoing has suggested that when a litigant presents a plausible argument that 
an activity lies within the “liberty” guaranteed to him by the constitution, the court 
would be abdicating its responsibility if it declined to consider it because of 
uncertainty over the meaning of the term. It is submitted that a more fruitful 
approach would be to accept that the litigant’s constitutional right to liberty protects 
the activity, and go on to consider if the government has presented sufficient public 
interest reasons showing that limitations on the right are reasonable and 
proportional. 
Commentators have noted that the application of proportionality analysis in 
rights adjudication is now widespread, particularly in jurisdictions on the ‘new 
constitutionalism’ model. Many Commonwealth nations with Westminster-style 
systems belong to this model of government, the characteristics of which include (1) 
a written constitution establishing and empowering institutions of government; (2) 
ultimate power placed in the hands of the people through regular elections or 
referenda; (3) the subjection of public authority to the constitution; (4) the existence 
of a bill of rights and a judicial review system ensuring that rights are upheld; and (5) 
procedures specified in the constitution for its revision.131 Thus, in R v Oakes,132 the 
Supreme Court of Canada held that a proportionality analysis was to be applied when 
                                                   
130  Chapter Two, Pt III. 
131  Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, “Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism” 
(2008) 47 Colum J Transnat’l L 72 at 84–85. 
132  [1986] 1 SCR 103, SC (Can). The proportionality analysis has been refined in subsequent cases 
such as Irwin Toy Ltd v Quebec (Attorney General) [1989] 1 SCR 927, SC (Can); and RJR-MacDonald 
Inc v Canada [1995] 3 SCR 199, SC (Can). 
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determining if a law limiting a right guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms could be upheld under section 1 of the Charter as “reasonable” and 
“demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society”. Like Charter rights, 
Articles 8 to 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights are qualified by 
necessity clauses. For instance, Article 8(1), which protects the right to respect for 
private and family life, home and correspondence, is subject to Article 8(2) which 
sanctions the freedom being interfered with by public authorities on a number of 
specified grounds if the interference “is in accordance with the law and is necessary 
in a democratic society”. In interpreting these clauses, the European Court of Human 
Rights has employed a proportionality approach, which is evident in such cases as 
Dudgeon v United Kingdom133 which held that interference with a right cannot be 
regarded as necessary in a democratic society unless it is proportionate to a 
legitimate aim pursued by the legal restriction in question.134 When the Human 
Rights Act 1998 (UK) came into force in 2000, providing aggrieved persons with 
remedies in domestic law for breaches of Convention rights, the House of Lords 
confirmed that a proportionality analysis would be applied to necessity clauses.135
In general, adopting a proportionality approach can be said to be a four-stage 
process:136
i. First, there is a consideration of whether the government is 
legally authorized to enact the restrictive measure in question. 
                                                   
133  (1981) 4 EHRR 149, ECHR. 
134  Id at 165, [53], applying Handyside v United Kingdom (1976) 1 EHRR 737 at 754, [49], 
ECHR, and Young, James & Webster v United Kingdom (1981) 4 EHRR 38 at 56, [63], ECHR. 
135  R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] 2 AC 532 at 547, [27], HL, 
citing de Freitas v Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands and Housing 
[1999] 1 AC 69 at 80, PC (on appeal from Antigua and Barbuda). 
136  Stone Sweet & Mathews, above, n 131 at 75–76. 
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ii. Secondly, an assessment is carried out as to whether there is a 
rational relation between the means adopted in the measure and the stated 
policy objectives of the measure. This is often known as the test of suitability. 
iii. Thirdly, the measure must be found to infringe rights as 
minimally as possible. This is known as the test of necessity. 
iv. Finally, there is an examination of whether the benefits of the 
measure outweigh the costs arising from a curtailment of rights. This is often 
termed ‘proportionality in the narrow sense’. 
As might be imagined, the manner in which proportionality is applied differs from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction.137  A detailed comparison is beyond the scope of this 
chapter, which concentrates on some potential difficulties with proportionality and 
whether the approach is applicable to a Westminster-style bill of rights that does not 
expressly require courts to balance the costs of limiting fundamental liberties against 
legislative goals. 
A. DIFFICULTIES WITH PROPORTIONALITY 
Proportionality and the concept of balancing are intimately related but not 
coterminous. Balancing has been described as the process of analysing a 
constitutional issue by identifying the interests implicated by the case and reaching a 
decision by explicitly or implicitly assigning values to the interests. 138  A 
proportionality analysis differs from mere balancing in that the former requires a 
                                                   
137  For instance, it has been pointed out that the ECHR does not regard the first stage as part of 
the proportionality analysis: id at 75, n 8. The test applied by the House of Lords in Daly, above, 
n 135, omitted the first and fourth stages, and included before stage 2 a consideration of whether the 
legislative objective is sufficiently important to justify limiting a fundamental right. Arguably, this 
consideration can be regarded as part of stage 2 of the four-stage schema set out in the main text. 
138  T Alexander Aleinikoff, “Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing” (1987) 96 Yale LJ 943 at 
945. 
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judge to assess whether there is legal authorization for a restrictive measure, and its 
suitability and necessity. On the other hand, the fourth stage of proportionality 
analysis clearly involves a balancing exercise. The implication is that problems said 
to be associated with balancing affect proportionality as well. We will consider the 
supposed incommensurability of interests, and the possibility that a proportionality 
approach has the effect of devaluing rights. 
1. Incommensurability 
For two or more things to compared to each other, it is generally thought necessary 
that they are commensurable. In other words, they must be capable of being valued 
with some common yardstick or in some common currency. Commensurability is a 
key reason why the invention of money was such a groundbreaking innovation. 
Suppose I grow pineapples while my neighbour Ivy weaves cotton cloth. I would like 
to obtain fabric, and similarly Ivy would like some of my fruit. It is not impossible for 
us to agree on how many pineapples a yard of cloth is worth, for that is how bartering 
works. Nonetheless, if there exists a common currency which makes it possible for us 
to determine that a pineapple is worth a dollar and one yard of cloth two dollars, 
then it becomes easy to determine that I must give Ivy two pineapples for every yard 
of cloth she provides, and that one unit of cloth is more valuable than one unit of 
pineapples. 
It is said that one difficulty with balancing, and hence proportionality, is how 
to find a common currency with which to value the competing interests that arise in 
constitutional adjudication. The scale has to be objective and external to the judge, 
otherwise it may simply reflect his or her personal preferences on the matter. 
Unfortunately, what often happens in practice is that judges talk in terms of 
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balancing the costs and benefits of interests at stake, but in reality do not disclose the 
scale they are using, how the scale is determined, or how the interests are weighted 
and balanced against each other.139 For instance, in Attorney-General v Wain140 the 
issue arising was whether the offence of scandalizing the court, a species of contempt 
of court, was a proper restriction upon the freedom of speech and expression 
guaranteed by Article 14(1)(a) of the Singapore Constitution. The High Court 
accepted “that this court has duty to uphold the right to freedom of speech and 
expression, and… that this right must be balanced against the needs of the 
administration of justice, one of which is to protect the integrity of the courts”. 
However, without explaining how it was carrying out the balancing exercise, it went 
on to dismiss the submission that the public interest in protecting the courts’ 
integrity should prevail only in cases involving dishonest or false criticism and where 
there existed a real and present danger to the administration of justice.141 The judge 
also said the “short answer” to the respondents’ reliance on Article 14(1)(a) was 
Article 14(2)(a), which reads: “Parliament may by law impose… on the rights 
conferred by clause (1)(a)… restrictions … to provide against contempt of court…”.142
Some of the best legal minds have been brought to bear on this issue, but not 
without cogent criticism. Robert Alexy focuses on the “concrete weights” of principles, 
and expresses preference for a “triadic” scale – light, moderate and serious – for 
measuring the intensity of both a statute’s interference with a constitutional right, 
and the importance of satisfying a competing non-constitutional principle.143 If the 
                                                   
139  Id at 972–976. 
140  [1991] 1 SLR(R) 85, HC (S’pore). 
141  Id at 101, [56]. 
142  Id at 102, [59]. 
143  Robert Alexy (Julian Rivers, transl), A Theory of Constitutional Rights (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002) at 402 and 408, n 64, cited in Grégoire C N Webber, “Proportionality, 
Balancing and the Cult of Constitutional Rights Scholarship” (2010) 23 Can J L & Juris 179 at 182–
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interference with a constitutional right is deemed by the judge to be ‘serious’ but the 
importance of satisfying a competing principle ‘not important’, then the restrictive 
measure is disproportionate and unconstitutional. Conversely, if the measure 
interferes with a constitutional right in a ‘moderate’ manner but the necessity of 
satisfying a competing principle is ‘very important’, the measure is proportionate and 
constitutional. In a “stalemate situation” 144  where the interference with a 
constitutional right and the importance of a competing principle are of equal 
importance, Alexy does not accord the constitutional right any priority but submits 
that since neither enacting or not enacting the measure violates the proportionality 
principle, the court should defer to the legislature on the wisdom of the measure.145 
The importance of rights and competing interests should be assessed in relation to 
the constitution, which provides “a common point of view”.146 However, Grégoire 
Webber is not convinced. He points out that unless the constitution provides 
guidance on how to determine degrees of interference, it is unclear how any recourse 
to it assists a judge. Furthermore, what is to say that a light interference with a 
constitutional right is to be regarded as of equal weight to a competing principle of 
low importance?147 Alexy’s triadic model therefore does not really assist much in the 
identification of a common currency with which to balance competing interests. 
However, too much is made of the necessity to value interests in terms of a 
common yardstick. For one thing, different yardsticks may be applicable to the same 
constitutional issue for different purposes. A court should, for instance, consider if 
                                                                                                                                                              
184. Alexy’s triadic model is based on jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany: 
Webber, id at 182. 
144  Alexy, id at 410–411. 
145  Webber, above, n 143 at 184. 
146  Robert Alexy, “On Balancing and Subsumption: A Structural Comparison” (2003) 16 Ratio 
Iuris 433 at 442, cited in Webber, ibid. 
147  Webber, id at 195. 
 When the Text Runs Out • 301 
 
the interests proffered to it by the parties are accurately or inaccurately expressed, if 
they are logical or illogical, if they are relevant or irrelevant to the issue, and so on.148 
The crux of the matter, though, is how the court is to assess the relative strengths of 
the competing interests. Here it is important to recognize that the balancing task 
involves evaluating moral and political arguments, and thus cannot be carried out 
with mathematical precision in the way pineapples and cotton can be valued in 
monetary terms. As Webber puts it: 
To weigh or balance reasons may involve an examination of the advantages 
and disadvantages of available alternatives, but this is not to devise a common 
scale of evaluation, to assign a value, and to weigh in the technical sense. 
Rather, in holding the relevant reasons in one’s mind, one proceeds according 
to the reason that is, in one’s judgment, the most compelling and – in 
colloquial terms – one identifies that reason as the “weightier” one.149  
This is a point recognized by David Beatty: “Whether someone’s rights have 
been violated in law is not computed by some utilitarian, mathematical calculation. It 
is not about adding and subtracting people’s preferences. Nor is it a process in which 
factors are catalogued and quantified and balanced against each other.”150 Instead, 
he proposes that judges should focus on the facts of cases 151  and “assess the 
legitimacy of whatever law or regulation or ruling is before them from the 
perspective of those who reap its greatest benefits and those who stand to lose the 
most”,152 such perspectives to be drawn from the parties to the proceedings and not 
                                                   
148  John Finnis, “Commensuration and Public Reason” in Ruth Chang (ed), Incommensurability, 
Incompatibility, and Practical Reason (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1997) at 217, 
cited in Webber, id at 198. 
149  Webber, id at 197. 
150  David M Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2004) at 
171. 
151  “Facts have a certainty, predictability, and reality about them that allows for more precise 
measurement and analysis. Factual claims can be tested for how accurately they conform to an 
independent empirical world, as it actually exists.”: Beatty, id at 73. 
152  Beatty, id at 160. 
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the judges’ personal views.153 The parties’ perspectives are to be assessed against 
objective indicia. Where applicants are concerned, these indicia include how 
important the impugned governmental action is to their “larger life stories” in 
contrast to its benefits in others’ lives.154 As for the government, it is relevant to 
consider whether the rights-limiting measure has been enforced with the same rigour 
in comparable contexts.155 By adopting a party-based perspective, Beatty reasons, 
judges are able to assess issues objectively and neutrally without relying on any 
particular philosophy or moral vision.156 Nonetheless, exaggerated claims by parties 
are justifiably rejected, so courts must assess for themselves how significant the 
measure is to the parties.157
Beatty’s arguments are not without difficulty. For one thing, he overstates the 
neutrality of his approach. Some element of subjectivity is inevitably involved when a 
judge determines when a party’s claims should be regarded as overblown, and the 
importance placed by the parties on the impact a legislative measure has on them. It 
is unlikely that the parties who benefit least and most from an impugned measure 
will always happen to be before the court, which means that in order to apply 
Beatty’s approach the court will have to engage in a degree of theorizing rather than 
merely considering the facts presented by the parties.158 Despite this, it is submitted 
Beatty’s views support the point that a proportionality analysis simply cannot be 
treated as a mechanistic act of measuring up costs and benefits. 
                                                   
153  Id at 116, cited in Vicki C Jackson, “Being Proportional about Proportionality: The Ultimate 
Rule of Law. By David M Beatty. New York: Oxford University Press. 2004. Pp. 193 + xvii. $80.00 
[review article]” (2004) 21 Constitutional Commentary 803 at 811. 
154  Beatty, id at 73. 
155  Compare Beatty, id at 66–67, cited in Jackson, above, n 153 at 811. 
156  Beatty, id at 168. 
157  Beatty, id at 160. 
158  Webber, above, n 143 at 188–189; Jackson, above, n 153 at 820–825. 
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However, does our admission that moral and political arguments are not 
commensurable in the way apples and oranges are mean that proportionality is a 
recipe for inconsistencies between cases since judges are essentially to rely on their 
intuition and personal preferences? 159  Not necessarily so. Over time, as judges 
applying proportionality analyses draw analogies from past cases and a stock of 
precedents is built up, it is likely that more “constraining and categorical” rules will 
emerge.160 Here is an example. Suppose that Parliament enacts a law making it a 
crime to protest within a certain distance from Parliament House without a permit, 
which is scarcely if ever issued. Such a statute usually does not state how much 
weight a court should give to the competing interests of protecting the safety of 
legislators and Parliament property on the one hand, and freedom of expression and 
assembly on the other. Taking a proportionality approach, the court will have to 
identify the relevant competing interests of the parties and decide which are more 
important. Let us say the court finds it imperative that people should be free to 
gather and express political opinions near the seat of the state’s primary policy-
making body, and strikes down the law. It would thus have laid down a rule 
concerning the importance to be given to freedom of expression and assembly in the 
context of political communication which will be applied in subsequent comparable 
cases.161
It seems somewhat glib for Beatty to say that “[j]udges who let the facts – and 
the parties – speak for themselves usually have no problem identifying whose 
                                                   
159  Jackson, id at 836: “Case-by-case application of proportionality analysis, it might be argued, 
virtually invites ad hoc exercises of the judge’s own intuitions.” 
160  Id at 838. Later on the same page, Jackson continues: “… [P]roportionality analysis, if focused 
on a broader array of facts and institutional contexts, might lead either to the adoption of a more 
formal rule or a more contextualized standard.” 
161  The example is adapted from one provided by Adrienne Stone, “The Limits of Constitutional 
Text and Structure: Standards of Review and the Freedom of Political Communication” (1999) 23 
Melb U L Rev 668 at 702–705. 
304 • Chapter Six 
interests are paramount in any individual case. Judges know just by looking, just by 
sight, … even when precise calibrations are hard to provide.”162  Ultimately judges 
have to lay all the relevant arguments on the table and decide which ones are 
weightier – more serious – and so deserve to prevail. This is no easy task, but once 
we accept that a degree of subjectivity is an unavoidable aspect of judicial reasoning 
present in many contexts, for example, when deciding whether it is fair, just and 
reasonable to impose tort liability, and whether punishment fits the crime, the 
balancing of competing interests in constitutional cases is perhaps not vastly 
different. 
2. Devaluation of Rights 
Another difficulty with proportionality is that it is said to devalue rights. This is 
reflected to some extent in the writings of Alexy and Beatty – for instance, Beatty 
regards proportionality as “[making] the concept of rights almost irrelevant”163 while 
Alexy regards rights as no more than “prima facie requirements”.164 Essentially, the 
problem lies in the ‘cost’ of restricting a right being seen as a mere interest capable of 
being outweighed by the benefit of an opposing interest which the limiting legislation 
or administrative decision promotes. 165  Related to this is the criticism that the 
balancing engaged in by the court is essentially what legislators do before they vote to 
enact legislation, so there is little reason for the court to depart from the balance 
                                                   
162  Beatty, above, n 150 at 73, citing Jacobellis v Ohio 378 US 184 (1964). 
163  Beatty, id at 160. 
164  Alexy, above, n 143 at 57. 
165  Webber, above, n 143 at 198, who calls this “[doing] violence to the idea of a constitution”. See 
also Aleinikoff, above, n 138 at 986–987, noting that Ronald Dworkin has argued that “viewing 
constitutional rights simply as ‘interests’ that may be overcome by other non-constitutional interests 
does not accord with common understandings of the meaning of a ‘right’”: Aleinikoff, id at 987, citing 
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1977) at 194 and 269. 
 When the Text Runs Out • 305 
 
already struck by the legislature. 166  Indeed, it has been suggested that 
proportionality analysis is best regarded as enabling the political branches of 
government to play a role in determining whether rights should be limited, and 
therefore courts should adopt a standard that is “relatively deferential to the 
necessary legislative judgment. … [T]he question reviewing courts should ask is 
whether the legislative judgment that the constitutional criteria for an override have 
been satisfied in the particular context is a reasonable one, and not whether the 
judges agree with it.”167 Thus, a court should not judge a limiting measure directly, 
but “at one remove”,168 that is, it should consider whether it was reasonable for the 
legislature to have enacted the measure, and not whether the measure is itself 
reasonable.169
It is submitted, though, that when engaging in proportionality analysis in the 
course of constitutional construction, courts are not simply repeating a task best left 
to the legislature but fulfilling a crucial, independent function. The presence of a bill 
of rights implies that courts act as scrutineers, ensuring that proper regard has been 
given to fundamental rights when the restrictive measure was made. Because of their 
structural independence from the political branches, they are the appropriate branch 
of government to vouchsafe rights, particularly those asserted by minorities and 
unpopular groups.170 This being the case, when applying a proportionality approach, 
judges should not be constrained to show deference to the prior choices of the 
political branches, but ought to carry out a full evaluation of whether the restrictive 
measure in question infringes rights to an unacceptable extent. With respect, the 
                                                   
166  Aleinikoff, id at 984. 
167  Stephen Gardbaum, “A Democratic Defense of Constitutional Balancing” (2010) 4 L & Ethics 
of Hum Rts 78 at 99. 
168  Id at 103, citing United States v Lopez 514 US 549 at 616 (1995) per Breyer J (dissenting). 
169  Gardbaum, id at 103–104. 
170  Aleinikoff, above, n 138 at 984–986. 
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suggestion that courts should judge restrictive measures “at one remove” sounds very 
much like Wednesbury unreasonableness, which is not an appropriate standard for 
rights adjudication.171
To guard against inadvertent devaluation of rights, then, it is submitted that 
courts must give presumptively stronger weight to the interests sought to be 
protected by fundamental rights. This can be seen as one of the consequences of the 
presumption in favour of generosity discussed in Part I. Indeed, the third stage of the 
proportionality test seeks to achieve this. The test of necessity, by which a restrictive 
measure must be found to infringe rights as minimally as possible, requires judges to 
ensure that rights are not outweighed by any measure that may be characterized as 
‘reasonable’. However, there is a sound argument that when applying the necessity 
test courts should not insist that there is only one possible ‘least restrictive’ way of 
limiting a right, but accord some degree of deference to the executive or legislative 
body that introduced the measure because “a judge would be unimaginative indeed if 
he could not come up with something a little less ‘drastic’ or a little less ‘restrictive’ in 
almost any situation, and thereby enable himself to vote to strike legislation 
down”. 172  Peter Hogg has expressed the view that permitting such a ‘margin of 
appreciation’ is required because judges may be “unaware of the practicalities of 
designing and administering a regulatory regime, and are indifferent to 
considerations of cost”.173 Thus, the stage three test is arguably better expressed as 
requiring a measure to restrict rights “as little as is reasonably possible”. 174  To 
enable courts to apply the necessity test properly, it is for the parties praying that the 
                                                   
171  See Chapter Three, Pts I.B and II.A. 
172  Illinois Elections Board v Socialist Workers Party 440 US 173 (1979), SC (US), at 188–189 
per Blackmun J, cited in Peter W Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (5th ed) (Scarborough, Ont: 
Thomson Carswell, 2007), vol 2 at 148, § 38.11(b). 
173  Hogg, id. 
174  R v Edward Books and Art Ltd [1986] 2 SCR 713 at 772, SC (Can), per Dickson CJ. 
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restrictive measure should be upheld to adduce evidence showing that any scheme 
limiting rights less would be administratively unworkable or costly to an 
unacceptable degree. 
By the same token, to resist devaluing rights, when applying the fourth stage 
of a proportionality analysis – that is, when determining overall whether the benefits 
of a restrictive measure outweigh the costs of curtailing rights – courts must likewise 
start from the point that the measure is seeking to limit a fundamental right, which 
must be vindicated unless substantial contrary reasons have been given. Again, it is 
submitted that this is a natural consequence of the presumption in favour of 
generosity. 
B. PROPORTIONALITY AND TACITURN CONSTITUTIONS 
As we have seen, proportionality analyses have been applied by courts to bills of 
rights documents such as the Canadian Charter and the European Convention on 
Human Rights, which permit rights to be restricted only on grounds that are, for 
instance, “reasonable” and “demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society”.175 Some constitutions and bills of rights are, however, more taciturn. The 
Singapore Constitution is an exemplar. Article 14(1)(b) guarantees to citizens “the 
right to assemble peaceably and without arms”. However, Article 14(2)(b) states: 
Parliament may by law impose… on the right conferred by clause (1)(b), such 
restrictions as it considers necessary or expedient in the interest of the 
security of Singapore or any part thereof or public order. 
In Chee Siok Chin v Minister for Home Affairs,176 the High Court contrasted this 
provision with Article 19(3) of the Indian Constitution which permits the state to 
impose “reasonable restrictions” on the right to assemble in the interests of the 
                                                   
175  Canadian Charter, s 1. 
176  [2006] 1 SLR(R) 582, HC (S’pore). 
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sovereignty and integrity of India or public order.177 In view of the absence of an 
equivalent phrase from the Singapore Constitution, “there can be no questioning of 
whether the legislation is ‘reasonable’. The court’s sole task, when a constitutional 
challenge is advanced, is to ascertain whether an impugned law is within the purview 
of any of the permissible restrictions. … All that needs to be established is a nexus 
between the object of the impugned law and one of the permissible subjects 
stipulated in Art 14(2) of the Constitution.”178 Further, the Court noted that the 
phrase necessary or expedient conferred on Parliament “an extremely wide 
discretionary power and remit that permits a multifarious and multifaceted approach 
towards achieving any of the purposes specified in Art 14(2) of the Constitution. … 
The presumption of legislative constitutionality will not be lightly displaced”.179
Does the phraseology of bills of rights along the lines of Singapore’s effectively 
rule out the application of proportionality? It is submitted there are a number of 
reasons why the Chee Siok Chin approach should not be followed. First, full effect 
ought to be given to the use of the word right. In another Singapore High Court 
decision, constitutional rights were distinguished from privileges in the following 
manner: 
Constitutional rights are enjoyed because they are constitutional in nature. 
They are enjoyed as fundamental liberties – not stick-and-carrot privileges. 
To the extent that the Constitution is supreme, those rights are inalienable. 
Other privileges such as subsidies… are enjoyed because the Legislature 
chooses to confer them – these are expressions of policy and political will.180
If a ‘right’ can be overridden simply by the legislature enacting a restrictive measure, 
which is essentially what Chee Siok Chin suggested, then in reality it is more akin to a 
privilege than a right. Thus, if something is to be properly characterized as a right, 
                                                   
177  Id at 601, [45]. 
178  Id at 602–603, [49]. 
179  Id. 
180  Taw Cheng Kong v Public Prosecutor [1998] 1 SLR(R) 78 at 102, [56], HC (S’pore). 
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with the fundamentality and inalienability that entails, the court must surely be 
capable of assessing whether the right has been legitimately abridged. This is where 
the proportionality test comes to the fore. 
The foregoing is buttressed by the petitio principii argument employed by the 
Privy Council in Ong Ah Chuan. It will be recalled that the provision in question was 
Article 9(1) of the Singapore Constitution, which states: “No person shall be deprived 
of life or personal liberty save in accordance with law.” The Public Prosecutor had 
argued that since Article 2(1) defined written law as meaning, among other things, 
“all Acts… for the time being in force in Singapore”, and law as including “written 
law”, so long as a deprivation of life or liberty had been carried out in accordance 
with an Act passed validly by Parliament, it was constitutional “however arbitrary or 
contrary to fundamental rules of natural justice the provisions of such Act may be”.181 
This submission failed to impress the members of the Board, who found that it 
begged the question: 
Even on the most literalist approach to the construction of the Constitution 
this argument in their Lordships’ view involves the logical fallacy of petitio 
principii. The definition of “written law” includes provisions of Act passed by 
the Parliament of Singapore only to the extent that they are “for the time 
being in force in Singapore”; and Art 4 provides that “any law enacted by the 
Legislature after the commencement of this Constitution which is inconsistent 
with this Constitution shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void”. So the 
use of the expression “law” in Arts 9(1) and 12(1) does not, in the event of 
challenge, relieve the court of its duty to determine whether the provisions of 
an Act of Parliament passed after 16 September 1963 and relied upon to 
justify depriving a person of his life or liberty are inconsistent with the 
Constitution and consequently void.182
In similar vein, it is submitted that the statement in Article 14(2)(b) that “Parliament 
may by law impose… restrictions as it considers necessary or expedient” places on 
                                                   
181  Ong Ah Chuan, above, [1979–1980] SLR(R) at 721–722, [24], [1981] AC at 670. The Public 
Prosecutor only conceded one limitation: that the Act of Parliament had to apply equally to all to avoid 
falling foul of the anti-discriminatory provisions of Art 12(1): id. 
182  Id, [1979–1980] SLR(R) at 722, [25], [1981] AC at 670. 
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courts the responsibility of determining whether the law in question is a reasonable 
and proportionate restriction on the right to assemble peaceably, and cannot be read 
as carte blanche for Parliament to impose any sort of arbitrary restriction. 
Singapore courts have on numerous occasions emphasized the need to balance 
fundamental rights against competing interests. 183  The 1991 decision Wain was 
mentioned earlier in this regard.184 It is submitted that the courts do themselves a 
disservice if they repeat this mantra, yet fail to adequately examine whether the 
rights in issue have been justifiably displaced by proportionate measures. 
CONCLUSION 
This Chapter has attempted to show that when the text of a constitution or a bill of 
rights ‘runs out’ – that is, when ascertainment of the text’s linguistic or clause 
meaning does not yield a useful or complete legal rule applicable to an issue that has 
arisen for resolution – the court must proceed on to constitutional construction. This 
involves the application of various legal principles and techniques to transform the 
clause meaning of the text into enforceable rules. We looked first at the presumption 
in favour of generosity, finding it to be justified by the fundamental nature of 
constitutional and bill of rights texts and the fact that textual interpretations that are 
overly restrictive should be avoided since the principles set out in constitutional texts 
are intended to endure largely unchanged for extended periods and to apply to 
circumstances not foreseen by their framers. It was submitted that the presumption 
is useful as a tiebreaker when competing concerns are equally balanced. 
                                                   
183  See, for instance, Lee Kuan Yew v Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin [1990] 1 SLR(R) 709 at 732, 
[46], HC; Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v Lee Kuan Yew [1992] 1 SLR(R) 791 at 817–818, [61], CA; 
Jasbir Singh v Public Prosecutor [1994] 1 SLR(R) 782 at 799, [46], CA; Attorney-General v Lingle 
[1995] 1 SLR(R) 199 at 203–204, [11], HC; Chee Siok Chin, above, n 176 at 619, [96]; Review 
Publishing Co Ltd v Lee Hsien Loong [2010] 1 SLR 52 at 176–179, [267]–[274], CA; and Attorney-
General v Shadrake [2011] 2 SLR 445 at 474, [56]–[57], HC. 
184  See the text accompanying nn 140–142, above. 
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Next, there was a consideration of how constitutional implications can aid 
the articulation of legal rules. As the text is the starting point and focus for all 
constitutional interpretation and construction, it is appropriate to draw implications 
from the text itself as well as its structure. Furthermore, where provisions of the text 
can be construed to rest on the existence of certain common law rules and principles 
not explicitly set out in the text, the court acts within its powers when it articulates 
these criteria and draws legal conclusions from them. Courts throughout the 
Commonwealth have done so on numerous occasions. The cases referred to in the 
preceding paragraphs give credence, it is submitted, to the suggestion that important 
common law criteria should be regarded as a category of legal criteria intermediate 
between ordinary common law criteria and statutory criteria. If a court finds that the 
constitutional text necessarily requires the application of a particular important 
common law criterion – whether this relates to basic rights and liberties, or to 
structural aspects of the legal order such as the rule of law and the separation of 
powers – it becomes embodied in the text and should then be treated as on par with 
constitutional principles. A connected issue beyond the scope of this work is whether 
the court may rely on fundamental common law criteria to invalidate statutory and 
constitutional provisions. 
Finally, it was suggested that where the techniques referred to above do not 
provide enough help to the court in applying a constitutional provision, it is more 
fruitful for the court to accept that the activity which an applicant wishes to engage in 
falls within the scope of a particular right, and to then apply a proportionality 
analysis to determine whether the government has a legitimate interest in restricting 
the right. While the manner of application of proportionality differs among 
jurisdictions, four steps are typically involved: (1) a determination that the 
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government has legal authority to enact the restrictive measure in question: (2) a 
suitability test that establishes whether the means adopted in the measure and the 
policy objectives of the measure are linked by a rational relationship; (3) a necessity 
test that requires the measure to restrict rights as minimally as is reasonably possible 
in the circumstances; and (4) a balancing exercise in which the benefits of the 
restrictive measure are compared against the costs arising from the curtailment of 
rights. It was submitted that though balancing is criticized because an overarching 
metric for assigning value to competing interests is lacking, it must be recognized 
that the moral and political reasoning that constitutional adjudication involves 
cannot be carried out in a rigid mathematical fashion. In addition, the concern that 
proportionality leads to a devaluation of rights may be countered by consciously 
giving stronger weight to rights during the third and fourth stages of the 
proportionality analysis. This can be regarded as a specific application of the 
presumption in favour of generosity.  
This account of constitutional construction and the enunciation of 
constitutional rules confers a fair degree of discretion on the courts. Judges are 
entitled, in proper cases, to identify common law criteria as important and to 
promote them to the level of constitutional principles such that they prevail over 
ordinary legislation. Legal criteria found to be fundamental in nature may even be 
superior to constitutional provisions and purported attempts to amend the 
constitution. Similarly, judges have leeway in applying proportionality and 
determining whether a restrictive measure should prevail against a fundamental 
liberty. It is submitted that this should be regarded as a strength and not a 
shortcoming of the system of constitutional adjudication in Commonwealth 
jurisdictions. The discretion accorded to the judiciary enables it to express 
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independent, considered views on key issues of the day, engaging the political 
branches of government in a constitutional dialogue. 
 
 
C O N C L U S I O N  
 
THIS DISSERTATION aims to identify the approach that courts in Commonwealth 
jurisdictions might take when ascertaining the meanings of terms and provisions of 
constitutions and bills of rights, in order to apply them to factual scenarios. 
Particular difficulty is created by taciturn constitutions – texts that express concepts 
at high levels of abstraction and thus do not provide much guidance to judges. It is 
submitted that, despite some views to the contrary, the starting point is still correctly 
regarded as the establishment of the legislative intention underlying the text. This is 
neither some mystical aggregation of individual legislators’ actual intents nor their 
acquiescence to the intent of the promoter of the bill that led to the enacted text, but 
is best regarded as the legislators’ joint adoption of the intent manifested in the text 
as it is reasonably understood by the courts. Adopting this conception of legislative 
intention avoids the problems associated with trying to discern what the legislators 
‘actually’ understood the text to mean, as well as the fact that reliance on an 
unexpressed intent undermines the constitutional principle that Parliament can only 
express its will through the enactment of legislation.1
The preferred conception may be called moderate originalism. It is a form of 
originalism as it requires the ascertainment of the meaning the legislators imbued 
the text with through their choice of words at the time the constitution was enacted. 
However, the originalism is moderate because it is recognized that parts of the text 
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may be interpreted dynamically where legislators have used language that connotes 
abstract moral principles. Depending on contemporary situations and values, this 
may require the court to hold that the text should be interpreted differently from how 
the legislators who enacted it might have done, or that it should be applied to a 
certain fact situation in a different manner.2
Constitutional interpretation and constitutional construction are distinct 
processes. Interpretation involves identifying the semantic content of a 
constitutional text. However, such content only contributes towards the content of 
constitutional law and does not fully determine it. At the end of the day, courts derive 
rules of constitutional law through a process of construction. Where interpretation is 
concerned, it is submitted that courts should consider the linguistic, purposive and 
applicative meanings of constitutional terms and provisions. A term’s linguistic 
meaning is composed of semantic and pragmatic aspects. Semantic meaning is most 
often the natural and ordinary grammatical meaning that a reasonable person would 
understand a term to possess. As for pragmatic meaning, it has been said that an 
interpreter’s task is to ascertain the ‘clause meaning’ of a term – the ordinary and 
conventional public meaning that the term would have had to its intended audience 
when it came into force as law. This requires an appreciation of the term’s context 
which, in particular, includes the purpose of the provision it appears in. Clause 
meaning is also shaped by the use of terms of art, implications and stipulations in the 
text, as well as potential applications of the provision in which the constitutional 
term appears foreseen by the legislators enacting it.3
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One vexing issue that judges have to grapple with is how a term should be 
understood when its conventional meaning has changed over time, or when the court 
is invited to apply a provision to a scenario not existing in the framers’ era. It is 
submitted that the clause meaning of a term or provision should be regarded as fixed 
at the time of its framing, since the intent behind the enactment of a statute is to 
create binding legal rules and communicate them to present and future generations 
of administrators, lawmakers, judges, and the public at large. Barring specific 
evidence to the contrary, it is unlikely that the framers intended to confer on judges 
the discretion to ignore the message they were trying to convey. Conversely, the 
applicative meaning of terms and provisions is not frozen as at the time of framing, 
especially where the legislature has expressed itself in terms embodying abstract 
concepts which are left undefined. The reasonable conclusion is that the framers 
intended to leave it to the courts to determine how such terms and provisions should 
be applied on a case-by-case basis.4
There will be instances, however, where the text ‘runs out’ – where 
ascertaining the clause meaning of the text does not yield any useful or complete 
legal rule that applies to an issue that has arisen for resolution. It is submitted that 
the court must then move on from constitutional interpretation to constitutional 
construction, and transform the clause meaning of the text into enforceable rules by 
applying various legal principles and techniques. These include the presumption in 
favour of generosity, which may act as a tiebreaker where competing concerns are 
equally balanced; and the use of constitutional implications. The latter include 
implications from the text and its structure, as well as from common law rules and 
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principles such as basic rights and liberties, and principles relating to structural 
aspects of the legal order like the rule of law and separation of powers. Where the 
liberties in a bill of rights are made expressly subject to restrictions that may be 
imposed by the legislature, the court has a duty to ascertain whether such restrictions 
are legitimately imposed. It is submitted that this duty exists even where the bill of 
rights is taciturn, in that there is no express language requiring the court to assess 
the reasonableness of the restrictions. The court should fulfil its responsibility in this 
regard by applying a proportionality analysis.5 Thus, any constitutional ‘silence’ is in 
fact not so silent after all, as it may be given voice by the court. 
Whether it is appropriate for the judiciary to be playing the role envisaged 
above is an issue that continues to excite controversy. It might be argued, for 
instance, that if a bill of rights simply states that a right may be curtailed through 
legislation, a judge steps beyond his bounds if he assesses the reasonableness or 
necessity for such legislation. While the three branches of government have an equal 
and independent duty to interpret bills of rights and constitutions, it is submitted 
that the judiciary enjoys interpretive supremacy – only it may issue interpretations of 
the basic text that the political branches are bound to adhere to. Suggestions that the 
courts act ‘undemocratically’ are to be rejected, because such arguments undermine 
the very basis of constitutional judicial review, which requires a judiciary having the 
independence to decide in the face of majority option where warranted. Moreover, 
democracy is more than mere majority rule, and must encompass respect for the 
fundamental rights of minorities.6
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Because the judiciary has a crucial responsibility to ensure that executive 
actions and laws are consistent with constitutionally guaranteed rights, courts must 
be cautious not to apply a doctrine of deference towards the political branches in a 
manner tantamount to an abdication of their obligation. There is an appropriate 
sphere within which deference may operate, but it ought not to function as a non-
justiciability doctrine that bars judges from even entering upon constitutional issues 
brought to the courts.7
If the political branches disagree with a particular judicial interpretation of the 
bill of rights, their recourse lies in seeking a constitutional amendment and not in 
refusing to give effect to the judgment. This will ensure that the issue is debated in 
Parliament, and is brought to the electorate’s attention. The relationship between the 
judiciary and the political branches is thus best conceptualized as a dialogue, a 
collaborative effort that enables the meaning of the bill of rights to be developed and 
refined.8
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